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Joshua Preston Miller: Democracy and Judgment in Ancient Greek Political Thought 
(Under the Direction of Susan Bickford) 
This dissertation examines practical and ethical dimensions of democratic political 
judgment in the works of Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle. Despite their philosophical and 
methodological differences, each of these thinkers raised similar doubts about the wisdom of 
fifth- and fourth-century Athenian decision-making. Arguing that Athenian policy debates 
tended to privilege short-term gains over longer-term interests, they suggested that moral 
reflection might guide political judgments toward more ethically sustainable ends. By showing 
how Greek political philosophy developed in response to real-world political problems, I 
demonstrate a dialectical relationship between theory and practice that is often overlooked in the 
scholarship surrounding these figures. This project also contributes to ongoing debates that 
depict political judgment as a practice open to radically democratic debate, on one hand, or 
reserved for the rarified talents of experts, on the other. In my view, sound political judgment 
emerges from careful considerations that all citizens are capable of, provided they commit 
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meetings 2012 and 2016, respectively. I would like to thank my discussants and the attendees at 
each conference for their lively questions and helpful suggestions. Informal exchanges about the 
Greeks with Amanda Barnes-Cook, Liz Markovits and Matt Weidenfeld were deeply valuable 
often my most enjoyable. I would also like to thank my students at UNC Chapel Hill, UNC 
Wilmington, UNC Charlotte, and Elon University. They didn’t know it at the time, but their 
thoughts on Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia and Plato’s metaphysics buoyed my spirits and 
kept me laughing long enough to finish some especially tough sections. 
 Most importantly, I would like to acknowledge the deep emotional and intellectual 
support I received from my family while writing this dissertation. Gary, Angela and Tyler Turner 
welcomed me into their family just as I was starting this project. In equal measure, their hard 
work and joie de vivre reminded me daily to appreciate the important things in life and to strive 
for them. Thanks, too, for the beer. My parents, Paula and Julian Miller, deserve higher praises 
than I can sing. Our winding conversations, covering everything from the politics of higher 
education to anyone-but-Hamilton’s chances for an F1 title, pulled me from my desk long 
enough to remember who I was. More importantly, they taught me that ethical values emerge 
from ceaseless reflection rather than from implicit faith in shallow dogmas. This dissertation is, 
above all, my best effort to follow their example. 
 My wife, Katie Turner, deserves her own paragraph. If I am right to argue that good 
judgment requires critical understanding and cultivated foresight, Katie is the best judge I know. 
The only person to read every chapter at least twice, she often saw my arguments more clearly 
than I and offered invaluable suggestions for articulating them. Indeed, this project would be 
twice as long and half as good without her incisive mind and patient help. She is the philosopher-
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 On October 8, 2016, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump met for a town hall-style debate 
at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. Days earlier, an audio recording from 2005 was 
released in which Trump bragged about sexually assaulting women. Eager to deflect attention 
from his comments, Trump attacked his opponent’s foreign policy judgment. “Yes, I’m very 
embarrassed by it,” he replied when asked about the tape, “But it’s locker room talk, and it’s one 
of those things. [But] I will knock the hell out of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. We’re 
going to defeat ISIS. ISIS happened a number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of 
bad judgment.” He later expanded on this charge, “[Clinton] has made bad judgments not only 
on taxes, she’s made bad judgments on Libya, on Syria, on Iraq.” Trump was not the first to 
criticize the former Secretary of State on these terms. In April, Senator Bernie Sanders 
questioned Clinton’s judgment during a bruising primary campaign for the Democratic Party’s 
presidential nomination. “In many respects, she may have the experience to be president of the 
United States,” he conceded during an interview on NBC’s Meet the Press. “But,” he continued, 
“in terms of her judgment, something is clearly lacking.”  
Questioning a political rival’s judgment strikes to the heart of a quality that most people 
think their leaders should have. In a series of public opinion polls taken between 1995 and 2003, 
the Pew Research Center found that voters ranked sound judgment as the most important quality 
a presidential hopeful should possess, followed closely by high ethical standards.1 Attacking an 
                                                 
1 Pew Research Center (2003: 12).  
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opponent’s judgment has the added benefit of vagueness. What do voters mean when they praise 
a leader’s sound judgment? Is sound judgment equivalent to effective decision-making? If so, 
effective to what end? Moreover, what relevant features distinguish good judgment from bad? In 
many respects, these questions are difficult to answer because judgment is so pervasive. As 
Albert Camus succinctly put it in The Rebel, “To breathe is to judge.”2 A life devoid of choices 
was, for him, unimaginable. Ronald Beiner makes a similar observation in his groundbreaking 
work, Political Judgment. “We are constantly forming judgments,” he writes, “Every perception, 
every observation, every situation of ourselves in the world, the very awareness of our own 
subjectivity, involves judgment. The exercise of this faculty encompasses every aspect of our 
experience.”3 “In judging,” he writes later, “we as judging subjects attempt to determine, as best 
we may, who we are, what we want, and how we realize our ends.”4 Understood this way, 
explaining judgment is akin to explaining water to a fish. It becomes, in Leslie Paul Thiele’s 
words, an “integrative and admittedly mysterious skill.”5     
Judgment resists easy theorization in part because it appears to include varying parts 
rational calculation, practical experience, and ethical reflection. As Isaiah Berlin put it, judging 
well requires “weaving together” these disparate and often conflicting components such that 
considered action becomes possible.6 It is also a concept with many names. Scholars often refer 
to the same quality as “judgment,” “prudence,” “political judgment,” “practical judgment,” 
                                                 
2 Camus (1956: 8).  
 
3 Beiner (1983: 6).  
 
4 Beiner (1983: 145). 
 
5 Theile (2006: 5). 
 
6 Berlin (1997: 31). 
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“practical wisdom,” “decision-making,” and “choosing,” often, as here, interchangeably. For 
many contemporary democratic theorists, Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis captures the quality 
best. This may be understood as an action- and goal-oriented activity of the mind that, while 
guided by character virtues and rational considerations, “takes place in the absence of formal 
rules and methods.”7 Phronēsis as “practical wisdom” also nicely captures the relationship 
between moral judgments about right and wrong, political judgments about justice and 
expedience, and practical judgments about feasibility that are often bundled together into the 
same activity. 
More ambitious writers than I have attempted to fully account for judgment in a single 
work. As I explain in greater detail below, some historians of political thought like Beiner and 
Peter Steinberger trace the concept’s development from Aristotle through Hannah Arendt. Others 
have recognized how questions of judgment traverse disciplinary lines. For example, Thiele’s 
excellent study, The Heart of Judgment, combines insights from the history of political thought 
with contemporary findings in neuroscience to better understand how narrative shapes cognition 
and decision-making.8 My aims are slightly more modest in this dissertation. I examine the 
ethical and practical dimensions of judgment in three ancient Greek thinkers – Thucydides, 
Plato, and Aristotle – each of whom developed different but, I argue, complementary accounts of 
judgment. I frame these thinkers’ political works as partial response to deficiencies that each 
identified in fifth and fourth century Athenian political judgment. All three figures, despite their 
differences, thought that ethical considerations would improve Athenian decision-making. 
                                                 
7 Markovits (2008: 9). 
 
8 Theile (2006).  
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Though different theories of justice, leadership, and politics divide them, all three share an 
interest in seeing ethical theory applied to practical life through judgment.     
Like us, the Greeks had a rich vocabulary to describe judgment. In addition to Aristotle’s 
phronēsis – which Plato sometimes uses differently – they also used gnomē, which could mean 
“thought” or “foresight,” euboulia, which could mean “deliberating well” but is often translated 
as “good judgment,” doxa, which translates as “belief” or “common opinion” but also correlates 
to “judgment” as opposed to epistēmē, or “knowledge.” As we shall see in chapter 4, Aristotle 
also reserved the word politikē to describe “legislative science” as a subset of phronēsis. Each of 
these terms refers to an act of thinking or deciding in the absence of certainty. The thinkers I 
consider here each thought that careful considerations of virtue, particularly justice, could help to 
orient Athenian judgments about a variety of pressing political concerns ranging from foreign 
policy to leadership selection. By making decisions on the basis of how well a given policy or 
leader would maximize justice, judgments would remain uncertain but aim toward the proper 
target.       
Before elaborating further on my argument, I believe it will be useful to situate my 
project within the broader literature concerning judgment. Even when confined to questions of 
politics, the subject of judgment remains vast. If we follow Beiner, who insists that “every 
contact we have with the political world” activates our capacity for judgment, we see that 
judging is what we do when we read the newspaper, discuss politics, or watch presidential 
debates.9 Precisely because it constitutes so much of our social activity, the subject has attracted 
attention from political scientists interested in an array of fields from foreign policy to social 
                                                 
9 Beiner (1983: 8). 
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psychology. Writing on foreign-policy, for example, the social scientist Perri 6 presents us with a 
dense catalogue of instances in which leaders rely on their political judgment: 
Political judgment…describes the weighted mix of thought styles through which 
politicians and their advisers determine whether they face a condition or a problem; 
understand and misunderstand their allies and opponents, classify their problems, options 
(if any) and conflicting imperatives; understand circumstance, causation, constraint or 
opportunity; recognize possible instruments; select analogies; construe risks; become 
willing to bear some risks but not others; conceive linkages between issues; relate reasons 
for action to goals for policy; and do or do not risk medium- or long-range anticipation, 
and in detail or only in outline.10 
For 6, political judgment is an essentially cognitive task that improves or declines depending on 
how accurately decision-makers perceive their reality and consider the choices available to them. 
As his case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates, however, an individual’s access to that 
information is, at best, sharply delimited by incomplete information about how other actors 
perceive the same events. This assessment accords with what Arie Kruglanski, a social 
psychologist, calls the “lay epistemic model” of political judgment, according to which 
“hypotheses are constructed from the individual’s available world knowledge.”11 Because the 
relevant information comprising the “world knowledge” upon which judgments are made is 
always incomplete, Kruglanski encourages decision-makers to remain open to the possibility that 
their judgments will be subject to later revision as more information becomes known.  
 By acknowledging that political judgments are limited by the information that decision-
makers have at their disposal, 6 and Kruglanski raise the question of how we might fairly judge 
another person’s judgment. As Kruglanski notes, we often assess judgments based on external 
criteria – such as the decision’s consequences – that were not available to decision-makers at the 
moment they took action. Because judging a judgment with the benefit of hindsight is not 
                                                 
10 6 (2011: 2). 
 
11 Kruglanski (1992: 459). 
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especially fair, he suggests that we assess judgments based on the information decision-makers 
had when they chose to act, as well as upon the decision-maker’s competence, intentions, and 
state of mind.12 Other social psychologists, most notably Philip Tetlock, share this perspective. 
In his empirical study of expert political judgment, Tetlock suggests that good judges should 
pass two types of tests: “correspondence tests” might assess how well private beliefs map on to 
the publicly observable world, and “coherence tests” might measure the internal consistency of 
beliefs.13 Following his framework, decision-makers can improve their judgment by frequently 
comparing their perceptions of the world with new information as it becomes available. As he 
puts it,  
Good judges are good belief updaters who follow through on the logical implications of 
reputational bets that pit their favorite explanations against alternatives: if I declare that x 
is .2 likely if my ‘theory’ is right and .8 likely if yours is right, and x occurs, I ‘owe’ 
some belief change.14  
Like Kruglanski, Tetlock encourages decision-makers to cultivate a strong sense of humility 
when making policy choices. Their humility should extend to an awareness of how affective 
factors like temperament, mood, and stress can influence their judgment. A wealth of research 
into how emotions shape perceptions of reality suggests that anger and stress encourage us to 
weigh recently acquired information more heavily in our judgments than other long-standing 
                                                 
12 Kruglanski (1992: 465). 
 
13 Tetlock (2005: 6-15). Through a crowdsourcing venture he calls the Good Judgment Project, Tetlock has tested 
his theory by asking participants to predict the outcome of world events along with measures of confidence and 
written explanations that justify their predictions. Though I find that Tetlock often conflates judgment with 
prediction, his effort to understand the reasons that support predictions alerts us to a relevant distinction between 
wise decision-makers and their lucky counterparts.     
  




beliefs, regardless of the new information’s accuracy.15 In moments of crisis, the last voice, not 
necessarily the wisest, often rings the loudest. 
These inquiries helpfully underscore the value of social scientific research for political 
practice. Such efforts are especially important for democracies, which (ideally) empower citizens 
to thoughtfully and meaningfully make decisions about public policy. To the extent that all 
democratic citizens are invited to participate in political judgment, all should share an equal 
interest in improving their ability to do so. Yet by focusing on how decision-making might be 
more or less cognitively taxing, the studies described above remain largely silent on ethical 
questions (e.g. Is this goal just? Is this right thing to do?) that I consider relevant to the 
distinction between good and bad political judgment. Turning toward political theory and 
philosophy can provide insights into how we might negotiate such questions. 
Thanks in part to Beiner’s own work, contemporary students of judgment may no longer 
agree with his claim that there is “strictly speaking, no ‘literature’ on the concept of political 
judgment.”16 As many have noted, and as I argue in this dissertation, questions of judgment have 
been relevant for political theorists and philosophers since the Peloponnesian War. Most 
theorists who are interested in judgment trace the history of the concept primarily through the 
works of three major thinkers: Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and Hannah Arendt. With a slight nod 
to Plato, contemporary scholars like Beiner, Theile, Steinberger, and Bryan Garsten, all of whom 
have written eloquently on judgment, begin their studies with careful attention to Aristotle’s 
account of phronēsis. I take up Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis toward the end of this dissertation 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Etheredge (1992); Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000); Neuman, et al (2007). 
 
16 Beiner (1983: 5). 
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in chapter 4. Before elaborating on his work and its relation to Plato and Thucydides, I turn 
briefly to Kant and Arendt. 
In the first section of his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant defines judgment as an 
a priori legislative faculty of the mind. It is, in other words, the cognitive faculty that allows us 
to make sense of the world and to act freely within it. Kant then distinguishes between two 
varieties of judgment: 
The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained 
under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the 
power of judgment, which subsumed the particular under it…is determining. If however, 
only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of 
judgment is merely reflecting.17 
     
Unlike determining judgments, for which universal rules or principles are already given, 
reflective judgments resemble aesthetic judgments of taste. When I encounter a particular object 
for which I have no prior concept (e.g. an attractive bowl) but for which I would like to have a 
universal concept not given by experience (e.g. beauty), I must consider the element within the 
particular bowl that gives me pleasure before arriving at the judgment, “This bowl is beautiful.” 
That is, I judge a particular bowl as beautiful despite not having a prior, universally recognized 
conception of beauty. Steinberger describes this reflective process as an “adventure in free 
thinking,” explaining that such judgments do not “rely on a rationally grounded and explicitly 
justified calculus or method.”18 Nevertheless, when I declare that the bowl is beautiful I still 
expect others to agree with me. My expectation that others will share my appreciation for the 
bowl is only possible, however, if I also recognize that a common or communal sense (sensus 
communis) is also possible: 
                                                 
17 Kant (2000: 66). 
 
18 Steinberger (1993: 282).  
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By “sensus communis,” however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., 
a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way 
of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as 
a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that 
could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. 
Now this happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the 
merely possible judgments of others, and putting himself into the position of everyone 
else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that contingently attach to our own 
judgment; which is in turn accomplished by leaving out as far as is possible everything in 
one’s representational state that is matter, i.e., sensation, and attending solely to the 
formal peculiarities of his representation or his representational state.19  
Appeals to common sense are appeals to shared judgments. If my judgment of the bowl’s beauty 
rests entirely on the sentimental fact that my friend Gaines made it for me, I should not expect 
others to agree with my assessment of its beauty for that reason alone. Yet by imagining myself 
viewing the bowl from another’s perspective – perhaps from the standpoint of someone who 
does not know my potter friend Gaines – I form a judgment of its beauty that I can explain to 
others and expect them to understand and accept. In other words, I am rendering the kinds of 
judgments that, by virtue of common sense, I should expect others to validate. No longer 
understood as merely subjective expressions of individual taste, the conclusions reached through 
reflective judgment are reasonable and, importantly, socially shared. By practicing reflective 
judgment in this way, I cultivate what Kant calls an “enlarged mentality,” or a critical capacity 
for considering other actual and possible viewpoints when judging particulars for which no 
universal law or category is given.20  
 Kant’s insights into the communal quality of reflective judgment gain more explicitly 
political force through Arendt’s interpretation of his work. According to her reading of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant’s notion of the enlarged mentality and its role in 
                                                 
19 Kant ([1790] 2000: 173-174). 
 
20 Kant ([1790] 2000: 175). 
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judgment amounted to the discovery of “an entirely new human faculty” that made inter-
subjective judgment possible.21 Noting that none of Kant’s three primary philosophical questions 
– What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? – were addressed in his expressly 
political works, she turned to his account of reflective judgment as a model for political 
deliberation. Much as Kant’s aesthetic judge might imagine multiple perspectives or opinions of 
a particular bowl before declaring it beautiful, Arendt’s deliberative actor considers a matter of 
public policy from the perspectives of others in her community. This is not a practice of 
empathy, nor does considering other viewpoints demand that the judge abandon her own 
perspective.22 It is, instead, a critical practice through which she learns to think beyond the 
prejudices and doctrines she has inherited. For Arendt, the goal of such political discourse, 
unlike philosophical argument, is not to arrive at truth but rather to persuade one’s peers that 
one’s judgments are sound and should be shared.23 By persuading others and being persuaded in 
turn, we enlarge our mentalities in politically relevant ways.  
Arendt thought political judgment was challenging yet possible for everyone. As she put 
it in her essay “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” “If the ability to tell right from wrong 
should have anything to do with the ability to think, then we must be able to ‘demand’ its 
exercise in every sane person no matter how erudite or ignorant, how intelligent or stupid he may 
prove to be.”24 For her, Adolf Eichmann was capable of treating others inhumanely because he 
refused to seriously reflect on the immorality of the Holocaust and to fully comprehend his role 
within it. Recalling Kant’s quip, “Stupidity leads to a wicked heart,” Arendt closes the essay with 
                                                 
21 Arendt (1982: 10). 
 
22 Arendt (1982: 43). 
 
23 Arendt (1982: 42-43). See Beiner (1983: 17); Zerilli (2005: 170). 
 
24 Arendt (2003: 164). 
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a study of Socrates, a figure who shielded others from the dangers of refusing to think. Though I 
sometimes depart from Arendt’s interpretation of Plato, I find her egalitarian notion that all 
people are capable of thoughtful judgment compelling. I also share her sense that we all need 
periodic reminders to take our judgments seriously.  
Arendt provides a rich account of political judgment that remains attractive to democratic 
decision-making today. In this project, however, I follow her interest in Socrates by turning to 
the accounts of judgment developed by Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. There are several good 
reasons for doing so. Though we are far removed in time and space from the direct democracy of 
fifth and fourth-century Athens, each of these three raised questions about the quality of 
democratic judgment that continue to resonate. Though none were as hostile to democracy as is 
often alleged, all criticized the Athenians for too often pursuing short-term material gains at the 
expense of thoughtful and ethical policy goals. From the beginning of the Peloponnesian War 
through to the radical democracy of Aristotle’s day, the Athenians consistently allowed their 
insatiable desire for greater wealth, glory, and influence (pleonexia) to drive their private and 
political decision-making. Doing so undermined their city first by stoking unsustainable imperial 
expansion and later by rendering the city’s population susceptible to demagoguery and class 
conflict. I argue that restoring Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle’s political works to this historical 
context reveals ways in which their ethical thought developed in reaction to this persistent 
problem.  
Studying decision-making in ancient Greece also helps us reflect on the challenges that 
arise from the account of judgment I described at the beginning of this introduction. 
Understanding political judgment as a balance between practical considerations and justice raises 
a host of political and philosophical questions that each of these thinkers explore across a variety 
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of genres. Thucydides’ historical narrative of the Peloponnesian War dramatizes the difficult 
choices that political actors make when confronted with privation, civil conflict, and the erosion 
of ethical norms. Plato’s Socratic dialogues likewise capture moments of despair and frustration 
as young men struggle to define a just way of life. Aristotle’s works clarify the many dangers 
that unjust income inequality and the rhetorical manipulation of judgment. In short, studying 
judgment through these thinkers, unlike through Kant, allows us frequent glimpses into the 
practical and ethical challenges of judging well in the real world.  
Finally, for all their differences, Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle understood political 
theory as inseparable from political practice. Just as the behavioral studies described above could 
improve political judgment by suggesting ways of optimizing cognitive resources, political 
theory can improve democratic decision-making by offering insights into how we decide 
between competing goals. Ethical reflection can improve judgment in two ways. First, a 
thoughtful account of justice can provide a more stable standard against which to judge a given 
policy or leader. Other considerations like expedience or advantage are largely determined by 
luck and tend to present themselves as short-term gains. Striving for justice, by contrast, is a 
longer-term goal, the consideration of which encourages citizens to cultivate other qualities like 
moderation and foresight. Second, ethical principles can direct judgment by setting parameters 
against unacceptable behavior. As I show in chapter 1, Athenian foreign policy abandoned the 
norms that structured Greek foreign affairs, alarming rivals and subject cities alike. Had the city 
tempered her expansionist impulses and respected the conventional notion of justice Thucydides 
endorses, Periclean Athens may have avoided war with Sparta. My treatments of Plato and 
Aristotle also highlight their efforts to align Athenian material interests with ethical principles.  
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The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 explores competing 
models of political judgment in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War by comparing 
Athenian decision-making to that of the Spartan commander Brasidas. I argue that the so-called 
Athenian Thesis disregarded justice as a relevant consideration in foreign policymaking, leading 
the city to pursue a strategy of unrestrained expansion that alienated her allies. By contrast, 
Brasidas pursues strategies that, while imperfect in their own right, hew more closely to 
traditional Greek values. By treating enemies as potential friends, he not only undermines 
Athenian strategy but demonstrates the instrumental value of taking ethics seriously in political 
judgment. Chapter 2 is the first of two chapters on Plato’s approach to judgment. Through 
readings of the Apology, Theaetetus, and Protagoras dialogues, the chapter traces two lines of 
criticism against Athenian democratic judgment. Plato worries that the democratic assembly 
reduces decision-making to a series of unstable hedonic calculations of short-term pleasure and 
pain while abandoning longer-term concerns for virtue. He also criticizes the influence of 
sophistry among the city’s elite. Taken together, Plato depicts Athenian decision-making as a 
haphazard and irrational process that has come unmoored from normative values that might 
guide public deliberation. Chapter 3 follows the last by concentrating on the relationship between 
justice, experience, and judgment in Plato’s Republic. Here, Plato offers a model of judgment 
that replaces hedonism with justice – understood as psychic harmony – as its guiding end, 
thereby rationalizing decision-making. Contrary to most interpretations of the philosopher-
statesman model as “hyper-rational” and hopelessly idealistic, I argue that Plato includes 
experience with actual political practice in the guardians’ pedagogy in order to enhance their 
own welfare and the wellbeing of the kallipolis. By joining virtue with experience, his 
philosopher-statesman practices a more just political judgment than the Athenians of Plato’s day. 
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My final chapter turns to Aristotle, whose Nicomachean Ethics and Politics develop an account 
of practical wisdom combining virtues of character with a grasp of both universal eudaimonia 
and sensitivity to particulars in the exercise of deliberative decision-making. Noting Aristotle’s 
concern with the threat that factional demagogues posed to democratic regimes, I argue that 
Aristotle prescribes institutional measures that both ameliorate the underlying material sources of 
stasis and cultivate citizen phronēsis. While few citizens will ever achieve the manifold qualities 
of the politikos, the majority can nevertheless play an important role in the selection and 
assessment of officials. By incorporating the average citizen’s judgment in these decisions, 
Aristotle cultivates their rational faculties while establishing a bulwark against demagogic 
rhetoric. I conclude with some brief reflections on the value of reading these thinkers together 
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CHAPTER 1: HATING FRIENDS AND LOVING ENEMIES 
Thucydides was exiled from Athens after losing Amphipolis to the Spartan commander 
Brasidas in 423 BCE. He made good use of his time abroad. By spending the first seven years of 
the Peloponnesian War serving Athens and the next twenty among her enemies, he was uniquely 
positioned to document the conflict from multiple perspectives. Thucydides began composing his 
History as soon as the war began with the expectation that his narrative would teach future 
generations about lasting features of political behavior.1 Yet because the History’s lessons are 
more often subtle than explicit – rendered as art rather than treatise – contemporary readers 
continue to ask themselves what, exactly, we are to learn from it. In this chapter, I argue that 
Thucydides provides an account of political judgment that gives good instrumental and strategic 
reasons for taking justice seriously. By setting parameters around acceptable and unacceptable 
action, considerations of justice guide strategic choices toward more sustainable ends. We also 
see, through his depiction of Brasidas, how concerns for justice are balanced against practical 
limitations amid the uncertainty of war. 
My emphasis on the balance between justice and expedience in Thucydides’ account of 
judgment is not universally shared. Classical realists instead interpret the History as an amoral 
                                                 
1 Though I adopt the conventional title History, all citations are from Jeremy Mynott’s translation of The War of the 
Peloponnesians and the Athenians throughout unless otherwise noted. Thucydides expected the war between the 
Athenians and the Spartans to exceed the violence of the Persian Wars for two reasons: first, all of the major 
belligerents were at the acme of their powers “in a full state of military readiness”; second, he recognized early on 
that the complex alliance structures between the major combatants had bifurcated the “the rest of the Greek world” 
into opposing camps (1.1.3). 
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account of power in the high politics of war.2 From their perspective, reflective deliberation and 
considerations of justice were luxuries that imperial Athens simply could not afford in 431. The 
upshot of this “Athenian thesis” is that while justice might be important for domestic politics, 
states nevertheless subordinate ethics to necessity in foreign affairs.3 This position is best 
summarized by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue: 
You understand as well as we do that in the human sphere judgments about justice are 
relevant only between those with an equal power to enforce it, and that the possibilities 
are defined by what the strong do and the weak accept. (4.89) 
 
Hans J. Morgenthau alludes to this sentiment when ranking Thucydides among the first rational 
students of political behavior.4 J.B. Bury concurs, telling us that the History is “written from a 
purely intellectual standpoint, unencumbered with platitudes and moral judgments,” while 
G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, contrasting Thucydides with the patriotic idealists of his day, describes 
him as a “complete and ruthless realist.”5 For George Cawkwell, Thucydides’ rationalist 
worldview and ardent imperialism deeply informed his theory of political judgment.6 Noting the 
historian’s obituary for Themistocles, whose judgment Thucydides praises, Cawkwell deduces a 
sharply delimited range of decisions that individual statesmen can make: 
[He] commended Themistocles’ judgment, his very great ability quickly to decide what 
had to be done (ta deonta). That is the tell-tale phrase; there is nothing about his purposes 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Kagan (1969); Meiggs (1972); de Romilly (1979). 
 
3 The Athenian envoy to Sparta is the first to articulate the thesis, e.g. 1.75.3-5, 1.76.5. It is repeated with slight 
variation by both Pericles (2.63) and Cleon (3.37) in their addresses before the assembly. As Orwin (1986: 77-78) 
puts it, “The justice that cities invoke is spurious, precisely because each invokes it only against the others…Justice 
is praiseworthy, and particularly so in rulers. The impeccably just city, however, would abstain from ruling other 
cities. On these two points the Athenians think as others do. Where they differ is in asserting that cities labor under 
three natural compulsions to rule to the limits of their strength…To be praised are those who exercise their unjust 
rule as justly as possible; to refrain from exercising it is not possible.”  
 
4 Morgenthau (1954: 8). For thorough reviews of realist interpretations of Thucydides, see Doyle (1990); Rahe 
(1995); Freyberg-Inan (2004: 19-35). 
 
5 Bury (1975: 252); de Ste. Croix (1972: 12). 
 
6 Cawkwell (1997: 6, 96). Cf. Podoksik (2006). 
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and his choice of ends, but simply his ability to decide on the necessary steps. That is, for 
Thucydides, there is only one course open and the best statesman is the man who best 
discerns it. Consistently with this, in the speeches in the Histories, it is never the 
balancing of justice and advantage, always purely the calculation of advantage. That is 
how he thinks statesmen really think.7 
Like others who read Thucydides as a strict realist, Cawkwell dismisses appeals to ethical norms 
as mere window-dressing for the zero-sum power politics depicted in the History. In essence, 
Thucydidean judgments are concerned exclusively with “how wisely or unwisely statesmen 
might be supposed really to think about the maintaining and extending of power.”8 “Behind all 
the rhetoric and fine pretensions,” Cawkwell concludes, “states ‘have no friends, only interests’ 
and statesmen are good and bad in so far as they reckon on those interests well or badly.”9 
Contemporary neorealists, most notably Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin, turn attention 
to how the international system’s anarchic structure informs the behavior of state actors.10 For 
them, the Peloponnesian War’s “truest pretext” (alēthestatēn prophasin) – Spartan fear of 
Athenian ambition – speaks to the international system’s anarchic nature and the struggles for 
hegemony it precipitates.11 Political morality is not only weak in their view, but altogether 
irrelevant to understanding political behavior. Instead, Gilpin encourages us to consult the 
History for insights into how power transitions from declining leaders to rising upstarts unsettles 
fragile interstate stability. Ascribing a systemic theory of international relations to the historian, 
                                                 
7 Cawkwell (1997: 5).  
 
8 Cawkwell (1997: 19). Pouncey (1980: 11) is more generous, arguing that, for Thucydides, “the real test of the great 
statesman, as of the great general, is how he keeps his people together under pressure.” This standard allows for a 
finer grained distinction between laudable statesmen like Pericles, a paragon of selflessness, and Alcibiades, the 




10 See, e.g., Waltz (1979); Gilpin (1986, 1988); Jervis (1988); Copeland (2000: 210-211). 
 
11 History 1.23.6   
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Gilpin writes, “Thucydides believed that he had found the true causes of the Peloponnesian War, 
and by implication of systemic change, in the phenomenon of the uneven growth of power 
among the dominant states in the system.”12 Neorealists praise Thucydides above all for his 
parsimonious explanation of an apparently complex phenomenon. By pathologizing war and 
diagnosing conflict as a symptom of structural fluctuations in the distribution of power, 
Thucydides imparts a theoretical framework through which we can understand as much about the 
Cold War as about the Peloponnesian War. Arthur Eckstein challenges these conclusions on the 
basis that most are grounded in English translations of 1.23.5-6 that, upon closer examination of 
the Greek, do not support the neorealist assertion as strongly as they claim.13 Sparta was not 
threatened by Athenian power (dunamis) or desire for empire (archē), but was instead compelled 
(anankasai) by the Athenians to wage war. For all of his criticism of Gilpin, however, Eckstein 
nevertheless arrives at much the same conclusion. Unlike other Greek and Roman historians, 
“who usually privileged human psychology as the crucial causative variable” of political change, 
Eckstein insists that Thucydides was primarily interested in the “interstate structure of power as 
the crucial causative variable” of war.14 Though he grants that Thucydides’ consideration of 
                                                 
12 Gilpin (1988: 596). 
 
13 Eckstein (2003: 759-760). Eckstein prefers Sealy’s translation (1975: 92), which reads:  
As to why they broke the treaty, I have written down first the complaints and the disputes, so that no one 
may ever inquire whence so great a war arose among the Greeks. Now the most genuine cause, though least 
spoken of, was this: it was the Athenians, in my opinion, as they were growing great and furnishing an 
occasion of fear to the Lacedaemonians, who compelled the latter to go to war. But the complaints of each 
side, spoken of openly, were the following, complaints which led the parties to break the treaty and enter a 
state of war. 
Unlike the Warner (1972) or Crawley-Wick (1982) translations, Sealy emphasizes fear (phobos) and compulsion 
(anankē) as the causes of war. Mynott’s translation of the relevant text reads: “I consider the truest cause, though the 
one least openly stated, to be this: the Athenians were becoming powerful and inspired fear (phobon) in the Spartans 
and so forced them into war (anankasai es to polemein).” 
 
14 Eckstein (2003: 772, 774). Cf. Westlake (1968: 7), who contends that Thucydides “takes care to impress upon his 
readers that the character of a leading figure might influence events very profoundly.” Westlake’s reference to 




individual decision-making and human psychology present a more richly complex narrative than 
Gilpin’s emphasis on elegance might have us believe, Thucydides was ultimately a systems-level 
thinker.  
Critics complain that by situating the History within the logic of Realpolitik, realists and 
neorealists alike are either methodologically anachronistic or too quick to dismiss its author’s 
ethical concerns.15 Noticing tensions between language (logos) and action (praxis), many instead 
frame the work as a commentary on the erosion of traditional polis ethics. James Boyd White, for 
example, depicts a deteriorating “culture of argument” in Greece throughout the war, showing 
how Athenian military ambitions fomented political disruptions that “the language of this 
community could not contain or manage.”16 He identifies a two-fold challenge to traditional 
linkages between normative principles and political behavior throughout the History. On an 
interstate level, the conventional language of diplomacy – emphasizing nominal equality and 
autonomy among cities – could not restrain the boundless ambitions of an imperial power whose 
growth subordinated neighboring cities to her will.17 On a domestic level, White suggests that 
Athens abandoned meaningful democratic discourse once she rejected a traditional normative 
vocabulary with which to articulate her policies. “The problem is not that Athens is self-
interested,” he writes, “but that she is unwilling, or unable, to speak the language of justification 
that constitutes her community.”18 In other words, once the Athenians reject ethical norms in 
                                                 
15 For methodological critiques, see, e.g., Garst (1989); Bagby (1994); Welch (2003); Monten (2006). On 
neorealism’s inattention to morality, see Ahrensdorf (1997); Williams (1998). 
 
16 White (1984: 84). 
 
17 This point is well supported by the Nottingham Oath Project, which records 269 oaths (horkoi) in the History, few 
of which successfully bound participants to the norms they pronounced. Insofar as these oaths articulated the 
language of the inter-polis community White identifies, their weakening influence over policy indicates a 
disjuncture between promise and action. See Lateiner (2012: 174).  
  
18 White (1984: 88). 
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their foreign policy decisions they simultaneously deny themselves the normative resources that 
might help them justify their strategic choices even to themselves.19 White’s reading foregrounds 
the erosion of ethical norms as a central theme of Thucydidean political thought. If such norms 
were as unimportant as many realists claim, their distortion would not likely have featured so 
prominently throughout the work.20 White also approaches the realist depiction of Thucydidean 
political judgment from a different angle. For him, Thucydides is lamenting, not praising, the 
Athenian neglect of ethical claims in decision-making, suggesting that political judgment ought 
to have reflected respect for conventional norms.       
Similar critics examine tensions between justice (dikaiosynē) and necessity (anagkaion) 
in the History as a means of charting the “limits of political life.”21 In one study of the text, 
Martin Ostwald attempts to steer a middle course between those who read Thucydides as a 
“hard-nosed exponent of Realpolitik” and those who find him “a compassionate observer of the 
human condition and the forces to which it is exposed.”22 Conceding the difficulty of ascribing a 
particular moral or political theory to Thucydides, Ostwald nevertheless maintains that he 
gestures toward a model of “morally desirable conduct in relations between states” that reveals 
his conservative attitude toward polis life.23 To the extent that the History is a tragedy, Ostwald 
                                                 
 
19 For similar arguments see, e.g., Edmunds (1975a); Saxonhouse (1978); Williams (1998); Kokaz (2001). 
 
20 See Rahe (1995) for a similar argument. 
 
21 Orwin (1994: 5). 
 
22 Ostwald (1988: 56). 
 
23 Ostwald (1988: 53-61) argues that evidence of Thucydides’ moralism is best gleaned through examples in which 
actors are sufficiently free from the pressures of ananke to make choices that reflect considered beliefs about 
choiceworthy lives. Through negative examples, such as the Corcyraean stasis, Thucydides dramatizes the moral 
breakdown of civil life in vivid detail in order to make a point about free choices and those made by necessity: while 
many choices are made under apparently free conditions, the consequences of those decisions may generate dire 
conditions which make ethical practice nearly impossible. Also see Edmunds (1975b: 74, 82).  
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contends that it is so only because Thucydides recognizes that necessity (anankē) “will always 
ride roughshod over human judgments of right and wrong.”24 Clifford Orwin is unsatisfied with 
Ostwald’s conclusion. He maintains that the Athenian thesis Ostwald builds his analysis upon is 
but one argument among many comprising the broader conversation of the text, and we should 
not mistake it for one that its author found wholly convincing. For Orwin, Thucydides does not 
set morality and necessity in opposition to each other so much as he presents a view of humanity 
striving – though ultimately failing – to reconcile each with the other, all the while finding itself 
hopelessly subjected to the whims of fortune (tuchē).25 The History is not tragic because 
necessity overwhelms virtue, but rather because fortune overwhelms all human planning on a 
scale that none of its main actors can accept.26  
Despite their differences, each of these interpretations conclude that Thucydides took a 
rather dim view of human agency. Whether he thought that our choices are constrained by our 
resources and talents, determined by needs that we must satisfy, dictated by the decisions of 
others, or contingent upon the whims of an ominous unknown, all seem to agree that Thucydides 
tells a deterministic story of individual lives brought low by forces beyond their control or 
comprehension. Thucydides may have rejected Homer’s gods, but not his view of man. As Peter 
Pouncey puts it, “For Thucydides, to moralize about human nature is to be pessimistic about 
it.”27 Insofar as ethical and moral theory presuppose a degree of human agency, both to make 
                                                 
24 Ostwald (1988: 61). 
 
25 Orwin (1994: 203). Cf. Edmunds (1975a).  
  
26 Orwin (1994: 194). Also see Burns (2011: 515), who demonstrates not only that the Spartans were more 
constrained by internal and foreign pressures but also that Brasidas, a most uncharacteristically active Spartan, best 
represents the regime through his self-delusions regarding his own justice and manifest hypocrisy. 
 
27 Pouncey (1980: 22).  
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free decisions about how to live as well as to act on those decisions with meaningful efficacy, 
one might consider Thucydides a poor source for considerations of political judgments that take 
ethics seriously. I challenge that conclusion in this chapter by insisting that ethical reflection was 
not only important for Thucydidean political thought but central to the historian’s account of 
good political judgment.    
Thucydides worried that his fellow Athenians were poorly equipped to make sound 
judgments prior to and during the Peloponnesian War.28 Following Thomas Hobbes, many 
commentators attribute poor Athenian judgment to the city’s democratic constitution: 
For his opinion touching the government of the state [Athens], it is manifest that he least 
of all liked the democracy. And upon divers occasions he noteth the emulation and 
contention of the demagogues for reputation and glory of wit; with their crossing of each 
other’s counsels, to the damage of the public; the inconsistency of resolutions, caused by 
the diversity of ends and power of rhetoric in the orators; and the desperate actions 
undertaken upon the flattering advice of such as desired to attain, or to hold what they 
had attained, of authority and sway amongst the common people.29  
Whether because of democrats’ capriciousness, zeal, or gullibility, Hobbes considered Athenians 
incapable of consistently rational decision-making. His remarks contribute to a long-standing 
consensus that post-Periclean Athenian democracy was misled by statesmen of inferior 
judgment.30 For Thucydides, the Hobbesian argument goes, democracies are as likely to punish 
                                                 
28 This theme has been prominent in the secondary literature. See, e.g., Strauss (1964); de Romilly (1979); Orwin 
(1989); Cawkwell (1997); Reeve (1999); Frank (2007); Zumbrunnen (2008). 
 
29 Hobbes (1723: xvi-xvii). He adds that while individual Athenians may have been chastened by fear, the assembly 
was never capable of admitting any unease about the city’s strength. “By this means,” he continues, “it came to pass 
amongst the Athenians, who thought they were able to do anything, that wicked men and flatterers drave them 
headlong into those actions that were to ruin them; and the good men either durst not oppose, or if they did, undid 
themselves” (xvi). 
 
30 Leo Strauss (1964: 153) extends this argument, stressing that Athenian democracy relied upon the wise and honest 
counsel of statesmen like Themistocles and Pericles, without which it was likely to err. He concludes that even the 
Periclean regime was inferior to its Spartan counterpart insofar as it was only as great as its “first man.” Josiah Ober 
(1998: 78) concurs, arguing that Thucydides’ “implicit lesson” is thus that “democratic knowledge does not provide 
an adequate grounding for assessing the truth-value of rhetorical discourse.” By extrapolating from the idiosyncratic 
Athenian case, Ober overstates the degree to which we ought to regard Thucydides as a critic of democracy as such. 
According to Strauss’s reading, moreover, Periclean Athens functioned less as a democracy and more as a kingship 
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as praise wise counsel because citizens cannot distinguish between wisdom and folly. The 
Athenians’ democratic empire functioned best when it functioned least as a democracy and most 
as an empire.  
Hobbes is certainly right to note Thucydides’ criticism of the creeping selfishness and 
myopic factionalism that took hold of post-Periclean Athens. Yet while critiques of democracy 
echo throughout the History (2.65.5-10), I argue that elitist depictions of Thucydides are 
nevertheless exaggerated. Whatever the historian’s attitude toward the democracy that exiled 
him, regime type alone does not explain the Athenians’ poor judgment. After all, theirs was not 
the only polis to make decisions via assembly, and their democratic counterparts in Syracuse 
fared well at the end of the war. Moreover, we should resist the urge to lay all blame for 
Athenian failure at the feet of Cleon and others like him. Doing so not only renders a complex 
argument too facile, but also overlooks the point that Athens did not merely lose the war but that 
others won crucial victories of their own. The History offers a master course in poor political 
judgment, but it also delivers examples of better judgment in the process. In short, Hobbes may 
have been more pessimistic about political life than was Thucydides.31 
 Rather than ascribing the failure of Athenian political judgment to a congenital defect of 
democracy, I follow White by locating the city’s poor decision-making in the assembly’s 
disregard for ethical norms.32 Like other fifth-century Greeks in the wake of the Persian Wars, 
                                                 
with nominally democratic undertones. This position stands in marked contrast to the same period Aristotle 
describes in the Constitution of Athens (1984 [1920]: §27), which insists that Periclean Athens “became still more 
democratic” by limiting some privileges of the Areopagus Council and turning “the policy of the state in the 
direction of sea power, which caused the masses to acquire confidence in themselves and consequently to take the 
constitution more and more into their own hands.”   
 
31 Cf. Pouncey (1980: 151-158).  
 
32 This is not to suggest that Athens’ opponents were paragons of moral excellence. One of the great values of 
Thucydides’ narrative is that he resists reducing politics to contests between the good and the evil, the wise and the 
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the Athenians tirelessly extolled their autonomy and gravely feared domination.33 On 
Themistocles’ advice they established a thalassocracy, or naval empire, over the Aegean in a bid 
to protect their own freedom at the expense of their coastal and island neighbors (1.18).34 
Crucially, they consistently justified their imperial policy in the name of necessity born of 
freedom, sustained through victory, and driven by fear.35 Though quick to congratulate 
themselves for their moderate treatment of subject states, justice never figured into their imperial 
calculations. Justice was no more relevant to their decision to maintain the empire than it was to 
their decision to defend themselves against invasion; indeed, Pericles often treated them as one 
in the same (1.143.5, 2.62.3).36 As he succinctly described their position in his final address to 
the city, Athens held her empire “like a tyranny, which it [seemed] unjust to take (labeīn mēn 
adīkon) but dangerous to let go of” (2.63.2). Yet by reducing political life to a zero-sum 
confrontation between the empire and the world, the language of necessity proved incapable of 
                                                 
foolish, etc. Though much of my argument departs from Heilke’s (2004: 121-123) reading, I think he correctly 
praises the value of narrative for its capacity to relate a complex image of politics resistant to nomothetic 
theorization.   
 
33 The democratic ethos of Athenian politics surely contributed to the city’s strong attachment to freedom. As 
Aristotle would later observe, freedom (eleutheria) constitutes the end of democratic government (Pol. 1290b1-5, 
1294a11). For Thucydides, the moderate imperialism under Pericles also boasted of enough wealth and stability that 
external threats were less worrisome than internal miscalculations (1.144.1). The more extreme democratic factions 
that took hold of the city after Pericles’ death, led by Cleon, made external threats a staple of the rhetoric 
Thucydides records.  
 
34 The Athenians were not alone in ruling other Greeks, but Thucydides is clear that the vigor with which they 
expanded their reach had no historic parallel. Far from considering imperialism a shameful enterprise, however, the 
Athenians thought it perfectly natural. As the city’s envoy to Sparta put it before the war, “there is nothing 
remarkable or contrary to normal human behavior in what we have done, just because we accepted an empire when 
one was offered and then declined to let it go, overcome by these strongest of all motives – honor, fear and self-
interest” (1.76.2). Moreover, they point out, the Spartans maintain hegemonic influence over the Peloponnesus and 
would, if similarly situated, treat their subjects equally harshly. Indeed, as their envoy to Melos puts it, the 
Athenians would look enticingly weak and fearful to their opponents if they did not continually expand (5.97).  
 
35 Though de Romilly (1979: 69, 251-253) attributes Athenian imperialism more to the city’s desire for glory than to 
fear of conquest, she also recognizes that the city’s thalassocratic strategy and dependence on external trade 
rendered Athens vulnerable. 
 
36 Besides, no other city “ever let that consideration stop them getting an advantage when presented with an 
opportunity to gain something by force” (1.76.2).  
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articulating an evaluative framework by which free decision-making was possible. The assembly 
did not judge policies based on whether they thought them good or bad, right or wrong, but 
exclusively based on whether they seemed immediately necessary or expedient. Exclusive focus 
on expedience weakened Athenian political judgment in at least two related ways. First, 
decision-makers were deprived of any normative ends – apart from glory and survival – toward 
which they could direct policies and against which they could assess them. Second, by failing to 
define or limit the concept of advantage, the language of expedience was unable to contain 
tendencies toward hubristic over-reaching (pleonexia) that eventually defined the fifth-century 
empire. In short, Athenian political judgment lacked direction and clarity because the city 
rejected the premise that justice mattered in foreign policy.   
Like the philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle discussed in later chapters, 
Thucydides’ History critiques the Athenian approach to political judgment. The work’s 
corrective wisdom suggests an alternative account of judgment that balances moral reflection 
with practical experience and affective intelligence.37 As noted above, good judgment for 
Thucydides emerges when considerations of justice establish parameters within which strategic 
decisions are made about an uncertain future. Like Ostwald, I do not read Thucydides as a 
strictly “compassionate observer of the human condition,” but rather as a thinker who, contra 
Cawkwell’s interpretation, investigates the difficult balance between moral and practical 
demands on political life. I argue that his depiction of Brasidas captures this balance by offering 
good instrumental and strategic reasons for taking justice seriously. Realists who interpret the 
History as a description of power politics overlook this insight into moral reflection as a practical 
                                                 
37 I define “affective intelligence” as a sensitivity to the ways in which emotions inform how we interpret the 




exercise.38 Likewise, critics who emphasize Thucydides’ ethical concerns risk presenting his 
work as a requiem for the intrinsic worth of justice without paying sufficient attention to its 
instrumental value. By examining morality as a material feature of good judgment, then, the 
historian teaches his audience a lesson in practical ethics.  
As will become clearer in later chapters, Thucydides also demonstrates the limits of 
traditional virtues for guiding political behavior in an increasingly volatile state of affairs. Polis-
centric conceptions of courage, piety, moderation, and justice greatly valued self-sacrifice as a 
means of engendering trust among members of shared communities. The Peloponnesian War, 
marked more by the normalization of factional conflict (stasis) than by the heroic sort captured 
in Herodotus’ account of the Persian Wars or in the Homeric poetry that set the artistocratic tone 
for Greek value judgments, signaled a collapse of that system.39 The political philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle emerges as a rehabilitation of ethical practice in the wake of the crisis Thucydides 
documents. In other words, ancient Greek political philosophy emerged, in part, as an effort to 
provide new foundations for political morality in a world that had violently renounced its 
traditions.      
I focus my analysis in this chapter on political judgments pertaining to friendship and 
enmity. For the Greeks’ deeply polarized culture, the friend/enemy distinction was, as P.J. 
Rhodes puts it, “a basic moral principle of determining behavior.”40 We see, for instance, that the 
                                                 
38 Cf. Burns (2011: 510) who distinguishes his study of Brasidas from Heilke’s and other realists by taking issue 
with their distinction between actions motivated by self-interest, on the one hand, and those motivated by virtue on 
the other. I think both Burns and Heilke are mistaken insofar as Thucydides is interested in how the teleological 
conception of excellence required of ancient Greek ethics ought to shape what actors consider self-interest.     
 
39 On Homer’s role in framing the main issues that emerge in Greek ethics, particularly the tension between heroic 
excellence (aretē) and human flourishing (eudaimonia), see Smith (2001). 
 
40 Rhodes (1996: 11). Rhodes further notes that the domestic debates between competing advisors (e.g., Nicias and 
Alcibiades) frequently exhibit a personal as well as political dimension (22-25). Polemarchus’ definition of justice 
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Corcyraeans appeal to friendship duties alongside promises of material gain in their diplomatic 
appeals for Athenian military aid prior to the war. The Egestans cleverly spin the same 
arguments with equal effect when they seduce the Athenians into waging the Sicilian expedition 
more than fifteen years later. The Corinthians in turn use similar language, albeit without the 
promise of material advantage, to galvanize Sparta against Athens.41 The edict to help friends 
and harm enemies constituted an operable, if under-theorized, principle of justice throughout the 
war that motivated some actions while prohibiting others. Political judgments therefore ought to 
have taken seriously questions about what a city owed to her allies and how best to resist her 
enemies. Most importantly, this definition of justice provided those who took it seriously with a 
normative goal toward which they could direct policy decisions. Unlike the Athenians, who were 
motivated by a pleonectic desire for greater glory and influence for its own sake, actors who 
applied this understanding of justice to strategic judgments produced more prudent and coherent 
policies.42  
                                                 
as “benefiting one’s friends and harming one’s enemies” in Plato’s Republic (334b-d) articulates an ethical position 
with which Thucydides’ contemporaries would have been familiar. Though the historian never formulates the 
principle in exactly those words, it is prevalent throughout his text. See Finley (1983); Ober (1989); Frank (2007); 
Cartledge (2009). 
41 When appealing for aid in their conflict with Corinth, the Corcyraean delegation claims that Athens will not only 
benefit militarily by securing a well-armed and grateful ally, but firstly “because [they] will be helping those who 
are being treated unjustly” (1.33.1). They clarify their definition of justice by anticipating Corinthian resistance: 
“And if they say it is not right of you to receive their colonies as allies, they ought to know that every colony honors 
the mother city when it is treated properly but is alienated when treated unjustly; colonists are not sent out to be the 
slaves of those who stay behind but their equals” (1.34.1). The Corinthians also define genuine alliances in terms of 
equality, saying first that justice cannot regulate relations between cities when one has an advantage over the other 
(1.39.1).  
 
42 On the role that pleonexia, the irrational and insatiable desire for greater wealth and glory, played in Athenian 
decision-making, see Frank (2007). As I argue below, the Corcyraean and Egestan envoys to Athens really do use 
the language of justice as rhetorical pretensions of the kind Cawkwell describes. I also argue, however, that envoys 
to Sparta and characters like Brasidas are more earnest in their commitments to justice, and that this is a defining 




Readers might dismiss this definition of justice for its inadequacies, citing Socrates’ 
exchange with Polemarchus in Plato’s Republic for evidence of its difficult application and 
potentially perverse outcomes.43 I share those reservations. Indeed, the History is dense with 
examples of friends failing to recognize each other, actors unwittingly helping their adversaries, 
and atrocious violence perpetrated in the name of honor by actors on all sides. Its narrow focus 
generates some of the most theoretically rich contradictions in the text. How, for example, can 
Thucydides praise Brasidas for his justice while admitting that the Spartan won converts through 
“seductive but misleading assertions” about his military effectiveness and popularity (4.108.5)? 
A second potential criticism is that, pace realist interpretations of the text, none of the 
purportedly ethical actors in the narrative were actually motivated by moral commitments. One 
might object, for example, that the Spartans limited the scope of their imperial ambitions only 
because they worried that stretching their fighting force too thinly would invite helot revolts at 
home. Indeed, Thucydides documents episodes of Spartan brutality that should disabuse readers 
of any notion that Lacedaemonian conduct was milder or more humane than that of the 
Athenians. Yet the historian also presents the Spartans – at least in this period – as a community 
whose conservative piety rendered them more sensitive to shame than their Athenian 
counterparts. Allies like Corinth and leaders like Sthenelaidas successfully appealed to Spartan 
conceptions of justice and honor as they shamed them into action (see esp. 1.68.3, 1.71.1-6, 1.86; 
cf. 7.89-93). Similar efforts to persuade Athenian judgment relied more heavily on appeals to 
material interest and were framed more in terms of expedience than in the language of duty or 
obligation.44 In sum, though we certainly see exceptions on all sides, Athenians were on balance 
                                                 
43 See Chapter 3 for my own treatment of this exchange. 
 
44 Though I think Malcolm Heath (1990) overstates his case when he insists that the Athenians were the only ones to 
consistently reject normative demands in their decision-making, I agree that the Athenian position is startling not so 
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less concerned with observing conventional notions of justice than were their adversaries 
precisely because they did not consider such notions appropriate for foreign policy decisions.   
By demonstrating how good judgments must combine elements of idealism and realism, 
practical experience and theoretical guidance, Thucydides offers a vision of political ethics that 
not only challenged fifth-century Athenian tyranny but which also remains useful today. My aim 
is to highlight that vein in his work. I do so by reading the specific named characters in the 
narrative as figures who model different styles of judgment for Thucydides’ readers.45 Insofar as 
Thucydides’ immediate audience were fellow Athenians, I suggest that these figures serve to 
mirror or challenge the democratic assembly’s own decision-making procedures.46 Though any 
audience of would-be decision-makers could surely benefit from studying Thucydides’ narrative, 
I argue that it was of particular importance to the democracy. No other regime type so fully 
embraced individual judgments about collective welfare as fourth century Athenian democracy. 
Challenging the people (hoi polloi) to effectively discern better from worse policies was and 
remains of great political urgency. By developing this claim, I am not suggesting that 
Thucydides espouses a systematic account of good political judgment such as we might hope to 
find in Aristotle’s work. Previous studies of his narrative style convincingly suggest, however, 
                                                 
much for its silence on questions of justice but more for its explicit rejection of all considerations of justice in 
deliberations.  
 
45 I should stress that while characters model certain attitudes, they are not themselves models as such. It would be 
too facile, for example, to flatten Pericles into a stand-in for imperialism or to regard Brasidas as a selfless liberator 
of Greece. The History is not, in my view, an allegory.   
 
46 Hornblower (1995) argues that, while Thucydides was never as popular as Herodotus with fourth century 
audiences, his influence was nevertheless strongly felt among Athenians who were sufficiently educated to follow 




that his depictions of different characters and their interactions can yield insights into his 
theoretical project.47 I adopt that approach here.  
In the following sections I contrast Athenian political judgments with those made by the 
Spartan general Brasidas. By demonstrating their differences with respect to friendship and 
enmity as both ethical and strategic categories, I highlight Thucydides’ distinction between better 
and worse judgment. I begin by offering a treatment of Periclean judgment as an approach to 
decision-making based on imperial maintenance and control. The following sections focus on the 
Mytilenean and Sicilian debates, two episodes that establish a pattern of systematic misjudgment 
on the part of the Athenian assembly. Each of these episodes depict more extreme variants of 
imperialism whose emphasis on expansion break from the Periclean model in the degree of their 
ambition, but are not of an altogether different kind. The fourth section turns to an example of 
better judgment in the characterization of Brasidas. His example suggests that an ethical attitude 
toward potential enemies and allies has a material impact on the course of the war. Most 
importantly, Brasidas demonstrates that taking justice seriously can free decision-makers from 
the sense of fear and necessity that blinkered the Athenian assembly and ultimately undid the 
empire. I conclude with thoughts on how Thucydides’ study can help contemporary thinkers and 
practitioners understand good political judgment.    
1.1 The Periclean Paradigm 
Pericles occupies a preeminent position in the first two books of the History. Thucydides 
credits him with establishing the halcyon period before the war as well as with crafting Athenian 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Pearson (1947); Orwin (1989); Heilke (2004). Whereas Strauss (1964) and de Romilly (1979) attempt to 
recover Thucydides’ political philosophy from the judgments he makes in his own name, I locate it in the examples 
he provides throughout the text. 
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strategy for the conflict once he deemed it imminent (2.65.5). He was well regarded for his 
confident judgment (gnomē), his moderate temper (sophrosynē) and especially for his rhetorical 
talents.48 His commanding oratory was well suited to fifth century democratic Athens, where a 
talent for speaking persuasively, and clearly, to as many as six-thousand opinionated peers was 
central to the effective performance of statesmanship.49 This was no coincidence. As a stratēgos, 
Pericles advanced policies that limited the elite Areopagus Council’s political influence, 
instituted provisions for jury pay, and promoted a culture of participatory citizenship. Through 
these populist revisions to the Athenian constitution, Pericles himself empowered the very 
institutions that were most responsive to his style of politics while blocking avenues through 
which aristocratic rivals might challenge his authority. The democratic assembly may have been 
able to limit the policymaking power of a single individual, but any individual who could 
consistently win it over could also exaggerate his influence over the city’s decisions; Pericles 
was such an individual. He further burnished his democratic bona fides through apparently 
selfless gestures that seemed to prove his incorruptibility and commitment to the polis.50 By 
                                                 
48 Though aware of his natural talents, Plutarch (2012: 8.1-8.5) attributes these qualities to the instruction he 
received from the sophist Anaxagoras, whose lessons in natural sciences and rhetoric gave his otherwise shy student 
the confidence to address the assembly. It is worth noting, however, that confident judgments are not always good 
judgments. 
 
49 See 2.60.2; 3.37-38; 3.42-43. In the Athenian Constitution, Aristotle notes that Pericles enhanced democratic 
features of the constitution by limiting the privileges of the Areopagus Council and instituting pay for “service in the 
law-courts, as a bid for popular favor to counterbalance the wealth of Cimon,” thereby breaking the patronage 
network of his wealthier rival (§27). Aristotle’s account raises a question about Pericles’ motives, as a more cynical 
observer might interpret his apparently selfless gestures as mere tactics for winning popular support, thereby 
securing his place in the assembly. Thucydides’ own remarks suggest that Pericles was certainly savvy in this 
regard.   
 
50 Pericles was related to the Alcmaeonids on his mother’s side. Unlike political rivals such as Cimon, Pericles was 
not especially wealthy but used what fortunes he had for public benefit. He was a choregos for Aeschylus’ Persians 
during the festival of Dionysus in 472, the success of which positioned him to begin his military career. He 
continued that pattern during the war as well when the Spartans invaded Attica. Pericles was a guest-friend (xēnos) 
of the Spartan king Archidamos, who lead the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in the summer of 431. Because 
of his personal connection with the Spartan, Pericles “became concerned that Archidamos…might perhaps pass by 
his own fields without wasting them” (2.13.1).  Pericles divulged his personal connections to Archidamos in the 
assembly, promising to donate any spared property to the public. Both of these examples underscore Pericles’ 
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contrast, Thucydides laments that his successors, “being more on a level with each other and in 
competition each to be first,” were so consumed with private ambition that Athens fell into 
“factional turmoil” without him to guide the city (2.65.10-11).   
Many have taken Thucydides’ favorable comparison between Pericles and his successors 
to suggest that Pericles ought to stand as a paradigm of good judgment in the History.51 H.D. 
Westlake asserts that persuading readers to accept Thucydides’ praise for Pericles’ far-sighted 
leadership and integrity was among the work’s major aims.52 As Mary Nichols puts it, 
“Thucydides presents Pericles as a model of statesmanship, even of leadership within a 
democracy.”53 To the extent that Thucydides exposes weaknesses in that paradigm – the 
general’s sometimes negligent foresight and failures to countenance contingency, for instance – 
Nichols insists that such episodes are not criticisms of Pericles per se, but are rather 
demonstrations of the limits of democratic leadership more broadly. Donald Kagan likewise 
describes Pericles as a uniquely democratic visionary who admirably espoused a theory of 
citizenship opposed to both the radical individualism of Homeric heroism and the similarly 
radical equality inculcated by the Spartan regime. “He intended,” Kagan argues, “to create a 
quality of life never before known, one that would allow men to pursue their private interests but 
also enable them to seek the highest goals by placing their interests at the service of a city that 
                                                 
commitment to conventionally noble virtues, as it was expected that political elites would parlay material wealth 
into political capital through contributions to the polis.   
   
51 See, e.g., Kateb (1964), Beiner (1983: 108), Kagan (1991), Yunis (1997), Cawkwell (1997), Freedman (2013: 36-
37); cf. Foster (2010: esp. 184-190). Themistocles is the only figure whose judgment Thucydides praises without 
qualification (1.138.4). Nevertheless, his cursory description of Themistocles’ character, decision-making, and 
influence is too brief for contemporary readers to draw as much interpretive significance from him as we might like.  
 
52 Westlake (1968: 23, 31, 41-42).  
 




fostered and relied upon reason for its guidance.”54 While Kagan concedes that the speeches 
Thucydides records focus “chiefly [on] the empire and military glory,” he speculates that “if we 
had access to Pericles’ inner thoughts…we would possibly discover that he took no less pride in 
the Athenians’ peaceful achievement of mind and spirit.”55 Contemporary citizens and politicians 
alike should therefore look to Pericles as a well-rounded paradigm of democratic practice with 
reason, rather than coercion, at its core.   
I disagree with these assessments of Pericles’ leadership and political judgment. Like 
other critics of Pericles, I argue that the general’s judgment was animated more by his uncritical 
imperialism than by his purportedly democratic virtues.56 A full-throated champion of the 
Athenian thesis, Pericles seduced, stoked, and mobilized a city ready to hear her talents 
catalogued and her victories assured. Much to his credit, the Athenians were not defeated by a 
better equipped or braver force during his lifetime. Yet as Plato would later have Socrates posit 
in his Gorgias, Pericles ultimately misled the demos by excising justice as a feature of their 
political judgment (515c-516d, 517b-c). Pericles never asked the assembly to assess policies on 
the basis of how well they would maximize justice or honor the terms of their Delian alliance; 
rather, he asked his fellow citizens to make their judgments on the basis of what was necessary to 
efficiently maintain their empire. In short, by making necessity and expedience the core 
                                                 
54 Kagan (1991: 137).  
 
55 Ibid, 149. 
 
56 This aspect of my argument contributes to skepticism about Pericles’ vaunted place within Thucydides’ narrative. 
Palmer (1982a) questions the wisdom of Pericles’ advice to withdraw behind the Long Walls and rely on the navy 
because it demanded more moderation of the Athenians than they were willing to muster. Pericles’ strategy was, for 
Palmer, a reflection of how poorly he judged the Athenian people. Also see Westlake (1968: 2In slight contrast, 
Monoson and Loriaux (1998: 290) read him as an intelligent but overconfident leader who resisted the “restraint 
provided by moral norms.” Foster (2010: 121) concurs, declaring that Pericles’ ambition and response to the acme of 
Athenian power “makes him symbolic for the tragedy of Athens and his age.” My argument adds to these by 
emphasizing both the restraining and motivating aspects of moral commitments.  
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standards of their political judgments, Pericles made the Athenians more vulnerable to the very 
contingency (tuchē) he thought their wealth and navy protected them from.  
The Periclean approach to political judgment nevertheless warrants careful study because 
it sets the tone for Athenian decision-making throughout the war. Its defining feature is the 
primacy it awards to natural exceptionalism. Pericles was, to borrow Kagan’s phrase, a 
“freakish” exception to the normal constraints of democratic politics: Thucydides does not record 
a single challenge to any of his policy proposals in a forum otherwise crowded with dissenting 
views.57 Yet his leadership sat as uneasily with Athenian democratic ideals of political equality 
as the city’s thalassocracy sat with Hellenic principles of autonomy and Delian League 
agreements of nominal equality between allies. Just as Pericles saw his influence as evidence of 
his unique political gifts, the Athenians regarded their empire as the reward for their natural 
superiority over those within their dominion to whom they also owed no explanation.58 Their 
allies disagreed, consistently describing Athenian ambitions in the same language of enslavement 
(katadoulosis) otherwise reserved for the barbarians from whom Athens was supposed to protect 
them.59 These contradictions threatened the tenability of democratic imperialism, yet were 
                                                 
57 De Romilly (1979: 128, 141, 155) relies on the absence of vocal opposition to argue that Thucydides endorsed 
Pericles’ moderate imperialism. While Thucydides clearly admired certain aspects of Pericles’ personality, 
especially in the final years of his life, his decision to exclude dissenting voices hardly amounts to a fervent defense 
of Periclean ideals. It is also not quite right to say, as Monoson and Loriaux (1998: 286) put it, that Pericles is the 
“only speaker of the History whose words are never disputed by those of an adversary.” Brasidas’ address to the 
Akanthians (4.85-87) is received without question, as is Hermocrates’ appeal for peace between the Kamarianaians 
and the Geloans (4.59-64). Rather, Pericles is the only Athenian speaker whose addresses are not contested. Even 
this claim deserves qualification, for Thucydides references, but does not reproduce, opposing viewpoints. It seems 
just as likely that Thucydides paid less attention to Pericles’ dissenters because they simply had no material impact 
on Athenian political decisions.  
 
58 Pericles grounds his authority in his talents for judgment and persuasiveness within the assembly (2.60.7). 
Likewise, the Athenian assembly in Sparta defends their empire in terms of natural right and necessity, insisting that 
their superior strength frees them from legal constraints forced on subjects (1.74-75; 1.76.2; 1.77.2). Cf. 1.76.2, 
2.41.3, 5.89, 6.83.2.    
 
59 See Strasburger (2009: 205).   
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simply rejected by Athens rather than resolved. Such resistance to critical reflection upon the 
choiceworthiness of their own political project plagued Athenian judgment throughout the war. 
Pericles was largely responsible for this condition.   
Thucydides situates Pericles within the Athenian imperial project by introducing him 
during the Pentakontaetia.60 The Athenians assumed control of the Delian League at the behest 
of smaller cities worried about the growing violence and ambition of Pausanias, the Spartan 
commander charged with patrolling the Persian border and repelling the Mede after the Persian 
War. Athenian hegemony was premised on the city’s commitment to protecting her allies from 
barbarian or Hellenic threats in exchange for funding and ships (1.96).61 Almost as soon as he 
outlines the terms of this agreement, Thucydides reports that the Athenians routinely conflated 
military actions against the Mede and Peloponnesians with counter-revolutionary measures taken 
against allies chaffing under their dominion. Ostensibly attempting to protect their interests, the 
Athenians immediately perceived themselves as nascent imperialists besieged by enemies. 
Pericles is likewise shown as an enthusiastic enforcer of that imperial project, waging battles 
against the Sikyonians and Oiniadai in Akarnania (1.111). He also leads efforts to suppress 
rebellions in Euboea and Samos (1.114-1.115).  
Despite his reputation for persuasiveness, Pericles does not attempt to resolve tensions 
within the League by means of diplomacy or reason. He instead becomes the face of Athenian 
aggression against the city’s enemies and allies alike. As Edith Foster observes, Thucydides’ 
                                                 
60 The Pentakontaetia (1.89-118) – Thucydides’ account of the fifty-year span between the conclusion of the Persian 
Wars and the beginning of the First Peloponnesian War – describes the formation the Delian League and the 
eventual tensions among its members. 
 
61 The Delian treaty was premature. Spartan officials recalled Pausanias on charges of Median corruption shortly 
after it was agreed upon (1.95). 
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cursory review of Pericles’ pre-war military record foreshadows the policies he advances in the 
assembly once the war has begun. “[Just] as the Athenians gave no quarter at Euboia and 
Samos,” she writes, “and just as they discovered during the Euboian revolt that the Spartans were 
plotting against them, so (he will argue) they should give no quarter now, and should remember 
that the Spartans are the enemies of their empire.”62 These remarks expose a contradiction 
between the forceful means by which Pericles holds the Delian League together and the way he 
perceives Athens’ relationship with her allies. Whereas Pericles praises the city for her 
generosity among friends, Thucydides shows us that, in deed, Periclean Athens ruled her subject 
allies with greater violence than even Pausanias could muster.  
Nowhere is the division between Pericles’ ideal and actual Athens wider than in his 
funeral oration. Many contemporary theorists have read the oration as a statement of democratic 
values, a treatise on public mourning, a description of the relationship between citizen and polis, 
and as a piece of rhetoric so stirring that it inspired the Athenians to “[stiffen] their resolve to 
carry on” with a war effort that was not yielding conspicuously impressive results.63 To one 
degree or another, it is all of these. A broad defense of Athenian exceptionalism, it is certainly 
the best known of Pericles’ three main speeches in the text. Here it is especially noteworthy for 
its comments on judgment and the dynamic between Athens and her allies.  
                                                 
62 Foster (2010: 127). 
 
63 Kagan (2003: 74). On the democratic appeal of the speech, see Harris (1992); Andrews (2004). For a reflection on 
the speech’s function as a declaration of public mourning, see Stow (2007). On the erotic relationship between 
citizen and polis, see Monoson (1994). Nicole Loraux (1986), who provides the most comprehensive analysis of the 
speech that I am aware of, argues that Pericles weaves all of these elements into the speech. Kagan’s remarks 
instructively remind us of how important emotional priming was to Periclean rhetoric, especially in light of how 
conservatively – some might have though inadequately – Athens performed in the first year of the war. See 
Bosworth (2000: 8-9).  
 47 
 
After some preliminary remarks on the difficulty of adequately praising the city’s fallen 
without inviting envy among the living, Pericles lists a number of virtues that set Athens apart 
from her neighbors. Among these he notes the citizenry’s natural capacity for political judgment: 
With us…people combine an interest in public and private matters, and those who are 
more involved in business are still well enough aware of political issues. In fact, we alone 
regard the person who fails to participate in public affairs not just as harmless but as 
positively useless; we are all personally involved either in actual political decisions or in 
deliberation about them, in the belief that it is not words which thwart effective action but 
rather the failure to inform action with discussion in advance. Indeed, in this too we are 
distinguished from others. We bring our ventures a very high degree of both daring and 
analysis, whereas for others their boldness comes from ignorance and analysis means 
paralysis. The bravest sprits are rightly judged to be those who see clearly just what perils 
and pleasures await them but do not on that account flinch from danger. (2.40.2-3) 
The Athenians were known for appraising everything from poetry to military matters as the war 
progressed.64 Contemporary historians speculate that the citizens assembled on the Pnyx would 
have had at least some combat experience upon which to base their decisions about the war.65 
Indeed, questions about logistical support or tactical arrangements might lend themselves to a 
hoplite’s hard-earned intuitions, if not to a rower’s. Those who experienced combat understood 
its dangers, moreover, and we might expect their judgments about whether or not to go to war to 
reflect that experience.66 But the veracity of statements about the city’s goals and reasons for 
fighting could not be judged by experience alone. Instead, these questions would demand 
                                                 
64 Thucydides was critical of dramatic competitions as a means of ethical reflection, considering the “patriotic 
stories” of poets more distracting than educational (1.22). Cf. Rhodes (2003). This passage does, however, highlight 
political judgment as a practice of democratic citizenship that was every bit as important as willingness for self-
sacrifice. In his first speech, Pericles emboldened the Athenians by depicting their victory over Persia as a victory of 
cunning and wise planning over sheer might: “By dint of good judgment rather than good fortune and through their 
courage rather than the might of power, they beat back the barbarian and brought us to our present state” (1.44.4). 
 
65 See, e.g., Hanson (2005). Thucydides’ description of the city’s younger population who, in their inexperience with 
war were eager to fight, disputes some of this claim. Given the number of citizens required to man the oars of the 
city’s navy, along with the preparations taken to train them for combat, it is fair to assume that a great many of those 
voting for war would have to fight in it. This proportion is strikingly different from the current United States 
Congress in which roughly twenty percent of those elected are veterans. See Ornstein, et al. (2013).  
 
66 This was certainly Archidamos’ justification for Spartan caution in matters of war (1.84). Though “wise and 
warlike,” the Spartans did not rashly wage war for the opportunity to die nobly on the battlefield. Pericles 
distinguishes Athens from Sparta by denying any trade-offs between dynamic action and patient deliberation.   
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reflective deliberation about what Athens ought to represent, what her interests entailed, and how 
she ought to pursue her goals. At this point in the History, however, we have seen no such 
debate. The fact that no Athenian challenges Pericles’ vision of the city suggests that the level of 
critical deliberation necessary to form such judgments was lacking during his tenure as the 
leading stratēgos.67     
Pericles next lauds the city for fighting as a single unit rather than relying on allies in 
combat. Unlike the Spartans, who invade Attica with their Peloponnesian allies, Athenians attack 
other lands by themselves and, though “fighting on the soil of others and against people 
defending their own homes,” usually conquer with ease (2.39.2). Instead of depending on friends 
for support, Pericles portrays Athens as a generous benefactor: 
Our idea of doing good is unusual, too. We make our friends not by receiving favors but 
by conferring them. The benefactor is the stronger partner, as the one who through his 
favors maintains the debt of gratitude in the recipient, while the one who incurs the 
obligation has a weaker motive, knowing that he will repay the service not to win a favor 
but to return a debt. Finally, we alone have the courage to be benefactors not from a 
calculation of advantage but in the confidence of our freedom. (2.40.4-5)  
This passage is significant for three reasons. First, it ignores the extent to which the city relied on 
her Delian allies to provide the material advantages Pericles first identified as the basis of 
Athenian naval supremacy.68 The city’s wealth, not her navy alone, was the source of her 
advantage and this was not possible without contributing allies. Second, Pericles characterizes 
the relationship between Athens and her allies as one secured through gratitude. Even for an 
audience prepared to hear themselves lionized by a great orator, this claim must have struck an 
                                                 
67 It is noteworthy that while Thucydides reports of dissenting views, he does not record them. This suggests that 
while there was certainly some dissent during Pericles’ tenure, none of the obstacles had a material impact – at least 
not in Thucydides’ estimation – on the course of the war. 
 
68 As Pericles put it in his speech urging the Athenians to war: “Capital is what sustains a war rather than forced 
contributions…The main point, however, is that [the Spartans] will be hampered by their lack of money, since they 
are slow to generate it and are therefore subject to delays” (1.141.2, 1.142.1). 
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odd chord. For had the city’s allies been comfortable with their alliance, Pericles’ military 
service, consisting as it did in the suppression of anti-Athenian revolts, would not have been 
required. Finally, Pericles forecloses on the possibility of ethical or material equality between 
Athens and her allies. Greek conventions recognized equality as a vital feature of genuine 
friendship and moral standing. By casting Athens as a city that does not need such friends, and 
whose hegemony may even be threatened by them, he also renounces the normative demands 
that these relationships would place upon her.  
Though Pericles often speaks of Athenian obedience to law, his funeral speech never 
mentions justice per se.69 It is the law that ensures contracts and regulates public behavior (2.37), 
not justice.70 This conspicuous omission underscores the extent to which imperial Athens, even 
in her most stylized rendering, does not take justice seriously as a factor in political judgment 
with respect to foreign affairs. With decision-making stripped of normative demands, political 
judgments are reduced to fickle assessments of vaguely defined material interests. Never again 
shall statesmen like Diodotus or Nicias appeal to justice as they caution the assembly against 
rash decisions. Likewise, Cleon and Alcibiades will be free to contort the concept of justice to 
                                                 
69 Heath (1990: 388) notes that the only time Pericles ever mentions justice (1.144.2), it is only in reference to 
Athens’ treaty with Sparta, and even there carries a legalistic – rather than normative – tone. 
  
70 More specifically, Athenian obedience to law is not derived from any intrinsic value that citizens place in it, nor 
even from a rational expectation of instrumental benefits that follow from law-and-order governance. Instead, 
Athenians obey the law out of fear of public censure or respect for authority: “A spirit of freedom governs our 
conduct, not only in public affairs but also in managing the small tensions of everyday life, where we show no 
animosity at our neighbors’ choice of pleasures, nor cast aspersions that may hurt even if they do no harm. Although 
we associate as individuals in this tolerant sprit, in public affairs fear (deos) makes us the most severely law-abiding 
of people, obedient to whoever is in authority and to the laws, especially those established to help the victims of 
injustice and those laws which, though unwritten, carry the sanction of public disgrace” (2.37.2-3). As we see in 
Thucydides’ description of the plague following Pericles’ speech, public commitment to the law dissolves once fears 
of official punishment or social censure are removed.   
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suit their own ends, unmoored as the principle was from any clear definition. It was Pericles 
who, in his most shining moment, gave them license to do so. 
 Thucydides highlights the fragility of law and policy without justice by immediately 
following Pericles’ funeral oration with an account of the Athenian plague. While some citizens 
unfairly blamed Pericles for the plague itself, most were right that his policies exacerbated its toll 
on the city. Taking his earlier advice, the Athenians began the war by recalling their rural 
population behind the safety of fortifications surrounding the city’s urban centers. The evacuees, 
few of whom would have had much prior contact with their urban peers, spent the first two years 
of the war living as refugees in the cramped quarters of an unfamiliar city while watching 
Peloponnesian raiders burn their homes and crops.71 When the plague came it spread quickly 
throughout the congested city, defying all human efforts (anthrōpīa technai) to assuage its 
symptoms or predict its patterns.72 Thucydides catalogues its gruesome effects, observing that 
“the most terrible thing of all about this affliction…was the sense of despair (athūmia) when 
someone realized that they were suffering from it; for then they immediately decided in their 
own minds that the outcome was hopeless (anelpīste) and they were much more likely to give 
themselves up to it rather than resist” (2.51.4).73 Though survivors were made more 
                                                 
71 As Bosworth (2000: 7) describes it, “For them the city was unwelcoming, profoundly uncomfortable, and a 
constant reminder that they were suffering out of all proportion if compared with the population normally resident in 
or around Athens.” Thucydides reports that the rural population was indeed the worst afflicted because of especially 
poor housing and sanitation (2.52.2.). Yet Pericles was apparently blind to the importance of property to Athenian 
public and private life. His strategy cautioned against Athenians acquiring new territory during the war while 
renouncing the importance of personal possessions to the point of ruining their own landholdings in a show of 
resolve (1.143.5). 
 
72 Thucydides’ description of the plague, much like his purpose for writing the History more broadly, is intended to 
“enable anyone investigating any future outbreak to have some prior knowledge and recognize it” (2.48.3). 
Symptoms manifested themselves differently in each patient (2.50.1, 2.51.1), treatments that helped some harmed 
others (2.51.2), and no one’s constitution proved more or less resistant to it (2.49.2). 
    
73 On the complex importance of hope to Athenian political psychology, see Schlosser (2013). Though baseless hope 
often feeds the pleonexia that ultimately undoes the Athenian war-effort, Schlosser also notes, especially with 
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compassionate by their experience, the general malaise hanging about the plague-stricken city 
soon gave way to “other forms of lawlessness” (anoumīa) (2.53.1) as citizens, suddenly aware of 
their mortality, indulged in immediate pleasures. As Thucydides describes it:  
They therefore resolved to exploit these opportunities for enjoyment quickly, regarding 
their lives and their property as equally ephemeral…Whatever gave immediate pleasure 
or in any way facilitated it became the standard of what was good and useful. Neither fear 
of the gods nor law of man was any restraint: they judged (krinontes) it made no 
difference whether or not they showed them respect, seeing that everyone died just the 
same; on the contrary, no one expected to live long enough to go on trial and pay the 
penalty, feeling that a far worse sentence had already been passed and was hanging over 
their heads, and that it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment from life before it 
finally fell on them. (2.53.2-4)74 
Leo Strauss reads the scene as Thucydides’ effort to subvert the funeral oration’s vision of 
immortal Athenian glory by juxtaposing it with a vivid account of corporeal human suffering.75 
Orwin extends Strauss’s argument in his comparative analysis of the Corcyraean stasis and the 
plague narrative, proposing that “political life depends on hopes and fears of the future, and 
therefore on the expectation of one.”76 By cutting even strong lives short, the plague cast doubt 
on whether anyone would live long enough to accomplish praiseworthy goals, thereby removing 
incentives to perform them. 
Strauss and Orwin are correct to highlight the corporeal themes captured in the plague 
narrative, but their interpretation is limited and slightly misplaced. As Orwin puts it, “The plague 
displays the abyss that yawns when men can no longer see the city for their bodies. The prospect 
of imminent death spurs men to live in and for the moment; but the moment inevitably eclipses 
                                                 
respect to the Sicilian campaign’s bloody conclusion, that hope (elpis) fortifies people against despair. Losing hope 
indicates both a shift in Athenian character as well as a depressive distortion of the city’s political judgment. 
74 Following Orwin (1988) it is useful to compare Thucydides’ account with the language used in his description of 
the Corcyraean civil war (3.82-83), esp. 3.82.2, 3.82.4-6. 
 
75 Strauss (1964: 194-5). 
 




the city.”77 Here, Orwin understands the narrative as Thucydides’ critique of materialistic 
Athenians who failed to embody Homeric qualities of self-sacrifice such as we see in figures like 
Hector. Yet the plague does not offer the prospect of death any more imminently than battle; 
instead, it offers the prospect of meaningless, pointless death.78 Thucydides does not report 
Athenians fearing bloody diarrhea or amputated fingers but rather the random likelihood of 
survival. Orwin is therefore closer to the mark when he uses the plague and stasis narratives as 
examples of how subject to chance and contingency human plans ultimately are.79 Yet even here, 
the two episodes make different thematic points. If, as noted above, the Corcyrean stasis altered 
polis life by reversing “the usual values in the application of words to actions” (3.82.4), the 
plague stripped meaning from words altogether: “Indeed, the form (eidos) of the disease is an 
occurrence (genomenon) greater (kreisson) than any account (logou)” (2.50.1). Seeing that virtue 
made no appreciable difference in the morbidity rate (2.51.4), and that lawlessness would go 
unpunished, many simply adopted a hedonic standard against which to judge an action’s value. 
In doing so, the Athenians revealed how weakly they regarded virtue when stripped of its 
immediate instrumental benefits while simultaneously abandoning any of the long-term interests 
Pericles had praised them for understanding so naturally. In other words, the plague scene does 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
 
78 It is worth noting that the plague persists unabated for two more years and recurs throughout the History. 
Athenians continue to fight, of course, suggesting that if this moment does indeed “eclipse the city” it only does so 
for a short while to the degree Thucydides describes it.  
 
79 Orwin’s emphasis on chance and contingency neglects the extent to which Periclean policies were responsible for 
much of the plague’s devastation. Again, had Pericles not concentrated so much of the city’s population within the 
city, far fewer would have died when the plague finally came. Rather than teaching readers a lesson in the frailty of 
human planning, as Orwin suggests, we might do better to see the plague as a consequence of poor political and 




not introduce materialism into Periclean politics; it reveals that materialism was all that Periclean 
politics ever amounted to. Pericles severely misjudged his fellow citizens in this regard. 
Depleted and exhausted, the demos began to criticize Pericles for having persuaded them 
to wage war in the first place. Pericles predicted such a turn of events in his first speech.80 When 
he calls a meeting of the assembly, then, he announces his intention “to administer some 
reminders to [his audience] and take [them] to task for any misplaced resentment against 
[himself] or any undue weakening in the face of difficulties” (2.60.1). We have come to expect 
this from Pericles. On one hand, he is savvy enough to the emotional temperament of the 
populace to recognize when and how to address them. He appreciates how the devastation of the 
plague has colored the Athenians’ judgment just as he appreciated how their material superiority 
prior to the war – which his first speech only sought to reinforce – rendered them overly 
optimistic. His sensitivity bears the mark of a populist statesman who acknowledges that his 
political influence is rooted in the support of the citizenry.81 On the other hand, his speech fails 
to address the most damning effect of the plague, namely its erosion of the civic trust holding the 
polis together.  
Pericles’ final speech is an argument about persuasion, responsibility, and democratic 
decision-making. He begins by repeating his earlier sketch of the citizens’ relationship to the 
polis, insisting that individual pursuits are only meaningful when understood within a communal 
context. A man can suffer private failings provided his community endures; likewise, a man can 
enjoy private success, “but if his country is destroyed he nonetheless falls with her” (2.60.3; cf. 
                                                 
80 See 1.40.1. 
 
81 Pericles is also sensitive to the demos’ desire for a scapegoat upon whom they can focus their wrath. Remarkably, 
despite his profound influence, Pericles was never ostracized from Athens. This prompted Cratinus (frag. 73; cf. 
Plutarch 2012:13.9) to joke that Pericles was the man whom “the ostrakon has passed over” Perhaps ironically, at 




2.43.1). Unlike the forebears he praised in his previous speech, men who “gave their lives to the 
common cause” (2.43.2), the Athenians he now addresses have, under the pressures of “domestic 
misfortunes,” sacrificed their “common security” (2.60.4).82 Though Pericles is the object of 
collective derision, he insists that the city should ultimately bear the blame for these misfortunes: 
“If you were persuaded by me to go to war because you believed me to be at least to some degree 
better qualified than others in [offering loyal advice], then I cannot reasonably now be blamed 
for anything like misconduct” (2.60.7). These remarks raise troubling questions about leadership 
and responsibility. Thucydides gives no evidence that Pericles willfully mislead the assembly, 
yet his faith in capital as the deciding factor in war wrongly diminished fortune’s part in shaping 
such matters.83 Whether because of hubris or ignorance, Pericles’ judgment had failed. But do 
the shortcomings of the city’s “first man” absolve the city herself of blame for their misfortunes? 
Thucydides seems not to think so for reasons that become clearer in later episodes. He 
reports that Pericles was punished with a fine but subsequently reelected as stratēgos despite 
lasting hardships. In a warm appraisal of Pericles’ service, Thucydides opines that “under him 
[Athens] reached the height of her greatness,” contending that “after the war broke out he then 
too showed himself a far-sighted judge of the city’s strengths” (2.65.5).84 Posterity would also 
validate his conservative strategy which, Thucydides thinks but does not explain, would have 
                                                 
82 The latter is a reference to efforts by some to negotiate peace settlements with Sparta (2.59.2). 
 
83 This is a point of contrast between Pericles, who thought Athenian resources and ingenuity could overcome all 
contingencies, and Archidamos, who was perhaps too sensitive to luck in combat. 
  
84 Notice, however, that he does not here credit Pericles with accurately assessing the city’s weaknesses. Thucydides 
suggests in the following lines that Pericles was aware of Athenian ambitions for expansion and so cautioned them 




brought victory had it been followed.85 “But they did just the opposite of this in every way,” he 
writes, “and in other respects apparently unconnected with the war they were led by private 
ambition and personal greed to pursue policies that proved harmful both to themselves and to 
their allies” (2.65.7). Again, unlike later statesmen who had to compete not only against each 
other but also for the attention of the assembly, Pericles could “through his personal ability, his 
judgment and his evident integrity…freely restrain the masses” (2.65.8). Contra Plato, 
Thucydides insists that Pericles led the demos more than he was led by them: “That is, he did not 
say things just to please them in an unseemly pursuit of power, but owed his influence to his 
personal distinction and so could face their anger and contradict them” (2.65.8; Cf. Gorgias 
503c-d, 517b-c). “What was in name a democracy,” he concludes, “was in practice government 
by the foremost man” (2.65.9). Taken together, we are to understand that Pericles’ personal 
integrity and strategic instincts were such that the Athenian empire could have survived even 
without – and perhaps at the expense of – democratic deliberation. It was only when the demos 
strayed from Pericles’ course that they found themselves in trouble.86 
Thucydides’ encomium to Pericles is the strongest evidence of the historian’s partiality 
toward the general. I do not doubt that the sentiments expressed therein are genuine. However, I 
stress that the qualities that Thucydides praises in Pericles the man should count against the 
model of Periclean judgment. I have argued that Periclean policy was vaguely envisioned and 
imperfectly executed; yet even if one takes a more favorable view of Pericles’ strategy, his 
model of exceptional judgment remains deeply flawed within a democracy. Thucydides blames 
                                                 
85 Mynott (2013: 130, fn. 2) complains that “one would have like examples to explain the judgments here and at 
65.10 and .11” noting the fifteen-year gap between Pericles’ death and the disastrous Sicilian expedition that most 
obviously flouted Pericles’ advice. 
 
86 In this, Thucydides may be read to confirm Plato’s Socrates, who insists that Pericles – like Themistocles and 
Cimon – excelled at giving the Athenians dockyards and public works, but failed to improve their souls or decision-
making ability. See Gorgias 516a-517c. 
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Athenian failures on the selfish designs of less exceptional politicians who struggled with one 
another to assert their exceptionalism. Put simply, Pericles’ successors failed Athens because 
they were pursuing Periclean status – “government by the foremost man” – rather than a vision 
of collective virtue. Pericles contributed to that state of affairs in two ways. First, he weakened 
institutional checks on the power of the popular assembly, making eloquence a precondition for 
politics in the process. Second, he failed to cultivate a climate of critical inquiry as a priority of 
democratic leadership, taking for granted that most Athenians were naturally capable of making 
sound decisions about complex matters. The combination of these steps resulted in an 
empowered but uncritical citizenry vulnerable to demagoguery.  
1.2 Justice versus Interests: The Mytilenean Debate 
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes forensic from deliberative oratory by observing 
that the two styles aim at different ends. While forensic oratory aims at justice, the deliberative 
orator assesses a policy on the basis of expedience: “if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the 
ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do 
harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust…he brings in as 
subsidiary and relative to this main consideration” (Rhet. 1358b21-25). Though Aristotle does 
not clearly endorse this distinction, Thucydides indicates that there was precedent for it in the 
Athens of his own day.87 The Athenian thesis treats justice and material advantage as discrete 
categories of political judgment, reserving the former for domestic politics while privileging the 
latter in foreign relations. That distinction is only intelligible if we assume a cleavage between 
what is ethically choiceworthy and what is materially advantageous. As I argue in later chapters, 
Plato’s Socrates challenges that assumption by insisting that material interests are only 
                                                 
87 For rhetorical distinctions, see Connor (1984: 84). 
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choiceworthy insofar as they accord with robust principles of justice. I shall also argue that 
Aristotle’s account of phronēsis arrives at the same conclusion. In the next two sections of this 
chapter, I propose that we look to the History for examples of how decoupling morality from 
advantage can result in poorly reasoned decisions with potentially disastrous consequences    
One such example is the debate between Cleon and Diodotus over the fate of Mytilene in 
428. The second of two discussions over how Athens ought to punish her rebellious ally, the 
Mytilenean debate features two extreme views competing for democratic approval. On one hand, 
Cleon’s impassioned appeal to what David Cohen describes as “primitive criminal justice” 
encourages the assembly to ruthlessly exterminate Mytilene in a muscular show of imperial 
vengeance.88 Diodotus, on the other hand, discourages the assembly from rash judgments. He 
urges them to spare those Mytileneans who did not participate in the revolt on the grounds that 
doing so advances Athenian interests: Athens should demonstrate compassion, but only because 
it will play well to her allies and strengthen her hand within the empire. Diodotus (barely) wins 
the day, but Cleon will go on to greater dominance within the assembly by supporting 
increasingly violent policies. The Mytilenean debate does not, therefore, capture a moment in 
which deliberation won out against demagogic calls for vindictive justice so much as a moment 
in which considerations of justice and interests permanently diverge in Athenian deliberations 
and political judgments. If Gomme is right to remark that the contest between Cleon and 
Diodotus is “as much about how to conduct debate in the ekklesia as it is about the fate of 
Mytilene,” then this is a moment with devastating ramifications.89   
                                                 
88 Cohen (1984: 46). 
 




Thucydides reports that the Mytilenean revolt surprised many in Athens, as the Lesbian 
city had enjoyed greater autonomy than most other Delian allies. Despite their relative 
autonomy, many in Mytilene resented Athenian influence even before the war, and soon looked 
to Sparta for help with an uprising as the Peloponnesian War spread throughout Greece.90 The 
Mytilenean envoy’s speech at Sparta is sensitive to how unseemly their timing might appear: 
“when men revolt in wartime and desert their previous alliance, those who receive them view 
them favorably to the extent that they are of service but think less of them for being traitors to 
their former friends” (3.9.1).91 The envoys frame their rebellion as an act of principle rather than 
of opportunity. Instead of emphasizing their practical utility to Sparta’s war effort, they offer a 
speech about justice and friendship: 
[Neither] friendships between individuals nor collaboration between states can be in any 
way well-founded unless the relationship is based on an assumption of good faith 
(dokouses arētes) on both sides…We did not become allies of the Athenians for the 
enslavement of the Greeks, but we became allies of the Greeks for their liberation from 
the Persians. As long as they exercised their leadership on a basis of equality we were 
very willing followers; but when we saw them relaxing their efforts against the Persians 
and becoming bent on the subjection of their allies we began to lose confidence…We no 
longer thought of the Athenians as trusted leaders, since it seemed unlikely that men who 
had subjugated our fellow allies, protected though we all were by treaty, would not deal 
with the rest of us the same way if they ever had the power to do so…If we had all of us 
remained independent we would have felt more assurance that they would do nothing to 
force a change in the relationship …Equivalence in the balance of fear is the only basis 
for trust in an alliance; for then the part that wants to break faith in some way is deterred 
from doing so by not having the advantage for any aggression. (3.10.1-11.2)  
                                                 
90 The parallels between their appeal and the Corcyraeans’ proposed alliance with Athens before the war are striking. 
Cf. 3.9.1 with 1.32-.41. 
 
91 It is worth comparing the Mytilenean speech with Alcibiades’ address to the Spartans in the winter of 415/414, 
especially for its justification of defection. Like the Mytileneans, Alcibiades justifies his defection by arguing that 
the Athenians drove him away by distrusting his loyalty: “The worse enemies are not those like you [Spartans] who 
do their enemies some harm, but those who force their friends to become enemies. My loyalty is not to a city where 




It was not the Mytileneans but the Athenians who violated the treaty when they enslaved their 
allies and ruled through coercion rather than justice, thereby freeing their subjects to 
preemptively defect in the name of autonomy.92 Because the Mytileneans could not trust the 
Athenians as friends, they could not trust them as leaders who would preserve their freedom. 
Furthermore, the asymmetry between Mytilenean and Athenian military powers disturbed the 
material equality necessary for mutual respect between the two cities, hardening differences over 
the nature of their alliance into a fixed antagonism. By couching their appeal in this language, the 
Mytileneans ally themselves in spirit with the Peloponnesian League. They give the impression 
that Athens has abrogated her moral and material commitments and has disrupted the status quo 
in the process. The Spartans agree, but to no avail. They delay sending support for the rebelling 
Mytileneans, who, blockaded by an Athenian fleet, subsequently surrender to the Athenians who 
angrily condemn their city to destruction.     
The public exchange we call the Mytilenean Debate takes place the day after the 
assembly initially voted in favor of eradicating its erstwhile ally. Thucydides reports that the 
Athenians awoke remorseful of their rash decision the day earlier and so convened to reconsider 
the sentence, which was slowly making its way to Paches in Lesbos. The assembly’s initial 
decision was complicated by several factors. First, the war-weary and plague-stricken Athenians 
were at first reluctant to believe the earliest news of Mytilenean machinations, and Thucydides 
recalls that many dismissed the initial reports out of hand (3.3.1). As Josiah Ober insightfully 
notes, their early denial of the facts on the ground should remind readers that the assembly did 
not benefit from the historian’s omniscient perspective; rather, the Athenians “interpreted what 
                                                 
92 “We did not ally ourselves with the Athenians for enslavement of the Hellenes, however, but with the Hellenes for 
freedom from the Medes…We no longer considered the Athenians leaders we trusted, going by the example of what 
had already happened; it was not likely that they would have subjugated those they had bound themselves to by 
treaty and not have done that to us if it had ever been within their power” (3.10.3, 5).  
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they heard according to their own self-interested preferences, and they rejected the truth-value of 
unpleasant news.”93 By the time their navy moved to suppress the rebellion, Athens was already 
reacting to events rather than driving them. Their suppression of the uprising introduces a second 
set of complicating factors. Though the Athenian navy dwarfed its Mytilenean counterpart, 
Mytilene was still an imposing presence on Lesbos. Without Spartan assistance, of course, the 
Mytileneans had no reasonable hope of successful rebellion; yet their resistance could have 
proved costly to Athenians who would prefer to spend their resources elsewhere. Athens was 
spared this expense thanks mostly to Mytilenean democrats who – for reasons unrelated to 
Athens – turned on the rebellious oligarchs once they were armed. Thucydides does not clarify 
how many Athenians knew this, but we must not discount the role that anxiety and paranoia 
played in shaping the assembly’s political judgment four years in to an increasingly brutal and 
expensive war. Any speaker approaching his fellow citizens would have to remain sensitive to 
this affective dimension of their political judgment if he was to influence their decision.     
Cleon speaks first. A notoriously hawkish and popular speaker, he thinks the assembly 
was justified in its initial decision to raze Mytilene.94  Now that support for that brutal decision is 
flagging, he seeks to recommit the assemblymen to the death sentence he had earlier persuaded 
them to adopt (3.36.6). He begins by admonishing their wavering judgment, using it as evidence 
of the democracy’s inability to rule an empire.95 “The most dire prospect of all,” he warns, “is if 
                                                 
93 Ober (1998: 95). 
 
94 Thucydides’ contempt for Cleon is well documented in the secondary literature, leading many to question his 
impartiality. See, e.g., Woodhead (1960); Grote (2001). Here, Cleon had persuaded the Athenians to execute the 
entire male population of Mytilene as well as to enslave all of the women and children (3.36.2). Thucydides notes 
throughout his report that the Athenians were furious while making these decisions, writing that they questioned 
their judgment the very next day.  
 
95 The parallels between Cleon’s address and Pericles’ arguments in favor of war are well drawn. See, e.g., Marshall 
(1984); Cartwright (1997).  
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none of our decisions remain firm” (3.37.3). Consistency is important because Athens is 
besieged on all sides by potential threats, and even bad laws, when consistently enforced, serve 
the city better than good laws irregularly applied. He warns that the assemblymen’s domestic 
comfort deludes them into a state of false security; in reality, Athens is surrounded by would-be 
enemies bristling under her dominion. The assembly also faces domestic threats from 
undisciplined intellectuals who “always want to appear wiser than the laws and to outdo any 
proposals made in the public interest” (3.37.4). He asks the Athenians to protect themselves by 
behaving as good citizens who, doubtful of their own intelligence, content themselves with 
applying the laws regardless of what “perverse advice” orators might offer them (3.37.4-5).96 
This is a strange request to make of an assembly that Pericles had earlier praised for bringing 
courage and careful analysis to all of their foreign endeavors. This is also a braver argument than 
most commentators admit. Cleon is the first Athenian recorded in the History to raise doubts 
about his audience’s native intelligence, and is second only to Pericles in bluntly acknowledging 
his empire’s unpopularity. Yet his advice in the face of uncertainty is to double down on imperial 
brutality. For him, policies should be judged exclusively by how consistently they advance 
control, untroubled by questions about the wisdom of the ends to which they are set. 
After accusing anyone who would like to reexamine the Mytilenean decision of 
corruption and berating the assembly for judging policy on the strength of good performances 
rather than good advice, Cleon finally arrives at his main thesis: Mytilene misjudged her own 
strength, broke her alliance with Athens, and now justly deserves punishment. There are good 
                                                 
96 Cleon’s rhetoric evinces a strong anti-intellectual current throughout, but his criticism of the assembly’s love of 
epideictic rhetoric bears a kernel of prudence. As Edward Harris (2013) reminds us, epideictic was a competitive 
form of rhetoric in which speakers often demonstrated their wit by proving intentionally outrageous paradoxes. By 
urging them to act as judges (kritai) rather than spectators (theatai) he is also asking them to take a more active role 
in deciding public policy.     
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strategic reasons for destroying the entire city, as imposing the same penalty on those who 
willfully revolt as on those who are forced to do so by the enemy will reduce the likelihood of 
defection in both cases. Punishing Mytilene with destruction thus serves Athenian imperial 
interests while satisfying the demands of justice (3.40.4). Cleon supports the normative 
choiceworthiness of his position by distorting the conventional definition of justice to reflect 
Athens’ tyrannical position among her neighbors. Conventions bidding Greeks to aid friends and 
harm enemies presuppose that one first has friends to help. Yet echoing the Mytilenean appeal to 
Sparta, he insists that hegemonic Athens can have no equals and thus no friends (3.37.2). She 
must consequently regard all outsiders as potential nemeses (polemioi) and treat them 
accordingly. By showing how Mytilene is, in fact, “the single city that has done [Athens] the 
most harm,” Cleon hopes to persuade the assembly that its punishment is the most just and 
expedient policy.  
 Cleon finds enemies in all corners of the Athenian empire and beyond. Though perhaps 
paranoid, he may yet have a point. Again, Mytilene was granted the most freedom of any other 
city in the alliance and revolted just the same (3.40.4).97 Cleon’s argument therefore hinges on 
persuading the assembly that because they appeared to be allies, the Mytileneans are in fact the 
most dangerous kind of enemy. He extrapolates from this case a broader point that Athens can 
trust no one. His closing words underscore the point most forcefully:  
Do not, therefore, be traitors to your own cause. Recall as closely as you can how you felt 
then and how you would have given anything then to beat them…Punish them as they 
deserve and give the other allies a clear warning that anyone who revolts is punished with 
death. If they come to realize this, you will be less distracted from your enemies by 
having to fight your own allies. (3.40.7)  
                                                 




Abstaining from punishment would be its own act of self-inflicted injustice insofar as the city 
had been gravely harmed and must therefore seek redress. If the assemblymen would only recall 
their previous emotional state of hurt and anger, they would recognize this harmony between 
their intuitions and expediency. If Cleon is persuasive, their judgments should reflect that 
consideration.  
 Cleon’s is a strongly affective speech intended above all to animate the assembly. It is 
tempting to read his oratory as an example of the kind of enflamed demagoguery that 
Thucydides worried might threaten the democracy.98 Indeed, to the extent that Thucydides 
portrays him as a sham Pericles, we might interpret Cleon’s emotional but unreasonable speech 
as an example of debased Athenian rhetoric.99 But Cleon is not appealing to emotion so much as 
he is trying to shape it; he shames the assemblymen for their pity while trying to rekindle their 
anger. He is, to paraphrase Aristotle, trying to warp the assembly’s collective straightedge – its 
judgment – before asking it to decide the case.100 From this perspective we see that Cleon takes 
emotion and commonsense no more seriously than he takes justice as measures of good political 
                                                 
98 Writing on affective speech in the post-revolutionary American context, Jason Frank (2010: 78) eloquently 
describes it as “the element of communication that resonates with clusters of sub-representational and pre-cognitive 
forces in the body, though not with ‘natural’ or ‘instinctive forces somehow untouched by historicity or cultural 
organizations.” For commentary on Thucydides’ apprehension about the effectiveness of affective rhetoric in the 
Mytilenean debate, see Andrewes (1962: 75-76). 
 
99 The rhetorical parallels between Pericles and Cleon are prominent and well-noted in the secondary literature. For 
instance, we can hear echoes of Pericles’ emphasis on consistency at 1.140.1, 2.13.2 and especially at 2.61.2 in 
Cleon’s insists that he has not changed his mind about Mytilene at 3.38.1, where he borrows much of the same 
language. We find the same pattern in Cleon’s depiction of the Athenian empire as an unjustly gotten tyranny that is 
nevertheless dangerous to lose (3.37.2, 3.40.4) that we initially found in Pericles’ description of the Athenian 
imperial dilemma (2.63.2).    
 
100 Rhetoric (1354a25). Unlike Plato, who regarded all rhetorical practice as evidence of sophistry, Aristotle 
recognized that rhetoric had a place in political deliberation, but thought the high stakes of such discussions would 




judgment. Cleon manipulates all of these in order to commit the assembly quickly and firmly to a 
rash course of action into which he has invested much personal credibility.101        
Whereas Cleon urges haste, Diodotus cautions restraint. “The two things I consider most 
prejudicial to good counsel are haste and high emotion,” he begins, “the later usually goes with 
folly, the former with crude and shallow judgment” (3.42.1). Diodotus finds Cleon’s marriage 
between justice and expediency incongruous. His counter-argument redirects the assembly’s 
attention to its own strictly material interests. Before turning to the substantive issue of Mytilene, 
however, he issues a broader critique of Athenian deliberation and judgment. Cleon has accused 
anyone wishing to reexamine the Mytilene question of having accepted bribes, a common tactic 
meant to bruise his opponents’ reputation and to sow seeds of distrust among the assembly.102 
Diodotus implores his audience to see how that dynamic hinders the city’s political judgment:  
The good citizen should want to prove the better speaker, not by intimidating his 
opponents but in a fair debate. In the same way, the prudent city should not keep 
conferring fresh honors on the person who regularly gives it good advice, but neither 
should it detract from those he already has; and the speaker who fails to win assent 
should not only not be punished but should not be held in any less respect either…Our 
actual practice is just the opposite of this…It has therefore come about that good advice 
honestly given has become as suspect as bad, and the result is that just as the person who 
wants to urge some dire proposal resorts to deceit to win over the people, so the person 
with better policies must lie to be credible. This is therefore the only city so clever that it 
is impossible to do good here openly and without deceit. (3.42.5, 43.1-3). 
Conditions within the assembly are not conducive to honest deliberation. By rewarding 
persuasive speakers and punishing those who are less convincing, the Athenians have deprived 
themselves of two essential features of good decision-making: honest counsel and dissenting 
                                                 
101 It is difficult to read Cleon’s arguments in the Mytilenean debate free from the prejudice of Thucydides’ final 
judgment of the orator, whom he insists exacerbated the war in order to cover up his nefarious slander and misdeeds 
(5.16.1).  
 




opinion. Any speaker wishing to give his best advice must be cagey about it, and this diminishes 
the full array of policy options available to the assembly’s appraisal.103 Taken in context, 
Diodotus is of course rebutting Cleon’s effort to smear him; yet the passage also supports 
Cleon’s earlier criticism of the assembly as a gathering of theatergoers rather than of serious-
minded citizens.104 Worse still, the assembly will punish even the most persuasive speaker if his 
advice turns out to have been wrong. Echoing Pericles’ final speech, Diodotus concludes his 
opening on a critical note: “when things go wrong you punish the single judgment of your 
adviser, not the multiple judgments on all your own parts that were implicated in the same error” 
(3.43.5).105 Here, Diodotus departs from Cleon by reminding the assembly of its civic role and 
the responsibility it ought to bear for decisions made in its name while providing, as Arlene 
Saxonhouse describes it, a “vision of a city” where pretenses to deception are not necessary.106  
Having established the difficult task before him, Diodotus posits advantage as the single 
criterion by which the assembly should decide on the Mytilene question. “The debate, if we are 
sensible,” he says, “is not about their guilt but about the right planning for ourselves” (3.44.1).107 
He advises the city to consider more carefully who among the Mytileneans should be punished 
and who spared. Once armed, after all, the city’s democratic sympathizers turned on the 
                                                 
103 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric (1354b22-24). 
 
104 We shall see a similar argument from Plato’s Socrates in Chapter 2.  
 
105 For further discussion on this point, see Gomme (1956: 313) and Ostwald (1979: 9).  
106 Saxonhouse (2006: 157).  
 
107 It is useful to compare Diodotus’ language with Hermocrates’ effort to persuade Sicily to unite against Athens: 
“If we are sensible (kaitoi gnōnai), we should recognize that our conference will not be concerned only with our 
separate interests (idiōn monon), but with whether we can still secure the safety of Sicily as a whole” (4.60.1). 
Connor (1984: 84) argues that because Diodotus does not feel that he can appeal to a competing formulation of right 
and wrong (to dikaion), he instead appeals to advantage (to xympheron) and manipulates the deliberative setting to 




rebellious oligarchs.108 Punishing these friends as though they were enemies would suggest that 
there was no value in remaining loyal to Athens. He says it would be disadvantageous to treat 
them harshly; he does not say that it would be unjust. In fact, Diodotus does not contest Cleon’s 
retributive notion of justice at all in his counter-argument, suggesting that his milder proposal is 
motivated by a commitment to realist conceptions of material advantage rather than by the tacit 
normative principles many have attributed to him.109    
Diodotus persuades the assembly to spare most of the city, but his manner of doing so is 
less than satisfying. Following Connor, and mindful of Diodotus’ prologue, we might attribute 
our dissatisfaction to his blatant misrepresentation of the case.110 Diodotus does not so much 
persuade the assembly as deceive it. The counter-revolutionary democrats who prevented the 
uprising were not acting on Athenian sympathies, as he suggests, but rather on their own 
interests. Diodotus also ignores the question of why the assembly regretted its decision in the 
first place. Surely the first ship was not “sailing without urgency for its horrible business” 
because it worried about harming Athenian interests alone (3.49.3). Instead, Thucydides 
indicates that the assembly recognized something intuitively disgraceful in its rash decision, 
thereby alerting us to a constructive affective aspect of judgment. Cleon criticized the Athenians 
for allowing their emotions to cloud their judgment; yet Diodotus might have challenged that 
point by insisting that their regret should motivate them question the wisdom of their initial 
judgment. By not pressing upon what this reflexive moment might suggest about the city’s 
                                                 
108 Diodotus misstates the facts in this depiction of the case, perhaps intentionally. The “democratic” mob used the 
threat of defection to Athens as leverage against the city’s oligarchs in order to get grain, not because they were 
particularly sympathetic to Athens.  
 
109 See Heath (1990: 387). 
 
110 Connor (1984: 88-89). 
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character, Diodotus leaves unaltered Cleon’s portrait of Athens as a tyrant whose judgment is 
clouded by fear of friends as enemies. He thus provides it with no basis from which to correct 
future misjudgments. As if to underscore the point, Book Three closes on the Athenian decision 
to send an exploratory force to Sicily, thinking that war there would conclude quickly and serve 
as practice for the navy.  
The Mytilenean debate is the first set of speeches following Pericles’ death. Its placement 
within the narrative recalls Thucydides’ eulogy for the statesman, lamenting Athenian decline at 
the hands of orators who “were more on an equal level with one another” and who were 
therefore inclined to compete for personal influence rather than to promote the city’s best 
interests (2.65.5-10). This indictment, coupled with the uneasy resolution to the Mytilenean 
affair, would seem to confirm the impression of Thucydides as chiefly critical of Athens’ 
democratic constitution. However, if I am right to suggest that even its purportedly wisest 
advisor, Pericles, was unable to teach the assembly how to judge better, we see that fault lies 
partly with the likes of Diodotus. Cleon’s advice is objectionable on moral grounds: the problem 
with Athens is not that it is an ineffective tyrant, but that the city is beginning to act as a tyrant of 
any stripe. By failing to contest the wisdom of tyrannical foreign policy, Diodotus’ advice 
actually serves to make it more tyrannical by clarifying its interests.111 At best, he teaches Athens 
to think as a more prudent tyrant than as a reflective democracy. Even this lesson would be lost.  
 
 
                                                 
111 In this way my interpretation departs from Saxonhouse (1996: 61), who reads Diodotus as the “real democratic 




1.3. Tyrannical Calculus: The Sicilian Expedition 
Twelve years after the Mytilenean debate, Athens was enjoying a tenuous peace with 
Sparta and sought to expand her empire westward. We know from Book One that the Corcyraean 
alliance was partly predicated on that city’s coastal proximity to Sicily, indicating that Athens 
had eyed the island for some time (1.44). Yet despite an earlier series of campaigns (427-424 
BCE), most Athenians knew ominously little of the place. Thucydides darkly recalls that most 
were unfamiliar with the island’s size or its population “and were unaware that they were taking 
on a war almost on the same scale as the one against the Peloponnesians” (6.1.1).112 
Foreshadowed since Book Two, the campaign’s collapse in the summer of 413 – the narrative of 
the Sicilian defeat is surely among the worst slaughters recounted in any military history – 
appears, with the historian’s hindsight, to have been inevitable. But the expedition’s fate was not 
at all clear to the men who voted for it in 415. When an Egestan envoy approached Athens that 
year, the city felt more secure in her empire than at any time since the war with the 
Peloponnesians began. The further promise of Egestan wealth gave every impression that war in 
Sicily would provide an affordable opportunity for greater honor and imperial control. In short, 
the Sicilian expedition seemed, to those who decided on it, as sure a bet as any in the city’s 
imperial history. Understanding how the Athenians arrived at their decision and explaining why 
it was wrongheaded is, I argue, one of the History’s primary aims. It is perhaps curious, then, 
that Thucydides is not of a single mind on the subject. 
                                                 
112 Thucydides underscores Athenian ignorance of Sicily by opening Book Six with a digression dedicated to the 
island’s history that is similar to the archaeology of Book One (6.1.2-6.5). He describes Sicily as a large island – 
taking merchant ships took nearly eight days to circumnavigate – populated by barbarians as well as Greeks who 
settled there in Doric and Ionian waves. Though prone to earlier territorial disputes, it was more unified by 416 than 
this brief anthropological sketch might suggest. 
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In one sense, Thucydides considers the Sicilian expedition a misjudgment rooted in the 
careless adventurism of a willfully ignorant demos.113 Sicily was not only larger and more 
densely populated than most Athenians realized, but also unified under Syracusan hegemony. 
This should not have been news to Athens. As noted, the city dispatched twenty ships to Sicily to 
support a Leontine war against Syracuse in 427. Thucydides explains that Athens sent the ships 
to halt Sicilian grain shipments to the Peloponnesians and to test the possibility of “bringing 
affairs in Sicily under their control” (3.86.4). A series of bare reports scattered across three books 
tell of marginal victories, embarrassing setbacks and shifting political alliances (3.86, 88, 90, 99, 
103, 115; 4.1-2, 24-25, 46, 48.6; 5.4-5).114 In the end, these early efforts only consolidated 
Syracusan hegemony when the Sicilians made peace amongst themselves in 424 (4.65.1).115 At a 
minimum, however, these events should have provided Athens with more than a passing 
familiarity with the island and its readiness for war. If Thucydides is right that the assembly had 
either forgotten about these earlier episodes or, especially of its younger members, never knew of 
them at all, then the Sicilian expedition exemplifies a category of misjudgments born of 
ignorance.   
For opponents of imperialism, using the Sicilian expedition as shorthand for ignorant 
foreign policy remains attractive. Yet Thucydides also attributes the expedition’s failure to 
dysfunctional domestic politics. In Book Two, he writes that the expedition “was not so much a 
                                                 
113 For those who maintain that the decision to sail on Sicily itself was the greatest Athenian misjudgment of the 
war, see Liebeschutz (1968: 299-306), Gomme (1970), de Romilly (1979: 200), Ober (1998: 114-115). 
 
114 See Rutter (1986) and Bosworth (1992) for detailed commentaries on the significance of these reports and their 
corroboration by other sources. 
 
115 The generals who were then in charge of the Athenian contingent – Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon – 
were punished for failing to bring the island to heel. Thucydides suggests that the charges of bribery brought against 
the hapless generals were motivated by the city’s unreasonable expectation for easy victory (4.65.4). These charges 
contributed to Nicias’ own concern for his safety if he returned to Athens empty-handed (7.15.4, 48.4), and recall 
Diodotus’ worry that the assembly holds public men to unfair standards.  
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mistake of judgment about the enemy [Athens was] attacking as a failure on the part of those 
sending the men abroad to follow up this decision with further support for them” (2.65.11).116 
“Instead,” he continues, “they engaged in personal intrigues over the leadership of the people and 
so blunted the effectiveness of the forces in the field and for the first time embroiled the city at 
home in factional turmoil.” This passage likely refers to the recall of Alcibiades, suggesting that 
the daring and inventive general could have capitalized on the expedition. Thucydides reinforces 
that impression in Book Seven, where he appears to agree with Demosthenes’ assessment that 
Nicias acted too cautiously at Syracuse and allowed the Spartans time to reinforce their Sicilian 
allies (7.42.3).117 On this view, the decision to sail may have been sound, but the judgments 
about its leaders may have been misplaced. That is, the Athenians may have been right to attack 
Sicily but were wrong about who they sent to do the attacking. Conversely, the Athenians may 
have been imprudent to sail on Sicily and even less wise in their choice of leadership. 
Thucydides’ wavering assessments of Nicias and Alcibiades – a complexity we do not see in his 
characterization of earlier figures – lend support for both hypotheses, adding a wrinkle to the 
narrative not captured in the Mytilenean debate.118        
In a final sense, the problem was more normative than strategic in that it reflected the 
kind of pleonectic foreign policy that Thucydides uniformly critiques throughout the narrative. 
                                                 
116 This might seem surprising given the immense size of the initial fleet – 100 triremes, provisions to pay each 
sailor one drachma per day, sixty unmanned warships, forty transport ships, excellent staffs and the city’s best 
infantrymen (6.31.3), and an eventual force of 134 triremes, 5,100 hoplites, 700 slingers (all from Rhodes), 120 
light-armed troops from Megara, and a horse-transport carrying thirty cavalry (6.43) – as well as initial 
reinforcements that included ten Athenian ships and 120 talents of silver in 414, plus an additional sixty Athenian 
ships, five more from Chios, and 1,200 Athenian hoplites under the command of Demosthenes the following spring. 
 
117 See de Romilly (1979: 208). Syracuse had fallen into despair before Gyllipus arrives, as the Athenian force was 
recruiting more successfully and drawing on more reliable supply networks (6.103.2-3). Indeed, Gyllipus was 
operating under the assumption that Sicily had already fallen when he arrived (6.104).  
118 Westlake (1968: 15) notes that Thucydides’ characterizations become more complex in later stages of the 




We find evidence for this interpretation in the historian’s estimation of why the Athenians 
wanted to sail on Sicily in the first place. For outside observers, the Athenians ostensibly 
campaigned in order to protect their distant kinsmen, the Egestans, from Syracusan hostility.119 
In addition to recalling their earlier alliance, the Egestan envoy that approach Athens in 415 
warned that an unchecked Syracuse would soon join with Sparta and revive the Peloponnesian 
War (6.6.2). The Egestans gave compelling arguments, but Thucydides is quick to disabuse his 
reader of the impression that supporting a distant ally was the campaign’s “truest cause” 
(alethestate prophasis). He reports that Athens was “bent on campaigning” and that her “desire 
for complete conquest” really motivated her expedition (6.6.1). Alcibiades confirms this plan in a 
later speech to the Spartans, where he informs the world that Sicily was intended as the first 
target in a much larger effort to control Italy and Carthage before doubling back on the 
Peloponnesus in an imperial march toward Mediterranean conquest (6.90.2-4). Taken from this 
perspective, the expedition not only reflected the Athenians’ imperial pleonexia but also 
demonstrated a pronounced break from Periclean strategic moderation.     
Thucydides’ analysis of the expedition’s “truest cause” combines the analytical theme of 
Book One with the study of Athenian pleonexia established in the first five books of the History. 
Here, Thucydides wants his audience to understand the Sicilian campaign as a manifestation of 
extreme post-Periclean imperialism. Indeed, his description of everyone in the city as having 
“fallen in in love” (kai erōs enepese) with the voyage recalls the erotic language Pericles 
employed in his funeral oration, when he called upon the citizens to become lovers (erastai) of 
                                                 
119 The status of this alliance is somewhat shaky, as it refers both to the Athenian alliance with Leontini during 
Athens’ first invasion of Sicily in 427, as well as to an ethnic Ionian affiliation that Thucydides explains only by 
attributing the foundation of Leontini to invaders from Naxos (6.3.3). See Bolmarcich (2011: 58-59) and Fragoulaki 
(2013: 298-9).  
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the city (6.24.3-4, 2.43.1).120 Fourteen years after Pericles’ death, the Athenians had gone from 
aspirational lovers of the city and her common good to lovers of themselves and their private 
interests. The decision to sail therefore typifies, among other things, the Athenian tendency to 
privilege private interests over the public good in political decision-making in the second half of 
the war. 121 As Ober puts it, “Given the context of lust, misinformation, selfish individual 
interest, false pretexts, outright lies, corrupt rhetoric, and suppression of dissent in which the 
decision was made, it would be a great stroke of luck…for all to go well.”122 The debate between 
Nicias and Alcibiades over the prospects of the expedition’s success reflects these themes.  
The debate between Nicias and Alcibiades over the wisdom of the Sicilian campaign took 
place in the summer of 415, five days after the city initially committed to the expedition. They 
were supposed to deliberate about how they would conduct the expedition, not to debate the 
prudence of the expedition itself. Nicias, the well regarded general “chosen against his wishes” 
(6.8.4) to lead the campaign, thought the expedition unwise and sought to dissuade the assembly 
from undertaking it. In a striking similarity to Diodotus’ speech, his advice would appeal to 
Athens’ material interests. But unlike Diodotus, Nicias did not have the city’s emotions on his 
side. Thucydides gives little indication that the city was anything but enthusiastic about the 
prospect of conquest. For a leader not known for his public speaking prowess, a difficult 
oratorical task lay before him. Nicias moreover faced a formidable opponent in Alcibiades, a 
                                                 
120 See also Mynott (2013: 402, fn.1).  
 
121 Hans-Peter Stahl (2012: 127) describes Athenian blindness to consequences in ethical terms by highlighting the 
greedy lust that overcame the assembly (see, esp., 6.24.3). 
 
122 Orwin (1998: 119).  
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young and charismatic upstart who saw the campaign as a means of expanding on his growing 
influence within the democracy.123   
Nicias begins his address by briefly contesting Egestan claims to friendship and, 
implicitly, the demands of justice in their case. The conflict between the Egestans – whom he 
describes as non-Greek foreigners (allophulois) – and their rivals is of no concern to the 
Athenians, and the city is under no ethical or diplomatic obligation to support the Egestan cause 
(6.9.1). Acknowledging that his conservative reputation sets him at odds with the energetic 
Athenian ethos, Nicias next attempts to present himself as a simple soldier who is sacrificing his 
opportunity for greater glory in the name of the common good (6.9.2).124 “I get personal honors 
from this kind of thing,” he says, “Nonetheless, I have never in the past sought preferment by 
speaking contrary to my real beliefs, no do I do so now” (6.9.2-3). He then frames his objection 
to the expedition in terms of public and private interests by inviting the assemblymen to consider 
how the peacetime prosperity the city currently enjoys benefits their private lives (6.9.3). This 
appears to be a savvy rhetorical move. More than any other people, the Athenians have been 
consistently persuaded by arguments that unite the public and the private while privileging the 
latter: the city’s reputation for daring and glory are good insofar as they benefit individual 
citizens’ perceptions of themselves. Nicias recognizes this and chooses not to appeal to self-
sacrifice. He instead implores his fellow citizens to rationally weigh their potential political gains 
                                                 
123 This was not the first time Nicias clashed with Alcibiades. In 420, they argued opposite positions on the question 
of whether to join an anti-Spartan Argive alliance (5.43-46). After an earthquake delayed the decision, the Athenians 
eventually sided with Nicias to maintain peace with Sparta. 
 
124 Nicias’ claim that he benefits most from daring actions is dubious. When negotiating his eponymous peace, 
Thucydides reports that he was principally motivated by a desire to secure his own reputation (5.16.1). Entrusted 
with large forces during the Archidamian War, he won his soldierly reputation more from avoiding losses than from 
daring victories. As Pouncey (1980:119) observes, Nicias’ conservative model of success invites comparison with 
Brasidas, “who is unquestionably the most successful Spartan general of the Archidamian War” remembered above 
all for his daring. See also Westlake (1968: 93).   
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against their potential private losses in an effort to introduce some caution into their strategic 
calculations.  
The bulk of Nicias’ speech turns to reminding the assembly of Athens’ geopolitical 
position and the limits of her imperial reach. In words that echo Pericles, if not Cleon, he warns 
them that they are surrounded by enemies throughout the Aegean and cautions them against 
“spoiling to sail over [to Sicily] and bring back more here” (6.10.1). The previous winter’s 
skirmishes in Argive territory betrayed the frailty of the Spartan peace that he had built and 
struggled to maintain. The assembly must remember that Corinth, Megara, and Boeotia never 
accepted the terms of the agreement because it was “forced on them by adverse circumstances” 
(6.10.2) and may therefore attack as soon as an opportunity presents itself. Any additional 
resources should go to securing borders and maintaining peace. Furthermore, he notes that Sicily 
is a distant and unknown island whose people will, he predicts, resist subjugation even in the 
event of initial conquest. Gains there will be even more difficult to sustain than those in the 
Aegean. Finally, he reminds them that luck is fickle and cannot be counted upon to deliver 
another victory. Whatever concessions Athens won from the Spartans were granted as much by 
luck as through their own strategy, and the assembly should not tempt fortune by inviting still 
more conflict.  
For all his efforts, Nicias’ appeal to prudence is still addressed to a tyrant-at-rest rather 
than to an assembly of wise and thoughtful citizens. Nicias realizes this and nearly says as much, 
yet proceeds with a politically tone-deaf speech that, in W.D. Westlake’s words, gives “the 
unmistakable impression” of “carrying caution to excessive lengths.”125 He is, after all, a rarity: a 
                                                 




pious and conservative Athenian who “subscribes to the justice of the gods, not,” as Orwin puts 
it, “to the Athenian thesis.”126 So even though we know, with Thucydides’ hindsight, that he is 
likely correct about Sicilian expedition, we should not be surprised to find that his speech lacks 
the daring or affective verve that we might hear from a Themistocles or a Pericles trying to give 
the assembly unpopular advice. Indeed, Nicias exhibits the same wariness about the assembly’s 
fickle disposition that would resurface, albeit justifiably so, during his actual command (see, e.g., 
7.48). Yet for all that we might ascribe to him an abiding sense of futile justice, he, like 
Diodotus, does not object to the expedition because it is unjust, but rather because it is 
unnecessary. He does not even raise the question of friendship except to reject its relevance to 
the discussion at hand. Athens is surrounded by enemies, he concludes, and the assembly should 
behave cautiously as a result.  
But what if Athens were not beset by enemies? What if Sparta posed no threat and the 
Delian allies still contributed to her coffers? Would the assembly have any reason to forestall 
imperial expansion according to Periclean, Diodotean, or Nician logic? The answer, I think, is 
no. While Nicias does not subscribe to the Athenian thesis, then, he does not challenge the 
normative arguments underpinning it, either. This is not to say that Nicias is a coward or 
incompetent; rather, the failure of this most pious and virtuous of Athenians to publicly question 
his city’s overarching vision of the world speaks to the extent to which such a vision had 
entrenched itself as fact.    
 Nicias closes his speech with a miscalculated attack on Alcibiades’ reputation and 
character. According to Thucydides, the ad hominem attack may not even have been necessary. 
                                                 
126 Orwin (1994: 137). 
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Thucydides reports that many in Athens were already wary of Alcibiades’ extravagance, familiar 
with his youthful impulsiveness, and divided over his place in the city. Remarkably, Thucydides 
traces the city’s eventual destruction to this tension:  
For Alcibiades’ status among the townspeople was such that he indulged his desires 
beyond his actual means in maintaining a stable of horses and in other extravagances, 
which was just the kind of thing that was largely responsible later for the destruction of 
Athens. The people were so apprehensive about the scale of his general lawlessness and 
the self-indulgence of his lifestyle and also about the ambitions behind every activity 
engaged in that they thought he craved a tyranny and became hostile toward him; and 
although in the public sphere he was excellent at managing the affairs of war, in private 
matters they were every one of them offended by his mode of life and so they put their 
trust in others and in no time at all brought about the downfall of the city. (6.15.3-4)  
As Peter Pouncey rightly observes, this celebrated passage betrays “a trace of ambivalence on 
Thucydides’ part” that we can follow back to the difficult question of why the Sicilian expedition 
reflected poor Athenian judgment.127 The first part of the passage appears to confirm, in 
Thucydides’ own voice, Nicias’ attack on the young general as an impulsive and immature 
spendthrift whose advice could only damage the city. If this were all Thucydides wrote, we 
might be primed to regard Alcibiades as a wealthier version of Cleon: less a Periclean “first 
among equals” than a would-be tyrant among his subjects.128 Yet this is not Thucydides’ 
claim.129 The second part of the passage instead shifts responsibility for the disaster away from 
Alcibiades and on to the demos. When read against 2.43.1, we see that the problem with the 
Sicilian expedition was not necessarily the decision to sail per se, but rather the choice of 
leadership. Concerns about Alcibiades’ private life undermined his credibility with the demos, 
                                                 
127 Pouncey (1980: 106).  
 
128 As de Romilly (1979: 203) observes, Thucydides invites this comparison not only with editorializing but also 
with his use of enēge (lead on) with both Alcibiades and Cleon (6.15.2; cf. 4.21.3). Nicias, it follows, appears to 
embody rational but unpopular argument that has the benefit of being correct. Westlake (1968: 9-10, 15) posits that 
the first part of the passage was likely added much later in the History’s composition than the rest of Book 6.  
 
129 See Strauss (1964: 192-195, 204); Pouncey (1980: 108). 
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leading first to a failed vote for ostracism and later to his recall under suspicions related to the 
mutilation of the Herms (6.53.1-2).130 Thucydides’ later digression into the story of Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton’ assassination of Hipparchus – the so-called tyrannicides – suggests that these 
worries were exaggerated. By choosing the wrong leadership for an already risky endeavor, the 
assembly, in de Romilly’s words “failed even more seriously to follow the principles of euboulia 
and committed an even worse mistake.”131 Understood this way, Thucydides’ introduction of 
Alcibiades prepares us to notice how the demos misjudges the qualities necessary for success in 
this particular expedition. I argue that he also gestures toward a further point that will become 
clearer in Chapter 4; namely, a speaker’s reputation mattered in Athenian democracy. Alcibiades 
may have had the requisite talents to make the Sicilian expedition a success, and may have 
therefore been right to advocate on its behalf. But I depart from thinkers like Strauss and 
Pouncey when they use Alcibiades’ recall as evidence of an irrational demos. Like David 
Gribble, I think it more plausible that Thucydides was conflicted about the young general and 
thus gives his readers good reasons for sharing his doubts.132     
 Thucydides reproduces Alcibiades’ speech as a rhetorical inversion of Nicias’ address. 
Contra Nicias, Alcibiades claims a mantle of leadership precisely because his personal interests 
align with the political good of the city. He boasts that he has elevated the city’s reputation by 
taking the same risks that Nicias found irresponsible (6.16.5), but worries that the city has a habit 
of castigating great men during their lifetimes and revering them in posterity (6.16.6). This 
observation yields two insights into Athenian psychology that eluded Nicias but prove important 
                                                 
130 On efforts to ostracize Alcibiades, see Rhodes (2011: 42-43). 
 
131 De Romilly (1979: 209).  
 
132 Gribble (1999: 175-188). 
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for shaping the city’s judgment. Alcibiades understands that leading a daring but capricious 
people entails unavoidable personal risk. The assembly will not take a conservative argument 
seriously, however sound, because by this point in the narrative conservative policies are un-
Athenian. Alcibiades also challenges the Athenian’s collective memory by recalling the 
persecution of great leaders like Themistocles.133 By reminding his opponents of the assembly’s 
previous prejudices, he temporarily wins their favor. His inability to see his own fate in the 
memory of such role-models as Themistocles, however, speaks to his own lack of wisdom. Yet 
this rhetorical move evinces a keen affective intelligence that proves invaluable to persuading 
audiences time and again. In a single stroke, he simultaneously disarms Nicias’ assault while 
positioning himself to exploit his audience’s prejudices.     
Alcibiades proceeds from this self-defense to profoundly misstate the military conditions 
in Sicily, arguing that the island’s cities are not only disunited but also poorly armed (6.17.4-6). 
In a noteworthy departure from Pericles’ vision of Athens as the “school of Hellas” (2.41), he 
faults the Sicilians for tolerating diversity, insisting instead that their openness is a source of 
weakness. Like Cleon, Alcibiades internalizes a perception of difference as instability. For this 
reason, he contests Nicias’ attempt to paint the Egestans as barbarians. “There is an obligation to 
support them,” he says, “since that is the oath we swore…we did not make them associates to 
take their turn helping us here, but to harass our enemies there enough to keep them from 
attacking us” (6.18.2-3). These remarks are noteworthy for two reasons. First, they partly echo 
Pericles’ comments regarding allies. Unlike Pericles, Alcibiades enlists a normative conception 
of friendship that for the first time places a moral demand upon the city.134 But the statement also 
                                                 
133 Themistocles’ expulsion from Athens and eventual defection to Persia (1.135-138) foretells Alcibiades own 
experience after his recall.  
 
134 This is a conception of justice as apo tou isou, or “on fair terms” (1.77.3). 
 79 
 
lends his argument an air of Cleonic paranoia: Athens is not only at war with the rest of Hellas, 
but also with Mediterranean enemies who will fall upon the city if given half a chance to do 
so.135 Whereas Nicias warns the assembly not to pursue another war, Alcibiades insists that 
Athens is already embroiled in one.  
The parallels between Pericles, Cleon, and Alcibiades become more pronounced when 
Alcibiades turns to discuss the empire and its security. As in the Mytilenean debate, Athens must 
expand if she is to resist subjugation:  
It is not an option for us to set limits to the empire like accountants; on the contrary, since 
we are in this situation we are forced to take active initiatives against some cities and 
keep our grip on the rest, because there is a danger that if we do not take other into our 
empire we shall fall into theirs. You cannot take the same passive stance as other states 
might, that is unless you are also going to change your whole style of life to match theirs 
as well. (6.18.3)  
By framing the rest of the world in threatening opposition to the city, Alcibiades supports and 
extends Cleon’s perverse view that tyrannical Athens cannot tolerate friends or neutrals. He also 
echoes Pericles’ final characterization of Athens as the seat of an empire that, however unjust, 
finds herself driven by necessity to expand in order to survive. Indeed, his view is more extreme 
than either of his predecessors’ insofar as Syracuse, unlike Mytilene and Sparta, demonstrates no 
foreseeable threat to the city. In short, Alcibiades transforms Athens from a ship of state into a 
great shark that must swim and eat in order to live. Sharks do not choose to swim or eat; if they 
rest, they die. Likewise, Alcibiades does not treat the Sicilian expedition as a choice but rather as 
a necessity dictated by nature.     
                                                 
 
135 Cf. Palmer (1982b); Cartwright (1984). On the parallel between Alcibiades and Cleon, see Conner (1984: 166); 
cf. Cartwright (1997: 234). 
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 Many have decried Alcibiades as a morally repugnant would-be tyrant who stokes 
Athenian fear and warps the assembly’s judgment. Alcibiades is, indeed, exceptional; and yet, as 
Steven Forde has argued, Alcibiades is also a product of the city at war.136 For all that we are 
tempted to read him and Cleon as perversions of Pericles, it is worth remembering Socrates’ 
charge in Plato’s Gorgias that if more sympathetic statesmen like Nicias, Diodotus, and Pericles 
were truly great leaders they would have inured the assembly to their opponents’ tyrannical 
rhetoric. Instead, they largely accept Athenian tyranny and adjust their arguments accordingly as 
the narrative continues. By looking to how these actors present judgments about the 
friend/enemy distinction, we can trace a clear line of Athenian decline. Cleon and Diodotus 
disagreed over whether or not Athens had any allies; by the time of the Sicilian debate, that is no 
longer a question. Nicias and Alcibiades agree on the fundamental fact that Athens is threatened 
on all sides. As such, the assembly’s scope of judgment narrows from decisions about how to 
regard friends and enemies to simply how best to deal with enemies. In short, the moral content 
has dropped out of their political judgment.   
1.4. Brasidas’ Better Judgment 
  This chapter has traced a gradual decline in the quality of Athenian political 
judgment. By renouncing justice as a relevant factor in her foreign policymaking, Athens 
alienated her allies and antagonized her enemies as she sought to conquer Greece. Decoupling 
ethics from foreign policy not only permitted the more extreme version of post-Periclean 
imperialism that Jacqueline de Romilly has observed, but also stripped Athens of any normative 
language that might justify her imperial ambitions to others.137 By emphasizing these points, my 
                                                 
136 See Forde (1989). 
 
137 See de Romilly (1978: 60-62). 
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reading of the History departs from the traditional realist interpretation of the text as one that 
eschews morality’s relevance to politics. As I read him, Thucydides was trying to teach his 
audience that political judgments devoid of ethical considerations were prone to pleonexia and 
manipulation. Yet I also resist interpretations of Thucydides that depict him as an idealistic 
moralist. Thucydides was interested in the ways in which morality could guide foreign policy, 
but he did not reduce political judgment to decisions about morality alone. In his view, virtues 
like moderation and justice ought to inform foreign policy decisions by setting justifiable goals, 
clarifying the distinction between friends and enemies, and setting some parameters on action; 
but actors must also consider realist questions related to material capabilities and strategic 
priorities. That is, good Thucydidean political judgment must aim at the good while doing so 
effectively under non-ideal circumstances. Moreover, by depicting judgment as an activity taken 
up by imperfect people confronting exceptional conditions, Thucydides lays bare the difficulties 
that any democratic readers would face as they struggled to make good decisions themselves.    
Thucydides’ depiction of the Spartan commander Brasidas provides a better model of 
political judgment than any we find in Athens. Thucydides esteems Brasidas, his most explicit 
opponent, as highly as any other figure in the History.138 Contemporary readers have therefore 
searched Thucydides’ characterization of the Spartan for clues to an otherwise inchoate account 
of excellence. Most focus on what Thomas Heilke describes as Brasidas’ “realist wisdom,” 
which combines Spartan virtues like moderation, valor, and self-sacrifice with Athenian qualities 
like daring, eloquence, and spontaneity.139 Noting that Brasidas is the only character in the 
                                                 
138 Connor (1984: 130-131) argues, somewhat tenuously, that Thucydides does not mean to praise Brasidas himself, 
but rather to capture his reputation among those who adored him. Cf. Orwin (1994: 79-81). Probably Thucydides’ 
only genuine enemy in the History is Cleon, whom Kagan (2003: 176) notes was the historian’s chief accuser 
following the loss of Amphipolis to Brasidas.  
 
139 Heilke (2004: 129). 
 82 
 
History who makes a sacrifice to Athena, Strauss encourages us to see him as “the Athenian 
among the Spartans.”140 “He surpasses the other Spartans not only by his intelligence, initiative, 
ability to speak, and justice but also by his mildness,” Strauss continues, “He is the only 
Thucydidean character praised by the author for his mildness.”141 Following Strauss, Steven 
Forde encourages us to see parallels between Brasidas as the most Athenian Spartan in the 
narrative and Nicias as the most Spartan Athenian.142 Yet whereas Nicias’s superstitious caution 
paralyzed him on the battlefield, Brasidas’ daring and eloquence, especially when moderated by 
Spartan virtues, earn him incredible success. These qualities are clearest when contrasted with 
Cleon during the Battle of Amphipolis in 422 (5.6-12).143 Here, the violent and blundering Cleon 
appears out of his depth while Brasidas is remembered for his courage and decisiveness. The 
comparison with Cleon is more striking when we note, along with Orwin, that Brasidas is the 
only character whom Thucydides describes as just in the entire work.144 Brasidas’ generosity 
toward would-be enemies and conciliatory diplomacy challenge the harshly retributive 
conception of justice Cleon applied to Mytilene. In short, Brasidas’ inversion of the Athenian 
thesis – i.e. treating opponents with moderation while aligning his own interests with the broader 
goal of Greek liberation – helps him garner friends while undermining his enemies. As I shall 
argue in this section, his focus on Greek liberation, combined with his characteristic moderation 
and justice, also give us insights into the qualities of good Thucydidean political judgment.     
                                                 
140 Strauss (1964: 213). 
 
141 Ibid. See 4.116.2.  
 
142 Forde (1986: 434). 
 
143 For a more sustained discussion of the comparisons, see, Heilke (2004: 124); Burns (2011); cf. Wylie (1992).   
 
144 Orwin (1984: 79). 
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For all of Brasidas’ noble qualities, however, Thucydides is never blind the Spartan’s 
flaws. As one commentator recently put it, “Thucydides’ admiration was tempered by his 
recognition of a canny opportunism, stemming from Brasidas’ failure to match his rhetoric to 
prevailing contingencies of power.”145 The same honey-tongued rhetoric that heralds Greek 
liberation also twists the truth, spins lies, and inflates the hopes of those who defect from Athens. 
“They felt there was no cause to fear,” Thucydides writes of these cities, “though this later 
proved to be an underestimation of Athenian power…They preferred to make their judgments on 
the basis of wishful thinking rather than on prudent foresight, as men often do when they indulge 
in uncritical hope” (4.108.4).146 While clear in his own thinking, Brasidas frequently manipulates 
the judgments of others as he campaigns through northern Greece, leaving contemporary critics 
like Timothy Burns skeptical of his virtue.147 Insofar as virtue demands a measure of self-
sacrifice and limitations on the means by which actors pursue their ends, Burns worries that 
Brasidas’ virtue is, at best, instrumental. Though I contend that Thucydides does not adopt the 
same rigidly rule-based view of virtue that Burns ascribes to him, these criticisms are difficult to 
meet and impossible to simply dismiss. Brasidas’ judgment is improved by his commitment to 
virtue, but he is not a uniformly truthful man. Even in his flaws, however, his example has much 
to teach us about political decision-making.    
Some of the reasons that make Brasidas stand apart in the History may seem awkward for 
my argument. First, Thucydides’ emphasis on Brasidas’ blend of Athenian and Spartan qualities 
makes him appear to practice a sui generis model of decision-making. We can strengthen this 
                                                 
145 Pazdernik (2000: 152).  
 
146 Schlosser (2012: 172) notes a parallel between the blindly hopeful cities defecting from Athens during Brasidas’ 
campaign and the dangerous hopes that Athens herself exhibits at Pylos. See 4.17, 4.21. 
 
147 See Burns (2011: 510-514). Also, see Orwin (1994: 79-81). Cf. Heilke (2004). 
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claim by noting his relative autonomy from Sparta while on campaign, including the degree to 
which he promised potential allies services that Sparta was either unable or unwilling to 
provide.148 As I detail below, his Thracian campaign employed few Spartan hoplites and his 
tactics depended as much on his quick wits (mētis, sunesis) as on his broader strategic judgment. 
Furthermore, Thucydides indicates that because Brasidas was the first Spartan “to go abroad and 
win a reputation for being in all respects a good man,” he left the impression among those whom 
he persuaded to defect from Athens that his countrymen would be just like him (4.81.3). (They 
were not.) All of this indicates that Brasidas was a man very much apart from his home city, and 
might therefore suggest that any praise accorded to him would remain his alone, not to be 
repeated. Yet Brasidas is not the only character possessing the unlikely qualities of his enemies. 
Again, Pericles – guest-friend (proxenos) to Sparta – and Nicias – proxenos to Syracuse – 
sometimes stand apart from Athens by tempering her native daring with a splash of Spartan 
caution. Likewise, the Syracusan Hermocrates demonstrates great strategic foresight and political 
insight while calling on Sicily to guard against Athenian invasion, all the while grounding his 
arguments in the language of the Athenian thesis.149 These men are unique among their home 
                                                 
148 Brasidas’ independence was largely responsible for his military successes. As Heilke (2004: 125) rightly 
observes, “Until his death…Brasidas suffers serious defeat only when he remains part of a larger Spartan contingent 
and cannot act independently.” 
  
149 See 4.61.4. Orwin (1994: 163-165) observes that Hermocrates is the only non-Athenian to articulate the Athenian 
thesis, deploying it “as the ground of a general political outlook.” Burns (2011: 519-20) favors Hermocrates as an 
exemplar of judgment “that stems from a sustained, serious reflection about human affairs.” In his view, Brasidas 
was either too delusional or naïve to recognize, as the Athenian thesis insists, that justice serves as little more than 
ex post justification for self-interested policy action: “Such reflection on the problematic nature of justice could have 
brought home to Brasidas the impossibility of sacrificing his own good in noble, virtuous actions.” I defend Brasidas 
against Burns’ critique by demonstrating not only the normative shortsightedness of the Athenian thesis but also the 
material and strategic advantages that come from rejecting it. I especially reject Burns’ claim that Hermocrates did 
greater damage to Athens than Brasidas simply because he rallied Sicily against Athens’ initial effort to take the 
island. He correctly reminds us, along with Cogan (1981: 80) that these events unfolded just as Brasidas was 
conducting his own campaigns; yet the difference between the failed Athenian invasion and Brasidas’ campaigns is 
that Athens, pursuing the imperial logic of the Athenian thesis, chose to mount the ill-fated campaign against 
Syracuse and her allies. While Brasidas would not likely have been successful if Athens’ allies enjoyed her rule, we 
should credit the Spartan for recognizing their weakness and exploiting it. As such, I argue that Burns’ example does 
not support the Athenian thesis as a method of judgment so much as it demonstrates its weaknesses.     
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polities. What sets Brasidas apart from even these figures, however, is that he takes conventional 
justice seriously.150 By upholding traditional Greek values during a war pitting Greek against 
Greek, Brasidas not only reconciles disparate Spartan and Athenian qualities but does so 
according to a broadly inclusive principle of justice. If Westlake is correct to argue that 
Thucydides exaggerates Brasidas’ role in the war, I suggest that his reason for doing so is to 
highlight this dimension of his character and the political judgments that follow from it.151  
 A second potential problem with looking to Brasidas as a model of judgment consistent 
with democracy is that he is not a democrat. As a Spartan soldier, Brasidas is largely free from 
engaging in political deliberations of the kind we hear in Athens, and we can only speculate 
about how he would fare in a forum like the Athenian assembly.152 Though I argue that his 
diplomatic exchanges display some qualities that democrats might hope to model, they are also 
rife with the kind of deception and false promises we found discomfiting about Diodotus’ 
contribution the Mytilenean debate. As I acknowledge below, Brasidas’ deceptive speech should 
give us pause; yet we should not lose sight of what Thucydides found distinctive about his 
diplomacy. Brasidas’ negotiations are successful because he is sensitive to the interests and 
concerns of those he is addressing, and his example teaches the strategic value of empathy. 
Unlike Diodotus, who implored the Athenians to make decisions that advanced their own 
interests at the expense of others, Brasidas encourages each city he encounters to understand 
                                                 
150 This aspect of my argument departs from Heilke (2004: 131) who reads the account of Brasidas’ Thracian 
campaign as a cautionary tale about boundless ambitions. Heilke rejects the notion that Brasidas actually took 
virtues seriously and only “appeared” to act justly and moderately. His final assessment is damning: “In any case, 
Brasidas’ excellences were imperfect, the success they wrought was partial, and their ultimate outcome ambiguous 
and ironic” (133). If Brasidas’ death teaches anything, according to Heilke, it is that virtue is limited.   
 
151 Westlake (1968: 149). 
 
152 Pazdernik (2000: 169) argues that, especially on his Thracian campaign, Brasidas essentially practiced his own 
foreign policy and was not accountable to anyone but himself.  
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their liberation within the broader context of Greek freedom. By teaching audiences to frame 
their arguments in terms of a normatively choiceworthy common good, then, Thucydides’ 
Brasidas imparts lessons that any deliberative community could appreciate.                           
*** 
Thucydides does not turn sustained attention to Brasidas until his Thracian campaign in 
Book 4, but he introduces him several times earlier in the History.153 Earlier episodes leave an 
impression of Brasidas’ courage and valor, laying the groundwork for his northern campaign in 
424. Brasidas finally began his march on Thracian territory after persuading the Spartan 
government to grant him seventeen hundred hoplites, six-hundred of whom were helots. His use 
of helots is noteworthy at a time when, as Kagan reminds us, the Athenians were encouraging 
their desertion and Sparta worried about a possible slave revolt.154 By taking six-hundred of their 
bravest fighters, Brasidas alleviated a domestic political issue while serving his own ambitions. 
The campaign was risky. Sparta had few friends in the north and the residents there, while only 
nominally allied with Athens, were suspicious of anyone bringing an army through their fields 
without permission. With a diplomat’s touch, demonstrative virtue, and cunning deception, 
however, Brasidas was successful: 
He had the reputation in Sparta itself of a man who always got things done and when he 
went out he proved himself invaluable to the Spartans. In the present situation he caused 
many of the cities to revolt from Athens through the just and moderate (dikaion kai 
metrion) way he dealt with them, while other places he took with the help of betrayal 
(prodosia) from within, so that when the Spartans later wanted to negotiate, as in fact 
they did, they had places available to transact in mutual exchanges and there was some 
relief of pressure on the Peloponnese from the war. And later on in the war, after the 
events in Sicily, it was the character and intelligence (aretē kai sunesis) Brasidas showed 
at this time…that did most to inspire enthusiasm for the Spartan cause among those who 
were allies of the Athenians. As the first Spartan to go abroad and win a reputation for 
                                                 
153 See 2.25.3, 2.90-92, 3.69, 4.12.2 
154 Kagan (2003: 171). 
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being in all respects a good man (agathos), he left behind a firm expectation that others 
too would be like him. (4.81.2).155  
Marching through Thrace and Chalkidia was a largely bloodless affair. Thucydides describes the 
campaign more as a recruitment opportunity than as an invasion, attributing much of Brasidas’ 
military success to his political connections in the area. Upon arriving in Trachis he enlisted 
friends in Pharsalos and proxenoi in Chalkidia to escort his army through the territory. With the 
help of these escorts, he assuaged Thracian fears and gained easier access to otherwise blocked 
roads. When his army encountered opposition, Brasidas charmed his opponents: 
Brasidas himself stated that he came as a friend to Thessaly…and was in arms against the 
Athenians, who were at war with him, not against them; although he knew of no hostility 
between Thessaly and the Lacedaemonians to prevent access to each other’s land, he 
would not now proceed against their wishes. (4.78.4) 
His deference bought him easier access to the territory than if he were to assault every blockade. 
“In this way,” Thucydides continues, “Brasidas hurried through Thessaly quickly enough to 
anticipate any preparation to stop him” (4.79.1). Through such accounts, Thucydides 
demonstrates the material benefits that come with affective intelligence and strong alliances. 
Persuasion is certainly cheaper than conflict, and one acquires allies besides.  
Though reflecting good strategic judgment, Brasidas’ strategy was not without political 
risks. As a member of a joint attack against Lynkos, he tested his friendship with the Macedonian 
king Perdikkas, who wished to employ him not as an arbitrator of his private quarrel with the 
Lynkestian king “but as the destroyer of those [Perdikkas] himself designated as enemies” 
(4.83.4-5). Rather than raze the city, Braisdas urged Perdikkas to allow him a counsel with the 
                                                 
155 Jowett’s (1998) translation of paraschōn suggests that Brasidas actively deceived these cities by saying that “At 
the time he gave an impression of justice,” while Rhodes’ (1998) translation suggests that “at the time” he was 
genuine. Though Tim Rood (1998: 71-74) references this passage to argue that Brasidas actively mislead defecting 
cities not only about Spartan support for their cause but also about his own virtuousness, I agree with Burns (2011: 
510) that there is simply not enough textual evidence to support that claim. Rather, copious references to Brasidas’ 
actual deeds lend better support to my sense that the Spartan was consistently motivated by conventional norms that, 
it is worth noting, did not preclude the possibility of individual gain.   
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Lynkestians to persuade them to become Lacedaemonian allies. Perdikkas refused because 
Brasidas was wrong to prevent the attack. Brasidas nevertheless stood firm and, though he 
abandoned his arbitration effort, persuaded Perdikkas to spare the city. Attacking Lynkos would 
have been an easy but costly decision. Given that Perdikkas was financing half of the Thracian 
campaign at the time, Brasidas might have considered his options limited and his hands tied in 
the matter. He also had to consider his friendship with Perdikkas and the normative demands that 
came with it. Refusing to attack Lynkos, an ostensible enemy, might appear to violate the terms 
of justice and friendship. Yet for a commander with limited resources, the prospect of besieging 
a peripheral city in Macedon must have looked like a distraction that might cost him men and 
would certainly cost him time. Friendship obligations notwithstanding, attacking Lynkos would 
have imperiled his campaign and undermined his broader effort to spur defections from Athens. 
Moreover, though Lynkos was not a Greek city, Brasidas’ success lay largely in his reputation 
for mildness; destroying Lynkos would make him appear more as a mercenary for Macedonian 
kings than as an emissary for peace as he approached neighboring cities.  
Brasidas’ handling of the Lynkos affair offers an important insight into how the Spartan 
balanced justice against expediency in his decision-making. Reasoning that he could part with 
Perdikkas’ money easier than he could his reputation, Brasidas tried to negotiate a settlement 
between the Macedonians. He failed. Yet in doing so, his decision spared the city, preserved his 
army, and added to his reputation. Most importantly, Brasidas’ stand against Perdikkas also 
asserted the Spartan’s capacity to make an ethically informed decision despite considerable 
material restraints on his options, tacitly challenging the assumptions underpinning the Athenian 
thesis in the process.  
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Brasidas’ political judgment is more problematically displayed in his capture of 
Akanthos. Thucydides reports that he arrived in the mid-summer “a little before the vintage” 
(4.84.1). The city was initially divided between Chalkidian sympathizers and the “common 
people” who were fearful of what a resentful Lacedaemonian army might do with their ripening 
fruit. This is the first occasion on which we hear Brasidas’ “not unskilled” oratory (4.84.3). His 
address begins by declaring Lacedaemonian intentions to “go to war against the Athenians as 
liberators of Hellas” (4.85.1). If the city stands against him and “in the way of freedom” for 
themselves, this will poison the well for other cities throughout the north. Without Akanthian 
acceptance he will likely meet resistance in every other city (4.85.5-6). The reverse assumption 
holds as well: if he can persuade the Akanthians to defect from Athens, the rest of Thrace and 
Chalkidia will likely follow suit. His entire strategy depends on maintaining this momentum. 
Perhaps because of Akanthos’ strategic significance, or perhaps because he is simply dishonest, 
Brasidas proceeds to deceive the besieged city into thinking that Athens is too timid to engage 
him in open combat. “It is not likely,” he falsely surmises, “that they will actually send against 
you a maritime force equal in numbers to the one [at Nisaia]” which he had earlier repelled 
(4.85.7). This statement not only grossly exaggerates the events outside Megara, but conceals his 
assumption that the Athenians are in fact sending a fleet – lead by Cleon, no less – to intercept 
him at that moment. Furthermore, he closes with the warning that, should the Akanthians refuse 
his invitation, he would be compelled to scorch their crop.  
Brasidas’ dishonesty and veiled brutality in this episode raise several difficult questions 
about his character, his reputation, and his status as a model of political judgment. Many critics 
ask how genuine any of Brasidas’ claims can be in light of the inconsistencies between his 
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purported mission and how he accomplishes it here.156 I suggest that we can better understand 
Brasidas’ tactics in this speech by comparing him with Diodotus from the Mytilenean debate. 
Both speakers deceive their audiences for what they take to be noble causes, and both are 
successful for doing so. They depart, however, in at least two ways. First, Diodotus encouraged 
the Athenian assembly to consider only their own interests when rendering their judgment on the 
Mytileneans. By contrast, Brasidas encourages his Akanthian audience to understand their 
situation primarily within a broader view of Greek liberation; private concerns for the vintage 
should be weighed more lightly. In this way, Brasidas appears more invested in virtue and the 
common good than his Athenian counterpart. This perception is undone, however, by the second 
way in which the two men differ, namely in the lies they tell. Diodotus lied to Athens about the 
partisan attachments of Mytilene’s as a secondary appeal to pathos. Brasidas lies about 
Akanthian safety under Spartan protection. It is one thing to persuade a people to stand for 
freedom and to prepare them for possible sacrifice; it is quite another to tell a people that they 
can defect from a powerful empire without suffering any great consequence. Indeed, Brasidas’ 
promises of protection were the primary factor in the Akanthian decision to defect (4.88.1). As 
we know, Sparta would soon abandon or brutalize the cities that defected to her during Brasidas’ 
campaign, and the Akanthians were no exception (4.120, 5.32.1). How unspeakably tragic, then, 
that they based their decisions on false hopes.       
Brasidas’ lies and half-truths are a black mark on his record, yet they did not undermine 
his posthumous reputation, nor should they obscure positive lessons from his example. As he 
moved throughout the northern territories, his strategic judgment balanced individual and 
communal interests in three ways. First, by treating formal enemies as would-be friends, he 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., Connor (1984); Orwin (1994); Heilke (2004); Burns (2011). 
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could spare his small army from heavy combat until the Battle of Amphipolis. His diplomatic 
policy not only bolstered his personal reputation for mild fairness, but also served to win more 
allies to the Lacedaemonian side than would a campaign of costly sieges and battles. Second, 
Brasidas’ march through the north granted him great personal independence from Sparta while 
cutting the Athenian navy off from its timber supply. This was a stroke of strategic genius that 
does not appear to have readily occurred to his fellow Spartans. Finally, his attention to justice 
and the boundaries of conventional morality restrained his private ambition. The alliances he 
extended all included moderate terms explicating each city’s autonomy as a free and equal 
member of the force against Athens upon their defection (4.86, 4.105, 4.121). Though he badly 
misjudged his fellow Spartans on their willingness to maintain those commitments, Thucydides 
gives no indication that he callously disregarded these cities’ safety. His goal was not to conquer 
the north but to defeat Athens by the most effective means possible, and that meant targeting her 
tribute-paying subjects. Thucydides suggests that his brilliance lay in the revelation that Athens 
would be defeated not by siege but by defections from her tyranny. Indeed, the discord Brasidas 
fomented within the Athenian empire proved devastating. If his goal was to damage his enemy, 
Athens, and help his friends, Greece, then his judgment served him well until his death.  
Brasidas’ deceptions can also teach a valuable lesson in political judgment. As noted 
above, Thucydides thought the defecting cities foolishly hopeful for believing the Spartan’s 
rhetoric. His seizure of Amphipolis from Thucydides himself seemed to confirm what Athens’ 
subjects wanted to believe. “They were fired with thoughts of change,” Thucydides writes, “and 
kept making representations to Brasidas, urging him to come and intervene, each of them 
wanting to be the first to secede” (4.108.3). This is hardly the description of a gullible people 
deceived by a charming charlatan. True, Brasidas misrepresented himself to these cities; yet 
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Thucydides writes as if they should have seen through is promises and reputation. In a word, 
they should have been more prudent, and that meant balancing their hopes for just liberation with 
the realistic expectation of Athenian counter-force. Joel Schlosser’s conclusions about the 
Sicilian Expedition could apply here as well: “hopes thus inflated prove delusive.”157  
1.5. Conclusion 
Reading the History as a study in political judgment alerts us to the relationship between 
practical and moral considerations generated by war. Rather than opposing morality and 
necessity, as is so often claimed, I argue that Thucydides shows how actors’ ethical judgments 
frame their perceptions of practical necessity. Athenian judgment faltered because it lacked 
appropriate considerations of how one understands the role of justice in regulating the 
friendship/enmity distinction. By regarding everyone as enemies, they effectively drove their 
allies into opposition. The pattern that began with Themistocles was repeated throughout the 
narrative to greater devastation for the embattled empire. In contrast, Thucydides uses Brasidas 
as an instructively imperfect exemplar of better political judgment. By combining moral 
reflection with affective intelligence, he is better able to clarify his interests than his pleonectic 
counterparts. Contra Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias, Brasidas sees himself surrounded by 
potential friends rather than enemies. By treating those with whom he meets as such, he wins 
alliances and demonstrates the strategic value of ethical political practice.  
A general lesson that contemporary readers can take from the History is that strategic 
judgments informed by ethically justifiable principles are also more materially sustainable than 
those that are not. Rather than viewing justice in tension with necessity, we see from Brasidas’ 
                                                 
157 Schlosser (2014: 173). 
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example that how one negotiates necessity is deeply aided by a prior conception of just action. 
This is not to suggest that practical reason always recommends caution, and that better 
judgments are those that default to restraint. Far from it. Brasidas was as much a man of daring 
action as he was of cunning diplomacy. But his actions were oriented toward goal – liberation 
from Athens – that other Greeks could understand and be persuaded to accept. Meeting the 
demands of justice with arms alone was, and remains, an unwise strategy. Words can sometimes 
open doors that siege machines cannot.   
 To be sure, Brasidas operated according to a conception of justice that was, as Plato 
would later demonstrate, seriously flawed. Arguing, as Polemarchus might, that “helping friends 
and harming enemies” perfectly captures what we mean by justice suffers serious practical 
problems, not least of which is the difficulty of deciding who falls into which category. But 
deciding to treat our opponents as potential allies commits us to the political work of 
deliberation, persuasion, and diplomacy that most would prefer to warfare. Successfully 
converting a would-be opponent into an ally is both normatively and strategically sensible 
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CHAPTER 2: THE MIDWIFE ON TRIAL 
The wounds they suffered during the Peloponnesian War were just scarring over when 
the Athenians brought Socrates to trial in 399 BCE. The war spared only a dozen triremes from a 
navy that once numbered in the hundreds, loosening Athens’ grip on the Aegean and, with it, her 
imperial revenues.1 Commercial traffic through the Piraeus slowed to a crawl while the Long 
Walls, symbols of the city’s defiance, lay in ruins.2 Flute players celebrated with hymns to the 
liberation of Greece as workers dismantled the defenses in 404. A Spartan-sponsored oligarchy 
briefly displaced the democracy that same year. Yet by the autumn of 399, the Athenians were 
speedily restoring agricultural production and resuming inter-Hellenic trade.3 They recovered 
their democracy four years earlier thanks to the populist general Thrasybulus and his Thracian 
allies. When Thrasybulus turned his attention to rebuilding the Long Walls and campaigned as 
far as the Hellespont in 401, it seemed that even the city’s imperial ambitions had been 
rekindled.4 If Thucydides was right to describe war as a “bloody teacher,” onlookers might have 
wondered what lessons the violence had taught Athens.  
                                                 
1 Even after the disaster at Sicily, the Athenians had rebuilt their fleet to 200 triremes. On the cost of the war to 
Athens, see Xenophon (2.2.20); cf. Hale (2009), Gomme (1956: 18-46), French (1991). 
 
2 Garland (1987: 58-100). 
 
3 See, e.g., Burke (1990: 7); French (1991).  
 





Plato addressed his Socratic dialogues to this apparently unchastened post-war Athenian 
audience. Rebuilding Athens required more than silver and timber; it demanded moral and 
political reflection on the part of her citizens.5 The reconstruction offered a prescient opportunity 
for the Athenians to reassess the methods of collective decision-making that their democracy 
relied upon. Plato’s Socratic dialogues underscore the urgency of that effort. By positioning 
judgment at the center of civic participation in the Athenian democracy, Plato’s work builds 
upon Thucydides’ concerns with the assembly’s capacity for consistently rational and ethical 
decision-making. Staging many of these works in the shadow of the Peloponnesian War, Plato 
invites us to interpret his dialogues’ philosophical questions within the same political context in 
which we read Thucydides’ History. With this in mind, we see that cultivating political judgment 
is as important to Plato’s philosophical project as it was to Thucydides’ historical work.  
Thucydides defined wise judgments as decisions that are consistent with the demands of 
justice. His History showed how the Athenians failed to take those demands seriously as they 
plotted policies of imperial overreach, or pleonexia. Specifically, he worried that excluding 
justice from political deliberation encouraged the Athenians to pass policies that turned their 
foreign allies into enemies, thereby dismantling the alliance network they depended upon. Worse 
still, he was concerned that the demos lacked the wherewithal to distinguish between the better 
and worse policy proposals put before them. Conversely, Thucydides celebrated the Spartan 
Brasidas for his moral restraint and strategic foresight. By orienting his material aims according 
to a clear – albeit problematic – conception of justice (i.e. helping friends and harming enemies), 
Brasidas served as a better model of political judgment than did his Athenian counterparts.     
                                                 
5 On the importance of the Peloponnesian War as a background to Plato’s work, see Frank (2007), Zuckert (2009). 
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Like Thucydides, Plato took a critical view of Athenian political judgment.6 He believed 
that the city’s ambitious public men, each trained in sophistic rhetoric, relied more on dazzling 
speeches and flattery than on reason when counseling the assembly on political matters.7 The 
second half of the fifth century had seen the Pnyx transformed into a showcase of oracular skill 
where clever speakers made weak arguments appear strong. Plato located the problem in 
sophistry’s influence over the young and condemned the movement for corrupting the men 
whom Athens would one day rely upon for political leadership.8 Yet sophists and politicians 
were only as influential as the assembly would allow. Plato also criticized the Athenians’ 
themselves for passively relying on this vocal but ill-informed group to instruct them in policy 
decisions.9 Plato insisted that any assembly of legislators must envisage itself not as a pliant 
body seeking entertainment, nor as a collection of self-deluded experts, but as an active organ of 
prudent political decision-making.10  
 Plato’s early and middle dialogues feature Socrates more prominently than any other 
figure, and it has become convention to assume that Socrates was more sympathetic to 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Apology (20a); Protagoras (313a-d, 320a). 
 
7 See Gorgias (463a-c). 
 
8 See Protagoras (313a-314c). One might object that Socrates is also guilty of corrupting the youth given his close 
association with Alcibiades. However, Alcibiades purportedly modeled himself much more in the likeness of 
Pericles – a point that Socrates raises in Plato’s Alcibiades as Socrates chastises his young companion for his 
ignorance and premature venture into politics (118b-c). This resonates with Socrates’ critique of Pericles in the 
Gorgias (517b-c) as well as in the Protagoras (320a-b).  
 
9 See, e.g., Protagoras (319c-d); Gorgias (455b-d, 481b). 
 
10 This claim follows Sheldon Wolin’s argument that while Plato did not deny each community member an 
opportunity to contribute to, and benefit from, his society “what he did deny was that this contribution could be 
erected into a claim to share in political decision-making” (1960: 57). Wolin is also right to follow Aristotle in 
noting that Plato distrusted popular rule because the average person was not capable of the unrealistic precision he 




democracy than the comparatively blue-blooded Plato.11 I resist that dichotomy. Plato has 
Socrates disparage democracy just as frequently as he has other characters, particularly 
Protagoras, advocate it. Unlike those who focus exclusively on Socrates’ “negative rationality,” I 
argue that Plato portrays the philosopher as a constructive member of Athenian political life who 
also models ways that democrats can improve their political decision-making.12 With the 
previous chapter in mind, it is tempting to cast Socrates in the same light as Thucydides’ 
Brasidas. Indeed, the two figures share several similarities: both men were excellent speakers, 
both were brave fighters, and their peers considered neither an ideal citizen. Moreover, they each 
took justice seriously as a guiding component of wise political judgment. But as Alcibiades’ 
flattering speech in the Symposium suggests, Plato intended to set Socrates wholly apart from 
such comparison.13 His differences from Brasidas are indeed telling. Socrates rejects Brasidas’ 
bellicose notion of justice in favor of a model promoting psychic harmony. He resists the 
Spartan’s expansionist ambitions, restricting his travel as much as possible within his city’s 
walls. His aims are also wider, his challenge to Athens more profound, than anything Brasidas 
demonstrates in Thucydides’ narrative. While Brasidas wanted to liberate the Hellenic world 
from Athenian imperialism, Socrates attempted to liberate the Athenians from their own imperial 
mindset. He tried to free their judgment from their narrowly material focus by urging them to 
                                                 
11 For an excellent review of this literature and debate, including arguments that Plato later supported Socrates’ 
execution, see Rowe (2001).  
 
12 See, e.g., Arendt (1990); Villa (2001: 1-58). 
 
13 As Alcibiades puts it, “As a whole, [Socrates] is unique; he is like no one else in the past and no one in the 
present—this is by far the most amazing thing about him. For we might be able to form an idea of what Achilles was 
like by comparing him to Brasidas or some other great warrior, or we might compare Pericles with Nestor…There is 
a parallel for everyone—everyone else, that is” (Symposium 221c-d). 
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reflect upon a richer conception of the good synonymous with justice. While Brasidas wanted his 
interlocutors to change their loyalties, Socrates wanted them to change their entire worldview.         
In the next chapter, I develop a more positive conception of Platonic political judgment 
through an interpretation of the Republic. Before turning to that dialogue, however, we must first 
understand Plato’s critique of fifth-century Athenian decision-making. For Plato, sound political 
judgment takes its direction from a rational understanding of human happiness, or eudaimonia. 
As we shall see again in chapter 4, eudaimonia was a central but contested feature of Greek 
ethics. Plato encourages us to align our understanding of eudaimonia with virtues like wisdom 
and temperance; in his view, the supremely happy life is above all supremely virtuous. He 
connects virtue to judgment by describing virtues as standards of behavior that imbue statements 
about praiseworthy or reprehensible action with meaning.14 He likewise locates the deepest 
source of civil discord (stasis) not in class tensions but in ethical disagreements between 
citizens.15 In his view, all ethico-political communities must grapple with the same challenge: on 
one hand, if citizens hold too tightly to their ethical beliefs, they grow close-minded and hostile 
to criticism; if, on the other hand, citizens hold too weakly to their ethical beliefs then virtue 
loses influence over action. Plato saw this problem in Athens. His fellow citizens were 
sometimes so confident in their moral beliefs that they brutally suppressed philosophical dissent. 
In other cases, they paid lip service to virtue publicly while pursuing every manner of venality in 
private. A third problem was more persistent – namely, the Athenians conventionally equated 
                                                 
14 For example, we cannot speak to a particular soldier’s bravery or cowardice without a universal conception of 
courage to which we can compare his action. Because all members of an ethical community must share the same 
conceptions of each virtue, Plato resists the Protagorean theory of conventional morality in favor of a model similar 
to the doctrine of the forms. See Cratylus (386a-387e). 
 




eudaimonia not to virtue but to pleasure. According to the popular view, all political judgments 
were merely hedonic calculations weighing anticipated pleasures against possible pains. It was 
this hedonic approach to political judgment that Plato attacked most vociferously throughout his 
Socratic dialogues.16    
Plato’s Socrates challenges conventional Athenian judgment through his elenctic method. 
Gregory Vlastos describes the standard elenctic procedure as follows: (1) the interlocutor asserts 
belief p, which Socrates considers false and aims to refute; (2) Socrates and his interlocutor agree 
to other premises which are logically independent of p but (3) inconsistent with p, whereupon (4) 
“Socrates claims that p has been proven false and not-p true.”17 The consequent confusion 
terminates in a state of puzzlement, or aporia, in which interlocutors have good reason to 
question their previously confident value judgments. Now humbled, both philosopher and 
interlocutor are able to see the moral problem before them with fresh eyes, rejecting bad 
arguments while searching for those that are true.  
Unlike eristic rhetoric, in which competing speakers try to negate each other’s claims for 
the sake of amusement or competition, the Socratic elenchus is supposed to teach us something 
about virtue. Vlastos and others contend that Socrates does not mean to embarrass his 
companions so much as to uncover knowledge (epistēmē) of morality.18 C.D.C. Reeve observes 
that Socrates also guides the process toward certain positive theses, namely that wisdom is the 
only virtue and that no one ever intentionally acts contrarily to what they know is best.19 Yet 
                                                 
16 As we shall see in the next chapter, Plato replaces pleasure with justice as the coordinating principle of sound 
political judgment. 
 
17 Vlastos (1982: 712). 
 
18 See Vlastos (1982) and Rappe (1995). 
 
19 Reeve (1988: 5). 
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even in these positive cases, Socrates rarely convinces his interlocutors that his beliefs about 
humanity’s basic goodness are correct. It is one thing to find oneself unable to refute a doctrine, 
quite another to believe it. Rather than using the elenchus to uncover moral knowledge, I argue 
that Socrates uses the method to teach us two lessons about good judgment. First, the elenchus’ 
aporetic effects teach us to be humble about how we define social goals. Through Socrates, Plato 
teaches us that any beliefs we maintain about what constitutes a just and good society are 
necessarily provisional and subject to reexamination, especially in light of new evidence and 
better arguments.20 Remaining open to the possibility that we are wrong prevents the kind of 
close-minded policies we saw in Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian Expedition. Second, the 
elenchus teaches us that there is a value to policy coherence and consistency. However 
provisional our beliefs about the principles that constitute social life, they nevertheless provide 
ends toward which we direct public policy. The elenchus might serve as a method by which we 
determine which policies advance or diminish those ends by comparing them with the original 
principles.    
  Unlike the politicians, poets, artisans, and other purportedly wise people whom he 
routinely encounters, Socrates does not present himself as an expert of virtue whose advice can 
set the city straight. He is not, in other words, an advisor of the Periclean stripe. He does not 
offer programmatic policy advice so much as he teaches an alternative method by which citizens 
might assess policy proposals and the goals they aim for. In this way, he portrays himself as a 
                                                 
20 As he says in the Cratylus, “I have long been surprised at my own wisdom – and doubtful of it, too. That’s why I 
think it’s necessary to keep reinvestigating whatever I say, since self-deception is the worst thing of all. How could 





fellow citizen-judge concerned with what is just and what is not.21 Insofar as he attempts to 
distinguish between coherent and discordant beliefs about justice, Socrates believes he is capable 
of judging between policies that will benefit the city and those that will harm it. When he 
announces to Callicles in the Gorgias that he is “one of the few Athenians … to take up the true 
political craft (politike technē)” (521d) he partly means to distinguish his own method of 
judgment from popular alternatives. He offers this as a method that more philosophically 
inclined citizens can adopt within a democratic context. Though Socrates is certainly no populist, 
we can nevertheless understand him as a sympathetic critic of democracy.  
 I trace Plato’s critique of Athenian political judgment through three dialogues, beginning 
with the Apology. Socrates identifies two related problems with Athenian judgment. First, he 
finds that the assembly bases its judgments on prejudice rather than on critical reflection. In 
Socrates’ view, popular judgment is a passive exercise more akin to theatergoing than the 
rigorous examination of truth and falsehood.22 As the self-proclaimed “gadfly” upon the horse of 
the city, Socrates seeks to re-engage Athens’ citizen-judges through philosophical discourse. 
Second, he decries the influence of false experts on the citizens’ decision-making. His immediate 
accusers would not be inclined to drag an old man into court if it were not for his unpopularity 
among the upper echelons of Athenian social life (23e). Socrates’ trial is a reflection of the 
extent to which elites have corrupted the city’s youth and endangered its future. While these 
                                                 
21 I take this definition of good judgment from his opening words in the Apology in which he exhorts the jury “to 
concentrate your attention on whether what I say is just or not, for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that of a 
speaker lies in telling the truth” (18a). Just as he favors frank, truthful speech in this address – his only before so 
large a body – he aims, I shall argue, to discern just from unjust beliefs in his other conversations.  
 
22 On the gullibility of the masses, see Protagoras’ position in Protagoras 317b. On the quality of citizen-judgments 
with respect to the quality of theatrical performance, see Revermann (2006). Partly because the recruitment 
necessary to perform in the choruses would have required a certain degree of democratization, Revermann insists 
that the average Athenian would have been more sophisticated interpreters of a dramatist’s authorial intent than their 
oligarchic critics might lead us to believe.   
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public men might make the Athenians think themselves happy through state-sponsored games 
and plays, Socrates thinks that he alone can “make [them] be happy” (36e), by encouraging them 
to re-examine their beliefs about eudaimonia. Though Socrates indulged in drinking and feasting 
as much as any of his younger companions, his enlightened view of happiness privileges care of 
the soul and psychic harmony above all else. Political decisions are better or worse depending on 
how well they direct collective action toward attaining that harmony.   
Plato’s Theaetetus and Protagoras dialogues envision a more positive conception of the 
philosopher’s political role within the democracy than much of the secondary literature 
recognizes.23 As Peter Euben and others observe, these dialogues capture some of Socrates’ most 
difficult and enriching conversations with the ardent democrat Protagoras.24 While these 
exchanges sometimes depict Socrates harshly criticizing democracy, he does not wholly dismiss 
collective decision-making as a means of self-governance.25 But by analyzing democratic 
participation through the voice of Socrates, Plato clarifies the challenges that democrats must 
attend to if their method of government is to avoid future calamities similar to those of the 
Peloponnesian War.         
2.1 Plato’s Critique of Athenian Judgment in the Apology 
With few exceptions, contemporary readers roundly condemn Socrates’ execution as a 
gross miscarriage of justice. This consensus is striking given the controversy surrounding nearly 
                                                 
23 See esp. Arendt (1990), Nehamas (1998: 40), Villa (2001).  
 
24 See Euben (1996). Though the Gorgias also explores similar themes, particularly in the exchange between 
Socrates and Callicles, I focus on the Theaetetus and Protagoras because Protagoras is more closely associated with 
democratic political judgment than Callicles. I nevertheless draw on the Gorgias where relevant to support my 
interpretation of the Theaetetus and Protagoras.  
 
25 For proponents of this view, see, e.g., Taylor (1933: 141); Wood (1974); Kraut (1984: 194,199, 207-8); Roberts 




every other aspect of the philosopher’s life and work. Commentators attribute his execution to 
his alleged hostility to popular rule, his unorthodox beliefs, his personal associations, and his 
open criticism of the assembly, as well as to his ascetic lifestyle and even his Spartan manner of 
dress.26 My aim here is not to further speculation about the jury’s attitude toward the old 
philosopher. Rather than ask why Athens executed Socrates, I ask why Plato and his companions 
thought the narrow majority was wrong to convict him in the first place.27 I also examine what 
Plato meant to teach us about good judgment through this example of its opposite. In what 
follows, I argue that the jury’s decision contradicted the city’s long-term interests. Echoing 
Thucydides’ critique of Athenian misjudgment, Plato uses Socrates’ trial as an illustration not of 
democratic shortcomings per se, but of the Athenians’ inability to link considerations of justice 
to their long-term civic interests.28 
 The Apology dramatizes Plato’s worry that because citizens based political decisions 
more on their collective prejudices and credulity than on well-reasoned beliefs, the city was 
uniquely susceptible to manipulation by statesmen and sophists alike. Underscoring the 
distinction Socrates draws between the elenchus and the sophistic rhetoric he criticizes at length 
in the Theaetetus and Protagoras, I argue that he resists sophistic claims to moral expertise by 
questioning the epistemic foundations upon which such assertions rest. This argument has 
implications for how we might understand the Socratic formulation of virtue as knowledge in the 
                                                 
26 The literature on each of these charges is immense. On Athenian perceptions of Socrates’ oligarchic sympathies, 
see, e.g., Wood (1974); c.f. Vlastos (1983), Kraut (1984: 199-202). On Athenian attitudes toward his unorthodox 
beliefs and associations with sophistry, see, e.g., Ober (1998); Blanchard (2000). On his willingness to shamelessly 
criticize the democracy, see, e.g., Strauss (1983: 43); Blyth (2000: 14); Saxonhouse (2006: 110). Nehamas (1998). 
On his ascetic lifestyle and provocative manner of dress, see Brickhouse and Smith (1998: 13-24).   
 
27 To Socrates’ surprise, a majority of only thirty votes convicted him (36b). 
 
28 Cf. Roberts (1994:73). Note that Socrates was as defiant of injustices under the democracy (32b) as he was under 




Protagoras, as well as for how we might interpret Socrates’ notion of politike technē in that 
dialogue and in the Republic. By connecting philosophical reflection to political practice, I argue 
that the elenchus bridges the divide between theory and practice through an examination of 
popular belief.29 The Apology is an especially fruitful text in this respect because it presents 
Socrates engaging the demos within an institution built for judgment.30     
Situating the trial within fifth and fourth century Athenian legal institutions highlights the 
political context in which its philosophical themes take shape. Readers of Thucydides’ History 
will recall Diodotus’ distinction between the assembly (ekklesia) as a space in which Athenians 
debated policy, and the lawcourt (dikasterion) where they meted out justice.31 As some historians 
have recently described it, the lawcourt was “partly judicial system, partly source of popular 
entertainment, partly economic redistribution mechanism … it was in some ways Athens’ most 
powerful political institution, even more powerful than the popular assembly.”32 Legal 
proceedings were ritualized affairs governed by a series of oaths that are worth closer attention. 
Each juror (dikastēs) swore a dicastic oath to judge “according to the laws and decrees of the 
Athenian people,” to resist tyranny and oligarchy, and to “give an equal hearing both to the 
                                                 
29 By describing Socrates’ defense speech as one meant to persuade the jury of his usefulness to the city, I mean to 
depart from Hannah Arendt’s (1990: 74) distinction between philosophical and political speech.  
29 See Thucydides (3.44.7). 
 
29 Mirhady and Schwarz (2011: 744). 
 
30 Though I will refer to the men assembled in the dikasterion as “jurymen” and “judges” interchangeably, I take 
Ober’s point that “The 501 Athenians who heard the case should be thought of as judges rather than jurors because 
they made substantive decisions about the meaning and applicability of law itself, rather than merely determining 
matters of fact” (2011: 139). My position is a qualification of Leo Strauss’ observation (1983: 38) that the Apology 
pits Socrates against the entire demos.  
 
31 See Thucydides (3.44.7). 
 




accuser and to the defendant.”33 Prosecutors and defendants promised to give honest testimony, 
to refrain from speaking on matters beyond the immediate charges, and to abide by the jury’s 
final decision. In addition to these procedural demands, all participants were also reminded of 
their ephebic oaths. These rites of citizenship required obedience to the polis, defense of 
comrades in battle, and dutiful observation of the “ancestral religion.”34 Socrates’ speech reflects 
many of these themes (18a, 28e, 32b-d, 35c). He insists on the Apollonian piety of his 
philosophical mission, and appeals to his military record in order to persuade the jury that he is, 
contra his accusers’ allegations, in fact a good Athenian who remains true to his word.35 
Conversely, Meletus, Anytus and Lycon’s charges of impiety (graphē asebias) and corruption of 
the youth mean to undermine Socrates’ status as a trustworthy observer of civil oaths. In their 
view, Socrates not only offends the city by denying its official gods but also endangers it by 
turning its young would-be citizens against their elders, thereby breaking his ephebic oath to 
protect the city.   
Plato’s account of the trial bridges the division between political deliberation and justice 
Diodotus exploited in his Mytilene speech. Socrates’ references to both the dicastic and ephebic 
oaths invite us to read his trial as an instance not only of legal judgment but also of political 
                                                 
33 The oaths were included in Solon’s reforms and became explicitly democratic features of Athenian criminal 
procedure. For a more complete reproduction of the dicastic oath, see Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012: 71-2). Some 
have speculated that because Socrates addresses the jury as “gentlemen” (ho andres; ho andres Athenioi) rather than 
as “jurymen” or “judges” (andres dikastai) he means to cheekily insult their prejudice against him. See Bonner 
(1908: 171); cf. Schanz (1893: 75).    
 
34 For a full account of the ephebic oath, see Lycurgus, 1.77. Cf. Taylor (1918: 499); Sommerstein and Bayliss 
(2012: 16). 
 
35 Socrates reminds the jurors of his distinguished service during the battles of Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, 
during which he “remained at [his] post where those [Athens] had elected to command had ordered [him]” (28e). 
Plato occasionally alludes to his military service in later dialogues. See, e.g., Symposium (220d-221c). Several 
prominent commentators have speculated that Socrates could not possibly have served at Amphipolis. See, e.g., 
Burnet (1954: 120); Gomme (1956: 638). Cf. Calder (1961).  
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decision-making. The jurors were not merely examining a body of evidence and determining 
whether or not Socrates was guilty-as-charged. Instead, a number of legal and philosophical 
ambiguities complicated their task, not least of which was the nature of the charges against him. 
The formal indictment against Socrates fell under a type of Athenian criminal procedure known 
as an agón timetós that carried with it no codified penalty, but required a two-part hearing. 36 In 
the first phase, the jury voted to either absolve or convict the defendant. In this case, the jury 
voted to convict and the case proceeded to a sentencing phase in which the jury decided between 
two penalties (tímesis) proposed by the defendant and the prosecutor.37 A third penalty was not 
available. The jurymen thus faced a two-fold series of questions: first, they had to ask what it 
meant for one to act impiously or to corrupt the youth – including an account of what evidence 
supported such charges – and, second, they would have to consider which of the two proposed 
penalties was justified by the nature of the offense. As there was no legal definition for piety or 
corruption of youth, their act of judgment could not be reduced to comparing evidence of 
Socrates’ activities to a standardized model of the sort they swore to uphold in their dicastic 
oaths.38 Rather, they faced a philosophical task of inquiring into the nature of piety, corruption, 
and justice. Determining punishment entailed additional considerations of the city’s interests. 
After delivering a guilty verdict, they had to weigh the political and moral consequences of 
                                                 
36 See Brickhouse and Smith (1988: 25). Ober (1998: 166) observes that this is a peculiar type of charge in Socrates’ 
case because it was typically reserved for elites.  
 
37 The standard reading the Apology takes its structure from the legal outline of the charges, dividing Socrates’ 
speech into the following order: the first stage includes the opening (17a-18a), the prothesis (18a-19a), the defense 
speech (19a-24b), the digression (28a-34b), the epilogue (34b-35d); the second stage entails the counter-penalty 
(35e-38b) and the closing address (38c-42a). See Brickhouse and Smith (1988: 24-37). Reeve (1989: 3) points out 
that this outline, though textually accurate, obscures an analytically fruitful tripartite structure in which we trace an 
arch from the “false” Socrates to a “true” rendition. 
  
38 Plato’s Euthyphro, staged against the backdrop of Socrates’ trial, illustrates the difficulty that even the city’s 
supposed experts on piety had in defining the term. 
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executing him against levying a fine or, as Socrates thinks is truly fitting, lavishing him with 
publicly provided meals in their most honored dining hall for the rest of his life.             
 Socrates begins by defining judgment as a practice of distinguishing between justice and 
injustice. In his opening address, he implores the jurymen to “pay no attention to my manner of 
speech – be it better or worse – but to concentrate your attention on whether what I say is just or 
not, for the excellence (arēte) of a judge lies in this, as that of a speaker lies in telling the truth” 
(18a).39 The conception of judging as an act of discerning between what is just or true and what 
is not, particularly when standards against which to measure either are provisional, recurs 
throughout much of the Platonic corpus.40 In this context, it puts the onus of defining justice and 
truth on the jurymen, whose verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty” will belie what should be a 
complicated philosophical inquiry into the nature of justice. In order to meet Socrates’ challenge, 
each juror will need to reflect on his conception of justice and assess the philosopher’s testimony 
and alleged activity against it. Socrates acknowledges that the jury will have difficulty discerning 
truth from falsehood because his “first accusers” had already turned them against him. He fears 
these older enemies because:  
[They] got hold of most of you from childhood, persuaded you and accused me quite 
falsely, saying there is a man called Socrates, a wise man, a student of all things in the 
sky and below the earth, who makes the worse argument the stronger. Those who spread 
that rumor, gentlemen, are my dangerous accusers, for their hearers believe that those 
who study these things do not even believe in the gods. Moreover, these accusers are 
                                                 
39 In the prooimion of his speech, Socrates warns the jury that, contra his accusers’ suggestions, he is not “an 
accomplished speaker at all” (17b). He explains that he has never before appeared in the lawcourt and is “therefore 
simply a stranger to the manner of speaking here” (17b-d). Prima facie we might think this ironic given the 
sophisticated speech we know he is about to give. His references to the shameful behavior others have exhibited 
before the court (34c) suggest familiarity with court norms. Socrates does not deny that he is a good speaker; he 
denies that he is an accomplished or clever speaker (dēinou ontos legein) with deceitful aims. Pace Aristophanes’ 
caricature in The Clouds, he must have expected his audience to expect clever speech. However, should his accusers 
“call an accomplished speaker the man who speaks the truth” then he is glad to accept the charge (17b). “It would 
not be fitting,” he continues, “to toy with words when I appear before you” (17c). Cf. Reeve (1989: 6). 
 




numerous, and have been at it a long time; also, they spoke to you at an age when you 
would most readily believe them, some of you being children and adolescents, and they 
won their case by default, as there was no defense. (18b-c)  
His first accusers included Aristophanes, whose popular comedy Clouds portrays a sophist 
named Socrates fancifully investigating natural phenomena – hypothesizing that gnats buzz from 
their anuses, for instance – while operating a think-tank (phrontistērion) that worships new gods, 
teaches clients how to evade legal prosecution, and turns sons against their fathers.41 Meletus’ 
accusations might be warranted were Plato’s Socrates anything like his Aristophanic 
doppelganger. Socrates denies a likeness to Aristophanes’ caricature, but is unsure that he can 
disabuse the jury of so deeply seated a prejudice in so short a trial.42  
 Before addressing the formal charges against him, Socrates identifies the implicit charges 
brought by these earlier accusers. His accusers allege that he proffered the kind of knowledge 
supposedly possessed by sophists like Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias.43 “Each of these men,” he 
says, “can go to any city and persuade the young, who can keep company with anyone of their 
fellow citizens they want without paying, to leave the company of these, to join with themselves, 
to pay them a fee, and be grateful to them besides” (20a). Socrates maintains that these traveling 
instructors threaten to corrupt the youth of Athens. Not only does their outsider status situate 
                                                 
41 Though Aristophanes’ Socrates offers clients instruction in aristocratic Just Logic (961-1149) as well as in the 
Unjust Logic practiced by sophists (1036-1104), most, including the play’s protagonist, choose the latter. 
  
42 His worry betrays a problem with the dicastic institutional parameters – e.g. time limitations, topical scope, etc. – 
which I discuss at greater length in my treatment of the Theaetetus. It also speaks to a problem with extant Athenian 
decision-making: because his first accusers are “numerous,” they can simply outvote Socrates’ sympathizers, 
thereby trumping truth with popular opinion. Socrates repeats this worry more explicitly at 28d-e. This is the basis 
of John Stuart Mill’s use of Socrates as a critic of popular decision-making.  As Villa nicely puts it, “For Mill, as for 
Socrates, the scandal of humanity is that we continually mistake local custom and convention for moral truth” 
(2001: 60).  
 
43 Plato attacks Gorgias as a teacher of rhetoric who cannot guarantee the virtuous use of oratory (Gorgias 461a-b). 
Prodicus and Hippias reappear in the Protagoras, where Plato pans Hippias as an elitist, vaingloriously proud of the 
“godlike intellect,” he exhibits at every Olympiad (Lesser Hippias 364a, cf. Protagoras 315c) and who considers the 
assembly of sophists in Callias’ home “the wisest of the Greeks” (Protagoras 337d). Prodicus’ wisdom amounts to 
nitpicking lexical distinctions (Protagoras 340b, 341c-e, 358b).    
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them as potential pariah upon the bonds of citizenship (24e), but Socrates discovers that sophists 
do not even possess the kind of expert knowledge (epistēmē) they claim to impart to the wealthy 
youths who can accompany them (21b-c).44 They instead take advantage of highly esteemed 
Athenians like Callias who uncritically accept that a foreign “expert” of virtue can improve his 
children more than his city can, and who endanger their sons in the process (20b).45 By 
discharging the care of their sons’ souls to sophists, these gullible elites break their ephebic oaths 
by condemning the city to poor advice. 
Recognizing that his reputation for wisdom has grouped him in with the likes of Gorgias 
and Hippias in the popular imagination, Socrates must distinguish his philosophical practice 
from sophistic methods of instruction. He does so by denying command of the knowledge 
sophists advertise themselves as possessing (20c). Unlike the sophists’ godlike claims to expert 
knowledge of virtue, Socrates maintains that his is a distinctly “human wisdom” (anthrōpinē 
sophia) (20d), the nature of which remains a source of consternation among Plato’s 
interpreters.46 Indeed, Socrates appears perplexed by it himself. He relates the story of how his 
friend Chaerephon asked the Pythian oracle of the Apollonian temple at Delphi “if any man was 
                                                 
44 Cf. Critias (52e). 
 
45 Plato stages the Protagoras in Callias’ home, which was, as we shall see, a popular venue where sophists could 
exhibit their skills in private.  
 
46 The paradox stems from Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge on one hand while maintaining that knowledge of the 
“most important things” is necessary for virtuous life, all the while presenting himself as a virtuous moral agent. 
Many resolve the paradox by contesting the sincerity of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge. See, e.g., Gulley (1968: 
69), Vlastos (1971: 7-8); cf. Vlastos (1991: 32). Others agree with Reeve’s straightforward reading that, for 
Socrates, “human wisdom involves seeing that one does not possess any significant knowledge of the most 
important things, that in all probability such knowledge belongs only to the god” (1989:13). Cf. Irwin (1995: 28), 
Zuckert (2009: 679), Bett (2011: 225-227). On the distinction between human wisdom and craft knowledge 




wiser than [Socrates],” to which the oracle replied, “that no one was wiser” (21a).47 Surprised by 
the oracle’s statement, Socrates testifies that he is “very conscious that [he is] not wise at all” 
(21b) and sets out to examine purportedly wise figures in the agora. So began his elenctic 
practice. 
Socrates practices the elenchus in his encounters with those citizens considered wisest in 
Athens. His questions initially confound the public men who thought themselves knowledgeable 
but were in fact easily refuted (22b). Socrates’ testimony does not explain the type of wisdom 
these public men claim to possess, but he does note that by publicly embarrassing them he 
invited the ire of elites and those who followed them.48 He next finds that while the poets are 
“inspired” by some “inborn talent” they cannot explain or interpret their poems any better than 
their audience can (22c).49 Finally, Socrates discovers that while craftsmen are knowledgeable of 
their particular trades, they nevertheless fall into the same error as did the poets:  
Each of them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most 
important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I 
asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to be as I am, with neither 
their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both. The answer I gave myself and the 
oracle was that it was more profitable to remain as I am (moi lusiteloi hōsper). (22e) 
Two points about this conclusion warrant special attention. First, Socrates couches his 
philosophical practice in specifically religious terms in order to refute the charge of impiety.50 
                                                 
47 Chaerephon was a well-known democratic partisan whom Socrates tellingly describes as “compulsive” (21a).  
One might suspect that his invocation here is an appeal to the jury’s populist sympathies. Some have challenged the 
veracity of Socrates’ story about Chaerephon’s venture to the Delphic oracle. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 40).  
48 Christina Tarnopolsky (2007: 291) insightfully observes the ambiguity of elenchus as a term describing refutation 
as well as shaming. 
 
49 The poets’ “inspiration” is not unlike the daemonic gift that Socrates claims dissuades him from committing 
injustice (31d-e, 40a). I consider this an unsatisfactory wrinkle in his defense. As I will demonstrate in the next 
chapter, this observation has implications for Socrates’ insistence that the users of goods are better positioned to 
judge them than those who craft them. See Republic (601d-e). 
 
50 Some have read Socrates’ response to the oracle as a challenge. See, e.g., Saxonhouse (2006: 106-7). Others have 
denied the religious aspect of his philosophical project altogether. See, e.g., Villa (2001: 40-1); Kateb (1998: 84). 
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Insofar as piety and patriotism were inseparable in fifth century Athens, his activity is expressly 
public and political. Second, Socrates presents a particularly difficult paradox with respect to 
judgment. He disavows the kind of wisdom others purportedly possess, claiming only to know 
better than others that he is ignorant of the most important things, namely virtue. Yet he claims 
the capacity to judge for himself which kind of life is most in his interest to pursue.51  
Addressing this paradox is central to the distinction between elenctic philosophical 
practice and competing sophistic methods of instruction and, by extension, to the practice of 
Socratic political judgment. Though sophists perhaps believe that they trade in Truth, as the title 
of Protagoras’ treatise suggests, Socrates argues that they instead peddle opinions, and poorly 
reasoned ones at that. By contrast, he restricts the domain of human wisdom to reasonable belief 
and examines it accordingly. To continually test, question, and refute a verified truth claim 
would be absurd.52 But he maintains that human wisdom can rarely be sure of when it has arrived 
at such certainty; instead, we can at best formulate justified beliefs about those things we think 
are true. When he asserts that the unexamined life is not worth living, he is positing a reasonable 
belief about how a virtuous life ought to be conducted and not a truth-claim based on irrefutable 
                                                 
My own reading adheres more closely to those who take Socrates on good faith that he considers his philosophical 
enterprise as one of pious and therefore civic duty. See Reeve (1989: 28); Corey (2005).  
 
51 Some contemporary readers and even Socrates’ own companions consider this position strange in light of his 
execution (e.g., Critias 45c-46a). Yet Socrates is unsure that death is actually a bad condition while he is much surer 
that living unjustly is a great evil (Apology 29b).  
 
52 This again distinguishes Socrates’ human wisdom from the craft knowledge sophists purport to possess insofar as 




evidence.53 The interlocutors and contemporary interpreters who complain that he never 
satisfactorily defends the veracity of such positions miss this point.54  
Socrates draws several politically relevant lessons from his examination of Athens. The 
first contains a problematic kernel of democratic potential. “In my investigation in the service of 
the god,” he recounts, “I found that those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most 
deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more knowledgeable” (22a). Though 
his conclusion would certainly raise the hackles of embarrassed politicians, it should similarly 
reveal to the jurymen, many of whom would count themselves among “those who were thought 
to be inferior,” that their judgments were no further from true belief than were those held by 
elites. His second conclusion situates his philosophical practice within Athenian political life. By 
helping his fellow citizens recognize the inconsistency of their moral beliefs, he also helps to 
clarify their material interests. Specifically, he insists that adhering to the virtues they claim to 
revere, especially justice, demands that they dramatically change how they calculate material 
advantage. Finally, he argues that such a shift will make them flourish and that, because he is 
centrally concerned with their wellbeing in this regard, it is in their self-interest to spare his life.  
The Athenians desperately need philosophical refection in order to recognize their own 
interests. Without continually examining their beliefs, Socrates fears that his fellow citizens will 
condemn themselves to “the most blameworthy ignorance” of believing “that one knows what 
one does not know” (29b). In this respect he envisions the elenchus as a tool for making beliefs 
                                                 
53 My claim slightly departs from Vlastos (1991: 72), who claims that where knowledge “means justified true belief, 
justified through the peculiarly Socratic method of elenctic argument, there are many propositions he does claim to 
know.” I read Socrates as stopping short of equating justified true belief to absolute knowledge. 
 
54 See, e.g., Stokes (1986); Nehamas (1998: 9); Benson (2000: 32-48); Villa (2001: 23). Cf. Thrasymachus in 
Republic (337a).  
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cohere to genuine interests by prioritizing the care of one’s soul over the shameful pursuit of “as 
much wealth, reputation and honor as possible” (29e).55 Importantly, Socrates does not demand 
that the city abandon material pursuits altogether.56 On the contrary, he stresses that “excellence 
(arēte) makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively” 
(30b). In other words, the pursuit of virtue is a first-order priority that orients the second-order 
pursuit of other goods; pursuing the first does not preclude the second. If, however, Thucydides 
was right that the Athenians had entirely abandoned the former in favor of the latter during the 
Peloponnesian War, we can begin to see in Socrates’ defense an explanation for how the city fell 
into pleonectic hubris. It was not merely the small-minded selfishness of the few, but rather the 
willful ignorance of the many that lead the city’s judgment astray.  
By uniting ethical reflection with material interests, Socrates defends his instrumental, if 
not intrinsic, value to the city. If the jury condemns him, he says, it will do much greater harm to 
Athens than to himself: “I am far from making a defense now on my own behalf” he protests, 
“but of yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god’s gift to you by 
condemning me; for if you kill me you will not easily find another like me” (30e). For Socrates 
to label himself “god’s gift” to Athens might seem at odds with his prior effort to characterize 
himself as the humblest man in the city. But we quickly learn that he is a peculiar gift: 
I was attached to this city by the god—though it seems a ridiculous thing to say—as upon 
a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to 
be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. It is to fulfill some such function that I believe the god 
has placed me in the city. I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade 
and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company. (30e) 
 
                                                 
55 More precisely, he defines genuine happiness as the maintenance of coherent beliefs about one’s interests. See his 
discussion of the tyrannical city in Rep. 566a-569c. 
 
56 See Vlastos (1991: 231). 
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Socrates’ gadfly metaphor is by now so familiar that it serves as shorthand for encouraging 
critical thinking in everything from education to business.57 Yet it remains strange for a number 
of reasons. For instance, we might think it odd to describe Athens as a “sluggish” horse in light 
of Thucydides’ description of her people as having been born to take no rest and to accord it to 
no others.58 Socrates’ metaphor suggests that the restless military planning captured in 
Thucydides’ narrative was a product of its philosophical complacence. That is, because the city 
never actively deliberated over its ultimate ends, its war effort was bound to continue 
indefinitely. With this reading in mind, we might expect Socrates to recall the horse-breeding 
metaphor deployed in his examination of Meletus, now casting himself more explicitly in the 
role of trainer to the city (25b). We might expect an account of how his elenchus improves the 
city’s judgment by turning its natural energy toward philosophical study. Indeed, many 
commentators interpret this aspect of his argument as evidence of Socrates’ hostility toward the 
democracy. Instead, he equates himself to an irritating pest without which, paradoxically, no one 
in the city will ever sleep easily (31b).  
 Contra popular interpretation, I argue that the gadfly metaphor offers an unsatisfying 
description of Socrates’ political practice, especially with respect to the cultivation of judgment. 
True, it illuminates several aspects of the elenchus: like a stinging fly, it is often frustrating, 
disquieting, and rarely appreciated. But the metaphor threatens to obscure as much as it reveals. 
Nowhere in the image of the gadfly do we see Socrates and his interlocutors jointly investigating 
the “most important things,” nor do we see how he guides his companions to meaningful 
conclusions. The gadfly metaphor also sells Socrates’ mission short. His goal is not simply to 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Klausner (1952); Griffen (1963); Mallison (1983); Euben (1991). 
 
58 Thucydides (1.70). 
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agitate his interlocutors, but to improve them. As I will argue in the next section, Plato 
supplements – or, rather, supplants – the image of Socrates the Gadfly with a model of Socrates 
the Midwife in order to highlight these otherwise obscure qualities. For now, we are left with 
only a partial portrait of the philosopher as an agitator guilty of the purely negative practices 
attributed to him by his enemies.  
*** 
The sentencing phase of Socrates’ trial introduces questions about happiness 
(eudaimonia) that are central to Plato’s critique of Athenian political judgment.59 Reiterating his 
devotion to Athens and Apollo, Socrates initially suggests a “fine” amounting to publicly 
provided meals in the Prytaneum as appropriate penalty for philosophizing.60 Especially because 
Meletus has proposed the death penalty, Socrates’ apparently outrageous counter-proposal has 
led some to suggest that he is either defying the court or provoking the jury into martyring him.61 
These interpretations have not considered Socrates’ defense of the proposed sentence in which 
he appeals to his civic usefulness. “The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy,” he 
says, “I make you be it” (36d).62 In other words, the Athenians may think that honors and 
pleasures bring eudaimonia, but they are mistaken; Socrates makes them genuinely happy by 
pursuing the “greatest good for man” (magiston agathon hon anthropō), namely “discussing 
virtue every day” (38a). Doing so is pursuant to his Apollonian mission within the city, which 
makes him not only pious but also civically useful.    
                                                 
59 Though I follow Grube in translating eudaimonia as “happiness,” the term describes a broader, distinctly human 
and self-sufficient good. “Flourishing” and “well-being” may also capture its meaning. See Irwin (1989: 80). 
    
60 He soon revises his suggestion to a fine of one mina, or 100 drachmas. This was a considerable sum. 
61 See, e.g., Stone (1988: 230); Danzig (2003: 307). Socrates grants that many in the jury will think his proposal 
arrogant (37a). 
 
62 Trans. Reeve (1988: 170). Grube translates the passage: “The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy, I 
make you be happy.” 
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Socrates’ pithy declaration summarizes his critique of, and response to, Athenian 
pleonexia. It was not the first time the city was accused of heedless pleasure-seeking and honor-
loving. Indeed, the same Aristophanic comedy that lampooned Socrates commonly teased the 
democracy for its hedonism, often to acclaim. A graver moment’s reflection on the 
Peloponnesian War, only five years past, would remind anyone that the political costs of 
pursuing pleonectic policies were too high for any city.63 Socrates suggests that he can reform 
the city, “make them [happy],” through the disquieting practice of elenctic examination. Yet 
given its largely negative form, the link between elenctic examination and eudaimonia is not 
altogether obvious. The jury certainly does not see it, nor do many of Socrates’ interlocutors in 
Plato’s later dialogues.64 Examining the claim will therefore motivate much of Plato’s ethical 
philosophy.      
Plato explicates the connection between Socratic philosophy and happiness in the 
Republic when he has Socrates associate human happiness with psychic harmony. This radical 
redefinition of happiness stands at odds with conventional thinking but affirms the importance of 
justice for better decision-making. By disrupting the soul’s harmonic balance, injustice 
forecloses upon any possibility for eventual human happiness.65 But in order to avoid injustice, 
we need to know what kinds of actions are unjust. The elenchus assists that effort by clarifying 
tensions between competing conceptions of happiness, demonstrating the conclusions of each, 
and offering reasons for rejecting some pursuits as inconsistent with the ultimate end. Yet the 
                                                 
63 See Frank (2007).  
 
64 Though Socrates insists that he could persuade the jury to take up philosophy were he given the time to do so, 
Plato almost never grants him that success in his later work. 
 
65 This is consistent with Irwin’s interpretation of Socrates’ unified theory of the virtues – e.g. courage, moderation, 
justice, etc. – as part of a broader argument that eudaimonia harmonizes all virtuous acts as a single pursuit of 
happiness (2007: 24).  
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elenchus cannot offer substantive alternatives to the propositions it resists; it does not produce 
positive knowledge, only good reasons for rejecting false beliefs. Given this limitation, how can 
the elenchus make Athens happy? The best answer, again borne out in the Republic, is that the 
contemplative life is the most choiceworthy and therefore “happiest” in the sense that it is most 
fulfilling. Socrates makes Athenians “happy” by challenging them to contemplate the nature of 
virtue as a serious undertaking of human life. The elenchus’ open-endedness combines with the 
limitations of human wisdom to ensure that Socratic philosophizing will be a continuous 
contemplation of the good. In this way, Socrates understands happiness as an ongoing activity 
rather than as an end state achievable through corporeal satisfaction.66    
 Most of the jury disagrees with Socrates and settles on Meletus’ death penalty. Socrates 
warns them that future critics will seize upon their decision as evidence of Athenian wickedness. 
For had he pandered to their sympathies and pleased them with shameless supplication, he may 
have avoided their wrath. By refusing to do so, he maintained his dignity but ran afoul of their 
favor. The differences between Socrates’ philosophic defense and the kinds of apologias the jury 
is accustomed to rewarding with lighter penalties highlights a broader difference between 
philosophic and conventional conceptions of eudaimonia as a standard of judgment. Returning to 
the earlier question of why Plato thought the jury was wrong to convict Socrates, we may now 
say that its decision was guided by a conception of happiness that was widely shared and not 
particularly controversial. Socrates was not condemned by a jury of petty tyrants; he was voted 
down by ordinary people who believed they were acting in the city’s interests. Insofar as the 
city’s interests were dictated by a shared conception of eudaimonia, they indeed were. But as 
Plato would allow Socrates to later demonstrate, the jury’s hedonic definition of happiness is 
                                                 
66 This view is consistent with Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia as an activity conducted for its own sake. See 
Nicomachean Ethics (1097b21-22, 1098a5-8). 
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shifty and bereft of virtue; there is no guarantee that pursuing pleasure will enhance welfare. 
According to Plato, pleasure and welfare are not synonymous. By mistaking pleasure for 
happiness as the ultimate end of human action, the jury’s judgment was a reflection of its “most 
blameworthy ignorance” of thinking it new something that it did not.   
2.2 Epistemology and Judgment in the Theaetetus 
Plato explores the relationship between judgment and democratic politics by pitting 
Socrates against his sophistic rival Protagoras. Born in the Thracian city Abdera in 490, 
Protagoras is widely credited as the “first democratic theorist in the history of the world,” as well 
the first openly professional sophist.67 The intelligentsia of Periclean Athens widely circulated 
his treatises Alethia (On Truth) and Peritheon (On the Gods) while generously compensating 
him for instructing their sons in legal rhetoric and oratory.68 Protagoras’ success also attracted 
other sophists to Athens, including Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Diogenes of Apollonia. 
When Pericles declared Athens the school of all Hellas in 431, he may well have had the city’s 
preponderance of these sophists and rhetoricians in mind.69  
Few remnants of Protagoras’ corpus survive for contemporary scholarship, and we only 
know of it through scattered fragments and Plato’s commentary. Much ink has been spilt parsing 
Protagoras’ actual doctrine from its Platonic filter.70  If Cynthia Farrar is correct that Plato was 
                                                 
67 See Farrar (1988: 77). Plato has Protagoras introduce himself as the first sophist in Protagoras (316d). 
 
68 Jacqueline de Romilly (1992: 5, 213) reports that Protagoras “sometimes charged as much as 100 minai,” or 
10,000 drachmas, for his services. To put that sum in perspective, Athens’ citizen jurors were paid three obols, or 
half a drachma, per diem.  
 
69 See de Romilly (1992: 21-24).   
 
70 See, e.g., Schiller (1908); Morrison (1941: 7); Versenyi (1962); Maguire (1973); Burnyeat (1976); Nill (1984: 4-




principally concerned with refuting the sophist, we might worry about the philosopher’s 
temptation to distort Protagoras’ arguments to suit his own ends.71 Yet as Paul Stern points out, 
Plato frequently puts into Socrates’ mouth unpolished, incomplete arguments that fail to 
undermine Protagoras’ position in the sophist’s eponymous dialogue.72 Though it is often 
tempting to read Socrates as the hero of Plato’s work, I follow Peter Euben in maintaining that, 
by the time he composed the Protagoras, Plato was genuinely interested in testing the theories 
set forth in his Apology.73 Far from dressing Protagoras up as a straw man for Socratic refutation, 
Plato presents the sophist as a heavy counterweight to philosophical practice. In what follows, I 
consider the interplay between Socrates and Protagoras as a contest between two hypotheses 
about political judgment, neither of which is completely satisfying.  
Before turning to Socrates’ direct engagement with Protagoras, it is helpful to begin with 
Socrates’ indirect engagement with his ideas in a work staged well after both the philosopher and 
the sophist had died. Written in 367, Plato’s Theaetetus preserves much of what survives of 
Protagoras’ epistemological theory.74 The dialogue is best known as an inquiry into the proper 
definition of knowledge (epistēmē).75 However, few contemporary readers have attended to the 
dialogue’s political undertones, the study of which I argue can illuminate similar themes in the 
Apology, Protagoras and Republic.76 In addition to examining competing epistemological 
                                                 
71 Farrar (1988: 53). So distorted is Plato’s portrait of Protagoras in Farrar’s view that she employs the moniker 
“Platagoras” in her study. 
72 Stern (2008: 8); cf. Sedley (2004: 9-12). 
 
73 See, e.g., Euben (1993). 
 
74 Indeed, Farrar insists on consulting the depictions of Protagoras in both dialogues, as doing so provides “a 
coherent picture of Protagorean theory which brings together two realms, cosmos and community” (1988: 47). 
75 See, e.g., Runciman (1962); Burnyeat (1990); Desjardins (1990); Dorter (1994); Heidegger (2002:109-117); 
Chappell (2004); Peterson (2011). 
 
76 Exceptions include Stern (2002); Sedley (2004). 
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theories, the Theaetetus explores the inter-generational transfer of political wisdom through 
student-teacher relationships and the impact of that transfer on citizenship. By relating his own 
pedagogical and philosophical methods to the practice of midwifery, Socrates challenges the 
sophistic approach to political education favored by Protagoras. Most importantly, the 
Theaetetus also explores the contours of good judgment and proposes several ways in which we 
might understand the difference between better and worse models of the practice.  
 Plato clearly wants his audience to interpret the Theaetetus with Socrates’ trial in mind. 
The dialogue is a written account of the philosopher’s exchange with two interlocutors, the 
geometer Theodorus of Cyrene and his brilliant Athenian pupil Theaetetus, as dictated to the 
Megarian thinker Euclides during his final days awaiting execution (142c).77 In the opening 
scene, Euclides tells his companion Terpsion that a chance encounter with Theaetetus has 
reminded him of Socrates’ account of a prior exchange between himself and the bright 
geometer’s student. Now an adult, Theaetetus is a famous mathematician and war hero who is 
returning home to die after suffering mortal wounds in a battle with Corinth. By portraying him 
as a citizen-scholar who is as brilliant as he is loyal to Athens, Plato gives the impression that 
Theaetetus and Socrates are cut from the same cloth. They even look alike.78 Socrates reminds us 
of the trial later when he says that he “must go to the King’s Porch to meet the indictment that 
Meletus has brought against [him]” (210d). By dramatically dating the Theaetetus to the morning 
of Socrates’ trial, Plato encourages his audience to reflect on the dialogue’s philosophical themes 
                                                 
77 On the significance of Euclides as a student of the Megarian school, see Stern (2008: 15-23). 
 
78 While introducing him to Socrates, Theodorus describes him as a brilliant thinker but “not beautiful at all, but is 
rather like you, snub-nosed, with eyes that stick out; though these features are not quite so pronounced in him” 
(143e). Tellingly, Socrates later objects to Theodorus’ assessment: “you are handsome and not ugly as Theodorus 
would have it. For handsome is as handsome says” (185e).  
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in close association with the political consequences captured in the Apology. The specters of 
politics and judgment hang over both dialogues.  
The main dialogue opens in media res as Socrates and Theodorus chat about the next 
generation of talented Athenians. Socrates has just asked the geometer if he happens to know of 
any especially bright students, saying that he is “anxious to know which of our young men show 
signs of turning out well” (143d).79 Theodorus recommends Theaetetus, introducing him as a 
“remarkable boy” who is as “manly” as any of his peers (144a). Socrates is more familiar with 
the boy’s dead father, adding that Theaetetus stands to inherit a sizable fortune from his family’s 
estate. This is not a trivial qualification: it marks Theaetetus as the kind of young noble whom 
Meletus has accused Socrates of corrupting and as a fatherless boy approaching manhood 
without access to traditional paternal guidance. Contra Theodorus’ estimation of the boy’s 
unique maturity, he is (or could be) a vulnerable character whom Socrates may either corrupt or 
nurture.  
Socrates and Theaetetus first discuss Theodorus’ area of expertise. Socrates wants to 
know if they can trust the mathematician’s aesthetic appraisal of their apparently grotesque 
features (144e). Because Theodorus is not an artist, they agree to discount his judgment of 
beauty; but if they can agree that he is wise, they must also agree that his assessment of their own 
wisdom must be sound. Theaetetus thus submits himself to Socrates’ “examination” of his 
intellectual acuity as much for his own sake as for his master’s reputation (145c). Their 
ostensibly innocent exercise suggests that only experts are qualified to assess in others the 
qualities they purportedly possess. Just as a shipwright is qualified to appraise a boat’s 
                                                 
79 Given the dramatic context, we might interpret this comment as a gesture toward Socrates’ prophesy that another 
generation would continue his work. See Apology 39c-d. 
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seaworthiness or a mason is qualified to test a wall’s foundations, so too should a wise man be 
qualified to assess the wisdom of others.80 Because Theodorus has praised Theaetetus as he has 
never praised anyone before, Socrates is curious about his companion’s judgment. Again, he 
tests that judgment not by examining Theodorus himself but by evaluating his pupil.81 We shall 
see Socrates extend this method of proxy measurement in his evaluation of Protagoras’ teaching 
through his later exchanges with both companions.       
 Socrates evaluates Theaetetus by asking him to define knowledge. As if to extend the 
parallel between the old philosopher and his young interlocutor, Plato has Theaetetus confess 
that while he has often pondered questions related to the essence of knowledge, he has never 
been able to persuade himself that he has definitively answered them. For that matter, Theaetetus 
complains, he has never before heard satisfactory answers from anyone else (148e). In other 
words, Theaetetus does not claim the kind of wisdom attributed to sophists, but instead 
demonstrates a natural tendency toward philosophical puzzlement (aporia). Socrates 
commiserates with the boy, explaining that he is merely experiencing “the pains of labor” which 
attend such endeavors (149a). It is here that Socrates introduces his celebrated midwifery 
                                                 
80 These examples belie a deeper problem of moral expertise and knowledge of virtue to which I shall return in my 
discussion of the Republic in chapter 3. Wisdom is a much more abstract domain of expertise than a technical skill 
like masonry. To say that one is an expert of wisdom suggests that one is also an expert of all things about which 
knowledge is possible. As Myles Burnyeat (1990: 216) observes, Socrates – and, by extension, Plato – reaches the 
extreme conclusion by the end of the dialogue that, like in the Republic, “no-one knows anything unless they know 
everything.” “But,” he continues, “a twentieth-century reader is already hard put to it to swallow the interim 
conclusion [reached in the Theaetetus] that knowledge is expertise and that no-one knows anything in a given 
domain unless they have total mastery of the domain on the basis of its elements.” As a means of dealing with this 
difficulty, Burnyeat suggests that we consider this conclusion rather as a weaker statement about understanding than 
as a stronger claim about knowledge. This approach appeals to what Martin Heidegger (2002: 111) identifies as the 
conventional pre-philosophical implication of epistēmē.  
 
81 One wonders how useful an examination of Theodorus would be, given his repeated inability to engage in 
dialectical discourse with Socrates (162a-c, 165a-b, 169d) and preference for listening to long speeches (177c). It 
soon becomes clear that Theaetetus is sharper than his master – whom he nevertheless respects – suggesting that 
Theodorus was able to appreciate wisdom even though he lacks it himself. This observation would seem to refute 
Socrates’ earlier position that only experts can accurately judge within their areas of specialty.  
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metaphor.82 Despite his reputation for “causing people to get into difficulties” and inducing the 
kinds of pain from which Theaetetus suffers, Socrates insists that he merely assists others in 
“giving birth” to their own ideas (149a).83 Explicating the metaphor for his bewildered 
acquaintance, he observes that women employed as midwives are those who have experienced 
childbirth but are no longer of childbearing age (149b-c). Like these women, the old man 
suggests that he is better suited to helping younger thinkers deliver their own ideas into the world 
than to producing his own or imparting them to others. Experience thus contributes to an 
understanding of difficulties in practice that may escape the person of purely theoretical training.   
Like the image of Socrates the Gadfly, the midwife metaphor is by now so familiar that 
contemporary readers rarely scrutinize it. Prima facie, it is straightforward enough. Unlike his 
sophistic counterparts, Socrates describes his elenctic examination as a means by which he can 
assist others in laying bare the beliefs they already hold within themselves.84 So understood, it 
helps us appreciate several aspects of his method. First, as illustrated in Theaetetus’ complaint, 
                                                 
82 Socrates introduces it as a confidence shared between himself and Theaetetus, saying that he conceals his art from 
the rest of the world (149a). Given that he has allegedly asked Euclides to transcribe this conversation in order to 
save it for posterity, his secrecy should be read with an ear for irony. As Ruby Blondell (2002: 267) insightfully 
observes, Socrates’ explicit effort to associate his life’s work with his mother’s occupation rather that of his father 
suggests that he is not only distancing himself from masculine conventions but is also attempting to relate to his 
fatherless interlocutor on a more personal level.  
 
83 There is some debate about the relationship between this passage and the dialogue’s discussion of knowledge 
within the Platonic corpus. F.M. Cornford (1935: 27-28) interprets Socrates’ defense as an allusion to Meno’s 
complaint in his eponymous dialogue that Socrates does nothing more than confound others without offering any 
positive instruction (Meno 79e). Insofar as both Meno and Theaetetus fall into the same trouble of defining concepts 
(i.e. virtue and knowledge, respectively) through examples, Cornford insists that Plato is also alluding to the Meno’s 
theory of anamnesis – that all learning is the recovery of latent, unremembered knowledge. He reasons that the 
theory is left undeveloped in the Theaetetus because it both presupposes familiarity with the middle dialogues and 
because the dialogue “is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition…judgments involving the perception of 
sensible objects.” Later commentators have rejected Cornford’s analysis on textual grounds. John McDowell (1973: 
116-117) points out that, according to the midwifery metaphor, the ideas Socrates delivers are “just as likely to be 
incorrect as correct,” thus complicating a connection between recollection and absolute knowledge. David Bostock 
(1988: 16-17) further complains that the theory of anamnesis advanced in the Meno remains unable to account for 
the distinction between knowledge and belief purportedly developed in the Theaetetus.  
 
84 C.f. Burnyeat (2012: 27). 
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Socrates’ approach to philosophy is often agonizing. The painful experience of grappling with 
the ambiguity surrounding basic beliefs makes philosophical discourse qualitatively different 
from the pleasure-inducing speeches prepared by the city’s politicians. (Though Wittgenstein 
may have been right to declare the Theaetetus Plato’s most philosophically interesting work, it is 
far from his most pleasurable to read.) It is also more worthwhile. As Socrates says in the 
Apology, he aims not simply to perplex his companions but to help them work through the 
creative pangs of their confusion. Here, Plato is recasting the otherwise hostile aspects of 
Socratic practice, illustrated in the gadfly metaphor, through a more productive visage of 
midwifery.  
The midwife metaphor also captures a social dimension of the elenctic process that is 
obscured by the image of the stinging gadfly. By depicting himself as an assistant to his laboring 
companions’ self-discovery, Socrates suggests that such knowledge is not uncovered through 
isolated toil but through joint investigation. Its collaborative quality makes Socratic philosophy 
necessarily social, even political. Moreover, by resisting claims that he asserts any positive 
doctrine of his own, Socrates can distance himself and his own beliefs from the conclusions 
reached by his interlocutors. To the extent that he is “barren” of his own ideas, Socrates cannot 
be held accountable for Critias or Alcibiades’ tyrannical tendencies.85 A cynic might therefore 
read the metaphor as a clever attempt to exonerate himself from his companions’ crimes.86 Such 
                                                 
85 As if to anticipate objections to his tyrannical companions in the Apology, Socrates explains that problems with 
his practice have arisen when these interlocutors left him too early. “And after they have gone away from me they 
have resorted to harmful company, with the result that what remained within them has miscarried; while they have 
neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and 
phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and everybody 
else” (151a). Though he refers specifically to Aristides in this passage, it is difficult to read it without recalling 
Alcibiades and Critias. Cf. Sedley (2004: 35-7).   
 
86 The fact that Socrates does not invoke the midwife metaphor in his defense speech serves as evidence that it 
should not be applied directly to the historical Socrates but should instead remain reserved for Plato’s portrait of 
him. See Tomin (1987). 
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a reading carries added weight in light of Socrates’ assumption that he can rightly judge the 
wisdom of Theodorus and Protagoras through his examination of their pupil Theaetetus. But this 
assumption is underwritten by both sophists’ claims to have imparted something to their 
students. Insofar as Socrates denies that he knows “any of the things that other men know,” the 
midwifery metaphor exempts him from similar scrutiny.    
The midwifery metaphor emphasizes the relationship between philosophical examination 
and practical judgment. According to Socrates, midwives have learned through practical 
experience when it is best to induce labor pains as well as when they should relieve them. They 
also decide when to “promote a miscarriage” (149d). To hear Plato’s account, midwives are 
eugenicists worthy of guardianship in the kallipolis. Indeed, Socrates tells Theaetetus that the 
midwives’ greatest secret is that they are the best judges of “whose marriage will produce the 
best offspring” (150a).87 This qualification anticipates the kallipolis’ marriage laws, which focus 
on cultivating the well bread and noble-born while discarding the children of unsanctioned 
unions (Republic 457d, 458d, 495d-e, 460c, 461b-c, 460a).88 In such a state, “the midwife’s 
greatest and noblest function would be to distinguish the true from the false offspring” (150b).89 
Insofar as Socrates delivers ideas rather than children, this suggests that his own “greatest and 
noblest function” is to distinguish justified true beliefs from false opinions (150c). 90 Like the 
                                                 
87 Theaetetus confesses his ignorance of this facet of midwifery, and a dearth of corroborating evidence suggests that 
it is wholly of Socrates’ creation. 
 
88 For all of the discussion of the differences between Plato’s theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus and the 
Republic, this line of continuity has gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. 
 
89 Contra Stern’s (2002: 66-67) interpretation of this passage as primarily comical, the parallels between Socrates’ 
midwife and the archons of his perfect city are deeply provocative. 
 
90 Sedley, extends this interpretation to include Plato himself, concluding that Socrates functions as a midwife of 
Platonism: “By developing this implicit portrayal of Socrates as the midwife of Platonism, Plato aims to 
demonstrate, if not the identity, at any rate the profound continuity, between, on the one hand, his revered master’s 
historic contribution and, on the other, the Platonist truth” (2004: 8). On this account, Socrates does not function as a 
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midwife, who remains the best judge of who should bear children for the greatest social benefit, 
Socrates serves as an excellent judge of which ideas his philosophically-inclined interlocutors 
should nurture and which they should set out for “exposure” (160c-161e).      
The midwifery metaphor is instructive but opaque. The brief description above fails to 
account for how Socrates can call himself a midwife given his definition of the term. Midwives 
derived their authority from their experience of having actually given birth to children in their 
youth. Obviously, the metaphor can only apply in Socrates’ case if he has “given birth” to his 
own ideas at some earlier point in his life. Yet he denies this. As he puts it: 
What I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of 
wisdom. The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other 
people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in 
me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend 
the travails of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a 
wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of 
wisdom. (150c) 
Given his explicit denial of ever having delivered his own ideas, how can he justify his 
employment? Two unsatisfying answers come to mind. First, we might think Socrates is being 
ironic. But given that the Theaetetus is the only dialogue in which Socrates invokes midwifery, 
there is insufficient textual evidence to support such a supposition. Second, we might think 
Socrates is simply incorrect to describe his practice as midwifery in the ordinary sense.91 
However, because the parallels with midwifery illuminate such important aspects of the Socratic 
elenchus, this approach risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  
                                                 
mouthpiece for Plato in the dialogue but rather serves as a means by which Plato can explore his own ideas about 
knowledge. Moreover, we may also read the midwife metaphor as one that Plato does not intend for us to apply to 
the historic Socrates. See, Burnyeat (2012: 21). 
 
91 For an elaboration of this position, see Wengert (1988). 
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 Rather than dismissing the metaphor as an example of Socratic irony or Platonic 
sloppiness, I propose that we reconcile philosophy and midwifery by reconsidering the bases of 
each profession’s authority. Midwives derive their authority from the experience of having 
delivered children; but Socrates does not insist that these children necessarily prove healthy. 
Indeed, if the midwife’s most important function is to determine which infants are likely to 
survive and which are not, we might suppose that some experience with delivering what Socrates 
describes as “wind eggs” might be of some value. Recalling his apologia, it seems that he has 
quite a bit of experience examining beliefs, including his own, and testing their viability. Even if 
he never discovered among his own thoughts any arguments that appear viable, he nevertheless 
avoided the blameworthy hubris of thinking himself wise when he is not.92 He repeatedly 
encourages Theaetetus to continue their discussion by telling him that even if they arrive at 
nothing they will have cleansed themselves of bad arguments (191a, 1210d). Underscoring the 
point, he mocks himself and Theaetetus in the conclusion of the dialogue by noting after their 
failed attempt to define knowledge that their “art of midwifery tells us that all of these offspring 
are wind-eggs and not worth bringing up” (210b).    
The midwifery digression shortly suspended, Theaetetus continues the dialogue by 
equating knowledge to perception. “It seems to me,” he says, “that a man who knows something 
perceives what he knows, and the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is 
simply perception” (151e). Socrates quickly traces this definition to Protagorean epistemology, 
recalling the doctrine, “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, 
                                                 
92 This is not to say that Socrates never arrives at justified true beliefs (i.e. it is better to avoid injustice than to 
commit it). It is to say, however, that even if those beliefs prove false along with every other belief he has examined, 
Socrates’ experienced examination can impart some measure of human wisdom to Theaetetus.  
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and of the things which are not, that they are not” (152a).93 The so-called man-measure principle 
is generally regarded as a refutation of Parmenides’ Eleatic monism. Indeed, Socrates alludes to 
the debate in his initial treatment of the theory (152e). According to Parmenides, the only 
sensible statements about reality proceed from an assumption that reality is necessarily fixed, 
immutable, and contained in pure thought.94 Protagoras, at least in this Socratic guise, denies this 
view for two reasons, both of which relate to a more general concern with the epistemic 
foundations of political judgment.  
First, Parmenides’ argument that reality is not subject to change implies that valid 
statements about knowledge are also fixed and indisputable. He thus distinguishes between 
knowledge (i.e., objectively true observations about reality) and opinion (i.e., subjects about 
which knowledge is not possible) as discrete categories of enquiry.95 Protagoras rejects this 
bifurcation, suggesting that each individual’s frame of reference informs their perception of 
reality such that all observations and utterances are subject to dispute.96 Like Jacques Derrida’s 
notion of différance, he insists that an utterance derives meaning solely from its relation to 
another such utterance, such that meaning is always deferred. Socrates objects that Protagoras’ 
position strips us of our ability to contemplate and sensibly discuss an ontologically prior notion 
of truth: 
Wherever you turn, there is nothing, as we said at the outset, which in itself is just one 
thing; all things become relatively to something. The verb ‘to be’ must be totally 
                                                 
93 The Greek text of the surviving fragment reads: Pantōn chrēmatōn métron estin anthrōpos, tōn men ontōn hōs 
estin, tōn de ouk ontōn hōs ouk estin. 
94 See Barnes (1987: 131-135). 
 
95 See Palmer (2009: 365-367). 
 
96 The relativist implications of this argument, as well as their political implications, are vividly captured in in an 
anecdote recorded by Plutarch (2012). According to the story, after a competitor in the pentathlon was accidently 
struck by a stray javelin and killed, Pericles and Protagoras spent the remainder of the day debating who was at 
fault. They concluded that the answer depended upon whom they asked: a judge would find the javelin-thrower 
guilty while an administrator would blame the contest organizers.  
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abolished—though indeed we have been led by habit and ignorance into using ourselves 
more than once, even in what we have just been saying. That is wrong, these wise men 
tell us, nor should we allow the use of such words as ‘something,’ ‘of something,’ or 
‘mine,’ ‘this,’ or ‘that’ or any other name that makes things stand still. (157b)   
For Socrates, a world without the possibility of absolute knowledge, regardless of whether it is 
within humanity’s limited reach, is subject to ceaseless, nihilistic flux. His resistance to such a 
state underscores the difference between doubting that humans can ever attain truth and denying 
that it exists at all. His critique also demonstrates the incomprehensibility of the relativistic world 
in which Protagoras insists we live. As we will see shortly, this has dire implications for the 
sophist’s reliance on persuasion as a means of collective decision-making.97      
Socrates’ critique relates to another aspect of Parmenidean metaphysics that Protagoras 
aims to unsettle. Because reality is complete according to Parmenides’ theory, we can make no 
sensible statements about change or pure negativity.98 Arguing, as Protagoras does, that an 
individual can assert that something is not would result in absurdity for Parmenides, who denies 
that any sensible statements or judgments can be made about things which are not. That is, if a 
phenomenon has never existed, it cannot be a subject of knowledge. In Socrates’ view, these are 
matters of opinion rather than truth. Protagoras also resists this claim. Rather, by insisting that 
man measures all things (Pantōn chrēmatōn métron estin anthrōpos), he means to include 
negative as well as positive assertions under the rubric of possible knowledge.   
 Socrates thinks the man-measure principle is both logically self-refuting and politically 
dangerous. For one thing, it renders all would-be truth statements interminably contestable; it 
                                                 
97 Aristotle raises the same problem in his discussion of Protagorean metaphysics: “For on the one hand, if all 
opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs 
in which they conflict with one another, and all think those mistaken who have not the same opinions as themselves; 
so that the same thing must be and not be” (Metaphysics 1009a6-12). 
  
98 The Megarians held a similar view, inviting us to question what effect Plato hopes to achieve by putting 
Protagoras’ opposite position into the pen of Euclides. See Stern (2008: 17).  
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cannot tell us if we can trust our senses, nor even if we are dreaming or awake, let alone if one 
person is wiser than another (158d).99 To the extent that everyone is their own measure of all 
things there can be no set standard against which we can make such evaluations (159e). As 
Socrates puts it, 
My perception is true for me—because it is always a perception of that being which is 
peculiarly mine; and I am judge, as Protagoras said, of things that are, that they are, for 
me; and of things that are not, that they are not…How then, if I am thus unerring and 
never stumble in my thought about what is—or what is coming to be—how can I fail to 
be a knower of the things of which I am a perceiver? (160c) 
  
Here, Socrates argues that the Protagorean theory of knowledge leads to perversely solipsistic 
consequences. It fails to provide a way of negotiating differences of opinion, with the result that 
all statements are mere reflections of untutored opinion rather than justified belief or knowledge. 
In short, the man-measure principle does not allow for the possibility of misjudgment. Though 
perhaps not as internally inconsistent as Socrates claims (171c), the principle nevertheless strips 
all social judgments of their authority.100  
Protagoras’ epistemological theory carries a democratic potential that is more fully 
articulated in the Protagoras. By asserting that no individual’s judgment is any more or less 
valid than anyone else’s, his epistemology validates the Athenian practice of regarding all 
citizens as equally qualified, in principle, to advise the assembly on political matters (Protagoras 
319b-d, cf. 323c). If we view Socrates as a committed Athenian with a critical but sympathetic 
disposition toward democracy, it is difficult to see why the philosopher resists this theory. 
                                                 
99 We will see this problem reemerge in the Protagoras when the sophist attempts to explain how he can at once 
maintain that all truth-claims are equally valid while simultaneously touting himself as the wisest man in Greece. 
 
100 On the internal consistency of Protagoras’ theory, see, e.g. Burnyeat (1976). Though Burnyeat is right to note the 
internal validity of the man-measure principle, his defense does not mitigate the anti-social implications of 
Protagoras’ position.  
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Especially considering his doubts about the human capacity to discover genuine truth, we might 
conclude that he and Protagoras are not too far apart in their conclusions.  
 To better appreciate the difference between Socrates and Protagoras, we must clarify 
their competing claims. Socrates and Protagoras diverge in their theories of truth and its relation 
to human wisdom. In his apologia, Socrates proposed that while moral truth exists, human 
wisdom is incapable of fully understanding it. We can, at best, recognize our imperfect relation 
to truth and proceed through joint dialectical investigation in its gradual, if ever delayed, 
discovery. In doing so, we will hopefully avoid the commission of injustice but we will surely 
avoid the most “blameworthy ignorance” of thinking we know that which we do not. Protagoras’ 
man-measure principle asserts a very different position. He implies that objective moral truth – 
that is, truth in the Socratic sense – is an illusion; rather, our various perceptions give rise to 
various opinions about all things including virtue (171a). His theory simultaneously denies the 
existence of objective moral truth while claiming that we absolutely know this to be so (161c). 
When compared to the Socratic hypothesis, we see this as a strongly hubristic claim about human 
wisdom. According to Plato’s version of Protagorean epistemology, we know that there is 
nothing to know beyond our capacity.  
 Socrates’ discussion with Theaetetus reveals the political implications of his 
epistemological debate with Protagoras. In his view, the man-measure principle corrupts the 
practice of political judgment in two ways. First, Socrates questions the theory’s ability to settle 
disputes between competing judgments (171e). He instead argues that citizens specifically 
require a method to determine what pursuits are in their best interests (172b). The man-measure 
principle is unable to supply such a method because it rejects objective statements regarding the 
good. Without a reasonable standard of the good, political deliberation reduces to the kind of 
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fickle indecision for which Socrates condemns the democratic man in the Republic. As Socrates 
interprets it, Protagoras’ theory reduces political wisdom to the skill of persuasion through appeal 
to emotion or pleasure rather than to reason (166e-167a, 201a-b). Given that Protagoras’ friend 
and erstwhile defender Theodorus cannot uphold the view that “all men, on every occasion, 
judge what is true,” we find strong evidence that this view is flatly untenable. The theory also 
corrupts political judgment and limits its adherents, including Protagoras’ pupils, to the folly of 
injustice (177a). If the assembly considers all judgments, good or bad, with equal weight and 
without any clear conception of its ultimate ends or the moral limits imposed by justice, they 
doom themselves to the “deepest unhappiness” from which Socrates warns there is no escape. 
Protagoras’ approach to judgment is especially problematic for democracies like Athens, 
where appeal to majority opinion dictates policy decisions. Again anticipating the rhetorical 
challenge before him in his trial, Socrates complains that the institutional parameters that define 
deliberative space forestall philosophical discussion about the common good. Rather than 
engaging one another as equals in conversation about matters of common interest, the demos sits 
as a master in judgment of the enslaved speaker. “The talk is always about a fellow-slave,” he 
says, “and is addressed to a master, who sits there holding some suit or other in his hand. And the 
struggle is never a matter of indifference; it always directly concerns the speaker, and sometimes 
life itself is at stake” (172e). Succumbing to the pressures of his environment, the speaker is 
“keen and highly strung, skilled in flattering the master and working his way to favor” (173a). 
Simply put, the extant institutions that serve as spaces of deliberation in Athens hold would-be 
advisors in servitude to the majority, muzzling their efforts to constructively engage with or 
criticize the city. Moreover, because pleasure rather than truth serves as the jury’s standard of 
 141 
 
judgment, public speakers are forced to indulge their audience’s tastes and expectations at the 
risk of offering truthful, if painful, policy advice.101    
 The norms that structure deliberative space in Athens disadvantage philosophical 
discourse. In the Apology, Socrates admits that the constraints placed upon him would likely 
prevent him from disabusing the jury of its preconceived notions about his efforts to introduce 
philosophical reflection into its long-term conception of happiness. He returns to that point in the 
Theaetetus in a digression comparing the philosopher’s political role within the city to that of the 
more ostensibly practical politician.102 He begins the digression by delimiting the field of 
political judgment to questions of tangible interests (172a-b). As noted above, Socrates doubts 
that either the lawcourt or the assembly can provide a deliberative space in which patient, well-
reasoned and lengthy examinations of genuine interests can develop. The so-called practical men 
who attempt to advise the city from these forums “resort to lies and to the policy of repaying one 
wrong with another” and are “constantly being bent and distorted” (173b). Practicing politics 
under such conditions is bad for one’s health and soul. Though “bent and distorted” by the 
pressures of public life, this practical man is nevertheless regarded as “a man of ability and 
wisdom” by himself and his peers (173b).    
 Socrates’ philosophers appear comically incompetent in contrast to their more practical 
counterparts in the assembly. Divorced from the quotidian details of material life, they “grow up 
                                                 
101 Socrates acknowledged the risk of refusing to appeal to the jury’s sentiments at his own trial, presuming that 
many of his peers would consider his decision not to present his family before them in a plea for mercy as a display 
of haughty self-righteousness (Apology 34c-35c).   
 
102 Many commentators have either dismissed the digression as irrelevant or have downplayed its significance for 
the dialogue’s main argument. See, e.g., Cornford (1935: 83); Ryle (1966: 157); McDowell (1973: 174); Burnyeat 
(1990: 33). Bostock (1988) fails to mention it at all. By contrast, Stern (2002; 2008) rightly highlights the third 
model of Socratic philosophy introduced through the contrast between the archetypical politician and philosopher, 
insisting further that this model is uniquely equipped with talents of political phronēsis.  
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without knowing the way to the market-place, or the whereabouts of the lawcourts or the council 
chambers or any other place of public assembly” and remain willfully ignorant of promulgated 
laws or the goings-on in partisan cliques (173d). They are also blind to the differences of social 
rank, gender, wealth, or reputation among their fellow citizens. Much like the early naturalist 
Thales, who allegedly walked into a well because he was so transfixed on the heavens, 
philosophers are often subjects of ridicule among their more worldly peers (174b).103 Aware of 
their absurd reputations, Socrates’ philosophers remain confident that the practical sphere of 
politics is not only distracting but also beneath their talents (173e). They are therefore 
unperturbed by their bumbling performance in the lawcourt and elsewhere because they actively 
avoid acquiring the experience necessary for performing well in the city’s deliberative spaces 
(174c-d). “On all of these occasions,” Socrates concludes, “the philosopher is the object of 
general derision, partly for what men take to be his superior manner, and partly for his constant 
ignorance and lack of resource in dealing with the obvious” (175b).    
The examples Socrates employs to portray philosophers as a misunderstood cast of 
deceptively deep thinkers might tempt us to read his digression as one of Plato’s thinly veiled 
criticisms of the boorish demos and their crass concerns for material gain. However, Socrates’ 
portrait of the archetypical philosopher does not neatly map onto his own life.104 Unlike Thales, 
Socrates invests himself in politics and remains aware of the partisan factions that influence the 
city’s decisions. His testimony before the court was far from akin to stumbling into a well. He 
even gossips. Moreover, Socrates finds both the politician and the philosopher guilty of the same 
                                                 
103 Socrates makes special note of the fact that it is a Thracian servant-girl who initiated the famous joke about 
Thales. Given Protagoras’ city of origin, we might read this as a cleaver allusion to the derision philosophers attract 
from their “more practical” sophistic counterparts. 
 
104 See, e.g., Cornford (1935: 88-9); Burnyeat (1990: 34-6); Sedley (2004: 66-7); Stern (2008: 163). For a thorough 
treatment of the differences, see Benitez and Guimaraes (1993). 
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conceptual fallacies with respect to their judgments about the best life. Both are wrong to cleave 
the practice of human inquiry into mutually exclusive pursuits of material advantage and 
theoretical wisdom.105 The mutual antipathy separating the politicians from the philosophers 
obscures what should be there common aim insofar as they should both concern themselves with 
formulating coherent and just public policies that enhance the city.   
Following the digression, Socrates clarifies his definition of political judgment by 
specifying that we rely on it when writing legislation based on estimations about future benefits 
(178b-d). This qualification raises questions about how communities can distinguish between 
virtuous interests and vicious distractions. Briefly returning to his critique of Protagoras’ man-
measure theory, Socrates relates this dilemma back to the problem of deciding between better 
and worse beliefs about the good. As no one has yet experienced the future, and so could not 
claim expertise on the basis of experience alone, Socrates concludes that we cannot rely on the 
Protagorean equation between sensory perception and knowledge when formulating legislation 
about the future good. We must instead look to the soul as an instrument of reasoning about true 
and false judgments when debating law (186d, 190a).106 This is a generally difficult task made 
harder by the illusive nature of the good (179a). Plato returns to this problem in the Protagoras 
                                                 
105 As I argue in chapter 3, Socrates will rectify the philosophers’ overly abstract and theoretical politics by insisting 
on several years’ worth of practical experience as part of training the philosopher-statesmen.  
 
106 In setting the parameters of judgment (190a-191a) Socrates explicitly notes that we do not make judgments about 
things we already know to be the case. This would appear to position judgment as a practice which falls between 
knowing and being ignorant. We find a parallel schema in Republic IV, where Socrates sets belief (doxa) between 
knowledge and ignorance (477a-480a). Indeed, several of Plato’s translators find little trouble indiscriminately 
translating doxa as ‘judgment’ or ‘belief’ or ‘opinion.’ See, e.g. McDowell (1973: 193); Bostock (1988: 157). 
Chappell (2004: 154), however, objects to the apparent parallel between the discussion of doxa in the Theaetetus and 
in the Republic. In his view, Plato uses the term in a popular, non-technical sense in the Theaetetus, but is more 
nuanced in the Republic. I will return to this controversy in the next chapter. What is especially important for my 
purposes is that Plato does not employ the more technical term phronēsis – most frequently translated as “practical 
wisdom” or “political judgment” – at this stage of his corpus.    
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and in the Republic, but for now the discussion turns to the more technical matter of discerning 
between true and false judgment more generally.  
Discerning between true and false judgments is an immensely difficult political 
practice.107 Socrates and Theaetetus first discuss it at 187b-c, when Theaetetus ventures “true 
judgment” (alēthēs doxa) as another possible definition of knowledge. According to this initial 
view, a true judgment is akin to correctly deciding upon a defendant’s guilt or innocence during 
a criminal trial. Such a decision might be limited by incomplete information, partial evidence, 
and inaccurate testimony, as well as by the jury’s cognitive ability to remember the facts as 
prosecutors and defendants presented to them. Theaetetus’ definition of true judgment accords 
with the way we typically understand good judgment as the capacity to accurately assess a 
possible state of affairs, to “get the answer right.” Likewise, false judgment amounts to a kind of 
heterodoxy, or “other judging” whereby an actor judges falsely when they mistake one subject of 
knowledge for another (188a). Socrates objects to this standard of distinction, insisting that “no 
one judges ‘The ugly is beautiful’ or makes any other such judgment” (190d) because doing so 
would amount to sheer ignorance rather than flawed perception or reasoning. We might also 
think false judgment emerges from incomplete information. Socrates rejects this view as well, 
however, because maintaining such a position would echo the Protagorean paradox that we can 
know that which we do not know. We may finally think that false judgment amounts to believing 
one has knowledge when in reality one is ignorant (199b). Again, Socrates resists this view 
because it describes ignorance rather than “truly false judgment.” 
                                                 
107 Kant (2000: 168-169) found this ambiguity vexing and in need of philosophical attention. A more recent 
literature has emerged that attempts to defend a notion of judgment based more on reflective rather than universal 
principles. See, e.g., Ferrara (2008: 16-42); Azmanova (2012). Cf. Beiner (1983); Markovits (2008: 125, 158-159).     
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Despite their persistence, Socrates and Theaetetus find that they are no nearer a satisfying 
definition of “false judgment” than they were before their digression. Mocking himself, Socrates 
imagines a master of contradiction demanding an account of them:  
Our friend the expert in refutation will laugh. ‘My very good people,’ he will say, ‘do 
you mean that a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance is thinking that one of 
them which he knows is the other which he knows? Or is it that he knows neither, and 
judges the one he doesn’t know to be the other, and judges that the one he knows is the 
one he doesn’t know? Or does he think that the one he doesn’t know is the one he does? 
Or are you going to start all over again and tell me that there’s another set of pieces of 
knowledge concerning pieces of knowledge and ignorance, which a man may possess 
shut up in some other ridiculous aviaries or waxen devices,108 which he knows so long as 
he possesses them though he may not have them ready to hand in his soul—and in this 
way end up forced to come running round to the same place over and over again and 
never get any further?’ (200b-c) 
 
Socrates considers their frustration appropriate punishment for having deviated too far from their 
original concern for knowledge (200d). Perhaps he is correct, but the baffling conversation is 
more than a non-starter, if for no other reason than that it helpfully illustrates the elenctic process 
by which Socrates’ midwifery judges each statement’s merits. He proposes three possible 
definitions of the term (i.e. false judgment), offers strong evidence supporting each definition, 
and then, just as Theaetetus has congratulated him on his discovery, refutes the apparent 
conclusion with an even stronger counter-claim that it has violated previous agreements – 
namely, that Protagoras is wrong to claim that we can know that which we do not know and that 
we do not make judgments about things we already know to be the case. In so doing he has 
rejected several conventional definitions of misjudgment as a strictly cognitive defect, thereby 
opening space for a refreshed perspective on received wisdom.  
                                                 
108 At previous points in the dialogue Socrates has described the soul as a ball of wax upon which perceptions are 
imprinted to form memories (191d-e) and has also compared it to an aviary in which pieces of knowledge and 
ignorance flutter about (197e). 
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 Socrates and Theaetetus' digression into the nature of false judgment is particularly 
instructive because it resonates with a view of knowledge as mastery of the complex whole. 
Returning to their original inquiry, they tentatively agree that in order for a person to claim 
partial knowledge of any subject (e.g., the alphabet, wagon construction, virtuous life, etc.) they 
must first demonstrate their complete knowledge of the entire subject. As Socrates puts it, “Let 
the complex be a single form resulting from the combination of the several elements when they 
fit together; and let this hold of language and of things in general” (204a). The standard reading 
of the Theaetetus puzzles over the conspicuous absence of the forms from its discussion of 
knowledge.109 Indeed, even if Richard Robinson (1950) and others are right to suppose that Plato 
had rejected the theory by the time he wrote the Theaetetus, we might expect a more explicit 
demonstration here of why it was unsatisfactory. But what we do see from the failed effort to 
define “false judgment” is an early case for the unity of virtues and knowledge. Socrates and 
Theaetetus are unable to define false judgment partly because they have not yet adequately 
defined judgment, nor have they understood the connection between judgment and knowledge. 
The conclusion is obvious: we must be able to identify a thing before we can say whether or not 
it is present. Looking ahead to dialogues like the Protagoras and Republic in which Plato 
explores the connection between knowledge and virtue, we can draw from their conclusion here 
that before we can claim knowledge of any particular virtue – e.g., courage, justice, moderation, 
etc. – we must first understand that each of the virtues are one in the same.  
                                                 
109 Cornford (1935: 7, 28) reads their exclusion as an attempt to show that the problems posed in the second half of 
the dialogue could have been solved by imposing a theory of the forms. This view has been rejected for lack of 
textual evidence as well as for Cornford’s inability to show delimiting the range of knowledge to forms alone help 




 In the third and final section, Theaetetus amends his original definition of knowledge as 
“true judgment,” adding that it must be “true judgment with an account (logos)” (201d, 202c). 
Supplying an account of how one reaches an ostensibly true judgment is meant to distinguish the 
wise judge from the lucky one. Socrates summarizes the position, saying, “when a man gets a 
true judgment about something without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that 
thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is 
ignorant about it” (202c). By stipulating that an account of one’s reasoning accompany a true 
judgment in order to qualify as knowledge, Theaetetus intends to separate wisdom (knowledge) 
from dumb luck (chance). 
 Equating knowledge to true judgment with an account raises two important questions. 
We must first clarify what we mean by an account (logos, legein) and then specify what is added 
to a “true judgment” by giving such an account. With respect to the first problem, it initially 
appears that “giving an account” means describing the features of a complex whole by defining 
the elements that comprise it and demonstrating how they fit together (202e). As in the previous 
case of true and false judgment, we might presume that if a person really knows a complex 
subject like masonry they should have no problem accurately describing all of the elements that 
constitute the whole – e.g., the proper fashioning and use of a trowel; mixing, measuring, and 
applying mortar; etc. – and demonstrating how they amount to a final end –e.g. a structurally 
sound wall. In this way, logos amounts to offering a proof of the sort we expect from a technē.   
Socrates tests their hypothesis by way of a lengthy examination of the alphabet, a 
complex subject about which literate people claim expertise. If such a person were to describe 
the alphabet by distilling it to its basic elements, they would quickly find themselves stumbling 
over how to distinguish between individual letters in such a way that did not depend on reference 
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to the complex whole of which they are trying to give an account (204e).110 The elements only 
derive intelligible meaning with reference to the whole; we are not capable of answering the 
question “What is X?” without reference to the alphabet because without the alphabet, X has no 
meaning. Likewise, the alphabet has no content without its constitutive parts. Though Plato does 
not explicitly develop the argument as such, we can infer that the same may be said in support of 
the unity of the virtues – i.e. courage, moderation, and justice are all reflections of the good. As 
Socrates summarizes their enquiry:  
So if, on the one hand, the complex is a plurality of elements and a whole, with them as 
its parts, then complexes and elements are knowable and expressible in account to just 
the same extent, since it has turned out that all the parts are the same thing as the 
whole…And if, on the other hand, it’s a single thing without parts, then a complex and an 
element lack an account and are unknowable to just the same extent; because the same 
reason will make them so…So if anyone says that a complex is knowable and expressible 
in an account, and an element the opposite, let’s not accept it. (205d-e) 
While their conclusion gets them no closer to an account, it remains significant for two reasons. 
First, Socrates has concluded for the second time that in order for anyone to claim expert 
knowledge of any subject they must not only know everything about the subject but also 
everything else that could inform it. Especially with respect to knowledge of virtue and politics, 
the subjects of the Protagoras and Republic, this argument implies that the truly knowledgeable 
person must know everything. Yet this is impossible. As his discussion with Protagoras in the 
next section further demonstrates, Socrates’ standard is clearly beyond human wisdom. We 
might once again conclude that informed, but fallible, belief rather than knowledge governs 
social life. Socrates’ conclusion is also significant for my interpretation of the Republic. Briefly 
put, if the philosopher-kings are to govern the kallipolis according to their knowledge of the 
good, it follows from this that they must also possess comprehensive knowledge of everything 
                                                 
110 He admits that one might distinguish between letters by distinguishing syllabic differences in a given language, 
but this again would presuppose mastery of the language in question (204d).  
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the city needs to function. As I will show in the next chapter, Socrates designs the guardians’ 
training with just this point in mind. 
 Before the dialogue concludes, the companions turn to the question of how adding an 
account of reasoning to a true judgment would get them closer to a definition of knowledge, 
assuming they knew what such an account would entail. Socrates proposes three different 
meanings of an account. According to the most literal meaning, an account (legein) is simply 
“making one’s thoughts known through words and verbal expressions” (206c). He objects that 
anyone can provide an account according to this definition, even when they are mistaken in their 
judgments. The account will not correct the judgment and thus fail to get it closer to knowledge. 
Rejecting that definition, he briefly floats a definition of account as “expert judgment,” namely 
the capacity to explain each element of a complex whole (207c). As the discussion above shows, 
however, this definition of logos is outside the realm of human understanding. Finally, he 
suggests that most people will say that giving an account means “being able to tell some mark by 
which the object you are asked about differs from all other things” (208c). This tempting 
definition implies that the key difference between a wise judgment and a lucky guess lies in 
one’s understanding of a measure or method by which one can make distinctions between 
categories. The difference between better and worse judgment, then, is that knowledge motivates 
the former but not the latter. But in practice, this qualification still gets us no closer to the 
difference between good and bad judgments. For in order to distinguish the good from the bad or 
the just from the unjust, we must know what is good or what is just. If we already know these 
things, we are no longer relying on our best judgments but are rather operating according to 
knowledge. Here, Socrates points out that he and Theaetetus have painted themselves into a 
tautology whereby knowledge equates to judgment supplemented by knowledge (209e).  
 150 
 
 Exasperated, Theaetetus confesses that he seems less sure of himself at the conclusion of 
his conversation with Socrates than ever before. Reprising his role as midwife, Socrates concurs 
with the young man and insists that they have yet to give birth to any ideas “worth bringing up” 
(210c). But their time has not been wasted. Having spent the morning judging between sound 
and unsound arguments, Theaetetus has presumably learned quite a lot about how to interrogate 
common opinion and philosophical argument. His future inquiries are likely to be more 
productive because he has now cleansed himself of inconsistent beliefs. Even if he should remain 
barren, Socrates consoles him, he will conduct himself in a humbler, more sociable way now that 
he has guarded himself against the hubris of claiming to know what he does not.  
Though the dialogue concludes without a positive definition of knowledge, these closing 
remarks offer a window into the political aims of Socrates’ philosophical practice and of Plato’s 
aims more generally.111 When lauding Theaetetus’ fighting spirit and insisting on how his 
commitment to philosophical examination will make him “less burdensome on those with whom 
[he associates],” Socrates admits that his own art is rather limited: 
That much my art (technē) can do, but no more, and I don’t know any of the things which 
others know, all the great and admirable men there are and have been; but this gift of 
midwifery my mother and I received from God, she with women, and I with young and 
noble (gennaiōn) men who are beautiful (kaloi). (210d) 
 
The passage is especially significant because it directly connects Socrates’ technē of midwifery 
to the practice of citizenship among the “young and noble men who are beautiful.” Socrates 
aligns himself with the Athenian political class who will one day distinguish themselves in 
public affairs. Insofar as that technē concerns the capacity to judge between well-reasoned 
                                                 
111 Cornford (1935: 162) interprets the dialogue’s unsatisfying conclusion as an indication that a theory of the 
Forms, as developed in the Republic, is needed to provide a more satisfying answer to the question of knowledge. 
His conclusion neglects the social and political significance of Socrates’ philosophical method.  
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arguments and poorly considered opinions, we see him engaged in cultivating or at least 
challenging these capacities in the city. As we shall see in the next section, however, he will have 
to compete with more popular sophists in order to retain his station. Second, we see in the post-
discussion description of Theaetetus a sketch of the good Socratic citizen. We know, along with 
Plato, that Theaetetus will actively pursue public life. As well he should. Nowhere in the 
dialogue does Socrates encourage philosophical quietism at the expense of political action; 
rather, he here suggests that philosophical self-examination is an essential feature of good 
citizenship and human flourishing. A talent for wise judgment lies at the heart of that civic 
practice. 
2.3 Hedonism and the Measure of Judgment in the Protagoras 
 The Theaetetus engages with sophistry at a remove, primarily through Socrates’ 
interpretation of the Protagorean man-measure principle discussed above. The Protagoras 
deepens Plato’s critique of Protagoras and of democratic decision-making rooted in sophistic 
influence. This section focuses on three interrelated aspects of Plato’s overarching critique of 
Athenian judgment present in the Protagoras. I begin with Plato’s fixation on fifth century 
sophistic instruction. Like the Apology, the Protagoras paints a portrait of young and 
undiscerning Athenians flocking to sophists, seduced by their reputations for wisdom. This 
aspect of the dialogue vividly dramatizes a phenomenon that earlier dialogues allude to, and here 
we feel the full force of Plato’s discomfort. I then return to the relationship between knowledge 
and virtue briefly discussed in the preceding section. Protagoras makes two conflicting claims 
about virtue in the dialogue. He claims, on one hand, to teach virtue – which suggests that 
knowledge is necessary for virtue – while resisting, on the other hand, that all virtues depend on 
knowledge. The former position seems to indicate his belief in a unified theory of virtue, while 
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the latter position seems to undermine such a theory and questions the usefulness of his 
instruction. Socrates reveals Protagoras’ contradiction and supports the unified theory by 
insisting that knowledge is necessary and sufficient for virtuous action. Finally, I examine 
Socrates’ argument for hedonism, showing how his vexing account of political judgment as a 
hedonic calculus exposes contradictions in popular hedonism and affirms his unified view of 
virtue.              
Plato stages the Protagoras in the home of Callias sometime around 432 BCE, just before 
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.112 It is a propitious time for Athenian democracy, 
culture, and, among the aristocracy, for sophistry.113 Imperial wealth combined with Periclean 
interests in liberal education to nourish the sophistic movement in the city. Callias was among 
the most affluent men in Athens and was an especially enthusiastic patron of sophists like 
Protagoras.114 Socrates chides him for spending so lavishly on their services in the Apology (20c) 
                                                 
112 The dialogue’s exact date is a matter of disagreement with little hard evidence. The consensus has long held that 
Plato stages the dialogue within a stylized version of the 430s prior to the Peloponnesian War. See Guthrie (1975: 
214); Taylor (1976: 64). John Walsh (1984) advocates a later date sometime in the 420s because any earlier date 
would subject Plato to gross historical anachronisms. Not only would Callias not have become the master of his 
house before the late 420s (his father Hipponicus was an Athenian general in 427) but many of those attending the 
dialogue, particularly Alcibiades, would not have been old enough to exert the kind of influence Plato attributes to 
them. Walsh instead argues that the dramatic staging is a combination of two separate visits Protagoras made to the 
city, one in the 430s and another in the late 420s. Yet this argument is also circumstantial: Alcibiades, for instance, 
would have been at least 20 according to proponents of the earliest possible dating in the late 440s, by which time 
his popularity among the young was firmly established. It is clear, however, that Plato wanted readers to understand 
the meeting as an occasion attended by the generation of elites directly after Pericles who would lead the city 
through the Peloponnesian War. We should regard the dialogue’s dramatic audience as a depiction of the reservoir 
of talent upon which Athens could draw after the great statesman’s death, and should therefore bear Thucydides’ 
criticism of this generation in mind throughout our study. See Farrar (1988: 45) for a similar argument.  
 
113 On the importance of Athens as a magnet for sophistry, see Kerferd (1981: 15); cf. de Romilly (1992: 18-22); 
Schiappa (2003: 168-71). Within the context of the Peloponnesian War, Syracuse was also a tellingly important city 
for rhetoricians. See Robinson (2000). For a thorough treatment of the political reasons for understanding the 
sophistic challenge to conventional morality, see Bartlett (2003). 
 
114 Callias belonged to aristocratic Alcmeonid clan of which both Pericles and Alcibiades were members. He 
inherited his fabulous wealth from his father and continued to lease slaves to the Laurium silver mines. By the end 
of his life he was publicly condemned as a profligate spendthrift devoid of morality. See, e.g., Andocides (1962: 
130-1); Aristotle (Rhetoric 1405a20-23). 
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and Theodorus describes him as the “guardian of Protagoras’ relics” in the Theaetetus (165a). By 
the date of the dialogue, he has converted his frugal father’s house into a menagerie of exotic 
luxuries, aspiring princelings, and pontificating wise men.115 Socrates describes the scene as a 
veritable who’s who of the Athenian upper crust: “On one side [of Protagoras] were Callias, son 
of Hipponicus, and his brother on his mother’s side, Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides, son 
of Glaucon. On the other side were Pericles’ other son, Xanthippus, Phillippides, son of 
Philomelus, and Atimoerus of Mende, Protagoras’ star pupil who is studying professionally to 
become a sophist” (315a). Agathon, Adeimantus and Pausanias cluster around Prodicus of Ceos, 
who is also visiting Athens in addition to a collection of foreign physicians, rhetoricians, and 
intellectuals who join Protagoras in his tour of the Hellenic world. “He enchants them,” Socrates 
says, “with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow the sound of his voice in a trance” (315b).116 
Comparing himself to Odysseus gazing upon Hades, Socrates quips that Callias’ house is a 
vision of hell.117 
 Socrates has come to Callias’ home under the auspices of introducing his young friend 
Hippocrates to Protagoras. Eager to become Protagoras’ student, Hippocrates promises to 
bankrupt himself and his friends to pay for the sophist’s services but needs a formal introduction 
from Socrates in order to do so. Before arriving, Socrates examines Hippocrates with questions 
                                                 
115 When he describes the scene, Socrates quip that Callias stores sophists where his father once stored grain. He 
also mentions that Callias’ doorman was a eunuch, suggesting that his host not only had a taste for conspicuously 
expensive luxuries but also a fascination with Persian culture (314d). The practice of keeping eunuchs would have 
been highly unusual across Greece, and to have employed one in so public a position would require considerable 
remove from community norms. See, e.g., Miller (1997: 214). That Callias seems to be able to afford to do so 
speaks to the growing cultural and normative disparity between the aristocracy and the rest of democratic Athens. 
 
116 Like Protagoras, Orpheus was of Thracian birth.  
 
117 See 315c. His reference is to Homer’s Odyssey (xi.601) in which the hero recalls what he saw in Hades.  
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about what he hopes to gain from Protagoras.118 Over the course of their brief conversation, 
Hippocrates reluctantly admits that he would, as a sophist, like to be able “to make clever 
speeches” (deinon poeī legein) (312d).119 Their exchange on the purpose of education frames the 
longer discussion between Socrates and Protagoras: 
S:  Maybe you expect to get the kind of lessons you got from your grammar instructor or 
music teacher or wrestling coach. You didn’t get from them technical instruction to 
become a professional, but a general education suitable for a gentleman. 
H: That’s it exactly! That’s just the sort of education you get from Protagoras. 
S: Then do you know what you are about to do now, or does it escape you? 
H: What do you mean? 
S: That you are about to hand over your soul for treatment to a man who is, as you say, a 
sophist. As to what exactly a sophist is, I would be surprised if you really knew. And yet, 
if you are ignorant of this, you don’t know whether you are entrusting your soul to 
something good or bad. (312e) 
 
When Hippocrates fails to deliver a clear definition of what craft Protagoras presumably 
practices, Socrates admonishes him for recklessly endangering his soul. Surely Hippocrates 
would not entrust the care of his body to an unknowledgeable physician, so why would he turn 
his much more precious soul over to such a man as Protagoras? The question echoes previously 
                                                 
118 While doing so, Socrates references Hippocrates of Cos, his companion’s namesake (311c). Socrates insists that 
Hippocrates talk with him in the open air of his courtyard while pointedly noting that, because “Protagoras spends 
most of his time indoors,” they are not likely to miss him (311a). The remark suggests an early contrast between 
Socrates, who famously conducts philosophy in the open-air agora, with Protagoras, who typically practices 
sophistry behind closed doors because he fears persecution (316d). 
 
119 Hippocrates’ phrasing in this passage is telling. Deinon, usually translated as “clever,” carried connotations of 
terrifying ingenuity associated with Prometheus. For instance, the first choral ode of Sophocles’ Antigone (lines 332-
375) describes the ways in which “clever man” (anthrōpon deinōteron) subdues nature through technological know-
how. As Martin Heidegger (2000 [1953]: 115) observes, deinon invoked terrifying anxiety about the limits to which 
man could use reason (logos) in the service of violence or deceitfulness. When Socrates introduces himself in the 
Apology as a speaker who is not accomplished, he says that he is not capable of “clever speech” (deinou ontos 
legein) (17b). Here, Plato suggests that sophistry abuses rationality by divorcing it from typical norms of ethical 
conduct. We see the point reemerge in Protagoras’ “long speech,” in which Prometheus is responsible for endowing 
humanity with rationality only to be punished by Zeus. It is perhaps because of Socrates’ disavowal of “clever 
speech” that Hippocrates is reluctant to admit that he would like to learn its craft (poesis).     
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cited remarks about the dangers of sophistry to vulnerable souls, but it also leads to an important 
point about judgment. Insofar as Hippocrates and others like him are untrained in the skills 
necessary to distinguish between qualified masters and deceitful imposters, they are especially 
reliant upon the better judgment of their elders. Here, Socrates approaches Hippocrates not as a 
midwife or a gadfly, but as a “father or older brother” who wants to protect him. He 
demonstrates throughout that the practice of soul-craft begins with discerning between those 
things that are good for the soul and those that are not. 
 When Socrates and Protagoras finally meet, the sophist thanks the philosopher for 
discretely discussing his services in private. “Caution,” he says, “is on order for a foreigner who 
goes into the great cities and tries to persuade the best of the young men in them to abandon their 
associations with others, relatives and acquaintances, young and old alike, and to associate with 
him instead on the grounds that they will be improved by this association” (316d). Protagoras’ 
phrasing is conspicuously similar to Socrates’ warning about the draw of sophistry in the 
Apology (20c), and we might question how likely the historical Protagoras would have been to 
express such reservations. For by coloring Protagoras as a cryptic figure, Plato not only captures 
the intrigue that surrounds him but also leads us to ask what useful, if dangerous, wisdom the 
sophist claims to possess.   
 When asked about his services, Protagoras declares, loudly enough for everyone in 
attendance to hear, that he will improve his students daily. Other sophists “abuse young men, 
steering them back again, against their will, into subjects the likes of which they have escaped 
from at school, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music and poetry” (318e).120 
                                                 
120 Protagoras’ language parallels Socrates’ language of “compulsion” in his description of the philosophers’ training 
in the Republic (515c-e).  
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“What I teach,” he continues, “is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters – how best to 
manage one’s household, and in public affairs – how to realize one’s maximum potential for 
success in political debate and action” (319a). Socrates interprets this as the “art of citizenship” 
(politikē technē). Protagoras appeals to Hippocrates because his instruction is both useful and 
easily, if expensively, acquired.121 Traditional education is painful; his training is pleasant. This 
important qualification comports with the popular hedonism to which Socrates will return later in 
the dialogue (351c). It also clashes with Socrates’ view of philosophical training as a difficult 
and sometimes painful process that, as we saw in the Theaetetus, may only produce “wind eggs” 
even as it disabuses students of their naïve ignorance. Moreover, it recalls Socrates’ warning 
about Olympic victors who please their supporters but do not necessarily bring them happiness 
(eudaimonia). At this stage, Protagoras does not promise happiness in the Socratic sense; but he 
does guarantee public and private success, and he banks on his prospective pupils equating that 
success with genuine happiness.122    
Protagoras professes to teach his students sound private and public judgment, returning 
us to the dissonance between his purported pedagogical goals and Plato’s representation of his 
character. If Protagoras’ primary goal is to mold men into good citizens by teaching them to 
persuade others, why does he express a strong desire for discretion when discussing the matter 
                                                 
121 Protagoras tellingly confirms Socrates’ impression that he intends to teach “the art of citizenship” (politkēn 
technēn) (319a). In their earlier conversation, Hippocrates confirmed Socrates’ impression that the young man was 
not after technical instruction (technē) but was rather interested in a more general education (paideia) “suitable for a 
gentleman” (idiōtēn kai ton eleutheron prepei) (312b). Protagoras promises to make Hippocrates a professional 
politician rather than a gentleman.  
 
122 Though the conversation soon turns to the challenge of teaching virtue, it is Socrates – not Protagoras – who 
directly connects virtue with the political craft (320b). Protagoras accepts this additional requirement without 
question, but it is telling that he does not immediately include virtue as a precondition of good citizenship. 
Protagoras could have easily resisted the equation. Indeed, when he agrees with Socrates that “having good sense 
(sophrosynē) means having good judgment (bouleuesthai) in acting unjustly” (333d), he suggests that he does not 
equate good citizenship with Socratic virtue at all.  
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with Socrates? Why does he fear persecution, especially in a city that is most amenable to the 
sophistic movement? Socrates seems sensitive to this tension and doubts that such a political art 
can be taught at all: 
The truth is, Protagoras, I have never thought that this could be taught, but when you say 
it can be, I can’t very well doubt it. It’s only right that I explain where I got the idea that 
this is not teachable, not something that can be imparted from one human being to 
another. I maintain, along with the rest of the Greek world, that the Athenians are wise. 
And I observe that when we convene in the Assembly and the city has to take some 
action on a building project, we send for builders to advise us; if it has to do with the 
construction of ships, we send for shipwrights; and so for everything that is considered 
learnable and teachable. But if anyone else, a person not regarded as a craftsman, tries to 
advise them, no matter how handsome and well-born he might be, they just don’t accept 
him. They laugh at him and shout him down until he either gives up trying to speak and 
steps down himself or the archer-police remove him forcibly by order of the board. This 
is how they proceed in matters which they consider technical. But when it is a matter of 
deliberating on the city’s management, anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, 
blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born, low-
born—it doesn’t matter—and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without 
any prior training under a teacher. The reason for this is clear: They do not think that this 
can be taught. Public life aside, the same principle holds also in private life, where the 
wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others the virtues that they 
possess. (319b-e) 
Again, we hear echoes of Socrates’ defense speech when he complains that Athenians seek out 
experts to advise them in every facet of life except virtue and political judgment. Cynthia Farrar 
connects this complaint with certain democratic features of the man-measure principle developed 
in the Theaetetus. As she notes, “This example suggests that each man judges for himself when it 
comes to political questions…The Athenians, [Socrates] asserts, recognize the existence of 
expertise with respect to ‘technical’ matters, but with respect to political questions they practice 
what amounts to free speech” (1988: 78-79). Indeed, Protagoras agrees that he does not teach 
virtue in the conventional sense at all. In a long speech, he posits that humanity acquired virtues 
from the gods, who endowed primitive man with sociable feelings in a bid to save the race from 
mutual destruction (321d-328b). It is therefore reasonable, he says, for the Athenians to accept 
advice from anyone “for they think that this particular virtue, political or civic virtue, is shared 
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by all” (323a). That said, Protagoras further insists that people do not consider civic virtue a fully 
developed native talent equally distributed among everyone; rather, virtue is cultivated through a 
combination of legal punishment and formal education (324c, 325d-326e). He facilitates that 
effort by modeling a “more advanced” virtue for his students (328a).  
 In order to support his claim to teach virtue, Protagoras would have to demonstrate that 
civic virtue is a knowable subject akin to a technē.123 In his Metaphysics (1.1), Aristotle writes 
that the four primary features of a technē are that its tenets can be universalized, taught, precisely 
measured, and explained.124 A technē must also aim at a defined end. We can illustrate the 
concept more clearly by turning to Socrates’ analogy with medicine.125 The end of all medicine 
is to secure the health of a patient. With respect to universality, Aristotle explains, “A technē 
arises when, from many notions gained by experience, one universal judgment about similar 
objects is produced” (Metaphysics 981a5-7). That is, a craft must demonstrate a shared 
commonality between all cases that come under its purview. In the physician’s case, these 
include common features about all human bodies such that accurate predictions can be made 
about how particular bodies will respond to given stimuli (e.g. all bodies bleed when cut with a 
sharp knife). Likewise, a physician can know enough about the human body to accurately judge 
                                                 
123 The technē analogy underpins his own pedagogical approach (328a). The analogy between virtue and craft is also 
a staple of Plato’s early and middle dialogues. See, e.g., Charmides 173a; Gorgias 460a-461b. As Nussbaum 
helpfully observes, “Technē is closely associated with practical judgment or wisdom (sophia, gnōmē) with 
forethought, planning, and prediction…A person who says (as many did in the fifth century) that practical reasoning 
should become a technē is likely, then, to be demanding a systematization and unification of practice that will yield 
accounts and some sort of orderly grasp; he will want principles that can be taught and explanations of who desired 
results are produced. He will want to eliminate some of the chanciness from human social life.” (1986: 94-95, 97). 
Cf. Reeve (1989: 37-41). 
 
124 Xenophon developed a less schematized but similar definition in his discussion of making body armor. See 
Memorabilia 3.10. Cf. Miller (2012: 111).  
 
125 It is worth noting, however, that ancient physicians were anxious to defend the epistemic status of their own 
technē, especially given its challenges to religious doctrine about the human body. The causal relationship between a 
given treatment and its effects was of particular concern. See Miller (1949). 
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how a set of conditions will likely affect particular bodies over time. Practitioners must also be 
able to teach these universal principles. For example, an experienced physician can train an 
intern in how to treat hemorrhagic fever without the intern ever actually experiencing a case of 
hemorrhagic fever himself. Equipped with theoretical wisdom, the new physician should not 
have to treat his patients through trial and error alone, though he will not possess genuine 
medical knowledge until he has acquired some experience with individual cases.126 Third, a 
technē brings a measure of precision to its subject. This is perhaps the most difficult element of a 
technē to define insofar as it demands a common standard against which to judge all similar 
cases. Physicians can agree that a certain blood pressure or standard of cardiovascular capacity 
can amount to health; but even here, those measures are subject to revision as more is learned 
about human bodies. Finally, a technē should be able to explain why and how a subject works. 
That is, it can explain – or seek to explain – why a certain practice was successful in meeting its 
end. In the hemorrhagic fever example, this might entail understanding how and why rodents 
transmit the disease and why exterminating their nests can effectively prevent contagion.127 
 In the Theaetetus, knowledge of the sort appropriate to a technē is difficult for all but the 
most empirical of sciences. Here, Plato extends the problem of acquiring technical knowledge of 
virtue to its application in political judgment. In order to teach virtue and sound deliberation in 
the technical sense, Protagoras would first need a coherent account of virtue similar to the 
                                                 
126 See Aristotle (Metaphysics, 981a20-25). 
 
127 Reeve recalls Aristotle’s criticism of the craft-virtue analogy. “A craft is a capacity for opposites. It enables its 
possessor to do both good and bad things. The doctor knows how to cure, but ipso facto he knows how to kill as 
well. A virtue, on the other hand, can result only in good things. A virtuous person cannot perform vicious acts. 
Precisely on this ground Aristotle will later reject the idea that virtues are crafts” (2006: 4). Cf. Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 1129a. Terence Irwin (1977: 177) argues that Plato, too, distances himself from the craft-
analogy by the time he writes the Republic. Rosamond Sprague (1976: 9) rejects this view, arguing that the technē 
analogy continues to provide an aspirational model in the Republic and elsewhere throughout the Platonic corpus. 
Cf. Nussbaum (1986: 74).  
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physician’s account of health. In his long speech about their divine origins, Protagoras talked 
about justice, moderation, and courage as though they were collectively one thing, namely, virtue 
(329c). When Socrates presses him to more precisely specify whether the virtues are unified or 
discrete, Protagoras replies that “virtue is a single entity, and the things you are asking about are 
its parts,” much as eyes, noses and mouths are constitutive features of faces (329d-e). Yet when 
Socrates follows up by asking if all people necessarily share all parts of virtue equally (i.e. all 
virtuous people are necessarily just, temperate, and brave), Protagoras balks: “By no means, 
since many are courageous but unjust, and many again are just but not wise” (329e). According 
to this revised account, justice, piety, moderation, and courage each carry different powers 
(dunamois) with none exactly like any other. Socrates questions Protagoras’ explanation, 
positing that justice, piety, and all of the other virtues are necessarily unified, for if they were 
not, pious acts could be unjust and just acts could be impious (331b). Protagoras relents only to a 
Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” between the various virtues that extends only so far as 
“anything at all resembles any other thing” (331d).128 Socrates then challenges Protagoras by 
getting him to agree to three dissonant positions: first, folly is the opposite of wisdom (332a); 
second, all actions have exactly one correct form described as “good” and one opposite “bad” 
form (332d); third, acting intemperately is as much an act of folly as behaving unwisely (333b). 
Protagoras realizes that he cannot hold all of these views on pain of contradiction, meaning that 
he cannot supply a coherent definition of the technē he purportedly teaches. 
                                                 
128 Irwin (1995: 80-81) characterizes Socrates’ argument as a Reciprocity Thesis (i.e. “the claim that [virtues] imply 
each other, and are therefore inseparable”), and notes that by rejecting it, Protagoras raises a difficulty for his own 
position: “If the Reciprocity Thesis is correct, then Protagoras is right to assume that we cannot acquire the self-
regarding virtues, aiming at one’s own success, without also acquiring the other-regarding virtues of the good 
citizen…The sophist is shown not to understand the conception of virtue that underlies his own claims about 
teaching virtue; and so he is shown to need the sort of enlightenment that results from a Socratic inquiry.” 
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Socrates embarrasses Protagoras by demonstrating that the sophist does not know what 
he claims to know about virtue or, by extension, sound deliberation. Unlike his conversations 
with Theaetetus and Theodorus, Socrates questions his older and more distinguished interlocutor 
with a verve and contempt that is more gadfly than midwife. We see the effects in Protagoras’ 
tone, when he refuses to continue the dialogue within the strictures of the Socratic elenchus 
(335a). The dialogue nearly breaks down again when Protagoras only reluctantly agrees to 
resume elenctic discourse in the face of public shaming by Alcibiades (348c).129 Socrates 
thereafter adopts a more conciliatory, if ironic, tone when the conversation resumes.130 Yet he 
surely wanted to discredit Protagoras when he arrived at Callias’ home, for doing so amounted to 
the kind of public service he describes in the Apology. The meeting affords Socrates a chance to 
grapple with the most famous sophist of his generation before of an audience that includes young 
aristocrats and social climbers very near the eve of the Peloponnesian War.131 Men like 
Alcibiades will soon lead the city into war; men like Hippocrates will vote on their policies, 
                                                 
129 Shame operates throughout the dialogue as a socializing emotion, first given to us, according to Protagoras, by 
Zeus (322c). Alfredo Ferrarin (2000: 314-316) observes that shame is only felt when a subject looks to others for 
approval. By replacing shame with moderation (sophrosynē) in his catalogue of social virtues, Farrarin argues that 
Protagoras hopes to cultivate an internalized sense of sociability among his students. If Farrarin is correct, it appears 
that Protagoras has either looked to Alcibiades or, more likely, the audience for approval in the same way that 
Hippocrates looked to Socrates when he blushed as he admitted to his sophistic aspirations (312b). Cf. Bartlett 
(2003).  
 
130 When Protagoras agrees to abandon long speeches about poetry and to resume Socrates’ dialectical method, the 
philosopher reassures him: “Protagoras…I don’t want you to think that my motive in talking with you in anything 
else than to take a good hard look at things that continually perplex me” (348c). This follows from a long speech in 
which Socrates insists that they put poetic references aside: “The best people avoid such discussions and rely on 
their own powers of speech to entertain themselves and test each other. These people should be our models. We 
should put the poets aside and converse directly with each other, testing the truth and our own ideas” (347e-348a). 
Taken together, these remarks suggest that Socrates is trying to take a more earnest approach with Protagoras as a 
co-investigator. His next line therefore drips with irony: “I think that Homer said it all in the line, ‘Going in tandem, 
one perceives before the other.’”  
 
131 Socrates attempts to engage the audience as an assembly of active judges by refusing to continue his discussion 
with Protagoras unless they do so (338d-e). It is a remarkably democratic gesture in the sense that the collective 
body will bring their force of numbers to bear on assessing and regulating the discussion. It also gives the discussion 
between Socrates and Protagoras a more public quality despite the secretive confines of Callias’ home. 
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serve under their leadership, and die in their battles. Plato has already established how easily 
men like Protagoras can persuade men like Hippocrates to part with their souls and bankrolls. 
Plato also knows how enthusiastically the same men will sail on Sicily because of Alcibiades’ 
promises of fame and fortune. In other words, Protagoras and Alcibiades both owe their 
influence to popular beliefs about how the talents they possess will ensure greater pleasure for 
themselves and the city alike. It is to this popular hedonism that Plato turns next.   
 Plato turns to the problem of popular hedonism as part of a broader investigation of 
courage. In the first part of their conversation, Protagoras objected to Socrates’ unified theory of 
virtue by observing that some people are widely considered courageous but also unjust (329e, cf. 
349d). Socrates returns to the dispute over courage in an effort to persuade Protagoras that he 
really believes that the virtues are not only unified, but are so through knowledge – a point 
Protagoras anticipates but nevertheless resists (350a, cf. 351a-b). Though Protagoras is prepared 
to grant that knowledge enhances confidence and courage, he is not yet willing to concede that 
knowledge is a necessary condition for bravery and, therefore, of all virtue. Before Socrates can 
fully refute Protagoras, then, he must first reveal inconsistencies in the sophist’s theory of virtue 
through an elenctic examination.  
Socrates begins his elenchus, somewhat incongruously, by having Protagoras agree to 
three points: some people live well while others live badly, a life of distress and pain is not a life 
well lived, and “having lived pleasantly” (hedeōs bios) a man can be said to have lived well 
(351b). Yet when Socrates glibly concludes, “to live pleasantly is good, and unpleasantly, bad,” 
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Protagoras agrees only insofar as the pleasure taken was in “honorable things” (351c).132 
Socrates reacts to the amendment with surprise: 
What, Protagoras? Surely you don’t, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and 
some painful things good? I mean, isn’t a pleasant thing good just insofar as it is pleasant, 
that is, if it results in nothing other than pleasure; and, on the other hand, aren’t painful 
things bad in the same way, just insofar as they are painful? (351c) 
 
Socrates thinks that while most people generally agree to a hedonic theory of value – desiring 
pleasure and avoiding pain – they confuse themselves by valuing unpleasant activities and 
renouncing others that are. Protagoras replies that Socrates’ first conclusion – that everything 
pleasant is good and everything painful is bad – remains unclear: 
It seems to me to be safer to respond not merely with my present answer in mind but 
from the point of view of my life overall, that on the one hand, there are pleasurable 
things which are not good, and on the other hand, there are painful things which are not 
bad but some which are, and a third class which is neutral – neither bad nor good. (351d) 
 
From this point, the philosopher and the sophist agree to examine the question of whether 
pleasure itself is good. We might suspect, along with Bartlett (2008), that Protagoras secretly 
harbors hedonic sympathies. Plato has, after all, depicted him as a fabulously wealthy tutor of 
luxuriating men like Callias. Yet Socrates does not implicate him in popular hedonism. By 
avoiding this charge, the philosopher flatters Protagoras as a gentleman who restricts himself to 
honorable pleasures and disdains the crass materialism enjoyed by “the many.” This is a sly 
move. For by including Protagoras among those noble people who revere knowledge and disdain 
the popular attitude toward it, Socrates simultaneously disarms his defensive companion and 
                                                 
132 Bartlett (2008: 141) describes Protagoras’ immediate disavowal of hedonism as a “precautionary measure” taken 




begins to build his case that knowledge is the supreme virtue.133 As we shall see, this gesture 
represents the beginning of Protagoras’ undoing. 
 Socrates examines hedonism through a study of akrasia, or weakness of will. Akrasia 
describes a condition in which a person does something they know they should avoid, or fails to 
do something they know they should, because they are overcome, usually by some immediate 
pleasure.134 In other words, the akratic person does not act merely on impulse (e.g., compulsively 
drinking wine until they are very drunk) or out of recklessness (e.g., drinking the bottle of wine 
in the belief that doing so outweighs the merit of meeting other obligations), but acts against 
their better judgment in spite of their practical reason (e.g., I know I shouldn’t drink tonight 
because I have an important meeting in the morning, but I’m going to drink anyway).135 Socrates 
finds akrasia troubling, for it raises the possibility that reason really is dragged about like a slave 
by non-rational desires. He also finds it puzzling. On one hand, “the many” who subscribe to 
hedonism equate pleasure to the good and pain to the bad (354c-d). According to this account, 
practical judgment amounts to choosing actions that induce pleasure while avoiding actions that 
induce pain. On the other hand, these same people explain bad actions by attributing the person’s 
poor decision to their having been “overcome by pleasure” (355a). Socrates demonstrates the 
absurdity of the akratic account by replacing “pleasure” with “good” and “pain” with “bad,” and 
                                                 
133 Once they have begun their investigation of popular hedonism, Socrates asks Protagoras if he agrees with the 
many knowledge is “not a powerful thing, neither a leader nor a ruler…while knowledge is often present in a man, 
what rules him is not knowledge but rather anything else – sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at 
other times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being utterly dragged around by all these other things as 
if it were a slave” (352c). Protagoras joins Socrates in his condemnation of this position, saying that it would “be 
shameful indeed for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful 
forces in human activity” (352d). 
 
134 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle remarks that pleasures related to sex, food, and alcohol are the usual culprits 
(1118a30-33, 1147b25-35). 
 




then imaging someone repeating the akratic argument: “What you’re saying is ridiculous – 
someone does what is bad, knowing that it is bad, when it is not necessary to do it, having been 
overcome by the good” (355d). Dyson points out that Socrates’ demonstration invites readers to 
reflect on the incompatibility between hedonic ethics and ordinary descriptions of akratic 
dilemmas: “Socrates has shown that, if good and pleasure are identical, there is something very 
odd about the way people would ordinarily describe cases of moral weakness.”136 It also allows 
Plato attend to the problem with hedonic political judgment.  
 “The many” could still claim that the hedonic account of akrasia remains sound on the 
grounds that akratic judgments are faults of how pleasures and pains are properly weighed while 
one deliberates. They might say that the immediate pleasure appears much greater than the 
longer-term pleasures and pains, leading the akratic to believe falsely that they were pursuing a 
greater pleasure when, in fact, they were mistakenly pursuing a lesser pleasure in the moment 
(356a). Plato raises a similar concern in the Philebus when, in a conversation with Callias’ son 
Protarchus, Socrates describes the challenge of hedonic judgment when pleasures are distant: 
Earlier it was true and false judgments which affected the respective pleasures and pains 
with their own condition. […] But now it applies to pleasures and pains themselves; it is 
because they are alternately looked at from close up and far away, or simultaneously put 
side by side, that the pleasures seem greater compared to pain and more intensive, and 
pains seem, on the contrary, moderate in comparison with pleasures. (42a-b)  
 
Here, Socrates returns to the assertion raised in the Theaetetus that judgments are necessarily 
about a future benefits. Our estimation of future pleasures can be distorted by our hopes or fears 
about the future, just as our estimation of immediate pleasures can become distorted by their 
proximity to us in the present. Consider, for example, the ways in which Alcibiades justified the 
tremendous cost of the Sicilian Expedition with promises of future wealth and glory to Athens. 
                                                 
136 Dyson(1976: 37); cf. Santas (1966: 12).  
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What we need, then, is an art of hedonic measurement, according to which we can see more 
clearly the relative scales of pleasures and pains as the really are, rather than as they appear to 
be (356e). A science of hedonic measurement would save us from the systematic distortions of 
hope and fear by basing political judgments in knowledge.  
 A science of measurement should appeal to hedonists because it supplies them with a 
technē model of political judgment. As Jessica Moss argues, “Once a person learns to judge that 
some particular immediately gratifying pleasure will be outweighed by the pains to follow, she 
will lose her desire for that pleasure, and desire the better course of action instead” (2006: 
507).137 The science of measurement should also appeal to Protagoras, as it grants him the 
outline for a technē of sound deliberation that justifies his profession. If he can demonstrate that 
his teachings about the proper way to regard pleasure can eradicate the problem of akrasia – now 
properly understood as a product of false belief – he can more than justify his steep fees. Indeed, 
Daniel Russell argues that Socrates constructs the measurement thesis solely in order to persuade 
the sophist that virtue requires knowledge.138 When they return to the problem of courage, 
Socrates can demonstrate that cowardice is a product of ignorance and bad judgment, best 
corrected through the kind of wisdom Protagoras claims to possess (360c-e).    
   
Socrates’ aporetic goal is important to keep in mind when understanding the context 
from which the hedonic argument arises. For many interpreters, the hedonic theory of value 
Socrates develops in the Protagoras reflects a hedonistic turn in Plato’s philosophical thought.139 
                                                 
137 Cf. Nussbaum (1986) and Balaban (1987). 
 
138 Russell (2005: 244-247) further notes that when Socrates returns to the question of courage (359b), Protagoras 
abandons his objection to the equation between knowledge and virtue.  
 
139 Hackforth (1928), along with Gosling and Taylor (1982), argues that this brief period in Plato’s thought 
represented a moment in which the philosopher was trying to make sense of Socratic eudaemonism, but which he 
rejected by the time he wrote the Gorgias, thereby explaining Socrates’ attack on Callicles. Vlastos (1956) notes, 
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If this account is accurate, then much of the critique of Athenian political judgment that I have 
located in Plato’s early and middle dialogues would face serious difficulty. Russell gives two 
reasons for hesitating: first, Socratic hedonism appears nowhere else in the Platonic corpus and 
he in fact attacks hedonism quite aggressively where it does appear; second, there is nothing 
about Socrates’ aporetic aims that necessarily commits him to believing the arguments he uses in 
the dialogue.140 There are at least three additional reasons for rejecting the Protagoras argument 
as genuinely Platonic. First, the measurement technē it supports is anti-elenctic and nonpolitical. 
It reduces a philosophical process that Socrates elsewhere considers essential for the best human 
life (i.e. continually reexamining and contemplating virtue) to an empirical calculation that 
obviates Socratic practice. Second, by suggesting that special training is necessary for accurate 
hedonic calculation, the technē argument implies that the democratic assembly is largely and 
systematically mistaken in its usual decision-making process. Plato of course criticizes Athenian 
political judgment elsewhere, but Protagoras earlier justified his pedagogical practice by 
appealing to the assembly’s intuitive wisdom. By persuading Protagoras to endorse the 
measurement technē as an alternative version of the political art, Socrates exposes the sophist’s 
antidemocratic prejudices. The upshot of this exchange is that Socrates drives a wedge between 
Protagorean sophistry and the democratic assembly. Finally, the measurement technē seems 
                                                 
however, that at the time of his translation of the Protagoras, scholarly opinion was in agreement that, however 
briefly he held it, the hedonism expressed in the dialogue was genuinely felt by Plato. Rudebusch (1999) takes a 
more nuanced view, reconciling the discrepancies between Socrates’ hedonism in the Protagoras with his attack on 
Callicles in the Gorgias by insisting that Socratic hedonism aspires to contemplative pleasures while Calliclean 
desire is strictly appetitive. Irwin (1995: 82-89) locates a similar argument in the Euthydemus and insists that the 
epistemological hedonism expressed in the Protagoras “makes it more reasonable to say that virtue is purely 
instrumental to happiness” rather than constitutive of it, and is, moreover, supportive of the foundationalist version 
of eudaemonism he traces throughout the early dialogues. He, too, however, notes that Plato moved beyond this 
view by the time he wrote the Gorgias (1995: 111). In her insightful analysis of the dialogue, Moss (2006) posits 
that the hedonism thesis is essential for the theory of hedonic measurement Socrates constructs in the Protagoras. 
She extends this theory of appetitive calculation to the Republic, thereby moving it to the center of Plato’s ethical 
thought.   
 
140 Russell (2005: 239-240); cf. Santas (1966: 8). 
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cleverly designed to undermine Protagorean epistemological claims. The man-measure principle 
posits that all beliefs are equally valid because they are derived from individual experience. By 
arguing that sound political judgment involves weighing future pleasures and pains alongside 
present pleasures and pains, Socrates suggests that accurate assessments must be premised on 
knowledge that cannot be derived from experience alone.141 In other words, Protagoras would 
have to abandon the man-measure principle in order to accept the validity of the measurement 
technē as Socrates develops it. The sophist’s willingness to do so indicates a fundamental 
weakness in his purported wisdom. Each of these additional reasons supports Russell’s 
interpretation of Socrates’ argument for hedonism in the Protagoras as strictly ad hominem 
efforts to undermine the sophist. 
Socrates attended the meeting at Callias’ house in order to challenge Protagoras and the 
sophists in his company. By demonstrating deep inconsistencies in sophistic theory and practice, 
he hoped to disabuse Hippocrates of his naïvely sophistic aspirations. Socrates does not suggest 
that Hippocrates or any of the other young men in attendance take up philosophy as an 
alternative; that is, he does not try to persuade them to take up philosophy so much as to abandon 
sophistry. Socrates implicitly assumes throughout that internal consistency is a hallmark of 
genuine knowledge and can, therefore, serve as a standard against which to assess wisdom in 
others. The elenctic demonstration in the Protagoras teaches similar lessons about sound 
political judgment. It teaches men like Hippocrates to assess the arguments of men like 
Protagoras on the basis of rational consistency rather than upon the speaker’s reputation. Political 
decisions are better or worse depending, in part, on how rationally consistent they are. This is no 
small observation in a city that will soon find itself addressed by men like Cleon, whose 
                                                 
141 Indeed, experience is actually shown to distort accurate hedonic assessment. 
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violently populist speeches will appeal to a great many in the assembly. The exchange between 
Socrates and Protagoras also reveals a profound challenge to hedonic theories of judgment. In 
the Apology, Socrates accused the Athenians of maintaining a crassly hedonistic conception of 
the good which focused too much on materialism and risked falling into pleonexia. The 
argument for hedonism in the Protagoras is more sophisticated, yet equally problematic. If 
sound hedonic judgment requires knowing everything about present and future pleasures and 
pains, that standard is clearly beyond the bounds of human ability. In his commentary on the 
Republic, Allan Bloom argues that Socrates’ philosopher-king proposal is so outlandish that, in 
making it, Plato is actually demonstrating the political impossibility of securing a truly just 
city.142 I disagree with that interpretation, but Socrates appears to be up to something in the 
Protagoras that resembles what Bloom finds in the Republic. The hedonic measurement technē 
is impossible for anyone but a god. On Plato’s account, citizens must aim at a different 
conception of the good when making their political decisions. Though advancing that alternative 
lies beyond the scope of the Protagoras, the dialogue nevertheless gives good reason for 
rejecting the status quo.   
2.4 Conclusion 
In Plato’s view, the citizens assembled on the Pnyx and in the lawcourts based their 
political decisions on whether policies seemed likely to maximize short-term pleasures without 
regard for longer-term virtues. Insofar as the majority equated pleasure with the good, they 
would always run the risk of descending into the kind of pleonexia Thucydides captured in his 
account of the Sicilian Expedition. Plato also worried about the influx of sophists into Athens. 
Sophists’ hubristic claims about knowledge and virtue confirmed their wealthy clients’ biases 
                                                 
142 Bloom (1991: 408). 
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while manipulating the judgments of the many. Though Plato is sometimes guilty of 
exaggerating the opulence associated with fifth and fourth-century sophistry, he does not 
ultimately present them all as an intentionally corrupt lot. Rather, because they do not realize 
how ignorant they are of the very subjects they profess to teach, Plato regards them as quite a bit 
more dangerous. 
Plato’s critique of Athenian judgment is not a criticism of democracy per se, but with the 
Periclean claim that the Athenian demos’ unchallenged intuitions were sufficient for practical 
wisdom. The Apology disrupts that claim by revealing how rarely the Athenians’ knowledge of 
virtue matched their confidence. Indeed, Socrates estimates that he alone gets the balance of 
knowledge to confidence right, insisting that it is quite low. Whether we believe that self-
effacing assertion or not, Socrates also demonstrates a strong commitment to his peculiar brand 
of civic action. By conducting his elenctic practice in the open with a large and diverse cross 
section of the city’s populace, he suggests that anyone is capable of serious ethical contemplation 
provided they are willing to take up the difficult task. In other words, confidence poses the 
greatest impediment to broadly practiced philosophical reflection, not class or intelligence. 
Insofar as he considers political judgment an extension of philosophical reflection, this insight 
gestures toward a model of practical wisdom that is, at a minimum, friendly to democracy. 
The Theaetetus and Protagoras dialogues demonstrate the difficult task before Athens. 
These dialogues show Socrates taking up the first deconstructive phase of his political 
philosophy by challenging the hedonic standard by which most people make their decisions. 
Pleasure is an expansive and slippery notion, susceptible to solipsism, inconsistency, and 
pleonexia. Thucydides gestured toward this problem in the History, but Plato dives more deeply 
into the standard’s internal inconsistencies. His Socrates wants to demonstrate two points for his 
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interlocutors: first, eudaimonia entails more than mere pleasure, requiring virtue as well; second, 
most people already realize that pleasure is a poor standard against which to assess a policy’s 
choiceworthiness. These dialogues do not, however, aim to replace pleasure with a fully 
articulated account of virtue. These are instead aporetic dialogues whose function is to unsettle 
our comfortable notions of what counts as good judgment. For the second, more constructive 
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CHAPTER 3: JUSTICE, EXPERIENCE, AND JUDGMENT IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC 
The Republic is the magnum opus of Plato's Socratic dialogues. To read it as a dialogue 
about justice is to at once belie the breadth of other topics covered in its pages – the features of a 
good life, the nature of knowledge, the pitfalls of governance – as well as to recognize the ways 
in which a discussion about justice binds them together. No treatment of Greek political thought 
is complete without some comment upon it and, as such, it has been the subject of exhaustive 
analysis. Yet with few exceptions, scholars have not sustained attention on the relationship 
between justice and political judgment in the dialogue.143 I hope to illuminate that relationship by 
showing how Plato’s theory of justice informs practical political decision-making in Socrates’ 
kallipolis. As an elaboration of the kallipolis – a “beautiful city” in words – the Republic is 
conventionally read as an exercise in ideal theory without regard for practical application. I 
challenge that interpretation in this chapter by examining how justice ought to inform political 
decision-making. According to my interpretation of the dialogue, sound practical judgment is 
guided by and directed toward the philosopher’s rational conception of justice. 
Socrates consistently posits justice as a model of right action. Like courage, moderation, 
wisdom and other virtues the form of justice supplies an archetype of action that allows actors to 
pursue the good life. To act justly according to Socrates’ model is to pursue psychic harmony; 
that is, to find balance between the sometimes competing demands of other virtues so that each 
can maximize its contribution to the whole without encroaching on the others. Insofar as political 
                                                 
143 For exceptions, see Frank (2007); Wolin (1960: 60-63); (2007); Markovits (2008).  
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decision-making entails balancing competing demands on a community’s scarce resources, 
justice can be understood as a virtue of social decision-making. As in his apologia, Socrates 
worries that a community which lacks such a virtuous model will doom itself to pleonexia and 
irrational policies. Understanding justice, then, is of great practical urgency to anyone seeking 
political office.  
I argued in the previous chapter that Plato’s early and middle Socratic dialogues issue a 
two-fold critique of Athenian political judgment. In his Apology of Socrates, Plato expresses 
reservations about the method of collective decision-making that governs the city. His Socrates 
cautioned the jury against basing its decisions about collective welfare on popular but 
inconsistent beliefs about the “most important things” (talla ta megista) (22e). Plato extends that 
criticism into the Theaetetus and Protagoras dialogues, suggesting that a rigorous, methodical 
examination of competing accounts of the good life is necessary for good political judgment. 
Unlike sophistry, which seeks persuasion rather than analysis, Socratic philosophy recognizes 
the value of uncertainty and the limits of human wisdom. By challenging the sophists’ hubristic 
certainty, Socrates encourages us to continuously reexamine the foundations of our judgments.  
The Republic explores the practice of virtuous politics in an unstable and often violent 
world. Plato advances a model of political judgment comprised of a philosophically defensible 
conception of justice that guides and assesses policies aimed at enhancing community welfare. 
By encouraging citizen-rulers to take their stated commitments to virtue seriously, he hopes to 
stabilize the volatility and impulsiveness that characterized the assembly’s judgment during the 
Peloponnesian War. Furthermore, by bringing philosophical theory to bear on practical concerns 
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that arise from contingency and crisis, the work demonstrates an alternative model of judgment 
that improves the polis through a combination of moral reflection and practical experience.144  
My first goal is to frame the work’s reflections on political judgment within the historical 
and intellectual tradition in which Plato composed it.145 I do so by offering a careful analysis of 
Book 1. Like Thucydides’ History, we can interpret Plato’s Republic as a work whose lessons 
are meant “for all time.”146 But the dramatic dating and setting of the dialogue raise important 
questions about Plato’s practical concerns for the politics of his own time. Attending to the 
work’s dramatic situation in Athens during the Peace of Nicias encourages us to reflect upon the 
connection between its philosophical themes and the experience of practical politics in forth-
century Greece.147 Book 1 strengthens the connections between philosophy and politics by taking 
up three popular theories of justice. These theories are more than set pieces. Indeed, Plato 
develops an alternative model of judgment by grappling with conventional wisdom. By 
presenting them in Book 1, he primes his audience to weigh them as they consider Socrates’ 
alternative model.  
                                                 
144 My argument departs from Catherine Zuckert’s (2009: 179) interpretation of the Republic, which she argues that 
the dialogue’s city-soul analogy renders its practical applicability moot. I also diverge from Alan Bloom’s (1991: 
392) argument that the philosopher-kingship model developed in Book 6 is so unlikely that it instead illustrates an 
unbridgeable gulf between philosophy and politics. 
 
145 Though the reflections on justice contained in Book 1 remain significant today, placing the discussion in its 
historical context foregrounds the practical urgency of political philosophizing. 
 
146 See, Thucydides (1998: 1.23). Cf. Nails (1998). Quentin Skinner (1969: 49-50) insists on the interpretive 
importance of accurately establishing the dialogue’s dramatic context: “the classic texts cannot be concerned with 
our questions and answers, but only with their own,” and that, as such, understanding the exact historic context of 
the Republic is of vital interpreting importance.” While I disagree with Skinner’s assertion that historical texts 
cannot have anything relevant to teach us about our own time, I agree that interpreting the work within its own 
context is greatly important. Nevertheless, the Republic’s dramatic dating has been the subject of scholarly 
controversy. Lewis Campbell (1902: 16) suggests that Plato probably composed the Republic in 378 BCE but that the 
dialogue is set in 411. Cf. Voegelin (2000: 3.52); Bloom (1991: 440). Other commentators have argued persuasively 
that the dialogue was set in 421. See, e.g., Taylor (1960 [1937]: 264); Howland (1993). 
 
147 For a similar argument, see Frede (1992: 219).  
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I take up the features of Plato’s model of judgment in the second section. Recalling his 
criticisms of both philosophers and politicians in the Theaetetus, I argue that good political 
judgment is informed by philosophical investigation as well as through practical experience. 
Justice supplies a model of right action according to which no individual element within the soul 
or the city reaches beyond its proper role. This model offers a standard against which actors can 
compare competing proposals and make policy decisions accordingly. But contemplating the 
form of justice alone is not sufficient; philosophers must test their wisdom through the practical 
experience of actually governing. By requiring philosophers to rule, or by requiring rulers to 
philosophize, Socrates turns the city’s welfare over to those who carefully consider the demands 
of justice. Socrates reminds the philosopher-rulers that their happiness is tied to the fate of their 
political communities. For Plato, even philosophers are political animals.148  
Finally, I will explore the democratic potential of Socrates’ model of the philosopher-
ruler.149 Building on Socrates’ observation that craftsmen have the most knowledge of their 
products, but that the products’ users are best qualified to judge their quality, I argue that 
democratic politics positions citizens to act both as the creators and as the “users” of laws. This 
argument raises two important questions about democracy and judgment. First, I will ask how 
democratic judgment differs from judgment practiced in alternative regime types. Second, I will 
examine the characteristics and temperaments that democrats should acquire in order to judge 
well. As a member of the assembly, each citizen is asked to make judgments about the welfare 
and long-term interests of the polis and to decide on policies that aim at the collective good. I 
argue that it is by encouraging citizens to see justice as advantage – rather than advantage as 
                                                 
148 See Wallach (2001: 213).  
149 Interpretations of Plato’s Socrates as a friendly critic of Athenian democracy have been established in the 
secondary literature for some time. See, e.g., Euben (1997); S. Sara Monoson (2000); Wallach (2001: 278-301); 
Markovits (2008: 47-81). 
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justice – that Socrates implores them to consider collective, sustainable wellbeing in their 
decisions. Taken literally, the philosopher-ruler model developed in Book 6 is impractical; yet it 
provides a useful model of good decision-making toward which the unphilosophical majority 
might aspire to govern the city.   
3.1 Political and Philosophical Context 
Book 1 frames the Republic by providing two levels of interpretive context. It first 
establishes the historical backdrop, alerting readers to the circumstances that motivate its 
thematic concerns and the connection Plato wishes to draw between philosophy and politics. 
Book 1 also introduces three theories of justice that reflect dominant attitudes toward virtue, 
politics, and decision-making. Because one or more of these theories of justice often informed 
popular political judgment in fifth and forth century Greek thought, I will pay special attention to 
flaws Socrates identifies within them as he sets the stage for his own theory.  
Writing in 380, Plato sets the Republic on the precipice of Periclean Athens in 421. The 
dialogue takes place roughly three months after the Peace of Nicias declared a formal break in 
hostilities between Athens and Sparta. It was an ominous time for the city. The Peace, never 
steady, formally dissolved in 414 when Athens sailed on Sicily while the Lacedaemonians 
renewed their Attic offensive. The democracy would succumb shortly thereafter to the Thirty 
Tyrants, whose campaign of terror purged the city’s popular leaders and persecuted the metic 
population.150  
Given the bloodlust that would soon consume the city, readers might be surprised to find 
Socrates enjoying a summer evening in the Piraeus among friends. In the opening passage, he 
                                                 
150 Plato’s own connection to the Thirty Tyrants in well documented. See, e.g., Taylor (1911: 3-6); Rosen (2005: 
14). Along with his brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato was a kinsman of their leader Critias. According to the 
Seventh Letter he was invited to join the oligarchic junta but declined (324c-326b).  
 186 
 
recounts that he and his young companion Glaucon were returning from the port town when a 
rowdy group of friends detains them: 
I went down (Katabēn) to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston. I 
wanted to say a prayer to the goddess, and I was also curious to see how they would 
manage the festival, since they were holding it for the first time. I thought the procession 
of the local residents was a fine one and that the one conducted by the Thracians was no 
less outstanding. After we had said our prayer and seen the procession, we started back 
towards Athens…Just then Polemarchus caught up with us. Adeimantus, Glaucon’s 
brother, was with him and so were Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others, all of 
whom were apparently on their way from the procession. (327a)  
The passage intimates interpretive and historical themes to which readers should remain attentive 
throughout the dialogue. Sara Monoson notes that its first word, katabēn, describes not simply 
the act of decent, but of “going down to do some active spectating.”151 In this case, Socrates and 
his companions were drawn down from Athens and into the port in order to say a prayer to the 
Tracian goddess Bendis and are later enticed to stay in order to watch a nighttime torch race on 
horseback – a novelty for Athens – as well as to attend the all-night festival (328a). The “decent” 
theme carries through the text, and is widely interpreted as Plato’s effort to connect philosophy 
and politics. 152 We see a similar description of the philosopher’s decent (katabateon) into the 
cave in Book 7 (520c), as well as near the conclusion of the text when souls “come down” from 
the heavens to select their earthly lives in the Myth of Er (614d). This pattern gives the 
dialogue’s opening a liminal quality; the conversation will concern movement between the 
theoretically good city (kallipolis) and the world of lived experience in which political judgments 
are made.  
The Piraeus is an unlikely stage for so lofty a script. Like the cave of Book 7, it was a 
place of people “like us” (515a), a menagerie of cults and craftsmen, theaters and brothels, 
                                                 
151 Monoson (2000: 217). 
 
152See, e.g., Monoson (2000); Frank (2007: 461). On the pattern’s structural significance, see (Reeve, 2013: 45). Cf. 
Strauss (1964: 56); Mara (1981: 356). 
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residents and travelers.153 As the seafaring city’s largest and best fortified port, it was a 
democratic stronghold that also served as the launching pad of Athenian imperialism.154 When 
that effort failed after the War, Thrasybulus would revive democracy from its banks when he 
fought the Thirty with his army of Thracians.155 The Piraeus was also a planned community. 
Designed by Hippodamus of Miletus, whom Aristotle credits as the inventor of urban planning, 
the town featured one of Greece’s first orthogonal street designs and homes carefully arranged to 
reflect the diversity of its denizens.156 On the one hand, Hippodamus’ rational approach to city 
planning and concern for class divisions evokes similar themes in the kallipolis to come. On the 
other hand, if Aristotle correctly chastised the planner as the “first among those who was not a 
statesman,” but who foolishly tried to speak of the ideal state, Plato’s decision to stage the 
conversation within the Piraeus may indicate its failure.157 Hippodamus was not, after all, a 
philosopher.  
Though often glossed over, Plato’s description of the Thracian festival is conspicuous for 
its level of detail and historical significance. Most Athenians regarded Thracian visitors to their 
city as barbarously wild; they were the antitheses of Periclean citizenship. As Despoina 
Tsiafakis’ insightful analysis of fifth and forth century Greek pottery demonstrates, the 
                                                 
153 Finley (1985: 65); Saxonhouse (2009: 745-746).  
 
154 Garland (2001: 28-32). A number of historians have questioned the influence that rowers and sailors had over 
Athenian politics, challenging the view that the Piraeus was symbolically central to Athenian political life. See, e.g., 
Osborn (1985: 64-92); Von Reden (1995).  
 
155 Once democracy was restored, Thrasybulus launched an unsuccessful bid to bestow full citizenship on all 
residents of the Piraeus who participated in the war of liberation. See Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, 40.2. Though 
defeated by the more moderate Archinos, the assembly nevertheless passed a decree bestowing honors and 
citizenship rights on some 1,000 non-Athenians. 
 





Athenians transmitted their prejudices against Thracian culture through the myths of Orpheus 
and Thamyris, whose divinely inspired poetry and songs wrought divine doom.158 This popular 
view comports with Plato’s parallel between the Thracian sophist Protagoras and mythical 
Orpheus in the Protagoras (315b), as well as with his hostility toward the poets in the kallipolis. 
But read against the background of the Peloponnesian War, the fact that Socrates and Glaucon 
have been attracted to the Piraeus for a novel Thracian festival suggests more than idle 
fascination with a culture known for its drinking parties. Tolerant as the Athenians were, the 
public honors accorded to the new Thracian cult to Bendis were exceptional for their grants of 
enktēsis (the right to construct a shrine) as well as for their extension of the right to form 
orgeōnes (sacrificing groups) an official status that was unprecedented for a foreign cult.159 The 
gestures may have been part of Athenian diplomatic efforts to attract Thracian military support 
for future campaigns against Sparta, or perhaps they were meant to cleanse the city of plague.160 
In either case, the festival’s Thracian overtones recall the conflict that has never fully left the 
Athenian horizon. This observation lends weight to Jill Frank’s argument that conflict, politics, 
and philosophy mingle in close proximity to one another throughout the dialogue.161 
Finally, the list of young gentlemen named in the opening passage should alert readers to 
future tensions within historical Athenian politics. Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato’s brothers, are 
kinsmen of the oligarchic junta that would unleash havoc upon the city. The Thirty would 
                                                 
158Tsiafakis (2000). Cf. Bianchi, Horewitz and Girardot (1971). 
 
159See, e.g., Planeaux (2000: 179, 186-9).  
 
160On the effort to attract military support, see, e.g., Garland (1991: 113. On the effort to rid themselves of the 
plague, see Planeaux (2000:181). For a careful treatment of evidence from both perspectives, see Sears (2013: 153-
56). For an instructive analysis of race and Athenian citizenship, see Lape (2010: 21-52). According to Lape, racial 
narratives were central to Athenian conceptions of citizenship and, by extension, their understanding of who was 
due moral consideration.  
 
161Frank (2007: 444). 
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execute Polemarchus, the wealthy metic, in 404 along with Nicias’ son Niceratus.162 Niceratus’ 
father would die honorably in 413 during the Sicilian campaign that he adamantly opposed. 
Socrates, of course, would drink the hemlock when democracy was restored. In light of the 
events to come, the list of characters reads like a necrograph of Periclean Athens. By casting this 
collection of foreigners and citizens as a group of friends, Plato transports his audience to a time 
of relative peace prior to the stasis that would overwhelm the city in its days before 
Lacedaemonian capture.  
Plato’s introduction frames his discussion about justice within a context of impending 
inequity and disruption. The norms that governed Athenian social life (e.g. their reticent 
tolerance of foreigners, their preference for rationality over superstition, etc.) are already bending 
to the pressures of the War. Likewise, the bonds that hold the young friends within a community 
of equality will soon dissolve under an oligarchic junta that would not likely have come to power 
had the Athenians not overextended their wartime ambitions. Athens learned these lessons in 
hindsight through the tragic experience of war, and we learn them in part by studying works like 
Thucydides’ History and the dramas of Aeschylus and Euripides. To the extent that good 
judgment entails foresight, however, we might hope to find some alternative education that 
anticipates such tensions before they manifest as tragedy. Philosophy aspires to supply that 
alternative. 
The intellectual tradition in which Plato situates the opening scenes of the Republic 
provide further interpretive tools for understanding the work’s argument. Plato dedicates the 
majority of Book 1 to three theories of justice that are more or less conventional throughout 
                                                 
162 His brother, the famed orator Lysis, would be driven into exile. 
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fourth century Greece. By challenging these theories, his Socrates is doing more than impressing 
his audience with his intellectual acumen. Indeed, if we agree with Thrasymachus that Socrates’ 
questioning was chiefly eristic, we might be disappointed; Socrates’ treatment of these 
arguments is not always particularly generous or convincing. But the exercise is thematically 
important for at least two reasons. First, Plato suggests that philosophical examination should 
start on fresh ground. By clearing away old arguments, Plato positions his characters to develop 
new solutions to persistent problems pertaining to justice. Second, and more importantly for my 
purposes, Socrates’ elenctic examination of each conventional theory of justice attempts to 
expose problems with their application. To the extent that justice ought to inform political 
judgments about a polity’s welfare, the definition of justice should also be consistent and 
practically applicable. Socrates’ concentration on practice suggests that Plato is not content to 
advance an ideal theory of justice alone. Rather, such a theory should also apply to the non-ideal 
circumstances of lived political experience via judgment.  
Plato introduces the first theory of justice in the comfortable home of Cephalus, 
Polemarchus’ father.163 Cephalus is a wealthy Syracusan shield manufacturer whose moderate 
lifestyle has eased his transition into old age (330a). For all that moderate living may be 
intrinsically virtuous, Cephalus’ long experience has taught him that sophrosynē certainly has 
material benefits as well. When asked about what lessons his experience has taught him about 
the road ahead, Cephalus reports that old age is only difficult for those who have lived 
immoderately. When he meets with others of similar age, he says that the majority complain 
about “the lost pleasures they remember from their youth” like drinking, feasting, and having sex 
                                                 
163 Cephalus’ significance to Plato’s project in the dialogue has received relatively scant treatment in the secondary 
literature. Important exceptions include Steinberger (1996); Beversluis (2000: 185-202); Reeve (2013: 38-45). 
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(329a). But if one lives temperately, he says, the twilight years are not so bad. Indeed, a measure 
of pious clarity surfaces as the appetites ebb (329c-d).  
Cephalus’ advice seems to agree with Socrates’ later depiction of psychic rule within the 
philosopher’s soul. According to this later view, reason (logos) and spirit (thumos) keep the 
appetites in check so that bodily pleasures do not overrun the soul: 
And these two, having been nurtured in this way, and having truly learned their own roles 
and been educated in them, will govern the appetitive part, which is the largest part in 
each person’s soul and is by nature most insatiable for money. They’ll watch over it to 
see that it isn’t filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and that it doesn’t become 
so big and strong that it no longer does its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over 
the classes it isn’t fitted to rule, thereby overturning everyone’s whole life. (442a-b) 
Comparing this passage to Cephalus’ remarks puts the agreement between the philosopher and 
the merchant into greater relief. Both take moderation as an essential quality of the good human 
life and both apparently treat corporeal desires as potential limitations upon it.164 This similarity 
lends weight to the “disembodied” interpretation of Socratic virtue, according to which morality 
and experience are set in tension with one another.165 Both experience and philosophy seem to 
instruct moral agents to abstain from appetitive distractions in favor of abstract learning. But 
notice that neither passage advocates the wholesale eradication of appetites; rather, both 
Cephalus (experience) and Socrates (philosophy) converge on a policy of moderation. After all, 
                                                 
164 The latter passage is especially telling for its emphasis on the moderate importance accorded to moneymaking. It 
recalls Cephalus’ self-characterization as a “mean” between his spendthrift father and avaricious grandfather (330d). 
For this reason, moderation is the virtue of the appetitive part while courage and wisdom are the virtues of the 
thumotic and rational parts, respectively.  
 
165 As David Roochnik puts it in his study of Plato’s conception of logos, “Plato has been damned repeatedly as the 
architect of a hyper-rational and oppressive world” governed by the single-minded obsession with impartial, 
absolute Truth” (1990: x). For the strongest representative of this reading, see Popper (1964). For Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1995: 51, 65), Plato’s Socrates was a delusional paragon of disinterested logic, while for Leo Strauss 
(1952: 17; 1964: 110-112, 138) the philosopher-rulers envisioned in the Republic were so enamored of the forms 
that they disdained material human life. Cf. Bloom (1991: 382). Martha Nussbaum (1986: 133, 164) has contended 




Cephalus was renowned for business acumen and Socrates was famous for his feasting and 
drinking.  
Cephalus’ experience aging demonstrates that virtue has its rewards. But that observation 
does not make him virtuous in the Socratic sense. As John Beversluis observes, Cephalus and 
Socrates share an appreciation for the connection between virtue and happiness.166 But whereas 
Socrates understands the connection as one of rational desire, Cephalus appears merely to have 
stumbled upon it like so much good advice. When Socrates asks him to explain himself, he 
references anecdotes and poetry rather than offering reason and argument (329c-d, 329e, 330a, 
331a). Indeed, he couches nearly everything he says in the authority of a poet or statesman 
whose reasoning he cannot further explicate. Socrates seems to like him, and Plato certainly does 
not portray him a vicious or stupid; but we would also struggle to describe him as wise. 
Moreover, like the hapless juror described in chapter 2, his judgments might happen to be correct 
on some occasions and incorrect on others, but he cannot give an account of the difference.  
The difference between experience and philosophy becomes clearest when Socrates 
presses his old friend on the definition of justice. Cephalus has just finished saying that wealth is 
only useful for guarding against the temptation to cheat others (331a-b). “A fine sentiment,” 
Socrates replies, “but, speaking of this very thing itself, namely, justice (dikaiosynē), are we to 
say unconditionally that it is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred? Or 
is doing these things sometimes just, sometimes unjust?” (331c-d) He posits the example of 
returning a borrowed weapon to a friend who has since gone mad. Cephalus agrees that arming a 
lunatic would demonstrate poor judgment, but he does not say that doing so would be unjust per 
                                                 
166 Beversluis (2000: 192) points out that Cephalus describes the benefits in terms of contentment (eukolos) rather 
than the philosophically richer notions of the “good” (agathos) or happiness (eudaimonia).  
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se. His concession nevertheless indicates that his theory of justice is not categorical and therefore 
incomplete. Abiding by it would also risk disastrous material consequences for his friends in 
Syracuse. Knowing that Athens will soon elect to sail on Sicily, Plato positions his Syracusan 
arms-dealer to equip the very men who will invade his homeland. His wrenching situation 
underscores the material importance of critically evaluating how we make decisions. The 
apparently abstract question of justice has suddenly become concrete, and relying on experience 
alone may not help us answer it.  
Polemarchus takes up Cephalus’ argument and allows his father to attend his sacrifice. 
Cephalus’ quick exit might give the impression that he is not up for Socrates’ challenge, or may 
indicate Plato’s effort to clear the space of old, poetic sophistry so that real philosophizing can 
begin.167 But we should not dismiss Cephalus’ significance both for the dialogue’s dramatic 
context as well as for its overall thematic unity. In addition to foreshadowing a number of themes 
that resurface on philosophically sturdier foundations later in the text, he also offers the first 
hypothesis about justice and demonstrates the insufficiency of a life tutored exclusively through 
experience. His conversation with Socrates also has bearing on Plato’s theory of political 
judgment. To the extent that Plato’s concerns for Athenian pleonexia motivate the Republic, 
Cephalus’ insistence on the instrumental benefits of moderate – that is, virtuous – living should 
not go unnoticed, especially insofar as they come from a Syracusan arms dealer. More 
importantly, however, Cephalus’ dependence on outside sources like poets and statesmen hinders 
his capacity for reflective examination. This trait is more than a character flaw specific to the old 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., Leo Strauss (1959: 29-32); Bloom (1991: 312); Darrell Dobbs (1994). Cf. Blanchard (2000: 434); 
Saxonhouse (2006: 38). 
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man; it is also indicative of how the average Greek made judgments about how to live their 
lives.168 
Polemarchus inherits his father’s argument in grand style. True to his namesake, he 
appears at first like an rowdy brat spoiling for a fight.169 Paraphrasing Simonides’ remark that “it 
is just to give each what is owed to him,” he insists that “friends owe it to their friends to do 
good for them, never harm,” and that, likewise, “what enemies owe to each other is appropriately 
and precisely—something bad” (331e-332b). Or, as Socrates puts it, “to treat friends well and 
enemies badly is justice” (332d). As I argued in chapter 1, this theory of justice is especially 
pronounced throughout Thucydides’ History. In my reading of that work, I argued that actors 
like Brasidas who took it seriously were better positioned to make sound political judgments than 
were those who rejected justice altogether as a factor in their decision-making. As if to 
underscore its specific application to combat, Plato presents Polemarchus’ arguement that wars 
provide the ideal venue in which to demonstrate one’s justness (332e). His qualification raises 
important questions about where and with whom we practice justice.  
                                                 
168 According to Reeve, “Cephalus cannot benefit from the elenchus because his character is already as good as 
Socrates’,” though we should note that his inability to offer a rational defense of his character exposes him – and his 
son – to threats from moral skepticism. As Reeve explains, “Cephalus grew up in a world relatively free from ethical 
skepticism, but he has neither passed on that world to Polemarchus nor equipped him to preserve his values in the 
new and skeptical world in which he actually lives…The Kallipolis is in part Plato’s solution to the problem of the 
transmission of the best values once they are found, and to the problem of how to insure that people who cannot 
defend their values against criticism, even when those values are the best ones, will yet hold securely to them” 
(2006: 9).  
 
169 His name translates as “war leader.” That his first mention in the dramatic prologue is in the context of sending 
his slave to detain Socrates and Glaucon gives the impression that he is accustomed to exercising power and getting 
his way. This view is reinforced by his veiled threat of force when Socrates and Glaucon demure: “Do you see how 
many we are? … Well, you must either prove stronger than we are, or you will have to stay here” (327c). When 
Socrates offers to persuade Polemarchus rather than overpower him, he replies, “But could you persuade us, if we 
won’t listen? … Well, we won’t listen; you’d better make up your mind to that” (327c). This initial characterization 
is not unlike that of Polus in the Gorgias, whose intemperance recalled his equestrian namesake.  
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Conventional definitions of justice applied primarily to wartime. This point is worth 
remembering if we are to read Polemarchus’ appearance in the Republic as anything more than a 
vehicle of inadequately reasoned beliefs that Socrates will easily refute.170 Though vulnerable to 
philosophical scrutiny, Polemarchus expresses a view that would have seemed perfectly 
acceptable to most decent Greeks and one that regulated affairs between cities during periods of 
inter-Hellenic conflict. Helping friends and harming enemies were, in effect, the primary norms 
structuring the inter-polis political system.171  
Socrates’ interpretation of Polemarchus’ definition of justice is notable for at least three 
reasons. First, he describes justice as a craft (technē) that, in Polemarchus’ view, “gives benefits 
to friends and does harm to enemies” (332d). The craft analogy is a distinctly Platonic device. 
Given that so many of Socrates’ elenchi in earlier dialogues turned on the virtue-craft analogy, 
we might actually attribute its inclusion here more to the philosopher than to the nobleman. The 
problems with defining justice as a technē become apparent, however, when Socrates presses 
Polemarchus on the usefulness of justice during peacetime. When not at war, Polemarchus 
replies that justice is useful for maintaining contracts between people, specifically with respect to 
the safe keeping of money (333a, 333b). Socrates objects: 
S: The one who is the best guardian of an army is the very one who can steal the 
enemy’s clans and dispositions?  
P: Certainly. 
S: Whenever someone is a clever guardian, then, he is also a clever thief. 
P: Probably so. 
                                                 
170 For a persuasive defense of Polemarchus’ importance for the dialogue, see Page (1990). 
 
171 Despite the prevalence of the friend/enemy distinction for much of Greek thought, we saw in Thucydides’ 
narrative that the Athenians generally rejected or distorted it as a matter of material importance in their decision-
making throughout the war. Consequently Polemarchus’ station as a Syracusan elite is conspicuous.  
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S: If a just person is clever at guarding money, therefore, he must also be clever at 
stealing it. 
P: According to our argument, at any rate. 
S: A just person has turned out then, it seems, to be a kind of thief. Maybe you 
learned this from Homer, for he’s fond of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of 
Odysseus, whom he describes as better than everyone at lying and stealing. 
According to you, Homer, and Simonides, then, justice seems to be some sort of 
craft of stealing, one that benefits friends and harms enemies. Isn’t that what you 
meant? 
P: No, by god, it isn’t. I don’t know any more what I mean, but I still believe that to 
benefit one’s friends and harm one’s enemies is justice. (333e-334b) 
Polemarchus does not challenge Socrates’ assumption that the most useful person in warfare is a 
spy. He could easily have objected that the most useful person is the wise general who prepares 
his men for combat while terrifying his enemies, or the courageous hoplite who maintains his 
position in the face of destruction rather than abandoning his friends in battle. Either of these 
characterizations would allow him to support his original position. Instead, Plato has him agree 
to a nefarious notion of usefulness in order to underscore the broader point that a technē is, to use 
Reeve’s phrase, “a capacity for opposites.”172 Pace Socrates’ argument against Gorgias, there is 
nothing intrinsic to a craft that necessitates virtuous action. By undermining Polemarchus’ assent 
to the craft analogy, Plato acknowledges a problem endemic to much of Socratic discourse. 
Tellingly, Plato has Socrates lead us there. 
A second important point about Socrates’ interpretation of Polemarchus’ argument is the 
ambiguity surrounding “harm” (blaptein) in its second half. Critics who complain that Socrates 
fails to refute Polemarchus argue, among other things, that the philosopher equivocates on the 
definition of harm employed throughout his examination of the young man. The problem comes 
into view when Socrates asks Polemarchus if a just person should ever harm anyone else. 
                                                 
172 Reeve (2006: 8). 
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Polemarchus replies that such a person, “must harm those who are both bad and enemies” 
(335b). Socrates next asks him if harming horses or dogs improves or diminishes them, to which 
Polemarchus concedes that they are diminished. Conversely, virtue (arēte) improves them. 
Insofar as justice is a virtue, a just person should aim at improving others; likewise, a just person 
ought to avoid harming others because “those who are good” cannot “make people bad through 
virtue” (335d). D.J. Allan contends that Socrates’ refutation is made possible only by interpreting 
blaptein as “to do injustice” rather than “to hurt” (1953: 91). R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley 
contend that we should interpret the verb in its latter sense, as this is more appropriate for 
Socrates’ contrast with “improve” (1964: 21). Though they admit that this is not at all clear from 
Plato’s text, following their interpretation grants greater credit to Polemarchus as a thinker 
worthy of critical attention. It would be absurd for Polemarchus to suggest that the just person 
should make their enemy “less just,” as doing so may render them a more potent adversary, at 
least in the short run. Far more credible is the claim that Polemarchus intended “harm” in the 
bellicose sense, that is, to hurt or disadvantage an enemy in the protection of friends.173 But Plato 
does not allow Polemarchus to issue that objection himself. Instead, the young man finds 
Socrates’ obviously fallacious counter-argument convincing, agreeing to be his “partner in the 
battle” (335e) against anyone upholding the conventional view he has just attempted to defend. 
When asked against whom they ought to do battle, Polemarchus lists a series of wealthy 
tyrants.174  
                                                 
173 As Reeve puts it, “Now it is clear that neither Solon nor Simonides meant that it is just to corrupt one’s enemies. 
No one wants enemies to be any more corrupt than they already are. What both poets mean is that it is just to destroy 
or disable one’s enemies” (2006: 7).  
 
174 He lists the Corinthian tyrant Periander, Perdiccas, King of Macedon, and the Persian king Xerxies (336a). 
 198 
 
The question of whom one should count as a friend and whom as an enemy vexes 
Polemarchus as deeply as it did the figures in the History. Socrates presses him to clarify his 
position by asking him if by “friends” he means “those [whom] a person believes to be good and 
useful to him or those who actually are good and useful, even if he doesn’t think they are, and 
similarly with enemies” (334b-c). “Probably,” Polemarchus replies, “one loves those one 
considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad and harmful” (334c). However, 
people frequently err in making this distinction, supposing that “good people are their enemies,” 
while bad ones are their friends (334d). As Socrates puts it in the Lysis, “many people are loved 
by their enemies and hated by their friends, and are friends to their enemies and enemies to their 
friends…but that doesn’t make any sense at all” (213b). Indeed, this confusion yields two absurd 
judgments. On one hand, Socrates supposes that Polemarchus means to say that it is just to 
benefit bad people while harming good ones – a claim he flatly denies. On the other hand, 
Socrates suggests that Polemarchus means “that it is just for the many, who are mistaken in their 
judgment, to harm their friends, who are bad, and benefit their enemies, who are good” (334d). 
Though Polemarchus grants that Socrates’ conclusion is logical, it is clearly not what he 
believes. He goes on to define a friend as one who is both believed to be useful and is actually 
useful but even here his argument is ambiguous, for what does it mean for a friend to be 
“useful”? We might wonder if a self-sufficient person has any need of friends. Moreover, 
echoing Socrates’ defense in the Apology, we might also wonder about the status of people who 
are actually useful but are not believed to be so.  
Polemarchus’ inability to distinguish between friends and enemies speaks to a host of 
practical and philosophical complications that arise from applying his theory of justice to 
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political judgments.175 On a practical level, his definition of friendship rests on a prior definition 
of utility so vague that it cannot settle disputes between whether a person is a friend or an enemy. 
If Polemarchus cannot reliably distinguish between those upon whom he should bestow benefits 
and those whom he should harm, he risks committing injustice on a grand scale. But even if he 
were to formulate a standard of utility sufficiently nuanced to use as a standard against which to 
weigh the happiness or harm that another person could bring to his life, he would still have 
missed an important point that Socrates wishes to make about justice (and friendship), namely, 
that as a virtue justice is intrinsically good. Genuine friendship (philia) does not rest on mutual 
dependence or utility so much as on the sheer good that comes from having friends.176 Put 
another way, if we were to adopt Polemarchus’ definition of justice as the normative motivation 
of political decision-making, we could reduce much of the problem of judgment to a Schmittian 
parsing of friends from enemies.177 If the constitutive principle of all friendship is merely sharing 
enemy, and the goal of friendship is to eliminate that enemy, it follows that the goal of all 
                                                 
175 The problem persists throughout the Republic, as when Socrates quips that dogs are the most philosophical of all 
animals a dog “judges anything it sees to be either a friend or an enemy, on no other basis than that it knows the one 
and doesn’t know the other.” “And how could it be anything besides a lover of learning,” he asks, “if it defines what 
is its own and what is alien to it in terms of knowledge and ignorance?” (376b). Extending the metaphor throughout 
the dialogue, we can interpret the guardians’ efforts to insulate the city from outside corruption as an effort to 
protect their friends without, it should be noted, harming potential enemies. Even the justification he offers for the 
philosophers’ rule over the city is based in their superior knowledge which would, presumably, better position them 
to parse friends of the city from enemies. I will return to this point in section 3.  
 
176 Again, recalling the Lysis helps to clarify this point. Late in the discussion, Socrates and Lysis seem to have 
agreed that sharing a common enemy is a necessary condition of friendship. But supposing the bad could be 
eliminated, Socrates wonders if there would still be need of friends: “For if nothing could still harm us, we would 
have no need of any assistance, and it would be perfectly clear to us that it was on account of the bad that we prized 
and loved the good—as if the good is a drug against the bad, and the bad is a disease, so that without the disease 
there is no need for the drug. Isn’t the good by nature loved on account of the bad by those of us who are midway 
between good and bad, but by itself and for its own sake it has no use at all?” (220e).  
 
177 For Schmitt, all political action follows from the distinction between friends and enemies; that is, between those 
who are members sharing a political association and all others who are not of that association. The enemy, or Fiend, 
is not a moral distinction but rather a category of “strangers” with whom conflict is possible. Deciding between 
friends and enemies “can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a 
disinterested and therefore neutral third party” (2007: 26-27.)   
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friendship is its elimination. Likewise, if justice exists because of the need to punish enemies, 
and all enemies are destroyed, there would be no need for justice. Extending this argument to all 
virtues (e.g. courage, wisdom, moderation, etc.) it would appear to follow that absolute self-
sufficiency would negate the need of virtue. This is the tyrannical argument that, disturbingly, 
held sway over Athens at the zenith of the city’s power.  
Plato articulates the tyrant’s justice – such as it is – through Thrasymachus, a sophist 
from Chalcedon.178 Thrasymachus is among Plato’s most controversial characters. Though some 
commentators have dismissed him as “a mere child in argument,” others have rightly read his 
challenge for a positive theory of justice – later refined by Glaucon – as the motivation for the 
remaining books of the Republic.179 My primary aim is not to show that Thrasymachus offers a 
wholly coherent account of justice, nor is it my aim to demonstrate the weaknesses in Socrates’ 
rebuttal. These have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.180 I am instead interested in exploring 
the implications of his theory as they pertain to the practice of judgment. According to what 
principles, if any, does Thrasymachus think a ruler ought to make political judgments? 
Thrasymachus bursts into the dialogue in a rage. Having grown restless throughout 
Socrates’ conversation with Polemarchus, he pounces upon them “like a wild beast” and 
chastises them both: 
What nonsense have you two been talking, Socrates? Why do you act like fools by giving 
way to one another? If you truly want to know what justice is, don’t just ask questions 
and then refute the answers simply to satisfy your competitiveness or love of honor. You 
know very well that it is easier to ask questions than answer them. Give an answer 
                                                 
178 Chalcedon was a Megarian colony founded near Byzantium, just outside of Thracian territory. 
 
179 For those who dismiss Thrasymachus outright, see, e.g. Jowett (1871: xi); Sidgwick (1968: 370). On his 
inconsistency, see Cross and Woozley (1964: 42). For his argument as a unifying theme in the Republic, see, 
Kerferd (1947); Strauss, (1964: 73).  
 
180 See, e.g., Hourani (1962); Harlap (1979); Reeve (2006: 23-24). 
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yourself, and tell us what you say the just is. And don’t tell me that it’s the right, the 
beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly 
what you mean; for I won’t accept such nonsense from you. (336b) 
Thrasymachus’ frustrated command, “is the cry of every substantive theorist against the 
destructive critic” (Reeve 2006: 10). But his question is also familiar from a Socratic perspective, 
inasmuch as it resembles the “What is it?” (ti isti) question the philosopher routinely asks his 
interlocutors when discussing virtues like justice and courage. Thrasymachus turns the question 
on the Socrates himself.  
Thrasymachus’ belligerence reminds us that violence is never far from the dialogue’s 
main themes, or at least not from its implications.181 He embodies an adversarial approach to 
argumentation characteristic of competitive sophistry and lawcourt rhetoric.182 To that end, his 
style is not only more obviously aggressive than the philosopher’s, but also more popular. As 
Plato has Socrates put it in the Phaedrus: 
As to the art of making speeches bewailing the evils of poverty and old age, the prize, in 
my judgment, goes to the mighty Chalcedonian. He it is also who knows best how to 
inflame a crowd and, once they are inflamed, how to hush them again with his words’ 
magic spell, as he says himself. And let’s not forget that he is as good at producing 
slander as he is at refuting it, whatever its source may be. (267c-d) 
Three points about this later description of the sophist are worth briefly noting. First, Plato 
establishes Thrasymachus as an authoritative orator on par with the likes of Gorgias and 
Protagoras. Read against dialogues like the Gorgias and the Protagoras, we see a familiar 
Platonic critique of rhetoric as a knack akin to flattery: a practice that manipulates crowds by 
                                                 
181 See Frank (2007: 447). 
 
182 Following the work of Al-Farabi, Strauss famously argues that Plato uses Thrasymachus as a foil for Socratic 
philosophy as a means of communicating with both elites and the masses: “The Platonic way, as distinguished from 
the Socratic way, is a combination of the way of Socrates with the way of Thrasymachus; for the intransigent way of 
Socrates is appropriate only for the philosopher’s dealing with the elite, whereas the way of Thrasymachus, which is 
both more and less exacting than the former, is appropriate for his dealings with the vulgar” (1952: 16). Cf. Al-
Farabi, (2001: 67).  
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distorting justice and negating the relevance of truth to persuasion.183 Secondly, the remark 
captures all that is problematic about the craft analogy examined above. Insofar as Thrasymachus 
excels at refuting slanderous allegations he is equally skilled at spinning them against his 
enemies. There is nothing about sophistic rhetoric that ensures its virtuous application. The same 
cannot be said of philosophy and, by extension, philosophically tutored political judgment. 
Finally, the Phaedrus’ description of Thrasymachus’ control over crowds suggests that a man of 
such talents could rise to greater prominence in a democracy than in an oligarchy or kingship.184 
Thrasymachus is not a citizen. His judgment will never be put to a vote in the assembly. But by 
transmitting his theory of justice to young aristocrats like Glaucon and Adeimantus, he can 
potentially benefit from his practice without subjecting himself to the consequences of its 
failures.185 In other words, he and foreign sophists like him are well positioned within the 
democracy to reap benefits without making the sacrifices commonly associated with membership 
in a political community. He is a tyrant among democrats in a democratic polity that is 
increasingly behaving like a tyrant among Greeks. Though not an Athenian, he appears as the 
most Athens-like foreigner so far examined in the dialogue.186 
Socrates feigns shock at Thrasymachus’ demand for a positive account of justice, 
resisting the charge that he is hiding his beliefs from the others while defending his method as an 
                                                 
183 See Gorgias 463b, 465a. He puts the point more forcefully during his interrogation of Polus: “So that I won’t 
make a long-style speech, I’m willing to put it to you the way geometers do – for perhaps you follow me now – that 
what cosmetics is to gymnastics, pastry baking is to medicine; or rather, like this: what cosmetics is to gymnastics, 
sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice” (465c).  
 
184 The parallel between Thrasymachus and Pericles should not go unnoticed in this regard. 
 
185 Socrates alludes to Thrasymachus’ profit motive later in their conversation: “Show some willingness to teach it to 
us. It wouldn’t be a bad investment for you to be the benefactor of a group as large as ours” (344e). 
 
186 This finding is surprising, given the formal and historic similarities between democratic Syracuse and Athens 
during the war. 
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appropriately cautious, systematic exploration of truth. “If we were searching for gold,” he 
protests, “we’d never willingly give way to each other, if by doing so we’d destroy our chance of 
finding it…You surely mustn’t think that, but rather – as I do – that we’re incapable of finding 
it” (336e). As the following nine attest, this is not an entirely earnest reply, and Thrasymachus 
rightly challenges Socrates’ deflection. Sensitive to Socrates’ own theatrical strategies, 
Thrasymachus knows better than to let himself feel offended. Rather, true to his adversarial 
approach to argumentation, he is (ironically) offended by his perception that the philosopher 
refuses to put any of his own skin in the game: “I knew, and I said so to these people earlier, that 
you’d be unwilling to answer and that, if someone questioned you, you’d be ironical and do 
anything rather than give an answer” (337a). He agrees to engage Socrates in a discussion of 
justice only on the condition that they each prepare to pay a fine to the winner of the argument. 
Socrates insists that he has no money for a fine but is willing to praise Thrasymachus if he finds 
that he speaks well. With this, the parallel between Socrates’ discussion with Thrasymachus and 
his prior engagement with Protagoras comes into full relief. We are left with a familiar 
reputational competition between philosophy on one hand and sophistry on the other. 
Socrates invites Thrasymachus to share his definition of justice with Glaucon and the rest 
of Polemarchus’ guests. “Listen,” the sophist replies, “I say that justice is nothing other than the 
advantage of the stronger (kreitonos)” (338c). The sophist recoils in disgust when Socrates asks 
him to clarify his position by asking if it is just for everyone who wishes to become strong to eat 
beef in order to make themselves even stronger. He accuses Socrates of intentionally 
misinterpreting him in order to belittle his otherwise elegant definition.187 “Your trick,” he says, 
                                                 
187 The remark is a telling flag that readers should beware of the difference between a speaker’s intended meaning 
and Socrates’ interpretation. As we shall soon realize, the complaint is not without warrant.  
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“is to take hold of the argument at the point where you can do it the most harm (kakourgēsais)” 
(338d). When Socrates demurs, he observes that while cities may be governed by a variety of 
regime types their laws are always written such that they advantage the ruling element. Contra 
Socrates’ claim in the Theaetetus that political judgments differ across cities, Thrasymachus 
maintains that a common rule unites them, namely that “the advantage of the established ruler” is 
always their guiding force (339a).  
Thrasymachus issues an institutional theory of justice according to which right action 
always supports established law, regardless of its content. Extending his reasoning to the practice 
of judgment, we might be inclined to think that all political judgments are not merely about the 
pursuit of individual interests, but more specifically about how power is retained once acquired. 
Like Polemarchus’ definition, which understood justice as an edict to protect and enrich already 
existing friendships, this conception of justice focuses on the maintenance of power without 
offering a rational defense of how that power was gotten to begin with.188 That is, even if an 
actor achieved power through ethically questionable means, like tyrannicide or conquest, a 
Thrasymachian might describe that actor as just provided they effectively pursued their interests. 
Also like Polemarchus, who stumbled over the standard of friendship, Thrasymachus struggles to 
define a standard of interests against which would-be rulers can judge a policy’s worth. As we 
shall soon see, his admission that even rulers are liable to misunderstand their own interests will 
undermine his theory of justice, as well as of judgment.  
It is tempting to reduce Thrasymachus’ initial theory to the oft quoted Athenian 
declaration in Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
                                                 
188 Indeed, Thrasymachus’ brutally realist account of justice was likely as conventional as Polemarchus’ definition. 
As A.W.H Adkins puts it, “scratch Thrasymachus and you find King Agamemnon” (1960: 239). 
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what they must.”189 This reading suggests that justice is equivalent to the domination of the weak 
by the strong. But this is not quite what he means. Instead, most commentators agree that he 
initially proposes that everyone pursues their own interests and, in doing so, competes with 
others for power.190 Justice is silent on how such competition takes place. To the extent that one 
agrees that power is a scare resource and that politics is a zero-sum struggle for control, this 
observation of human psychology yields a naturalist account of justice. Socrates, however, 
remains skeptical of the additional requirement that rulers are “stronger” than those they govern: 
S: Tell me, don’t you also say that it is just to obey the rulers? 
 
T: I do. 
 
S: And are the rulers in all cities infallible, or are they liable to error? 
 
T: No doubt they are liable to error. 
 
S: When they undertake to make laws, therefore, they make some correctly, others 
   incorrectly? 
T: I suppose so. 
 
S: And a law is correct if it prescribes what is to the rulers’ own advantage and  
  incorrect if it prescribes what is to their disadvantage? Is that what you mean? 
 
T: It is. 
 
S: And whatever laws they make must be obeyed by their subjects and this is 
  justice? 
 
T: Of course. 
 
S: Then, according to your account, it is just to do not only what is to the advantage  
  of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is not to their advantage. (339c-d) 
 
                                                 
189 See Thucydides, History, 5.89. Jeremy Mynott (2013) rightly observes that while Crawley’s translation perhaps 
captures the drama of the exchange, it does not reflect what the Athenians actually say. The passage reads, “You 
understand as well as we do that in the human sphere judgments about justice are relevant only between those with 
an equal power to enforce it, and that the possibilities are defined by what the strong do and the weak accept.” 
Steven Lattimore renders the passage in similar language, suggesting that power disparities render some actors 
unworthy of moral consideration.  
 
190 Strauss (1964: 74).  
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Socrates concludes from their initial agreement that rulers are likely to misunderstand their own 
interests. But unlike Polemarchus’ definition of justice, which depends on an actor’s ability to 
reliably distinguish between friends and enemies, Thrasymachus’ legalistic conception 
understands right action as following whatever rules the leaders set (340a). Should a ruling body 
promulgate legislation that works more to its subjects’ benefit than to its own, he would find the 
subjects remiss if they resisted the law in the name of the rulers’ interests (339e).  
Thrasymachus does not intend for his audience to draw this conclusion from his 
parsimonious theory. Scholars are divided over whether this is a product of Thrasymachus’ 
inconsistency or if this conclusion is an unexpected consequence of his legalism.191 Plato’s text 
lends support to the latter view. For example, when Cleitophon insinuates that Socrates has once 
again contorted the otherwise fine argument into one wrought with inconsistencies, 
Thrasymachus rejects his proposed amendment:  
C: But…he said that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be 
his advantage. This is what the weaker must do, and this is what he maintained 
the just to be.  
S: If Thrasymachus want to put it that way now, let’s accept it. Tell me, 
Thrasymachus, is this what you wanted to say the just is, namely, what the 
stronger believes to be to his advantage, whether it is in fact to his advantage or 
not? Is that what we are to say you mean? 
T: Not at all. Do you think I’d call someone who is in error stronger at the very 
moment he errs? 
S: I did think that was what you meant when you agreed that the rulers aren’t 
infallible but are liable to error. 
T: That’s because you are a false witness to arguments, Socrates. When someone 
makes an error in the treatment of patients, do you call him a doctor in regard to 
that very error? Or when someone makes an error in accounting, do you call him 
an accountant in regard to that very error in calculation? I think that we express 
ourselves in word that, taken literally, do say that a doctor is in error, or an 
                                                 
191 For a representative of those who attribute the conclusion to Thrasymachus’ inconsistency, see Maguire (1971). 
For those who attribute it to his flawed legalism, see Hourani (1962); Kerferd (1964); Hadgopoulos (1973).  
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accountant, or a grammarian. But each of these, insofar as he is what we call him, 
never errs, so that according to the precise account (and you are a stickler for 
precise accounts), no craftsman ever errs. It’s when his knowledge fails him that 
he makes an error, and in regard to that error he is no craftsman. No craftsman, 
expert, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling, even though 
everyone will say that a physician or a ruler makes errors. But the most precise 
answer is this. A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly 
decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must do. Thus, as I said from 
the first, it is just to do what is to the advantage of the stronger. (340b-e) 
Two elements of Thrasymachus’ reply are especially important for political judgment. First, by 
resisting Cleitophon’s amendment, he suggests that political decision-making is not motivated by 
belief (doxa), but rather by knowledge (epistēmē). A ruling body’s strength and legitimacy are 
contingent upon how clearly the regime defines and pursues its actual interests. Legitimate laws 
are therefore produced by knowledge of genuine interests, not on beliefs about which interests 
are genuine and which are not. In this respect, Thrasymachus’ theory of rulership would appear 
to comport with the conventional interpretation of the philosopher-rulers’ legitimacy; their 
superior knowledge of the good (interests) imbues them with the superior talents (strength) to 
govern the kallipolis.192 If Socrates rejects that view, it would seem to follow that he must find 
alternative grounds for legitimating the philosophers’ rulership as well. If the kallipolis is 
populated by subjects who have been manipulated into supporting the philosophers simply 
because of how they have been taught to regard justice, there is no obvious need for them to hold 
elenctically justified conceptions of the virtues in order to confer legitimacy upon them. Much 
like Thrasymachus’ tyrants, the kallipolis’ citizens might agree that the philosophers ought to 
rule simply because philosophers told them that that is the natural order of things.  
The second noteworthy element of Thrasymachus’ reply is his reliance on the craft 
analogy to define genuine rulership. As we saw in the last chapter, and again in Socrates’ 
                                                 
192 Reeve (2006: 13-5) offers a similar argument.  
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discussion with Polemarchus, the craft analogy is an attractive means of connecting legitimate 
governance to knowledge. But Polemarchus’ refutation also exposes inadequacies in the technē 
model of virtue. Unlike virtues, crafts are normatively neutral. By maintaining the analogy here, 
Thrasymachus suggests that effective rulership is not synonymous with virtuous rulership. 
Insofar as rulers promulgate laws and codify the terms of justice, they stand apart from the 
constraints of both. Rather than constructing a polis that binds everyone to the rule of law, 
Thrasymachean rulers instead construct what Reeve describes as an “exploitation machine” in 
which subjects acquiesce to whatever the rulers’ laws dictate. So understood, we see an 
important connection between his initial theory of justice (i.e. the rule of the stronger over the 
weaker) and his later insistence that justice is always for the good of another and never for 
oneself (343d). Justice is a fool’s game, and any sensibly self-interested actor will disregard it as 
little more than “high-minded simplicity” intended for population control (348c). When 
Thrasymachus contends that acting unjustly demonstrates “good judgment” (euboulían), he 
means that doing so equates to acting like a true ruler (348d). As a sophist who aims to recruit 
wealthy pupils by promising them the keys to democratic power, he would think that knowledge 
of rulership, by which he means rhetorical persuasion, would free one from the bonds of 
common morality.  
Thrasymachus’ view that justice and law apply to subjects but not to rulers supports my 
earlier contention that he represents a tyrannical presence in the dialogue. In making this claim I 
do not wish to present him as a necessarily villainous character whose views are obviously 
reprehensible. Following T.D.J. Chappell (1993), I take his argument seriously not only because 
the rest of the Republic responds to it, but also because his views of justice and exceptionalism 
motivated Athenian decision-making during the Peloponnesian War. Especially given the 
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apparent similarities between his and Socrates’ arguments in earlier dialogues, Plato must 
soundly refute him if we are to interpret the Republic as a work that resists tyranny by correcting 
extant Athenian political judgment.  
Socrates seizes upon two problems with Thrasymachus’ craft analogy. When the sophist 
reiterates his claim that rulership is a craft by which rulers always pass laws that work 
exclusively to their own advantage, Socrates asks him to define the objects of other crafts. 
Doctors, for instance, treat sick bodies; ships’ captains rule sailors (341c). In each case, the craft 
improves an external body. Doctors and captains may derive happiness from their subjects’ 
performance, but the craft itself does not supply that advantage directly to them. Next, the 
philosopher and the sophist agree that bodies and sailors are deficient, and that these deficiencies 
prompt the development of the physician’s and the captain’s crafts (341e). This suggests that 
crafts always aim at correcting a deficiency in their subjects. When Thrasymachus agrees, 
Socrates presses him on whether crafts are themselves wholly complete (342a-b). Not only does 
the sophist admit that each craft is dependent upon others to meet its aims, but he further 
concedes that each aims not at its own fulfillment but at the improvement of another. If 
governance is a craft, its ruling practitioners are no more self-sufficient than any of their 
subjects. To the extent that Thrasymachus considers rulership a craft, he must also accept, 
however reluctantly, that rulers direct their craft to the improvement of their subjects rather than 
to themselves (342e). His concession reveals the second kink in his initial position, namely that 
the ruler stands apart from norms and dependencies that structure normal political life. In short, 
even the tyrannical ruler needs the support of others.  
Socrates’ elenctic examination of Thrasymachus’ original position reveals that 
governance entails the care of others rather than sustaining the rule of the powerful. We might 
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therefore conclude that political judgment is directed toward enhancing the welfare of a polis and 
its denizens. But Thrasymachus is not yet prepared to concede the final point that the art of 
politics is necessarily virtuous: 
You think that shepherds and cowherds seek the good of their sheep and cattle, and fatten 
them and take care of them, looking to something other than their master’s good and their 
own. Moreover, you believe that rulers in cities – true rulers, that is – think about their 
subjects differently than one does about sheep, and that night and day they think of 
something besides their own advantage. You are so far from understanding about justice 
and what’s just, about injustice and what’s unjust, that you don’t realize that justice is 
really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the 
one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the truly simple and just, and 
those it rules do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one 
they serve happy, but themselves not at all. You must look at it as follows, my most 
simple Socrates: A just man always gets less than an unjust one. (343b-d)  
Rulership, like husbandry, can be effective without being virtuous, at least in the short term. 
While the shepherd may care for his flock, he does so because he will fetch more for fattened 
sheep than scrawny ones at market. Likewise, an effective ruler will fatten his subjects with 
pleasant speeches because doing so will render them malleable, not because he cares for their 
souls. Thrasymachus undergirds his argument with a refutation of the theories offered by 
Cephalus and Polemarchus. The business partner who cheats his just associate is rewarded for 
his deceit; the tax dodger enjoys the city’s public goods without contributing to them; the honest 
politician annoys his friends and falls prey to his enemies (343e). In each case, political 
judgments motivated by virtues are personally disadvantageous and therefore wrongheaded.  
Thrasymachus does not consider how mistrust and deceit would undermine public and 
private life, nor does he recognize how such instability would hinder the unjust person’s long-
term welfare. Socrates leads him in to this point in two ways. He first demonstrates that crafts 
like governance, wage-earning, medicine, and horse-breeding are necessarily socializing 
activities. Because no one can satisfy all of their needs by practicing a single craft, everyone is 
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necessarily dependent upon others to do so for them (346c-d). Returning to his earlier point that 
crafts aim at improving deficiencies, Socrates concludes, “no craft or rule provides for its own 
advantage, but, as we’ve been saying for some time, it provides an order for its subject and aims 
at its advantage, that of the weaker, not the stronger” (346e). The art of ruling is at once the most 
sociable and unpleasant of such crafts, for doing so requires practitioners to concern themselves 
with the manifold problems of others.193 “It is because of this,” he suggests, “that wages must be 
provided to a person if he’s to be willing to rule, whether in the form of money or honor or a 
penalty if he refuses” (347a). Like Glaucon we might wonder how a penalty could count as a 
“wage” (347b). Socrates replies: 
Good people won’t be willing to rule for the sake of either money or honor. They don’t 
want to be paid wages openly for ruling and get called hired hands, nor to take them in 
secret from their rule and be called thieves. And they won’t rule for the sake of honor, 
because they aren’t ambitious honor-lovers…Now, the greatest punishment, if one isn’t 
willing to rule, is to be ruled by someone worse than oneself. And I think that it’s fear of 
this that makes decent people rule when they do. They approach ruling not as something 
good or something to be enjoyed, but as something necessary…In a city of good men, if 
it came into being, the citizens would fight in order not to rule, just as they do now in 
order to rule. There it would be quite clear that anyone who is really a true ruler doesn’t 
by nature seek his own advantage but that of his subjects. (347b-d) 
The remark is not aimed at Thrasymachus alone, but also at the likes of Cephalus (the money-
maker) and Polemarchus (the honor-seeker). It also anticipates Socrates’ much later discussion 
with Glaucon about why and how they must compel philosophers to rule (519b-521c). There, he 
judges the philosophers the best rulers because they alone will practice the true political craft, 
which is to say that they will legislate for the good of others. Here, however, it is especially 
important to note that for all of the advantages Thrasymachus attributes to injustice, only the just 
person is social. 
                                                 
193 As such, the political craft strains against Plato’s theory of specialization.  
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Arguing from the premises that excellent craftsmanship requires specialization, and that 
specialization necessitates sociability, Socrates demonstrates that justice ensures sociability in 
ways that injustice precludes. As already noted, Thrasymachus associates injustice with good 
judgment because acting unjustly is “clever and good” (348d). Injustice as a virtue like wisdom 
because, according to Thrasymachus, injustice is a source of strength in a society of foolishly 
just people who lack the wherewithal to compete with one another (349b). However, injustice is 
only advantageous according to his schema because most people are just. If they were not, 
injustice would lose its advantageousness. Socrates highlights this point by asking Thrasymachus 
to compare the natures of just and unjust people. Just people are like good doctors, musicians, 
and others who are knowledgeable of some craft. Insofar as they are clever, good, and 
knowledgeable, they seek to emulate one another in an effort to attain harmony (350a). To the 
extent that they try to outdo others, they only target those who are not like themselves. 
Conversely, an unjust person is driven to outdo “both his like and his opposite”; that is, those 
who are equally unjust as well as those who are just (350c). Socrates equates justice to wisdom 
and injustice to ignorance, a move that is not altogether obvious but to which Thrasymachus 
reluctantly agrees. In so doing, he concedes that injustice and craftsmanship are mutually 
exclusive, thereby suggesting that injustice equates to demonstrating poor judgment. 
If justice is wisdom, and injustice is its opposite, then practical reason would recommend 
the former. We see this most clearly when Socrates turns the conversation to more explicitly 
political territory. Taking all that has been said as given, he probes Thrasymachus’ initial 
position that injustice helps to secure political power. If what Thrasymachus says is true, then 
injustice should yield material rewards; if his argument is false, then we ought to pursue justice 
on practical grounds. Socrates therefore asks him if he would agree “that it is unjust for a city to 
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try to enslave other cities unjustly and to hold them in subjection when it has enslaved many of 
them,” to which Thrasymachus replies in the affirmative (351b). The question is pregnant with 
significance. If I am correct to describe Thrasymachus as the most Athens-like interlocutor so far 
featured in the dialogue, we can read him as an ideal representative of that city’s wartime 
decision-making. By interrogating the sophist, Socrates likewise interrogates fifth-century 
Athenian politics. As such, we should interpret their exchange as a pointed commentary on 
fourth century Athenian political judgment: 
S: Will the city that becomes stronger than another achieve this power without 
justice, or will it need the help of justice? 
T: If what you said a moment ago stands, and justice is cleverness or wisdom, it will 
need the help of justice, but if things are as I stated, it will need the help of 
injustice… 
S: Do you think that a city, an army, a band of robbers of thieves, or any other tribe 
with a common unjust purpose would be able to achieve it if they were unjust to 
each other? 
T: No, indeed. 
S: What if they weren’t unjust to one another? Would they achieve more? 
T: Certainly. 
S: Injustice, Thrasymachus, causes civil war, hatred, and fighting among themselves, 
while justice brings friendship and a sense of common purpose. Isn’t that so? 
T: Let it be so, in order not to disagree with you. (351c-d) 
In having Thrasymachus admit that injustice breeds stasis, Plato invokes Thucydides’ 
descriptions of Athens during the plague, the Corcyrean civil war, and the visceral horror that 
would attend the dissolution of the Athenian empire. Though at this stage in the discussion 
justice has not yet arisen to the level of an intrinsic good, we should not ignore its instrumental 
value. As in the Apology, Socrates maintains that justice is politically useful insofar as it 
cultivates sociability, enhances citizen welfare, and aims at civic improvement.  
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The three theories of justice so far discussed cannot direct sound political judgment 
because none of them are sufficiently political. Cephalus rightly values experience, yet tailors his 
conception of justice to commercial exchanges and fails to include any internal characteristics of 
the virtue that would prevent its abuse. His son’s theory serves normal politics no better. By 
conscribing justice first within the domain of warfare and second to the domain of commerce, his 
theory of benefiting friends and harming enemies leaves much to be desired with respect to 
practice. Recall the problem of stasis discussed in chapter 1. When neighbors cannot know who 
among them are friends and who enemies, they would be fools to reward those who wish them 
harm while condemning those who are in fact friendly. Assuming one does not simply consider 
everyone a friend – a position Polemarchus initially resists – his theory of justice can prove as 
politically destructive as beneficial. Finally, Thrasymachus’ tyrannical theory of justice militates 
against sociability of all kinds. The apparently powerful tyrant is the most isolated member of his 
community and so seeks to consolidate his rule by abolishing politics altogether. As we shall see 
in the next section, Socrates’ theory of justice as psycho-social harmony conceives of justice as a 
distinctly political virtue. By emphasizing harmony over unity and plurality over monism, his 
theory of justice recognizes the human need for mutual dependence upon others while aiming as 
much as possible at collective welfare. In short, it is not only philosophically consistent but also, 
perhaps more importantly, eminently political. 
3.2 Alternative Justice, Alternative Judgment 
 Though each theory examined in Book 1 formulates justice differently, none properly 
orients practical political judgments toward the good of an entire community. By privileging one 
group (i.e. one’s allies, the strong, the wealthy, etc.) over others (i.e. one’s enemies, the weak, 
the many, etc.) each theory threatens to justify factionalism rather than motivate virtuous, 
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sociable action. Moreover, because none of Socrates’ interlocutors can account for the first 
principles upon which they built their theories, none withstand the philosopher’s elenctic 
examination. In short, each theory of justice examined in Book 1 is as rationally inconsistent as it 
is practically problematic.  
 Socrates’ alternative theory of justice prescribes a different practice of judgment, one in 
which he proposes that philosophers are best positioned to rule. Socrates presents justice as 
harmony between discrete parts of an otherwise unified whole. Justice benefits the practice of 
political judgment by modeling how an actor ought to balance conflicting claims of different 
groups in order to maximize the greater good of all.194 Insofar as political judgments aim to 
sustain communities by marshalling the virtues of each part without allowing any single 
component to overwhelm the whole, we see that in Socrates’ view judgment is best when guided 
by this particular account of justice.195 
I will address two major controversies as I develop that claim in this section. First, 
Socrates’ definition of justice as “doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t one’s 
own” (433a) is not obviously more sociable than any of the theories examined in Book 1. Indeed, 
his definition of justice appears to recommend an intensely private, even selfish life of political 
quietism. If this account is correct, then the Straussian interpretation of the dialogue as 
                                                 
194 The root of justice (dikaiosynē), díkē, connotes fair judgment. As Vlastos explains, however, dikaiosynē “could 
carry a sense broad enough to cover all virtuous conduct toward others, though for the most part it was used in a 
more specific sense to mean refraining from pleonexia, i.e., from gaining some advantage for oneself by grabbing 
what belongs to another…or by denying him what is (morally or legally) due him. What holds these two senses 
together is that dikaiosynē is the preeminently social virtue: it stands for right dealings between persons” (1969: 
507). Aristotle captures its manifold quality in his Nicomachean Ethics when he describes justice as the practice of 
complete virtue: “Justice is complete virtue to the highest degree because it is the complete exercise of complete 
virtue. And it is the complete exercise because the person who has justice is able to exercise virtue in relation to 
another, not only in what concerns himself” (1129b31-32).  
 
195 He underscores the point in the Apology when describing the excellence (arēte) of the judge as correctly 
distinguishing between true and false claims of justice (18a). 
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advocating the practical impossibility of the kallipolis project is surely correct.196 I challenge that 
view by depicting the “synoptic” craft of philosophical rulership as a practical example of how 
just actors might make socially responsible decisions about the welfare of their community.197 
Justice is an eminently political virtue. Unlike wisdom, courage, or moderation, justice does not 
accord to any specific part of the tripartite soul, but is rather a virtue of the whole. Insofar as 
philosophy expands its practitioner’s vision of virtue and embraces the whole of its subject as a 
cohesive body of knowledge, I argue that it is eminently political as well.   
My defense of the political applicability of Socratic justice elicits a second controversy, 
namely, the proposition of philosophical rule. “Until philosophers rule as kings in cities or those 
who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is until 
political power and philosophy entirely coincide,” Socrates says to Glaucon, “cities will have no 
rest from evils…nor, I think, will the human race” (473d).198 Socrates’ proposal presents three 
problems for Plato’s interpreters. First, as Aristotle was the first to observe in the Politics, it is 
not obvious that the majority of people in the city, especially the warriors, will acquiesce to the 
same select group ruling the city in perpetuity (1264b7-15). Second, as Aristotle also objects, the 
                                                 
196 See, e.g., Strauss (1964: 127); Bloom (1991: 410).  
 
197 My argument thus addresses Sheldon Wolin’s (1960) concern that philosophical rulership is only possible, on 
Plato’s account, at the expense of discord, disagreement, and dissent – that is, the very stuff of politics. Rather than 
dispelling discord, I argue that philosophical rulership models the ways in which it is managed in the ideal city.  
 
198 Socrates’ suggestion that philosophers are naturally better suited for rulership than non-philosophers can admit of 
a certain elitism in the Republic, or, as Ober understands the passage, at least that the kallipolis militates against 
democracy. See Ober (1998). Though the dialogue goes on to develop a sophisticated account of philosophical 
training – suggesting that this is, indeed, what Socrates has in mind – I believe that such interpretations unfairly 
discount the second suggestion that rulers can learn to philosophize. To the extent that rulers in any polity can be 
taught to philosophize, we can see that even democracies can become just given a wide dissemination of 
philosophical training. The thrust of the passage is often overlooked: “Until philosophers rule as kings in cities or 
those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political 
power and philosophy entire coincide, while the many nature who at present pursue either one exclusively are 
forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils…nor, I think, will the human race” (473c-d). 
The emphasized clause alerts us to Socrates’ main point that philosophy and political power must be harmonized in 
order for justice to prevail.  
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proposal not only implies that a single conception of happiness will suffice for the entire 
community, but that justice is so demanding that not even the philosophers will be happy 
pursuing it (Politics 1261a14-22, 1264b16-23). Third, insofar as the practice of rulership 
apparently necessitates “meddling” in the affairs of others, many commentators debate the extent 
to which Socrates is therefore commanding the reluctant philosopher-rulers to sacrifice their own 
contemplative happiness by violating the principle of specialization and, by extension, justice.199 
I argue that Socrates addresses these problems through a combination of philosophical training in 
dialectics and a regimen of military and political experience. Though often figured as the 
embodiment of rationality alone, I argue that Socrates’ philosopher-rulers achieve psychic 
harmony by demonstrating the manifold virtues of the through contemplation of the forms and its 
application to worldly conflict.200 As I demonstrate below, philosophical rulership amounts to a 
                                                 
199 For arguments affirming this position see, e.g., Strauss (1964: 109-110); Bloom (1991: 378-379, 407-409); 
Aronson (1972); White (1979: 195-6); Annas (1981: 260-71). Irwin (1979: 236-243) counters that the philosophers 
do not actually sacrifice their interests to rule by relying on an interpretation of the Symposium. Reeve (2006: 202-3) 
challenges the “unhappy philosopher” reading by noting that the shift rotation among philosopher-rulers supplies 
sufficient political stability to allow others to contemplate the forms for as long as possible. Still others attack the 
core assumption that the contemplative life is most choice-worthy. Charles Kahn, for example, argues that 
philosophers are not motivated by a general curiosity but rather by their “desire for the good,” which is to say 
justice: “Hence the goal of rational desire, of reason as such, is neither the good of the individual alone (as it is 
sometimes said to be, on egoistic readings of Plato) nor the good of the community alone, but the good in every 
case, the good in general or the Good as such” (1987: 84). Timothy Mahoney (1992) concurs, observing that while 
no philosopher would regard ruling as an enjoyable activity taken up for its own sake, it is nevertheless “splendid” 
because it is necessitated by justice. Though I am sympathetic to this interpretation, Mahoney’s further claim that, 
by taking up ruling, the philosophers embrace a version of Glaucon’s third-order goods – those desirable only for 
their outcomes – as superior to Glaucon’s intrinsic goods strained. I suggest instead that the act of governing 
supports and participates in Glaucon’s second-order goods – those desirable both for themselves and their outcomes. 
Finally, Joseph Beatty (1976) offers the novel interpretation of philosophical rulership as more akin to education 
than warfare and are therefore happy to rule because doing so enables them to impart wisdom to others while 
discovering others like themselves.  
 
200 On critics who associate philosophical rule exclusively with rationality, see especially Bloom, (1991: 391); 
Steinberger (1989; 1993: 91-93). Steinberger’s views are given special scrutiny in an exchange essay between 
himself and Christopher Duncan (1990). Duncan assents to Steinberger’s premise that there is a fundamental 
distinction between “ruling as philosophy” and ruling as technē (which is something more like crafting laws), 
agreeing further that the addition of the philosopher-kings to the kallipolis adds “little to the integrity of the model” 
of political life (Steinberger 1989: 1216). He insists, however, that the “role of the philosopher-king…is to destroy 
the kallipolis by getting the people to ‘despise the current honors’ and by killing off all those over the age of ten who 
desire…the self-contradiction of a community that is both luxurious and just” (1990: 1319). Steinberger is therefore 
correct to reject Duncan’s claims against his own. I think both are wrong. As Steinberger notes, Duncan’s critique 
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two-way street between dialectics (rationality/contemplation) on one hand and 
governing/warfare (experience) on the other. It is not sufficient merely to contemplate justice; it 
must be practiced. Political judgment, which is here understood as the act of addressing the 
model of justice as psychic harmony to material conflict, is the essential practice of justice. 
Before examining that practice in detail, however, we should first see how and why Socrates 
develops justice as he does. 
Book 2 opens with a challenge. Unsatisfied that Socrates has actually proven the choice-
worthiness of justice, Glaucon demands a fuller account that praises the virtue for its own sake. 
Irrespective of the potentially practical benefits of justice, Glaucon wants to know how he and 
his companions can appreciate justice as something akin to pure joy (eudaimonia). Glaucon and 
his companions are not skeptics; they harbor an intuitive sense that this must be the proper way 
in which to regard the virtue, but they cannot defend that view against the likes of a sophist like 
Thrasymachus.201 While their intuitions incline them toward justice, they have not yet heard a 
rational argument to support that inclination. Though most people (hoi polloi) regard justice in 
strictly consequentialist terms, Socrates maintains that the virtue is both intrinsically and 
instrumentally valuable (358a). Glaucon requests a defense of justice stripped of its beneficial 
consequences: “I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself has 
                                                 
rests on an erroneous view of the “apolitical city” which he extends from the first “city of pigs” into the kallipolis. 
But Steinberger’s own distinction between philosophical and practical rule is too rigid. As I explain below, the 
training afforded the philosopher-rulers is explicitly designed to bridge that gap by enabling them to apply 
philosophical insights gleaned from their “synoptic view” to the discord which inevitably arises within the city. 
 
201 We might ask who they have to convince. They want to rationally assent to this view based on something more 
than belief. If the majority have the wrong beliefs about justice, they will have to convince them otherwise on firmer 
ground that slickly worded arguments which attest to little more than a countervailing but no more epistemically 
rigorous set of beliefs. Why shouldn’t they be corrupted by Thrasymachus and his ilk if there are no better reasons 
for agreeing with Socrates, and if Thrasymachus’ intuitions are profitable besides?  
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when it’s by itself in the soul (psyche)” (358b).202 Socrates will attempt but fail to meet that 
request throughout the remainder of the dialogue. As the conversation proceeds into the evening 
Socrates repeatedly reminds his companions that happiness and justice are not strictly 
synonymous and that only the proper view of human flourishing will harmonize with virtue 
(420b-c, 421b).203 Glaucon’s later insistence that Socrates demonstrate the practicability of his 
otherwise ideal theory moves the philosopher’s focus away from pure theory and toward the 
practical work of politics. While this movement is advantageous for a discussion of how 
judgment connects theory to practice, it may leave Glaucon a bit disappointed by morning.  
Each theory of justice discussed in Book 1 fails to theorize justice in sufficiently political 
terms. All of the discussants, including Socrates, attempted to isolate the qualities of justice by 
asking how a just person would interact with those in his community. Plato takes a different 
approach in the Republic. An individual life is a relatively small subject of which virtue is an 
even smaller part. Socrates therefore proposes that we look to how justice will appear when 
expanded to the larger scale of the city in order to see it more clearly (368d). Insofar as justice is 
the same for people and polities alike, there should be analogous features between them. 
Likewise, what counts as good political judgment should also have some bearing on good 
personal judgment and, vice versa, practicing good political judgment should improve the 
individual’s capacity for private decision-making. In other words, virtuous individuals can 
improve the quality of politics while virtuous politics can improve the quality of an individual 
life. The isomorphism between city and state is therefore an essential step not only for 
                                                 
202 Unlike Socrates’ earlier interlocutors, Glaucon understands justice as a virtue of the soul rather than a quality of 
actions or consequences. See Reeve (2006: 25). 
 
203 Some theories of happiness are indeed contrary to justice altogether. Take, for instance, the consumer’s hedonic 
equation between happiness and pleasure, which  
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underscoring the political quality of Socratic justice but also for legitimating the philosophers’ 
claim to govern later in the dialogue. Furthermore, assenting to the city-state analogy justifies the 
demand that philosophers experience earthly political life before they can claim themselves 
among the Isles of the Blessed.  
Plato’s commentators have variously praised and attacked the city-soul analogy. Socrates 
appears to question the analogy’s applicability almost as soon as he introduces it, saying that he 
and his companions would “consider it a godsend” if there was indeed a common set of 
principles underlying personal and political virtue (368d).204 Bernard Williams (1997) complains 
that Plato remains ambiguous as to whether we are to identify the city’s “soul” with its leaders or 
with the majority of its citizens.205 On one hand, locating the city’s soul in the reasonable but 
limited cadre of the ruling class – as the tripartite conception of the soul, with rationality (logos) 
as commanding part, appears to recommend – amounts to dismissing the majority and declaring 
the city a tyranny; on the other hand, locating the city’s soul in the broad but appetitive majority 
diminishes effective rulership. In Williams’ view, Plato fails to resolve this confusion at the heart 
of the drama. G.R.F. Ferrari (2005) rejects this interpretation, arguing instead that Socrates 
conceives of justice as a unitary virtue that remains constant between individuals and cities. 
According to his reading, when we praise individuals and cities as just, we identify and describe 
the same qualities. I am inclined to agree with this interpretation. In addition to defending the 
essential unity of the virtues and providing a measure of definitional clarity, the analogy between 
city and soul also reinforces the essentially political nature of individual life first posited in Book 
                                                 
204 Socrates twice speculates that treating the city and the soul as one will make his difficult task easier (368e, 369a). 
 
205 Cf. Roochnik (2003: 15-17).  
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1. Just as all crafts depend on others for excellence, so too do all individuals rely on others for 
life and happiness.  
By insisting on the isomorphism between individual souls and cities, Socrates suggests 
that judgments about justice in individual cases will hold for political case as well. This equation 
between civic and individual decision-making lays the groundwork for his controversial claim 
that justice can only thrive in political communities when philosophers rule as kings or when 
rulers learn to philosophize. That is, the city-soul analogy highlights Plato’s practical concerns 
with the application of philosophical contemplation by way of political practice, i.e. judgment.206 
It also intimates the features of virtuous political leadership developed later in the dialogue. 
Again, we see that the individual who aims at the right goods in her or his own life will likely 
translate that practical wisdom into ethical political practice. It is likewise easier – perhaps too 
easy, if the Myth of Er is any indication (619d) – for an individual to live virtuously if brought 
up in a virtuous environment free of the conflict that would compel them to assess the 
foundations upon which they build their lives.207 
Socrates and Glaucon discuss three hypothetical cities, each of which corresponds to one 
of Glaucon’s goods as well as to a component of the individual soul. Beginning from premises 
that should recall Protagoras’ monologue, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus agree that cities 
arise from the common problem that no one is self-sufficient and that we require many things in 
order to survive (369c). The first city is fairly basic, composed of five or six people, and 
                                                 
206 For a similar argument, see Wallach (2001: 217-234).  
 
207 As I show in the next section, some “[training] in suffering” is necessary for the practice of good decision-
making because it compels otherwise just people to critically reflect upon the best course of action in the face of 




designed to maximize individual talents to meet collective needs. The city is small but “healthy,” 
populated with farmers and craftsmen who share their goods and services while eking out modest 
lives for themselves (372a-c). Because all members share their goods in common and pursue the 
same goals, there is no cause for discord and so little reason to discuss justice.208 Glaucon objects 
to this humble arrangement, disparaging it as a “city for swine” (372d). He demands that 
Socrates propose something more conventional (nomīzitai) and allow his citizens to avoid 
hardship with proper couches, dining tables, and delicacies (372d). This second city quickly 
becomes feverish with luxury. As the first city grows it becomes more diverse, resplendent with 
opulent adornments and succulent meals. Where the citizens of the first city shared their goods 
communally, the money-lovers of the second city establish markets and trade (371b). The 
growing city encroaches upon its neighbors, whose denizens have also “surrendered themselves 
to the endless acquisition of money and have overstepped the limit (huberbantes) of their 
necessities” (373d). Satisfying the city’s pleonectic desires and defending its wealth from 
envious counterparts requires professional warriors (374b). So described, it bears more than a 
passing resemblance to their own Athens. 
                                                 
208 Indeed, while there is much talk of moderation in Socrates’ description of the first and second cities, justice is not 
once mentioned. The striking omission suggests that justice only emerges when there is threat of immoderation; that 
is, justice regulates relations among the different parts of the city/soul as each pursues its own conception of the 
good. Where there is no conflict among the virtues, however, there is no need of justice nor, it would seem, of 
politics. The prospect of injustice is only raised in Book 3 when Socrates and Glaucon discuss the proper attributes 
of a guardian-judge: “As for the judge, he does rule other souls with his own soul. And it isn’t possible for a soul to 
be nurtured among vicious souls from childhood, to associate with them, to indulge in every kind of injustice, and 
come through it able to judge other people’s injustice from its own case, as it can diseases of the body. Rather, if it’s 
to be fine and good, and a sound judge of just things, it must itself remain pure and have no experience of bad 
character while it’s young. That’s the reason, indeed, that decent people appear simple and easily deceived by unjust 
ones when they are young. It’s because they have no models in themselves of the evil experiences of the vicious to 
guide their judgments” (409a). This passage offers two important insights into the connection between justice and 
judgment. First, political judgments are generated by comparing a case of disharmony with the model of harmony 
taken from the just individual’s soul. In order to judge effectively, then, one must possess a well-ordered soul. 
Second, we see that justice and judgments are only relevant in the face of potential injustice and viciousness.  
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Purging the second city of its decadence consumes the better parts of Books 2 through 5. 
Its money-lovers are ruled by appetite (to epithumētikon) and protected by guardians who, 
though tempered by moderation (sophrosynē), are principally motivated by honor and aspiration 
(to thumoeides). We learn surprisingly little about the producers and money-lovers beyond the 
fact that some produce goods (370d) while others provide services (371d).209 Plato instead 
directs our attention to the training of the guardian class who will maintain the city’s 
constitution. Socrates suggests that children undergo affective conditioning through music and 
poetry. Along with Glaucon and Adeimantus, he purges all stories that falsely represent the 
“most important things” (talla ta magista) and references to discord among the gods (377c-
378c). Tales that would impart a fear of death are similarly censored (386b), along with 
excessive laughter (387d), and restrictions on sexual desire (390c).210 Echoing Pericles’ edict 
against public morning during his funeral oration, Socrates and his companions even agree to 
“delete the lamentations of famous men, leaving them to women (and not even to good women 
either) and to cowardly men, so that those we say we are training to guard our city will disdain to 
act like that” (388a). Musical censorship extends to the prohibition of multi-stringed instruments 
and “soft modes suitable for drinking-parties,” instead favoring the Dorian and Phyrgian modes 
that invoke courage and discipline (399a-d). At the conclusion of their efforts to purify the 
luxurious city, Glaucon quips that they have gone to such extremes “because we’re being 
moderate” (399e).  
                                                 
209 For one of the few studies of the marketplace, see Weinstein (2009).  
 
210 The final restriction on erotic desire is often considered the most important for the internal stability of the city. 
See, e.g., Nussbaum (1986: 164); cf. Newell (2000: 1-8). By denying these first guardians any capacity for erōs, 
Socrates suggests that they rule in accordance with obedience to the city’s laws. Indeed, obedience emerges as the 
first guardians’ primary civic virtue. This sets them apart from the philosopher-rulers, who are deeply motivated by 
an erotic love, first of knowledge, then of justice in the city. 
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Glaucon’s remark seems strange given the extremes to which Socrates has gone to strip 
the city of the hallmarks of diversity, eros, and tragedy so familiar to extant Athenian life. 
Especially given their later position that moderation by external force, even of enemies, is 
inconsistent with genuine virtue (471a), we might worry that Socrates and Glaucon are in danger 
of violating rules they themselves set for their first guardians.211 Robyn Weiss helpfully reminds 
us that kallipolis “is not Plato’s or Socrates’ ideal city but is intended to be Glaucon’s” (2012: 8). 
While the complete guardians of the second city possess right belief, they are not the 
philosopher-rulers who will oversee the fully formed city ruled by philosophy. Because these 
guardians do not themselves have access to the forms of high-minded courage, generosity, and 
justice – a concept which has not yet been re-introduced in the narrative – they must be 
inculcated as matters of true belief. As Reeve puts it, “primary education gives a person true 
beliefs about the visible manifestations of the virtues and vices…and hence cognitive access to 
their figures; for access to figures is required for reliably true belief about the visible world” 
(2006: 183). I would add that, in addition to giving the guardians access to the principles of 
justice, their primary education is also intended to inculcate them with the virtues of moderation 
from the beginning of their lives without requiring them to experience the tragic suffering 
attendant to pleonexia beforehand. This pedagogic exception is conspicuously absent from the 
training to philosophy developed later in the dialogue.  
The second city needs guardians in order to sustain domestic harmony and temper 
expansionist desires. The guardians’ claim to rule is based on the natural moderation which their 
education is intended to preserve, as well as upon their true beliefs about what constitutes 
communal welfare. Like pedigreed guard dogs, they are excellent judges of what will help and 
                                                 
211 See Frank, (2007: 452). 
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harm the polis, but they are not equipped to devise the standards for how to judge in the first 
place (375e). In short, the guardians described in Books 2 through 5 are trained to implement the 
laws they are given but not to devise any of their own. Still, as even Socrates’ bad joke 
illustrates, Plato understands basic political practice in terms of practical judgments between 
what is good or bad for one’s community. In order to improve upon this already elaborate model, 
he must introduce a superior class of judges – the philosopher-rulers. 
The philosopher-rulers emerge in Book 5 as the first characters motivated by reason (to 
logistikon) and a love of knowledge. Socrates introduces this new class of guardians with some 
apprehension. While Glaucon and Adeimantus might be able to tolerate nude women exercising 
in public (452c-d, 457a-b) and agree that women and children should “belong in common to all 
the men” (457c-d), philosopher-rulership may still seem a bridge too far. Still, Socrates thinks 
that once the philosophers reveal their true natures even the masses will agree that they alone are 
equipped to rule the city “while the rest are naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and follow 
their leader” (474b).212 Several talents recommend them for the post. They are “keen-sighted” 
guardians whose wisdom-loving souls provide a model of “what is most true” to which they can 
make constant reference (484c). They alone possess both sorts of qualities (i.e., intellectual 
acumen and moral courage) necessary for virtuous rulership (485a). Moreover, their love of 
wisdom purifies their souls, harmonizing their appetites with reason while making them naturally 
moderate and especially disdainful of money (485e).213 Their disregard for “human life” is such 
                                                 
212 Aristotle’s concern that the city’s first guardians, henceforth relegated to an auxiliary class, will bristle at such an 
expectation is not unreasonable given empirical experience. But Socrates’ optimism should only underscore the 
radical – one might say rabid – obedience with which these philosopher-dogs will execute the laws demanded of 
justice.  
 
213 This is not to suggest that commerce should be exorcised from the city: “It’s appropriate for others to take 
seriously the things for which money and large expenditures are needed, but not for him” (485e).  
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that they are unmoved by fears of death while their long memories and cognitive capacity grants 
them superior decision-making skills. 
With so many qualities to recommend them, we might wonder why more citizens do not 
come around to Socrates’ way of thinking and compel philosophers to manage their cities. 
Adeimantus points out that while no one would contradict what Socrates says, popular opinion 
nevertheless holds that philosophers are vicious cranks who are, at best, useless to the city (487b-
d). Socrates agrees that philosophers are indeed useless to the city according to its own 
standards, but suggests that the citizens’ skepticism is endemic of their deep discord. He 
illustrates the point with the so-called “ship of fools” simile, according to which the shipowner, 
who “is bigger and stronger than everyone else on board, but hard of hearing, a bit short-sighted, 
and his knowledge of seafaring equally deficient,” struggles with the sailors who “are quarreling 
with one another about steering the ship, each of them thinking that he should be the captain, 
even though he’s never learned the art of navigation, cannot point to anyone who taught it to 
him, or to a time when he learned it” to control this ship (488b-c). They praise anyone who is 
able to drug the ship-owner as a “captain” or “navigator” while dismissing everyone else as 
useless because 
[they] don’t understand that a true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the year, 
the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft…And they don’t believe 
there is any craft that would enable him to determine how he should steer the ship, 
whether the others want him to or not, or any possibility of mastering this alleged craft of 
practicing it at the same time as the craft of navigation. (488d-e) 
Under such circumstances anyone who attended to the genuine matters of navigation would 
appear as a babbler or good-for-nothing. Because they lack within themselves a model against 
which to accurately judge the excellent captain, Socrates does not find it surprising that the 
majority (dēmos) rejects philosophical rule even though embracing it would maximize their 
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welfare. “I don’t think you need to examine the simile in detail to see that the ships resemble 
cities and their attitude to the true philosophers,” he says to Adeimantus, “but you already 
understand what I mean” (489a). Still, the majority’s failure to take advantage of the superior 
wisdom offered by philosophers is blameworthy. For it is not natural for the “captain to beg the 
sailors to be ruled by him,” but is natural for those who are sick to hammer down the doors of the 
doctors who can help them. The problem, of course, is that most people not only fail to recognize 
how sick they are but are also the most adamantly opposed to the treatment that might save their 
lives.214  
 The majority reject philosophy less because they fail to recognize its benefits and more 
because they fail to recognize the very condition from which the philosophers might save them. 
Though false, their beliefs about virtue and happiness are so deeply engrained that any challenge 
strikes them as heresy. They are likewise inclined to praise anyone who confirms their 
worldview as eminently wise, particularly, as we saw in the last chapter, the sophists who defend 
their beliefs against philosophic critique (493a). The assembly’s vulnerability to confirmation 
bias threatens the quality of its democratic deliberation. When Socrates concludes that “the 
majority cannot be philosophic” (494a), he attributes their shortcoming more to this intolerance 
for genuine education than to anything innately lacking in their souls. They are intolerant, not 
stupid.215 This observation is especially important for those who are naturally talented and 
                                                 
214 My interpretation accords with Monoson’s reading. She argues that the parables of the ship and the cave “[link] 
the bad reputation of philosophy to something other than the poor-quality minds of the many. It links it to their 
inexperience and ignorance of justice. The parable casts the people, at least in part, as victims of circumstances, not 
just as hopelessly dumb” (2000: 124).  
 
215 For a similar interpretation but different conclusion, see Bloom, (1991: 392). Whereas Bloom insists that the 
majority’s hostility to philosophy dissuades philosophers from public deliberation, I argue that the majority’s 
potential for wiser action should induce the opposite; that is, it generates a duty among philosophers to educate their 
fellow citizens. The allegory of the cave explicates this point. Andrew (1983: 513). 
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inclined toward philosophy. If, after a lifetime of easy living and praise, a naturally talented 
person is informed by the truly wise that “there’s no understanding in him” and that “it can’t be 
acquired unless he works like a slave to attain it,” he is likely to resist the challenge (494d).216 
And even if such a student is receptive to the shocking news that he is not all that he has been 
told to believe he is, the majority are likely to haul him before the community to “prevent him 
from such persuasion” (494e).  
 Socrates further illustrates popular contempt of philosophy through a now familiar story 
about knowledge, resistance, and, I argue, judgment. He asks Glaucon to imagine human beings 
living in an underground “cave-like dwelling”: 
They’ve been there since childhood, fixed in the same place, with their necks and legs 
fettered, able to see only in front of them, because their bonds prevent them from turning 
their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Also 
behind them, but on higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the fire. 
Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of 
puppeteers above which they show their puppets…Then also imagine that there are 
people along the wall, carrying all kinds of artifacts that project above it – statues of 
people and other animals, made out of stone, wood, and every material. And, as you’d 
expect, some of the carriers are talking, and some are silent. (514a-b) 
This artificial environment is itself filled with artifice. The statuesque figures are artistic 
renderings of actual people and animals. The shadows are cast upon the wall by a flame, an 
artificial light Socrates contrasts with the much brighter sunlight at the opposite end of the 
dwelling. Its enslaved inhabitants are “like us,” mistaking the wavering figures cast before them 
for real people and animals who converse in distorted echoes. Next, Socrates asks Glaucon to 
consider the trauma of sudden release from such bondage: 
When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, 
and look up toward the light, he’d be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things 
whose shadows he’d seen before. What do you think he’d say if we told him that what 
he’d seen before was inconsequential, but that now – because he is a bit closer to the 
things that are and is turned towards things that are more – he sees more correctly? Or, to 
                                                 
216 Socrates’ insistence that even the naturally talented will have to work hard in order to acquire genuine wisdom 
underscores my argument that knowledge and rulership are not necessarily the province of a gifted few but are 
rather earned by those who are humble and willing enough to seek them out.  
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put it another way, if we pointed to each of the things passing by, asked him what each of 
them is, and compelled him to answer, don’t you think he’d be at a loss and that he’d 
believe that the things he saw earlier were truer than the ones he was now being 
shown?...And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t his eyes hurt, 
and wouldn’t he turn around and flee towards the things he’s able to see, believing that 
they’re really clearer than the ones he’s being shown?...And if someone dragged him 
away from there by force, up the rough, steep path, and didn’t let him go until he had 
dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn’t he be pained and irritated at being treated that 
way? (515c-e) 
 
Emerging from the cave is painful. Insofar as it is an account of philosophical education, the 
story helps to explain why an ordinary person “like us” would reasonably resist the Socratic 
elenchus.217 Unlike the natural philosophers, whose internal desires (erōs) for knowledge would 
drive them toward the sun, the randomly chosen prisoner must be compelled to emerge, 
compelled to open his eyes, compelled to gaze into the sun, and compelled to recognize the 
falsity of his own beliefs. Socrates does not dress the experience up as one of immediately 
ecstatic reverie or anything akin to the nirvanic bliss the true philosophers enjoy as they 
contemplate the forms on the Isle of the Blessed. Rather, he says three times that they must 
compel (anagkazó) the prisoner to appreciate the splendor that surrounds him.  
 The allegory of the cave is most obviously intended to contrast the difficultly of 
philosophical education with the milder, but ultimately deceptive, training acquired through 
sophistry. Unlike sophistry, which panders to popular prejudice, philosophical training amounts 
to a confrontation between false belief and truth. Everything about the philosopher changes as a 
result of this process: they reject previous pleasures (e.g. staring at a dimly-lit wall); they pity 
their imprisoned companions; they gain insights into the truth but lose the ability to traverse the 
                                                 
217 This is how Socrates asks us to interpret the story (logos), with the visible realm “likened to the prison dwelling, 
and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun.” Relating the practice of philosophical education to the act 
of dragging a prisoner against his will to a harsh and alien place, Socrates asks Glaucon to see it this way: “In the 
knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has 
seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it 
produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth 
and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it” (517b-c). 
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visible realm (518a). In short, their encounter with the noumenal realm subverts the standards 
against which they would previously have regarded life in the cave a perfectly choice-worthy 
existence.  
This difference in judgment regarding the most important things exposes a tension 
between the philosopher and the cave-dwellers. If the philosopher gains the insights that make 
him a philosopher outside of the cave – that is, apart from society – and loses the desire to return 
to the cave – that is, to the city – to what extent can the philosopher and the cave-dwellers be 
regarded as members of the same community? This difference has lead many, particularly Bloom 
and Strauss, to interpret the allegory as one intended to expose an unbridgeable gulf between 
philosophy and politics. Against these claims, I argue that the Republic not only equips us to 
narrow the apparent division between philosophy and politics, but further does so in an effort to 
make the otherwise ideal theory set forth in the dialogue more practical. In order to develop that 
argument, we must first get clearer on two elements of Socrates’ philosophers, namely, their 
training and their motivations. Attending to these facets of the philosophers’ lives will help to 
reconcile them with political society by amounting to an account of their judgment. 
 The philosophers’ transferrable talents notwithstanding, there is little about their natures 
that lends itself to rulership. Unlike their “blind” counterparts, the guardians, the philosophers 
are best fit for rule because they alone possess the model of psychic harmony – that is, justice – 
within their own souls. Because the many “have no clear model” within themselves of what is 
true, they “cannot establish here on earth conventions about what is fine or just or good, when 
they need to be established, or guard and preserve them, once they have been established” 
(484d). But while such a balanced soul might model happiness or justice, it is not obviously 
practical. After all, natural philosophers are drawn to a specific love of changeless truth, a 
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learning of that which “does not wander around between coming to be and decaying” (485b). 
Insofar as everything in the temporal realm wanders “between coming to be and decaying” – 
which is to say, everything temporal lives – we might worry that anything practical might escape 
their otherwise keen sights. The philosopher is no doubt talented, “by nature good at 
remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, 
courage, and moderation” (487a), but also naïve and easily corrupted by wealth, powerful 
relatives, and especially the people (hoi polloi) themselves (491c-492a).218 Very few survive 
their formative years with their natural talents intact, and these are driven in desperation to 
quiescence, “blameless and content” but hardly fulfilled (496e). In short, the very talents that suit 
them for philosophy also work against their appreciation for the earthly complexities of practical 
governance. 
 Most of those who demonstrate a natural aptitude for philosophy either abandon its study 
too soon or delay it until their later years when they resume it as a leisure activity. Socrates 
blames the neglect of philosophy on its usual method of instruction: rather than regarding 
philosophical practice as a mature activity, most people encounter it early in life and so regard it 
as a childish pastime. Popular disdain for philosophy seems more reasonable in light of this 
explanation, as most of those who pursue philosophy in their later years are either poor 
practitioners or outright charlatans.219 Socrates therefore restructures philosophical pedagogy. 
                                                 
218 The prospects of a democracy properly nurturing such a natural talent are especially dim according to Socrates: 
“for there isn’t now, hasn’t been in the past, nor ever will be in the future anyone with a character so unusual that he 
has been educated to virtue in spite of the contrary education he received from the mob…You should realize that if 
anyone is saved and becomes what he ought to be under our present constitutions, he has been saved – you might 
rightly say – by a divine dispensation” (492e).  
 
219 Callicles summarizes the view succinctly in the Gorgias: “When I see philosophy in a young boy, I approve of it; 
I think it’s appropriate, and consider such a person a liberal one, whereas I consider one who doesn’t engage in 
philosophy illiberal, one who’ll never count himself deserving of any admirable or noble thing. But when I see an 
older man still engaging in philosophy and not giving it up, I think such a man by this time needs a flogging. For, as 
I was just now saying, it’s typical that such a man, even if he’s naturally very well favored, becomes unmanly and 
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When would-be philosophers are young, they should “put their minds to youthful education” and 
“take care of their bodies at a time when they are growing into manhood” (498b). Physical 
training inculcates discipline and equips the student with “a helper for philosophy” in the form of 
a healthy body. “As they grow older,” he continues, “and their souls begin to reach maturity, 
they should increase their mental exercises” (498b). They should continue their philosophical 
pursuits into old age after they have “retired from politics and military service,” a qualification 
that clearly assumes that they would have pursued more conventionally public lives beforehand. 
Though admittedly few people will ever meet the pre-qualifications necessary for such lives, 
Socrates insists that finding them is not impossible, and that once their superior talents are 
revealed the majority (hoi polloi) will abandon their misgivings about philosophical rule (500d). 
But Glaucon maintains his reservations. Just as Socrates explains his alternative with growing 
enthusiasm, he anticipates even greater resistance from popular opinion. In order to disabuse the 
majority of these reservations, Glaucon challenges Socrates to give a more detailed account of 
how philosophical training improves one’s ability to govern. More specifically, he asks for a 
clearer explanation of their ultimate craft, the dialectic. 
 In order to meet Glaucon’s demand, Socrates declares that they must take up the subject 
of rulers in the kallipolis once more from the beginning. Like the auxiliary guardians, 
philosopher-rulers must demonstrate loyalty to their community in the face of pleasure and pain, 
fear, and adversity. Also as with their auxiliaries, the city should reward its philosopher-rulers 
with honors and praise them when they die. But these honors, so ancillary to motivating the 
auxiliaries, do not turn the proper philosopher to the task of rulership. For unlike their auxiliary 
                                                 
avoids the centers of his city and marketplaces – in which, according to the poet, men attain ‘preeminence’ – and, 
instead, lives the rest of his life in hiding, whispering in a corner with three or four boys, never uttering anything 
liberal, important, or apt” (358c-d). 
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counterparts, philosophers reluctantly govern from a position of knowledge rather than 
habituation (522a). In order to understand the distinction, we must turn to how philosophers 
acquire dialectical skill in the first place. 
 The Divided Line analogy in Book 6 demarcates the boundary between the realms of the 
intelligible (to noēton) and the perceptible. As we saw in the allegory of the cave, any effort to 
discover truth within the perceptible realm is bound to failure; the forms are only accessible in 
the noumenal realm (532b). In order to turn them toward the light, students receive propaedeutic 
training in mathematics as children, first in the form of games and later as more formal study in 
arithmetic and geometry (536d). Late adolescence is occupied with physical education too 
intense for intellectual training (537b) but is followed two years later with a ten-year curriculum 
in advanced mathematical and scientific study (537c). These “synoptic” studies aim to more than 
a technical mastery of mathematical principles; they further aim to inculcate philosophers with a 
“unifying vision” (synopsin) that situates them relative to their community as well as to the form 
of the good.220 Those who excel in these studies and their other civic duties, including warfare, 
are tested and, if approved, pass into formal dialectical training. The training is difficult and 
dangerous, for “those who practice it are filled with lawlessness” (537e). The curriculum’s 
rewards are revelatory but potentially unsettling, rendering it suitable only for a distinct minority. 
 Socrates’ portrayal of dialectical training as a near panacea for the injustices pervading 
extant Greek civic life belies a number of challenges with the procedure itself. For instance, it 
remains unclear how or why dialectics rise above mathematics as the preferred method of 
contemplating the forms. By beginning in the visible realm of diagrams and moving into the 
                                                 
220 As Socrates puts it “The subjects they learned in no particular order as children they must now bring together to 
form a unified vision of their kinship both with one another and with the nature of that which is” (537c). In other 
words, the goal of mathematical training is not mastery of the subject per se, but rather to cultivate the philosopher’s 
capacity to locate him or herself in relation to the community as well as in relation to the truth.  
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realm of pure intellect, training in mathematics prepares the mind for an adequate grasp of the 
forms and inures it to the rigor with which their contemplation demands.221 But there are at least 
two potential problems with this approach. Socrates explains them to Glaucon with respect to the 
Divided Line itself: 
In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced 
to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle (arché anypótheton) 
but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle 
that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the 
previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through 
them….I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize 
the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin 
to these in each of their investigations, as if they knew them. They make these their 
hypotheses and don’t think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves 
or to others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these first principles 
through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement. (510b-c)  
 
The propaedeutic training in mathematics has two potential shortcomings. First, geometers and 
the like develop axioms with the aid of diagrams, a method that supplements, or distracts from, a 
purely cognitive contemplation of the forms.222 Why the use of diagrams is so objectionable 
remains unclear (the entire sketch of the kallipolis is, after all, an imagined but vividly rendered 
sketch of the soul), especially given Socrates’ observation that when geometers “use visible 
figures” to make claims about their proofs “their thought isn’t directed to them but to those other 
things that they are like” (510d-e). In other words, Socrates acknowledges that when Theodorus 
sketches a diagram to illustrate his point that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles, he is speaking of the form of a triangle and not of the one he has just drawn. But the 
second objection is more troubling, namely that mathematicians are unable to account for their 
                                                 
221 See Kahn (1996: 295). 
 
222 Socrates’ discussion of the mathematicians and their reliance on diagrams in the Republic stands in apparent 
contrast with his use of the square in the Meno to explicate the doctrine of anamnesis. See, e.g. Patterson (2007). On 
its empirical interpretation, see, e.g., Ross (1951: 18); cf. Gulley (1954: 194).  
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first principles. Rather than regarding their hypotheses as contingent propositions in need of 
defense – “stepping stones to take off from” (511b) – the geometer is likely to proceed as if their 
first principles were statements of truth. The dialectician, by contrast, not only contemplates the 
forms free from the aid of diagrams but also proceeds with the understanding that their 
hypotheses about the form of the good are subject to refutation, defense, and revision.223 In order 
to count as knowledge of the forms, a hypothesis must pass through a rigorous dialectical test 
akin to the Socratic elenchus that is only possible from the synoptic view adopted by 
philosophical reflection. While the mathematician engages in thought, only the 
philosopher/dialectician enjoys genuine understanding (533d). 
 Dialectical analysis yields the genuine understanding of first principles from which 
philosophers can render their judgments. The level of rigor and training necessary for mastery of 
the science is clearly difficult, but why does Socrates warn that it is also prone to lawlessness and 
danger? Why does it require courage as much as stamina and curiosity? We get a sense of this by 
looking briefly to the Parmenides. Here, a young Socrates investigates a series of hypotheses set 
forth by Zeno. While he begins to articulate a recognizable doctrine of the forms in his critique, 
Socrates is unable to offer a robust theory in the face of Parmenides’ questions.224 He admits that 
whenever he gives the forms serious thought he recoils in fear of absurdity, a reaction 
                                                 
223 Underscoring its importance, Plato has Glaucon summarize Socrates’ position as follows: “I understand, if not 
yet adequately…that you want to distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the so-called 
science, for which their hypotheses are first principles. And although those who study the objects of these sciences 
are forced to do so by means of thought rather than sense perception, still, because they do not go back to a genuine 
first principle, but proceed from hypotheses, you don’t think that they understand them, even though, given such a 
principle, they are intelligible” (511c-d).  
 
224 Socrates is especially overwhelmed by the multiplicity of forms implied in his doctrine and exasperated by 
Parmenides’ suggestion that these “patterns” are virtually unknowable to the human mind because they do not 
belong to our world: “Then the beautiful itself, what it is, cannot be known by us, nor can the good, nor, indeed, can 
any of the things we take to be characters themselves” (134c). This is especially troubling when applied to the gods, 
who possess knowledge of the forms but not, by necessary extension, of their terrestrial manifestations because gods 
are by definition extra-terrestrial (134d).   
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Parmenides attributes to his lack of experience, as well as to the natural limitations of the human 
mind for entertaining such subjects (135d, 133b-c). Socrates portrays the person capable of such 
work in hues of a Republic philosopher: 
Only a very gifted person can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a 
being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be 
able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically 
for himself…Yet on the other hand, Socrates…if someone, having an eye on all the 
difficulties we have just brought up and others of the same sort, won’t allow that there are 
forms for things and won’t mark off a form for each one, he won’t have anywhere to turn 
his thought, since he doesn’t allow that for each thing there is a character that is always 
the same. In this way he will destroy the power of dialectic (dialegesthai) entirely. (135b-
c) 
 
Proving the doctrine of the forms therefore depends upon a mastery of dialectic few are capable 
of attaining. For in order to do so, Parmenides explains that Socrates and his companions will 
need to do more than test a positive hypothesis; they “must also hypothesize, if that same thing is 
not” (136a). Every hypothesis implies a series of naught hypotheses which must also be set 
against each other and tested:  
[Take] as an example this hypothesis that Zeno entertained: if many are, what must the 
consequences be both for the many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to 
the one, and for the one in relation to itself and in relation to the many? And, in turn, on 
the hypothesis, if many are not, you must again examine what the consequences will be 
both for the one and for the many in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. 
And again, in turn, if you hypothesize, if likeness is or if it is not, you must examine what 
the consequences will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized themselves 
and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And the 
same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation and destruction, and to 
being itself and not-being. And, in word, concerning whatever you might ever 
hypothesize as being or as not being or as having any other property, you must examine 
the consequences for the thing you hypothesize in relation to itself and in relation to each 
one of the other, whichever you select, and in relation to several of them and to all of 
them in the same way; and, in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to 
themselves and in relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether 




Parmenides initially refuses to offer a public demonstration for Socrates because he is too 
old and enfeebled to engage with philosophy.225 More than this, Socrates recognizes in the 
Republic that philosophy threatens its practitioner with radical contingencies regarding 
knowledge. Even when truth is uncovered it would appear from this that its status would remain 
in flux. Socrates attempts to guard against the challenge of nihilism. Like his resistance to the 
fluctuations of Protagorean epistemology examined in the last chapter, Socrates commits himself 
to the view that truth statements about the form of the good are not only possible, but that they 
are verified by dialectical testing. In other words, dialectics supply a method of judging 
statements about the good. As in the Theaetetus, we see that applying this method rigorously to a 
particular statement demands a comprehensive understanding, a “synoptic vision,” of how 
various elements are composed and interrelated. Though such practice is difficult, it is no further 
beyond theoretical possibility than the kallipolis itself. 
 The philosophers’ dialectical training inculcates the skills necessary for them to arrive at 
well-reasoned, irrefutable truth-statements about the form of the good. Socrates is explicit that 
such conclusions should reveal themselves to the philosophers over a slow and gradual 
application of dialectics to various theses (539b-d); the form of the good is not a subject to be put 
into the mind like sight into blind eyes.226 After this strenuous “participation in arguments,” by 
which time they are around 36 years old, the philosophers enjoy a vivid view of the form of the 
good. But the philosophers’ education is not yet complete. Instead, Socrates insists that they 
must 
                                                 
225 With this description of dialectic in mind, we see how important a healthy body becomes as a companion to 
philosophy! 
 
226 As if to further distance himself from the eristic practice to which the dialectic was often compared, Socrates 
insists that those who engage in contradictions not do so frivolously: “An older person won’t want to take part in 
such madness. He’ll imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather than 
someone who plays at contradiction for sport” (539c). See Nehamas (1990). 
 238 
 
make them go down (katabibestéos) into the cave again, and compel (anankastéos) them 
to take command (arkein) in matters of war and occupy the other offices suitable for 
young people, so that they won’t be inferior to the others in experience (empiria). But in 
these, too, they must be tested (basanistéos) to see whether they’ll remain steadfast when 
they’re pulled this way and that or shift their ground. (539e)   
 
Only after fifteen years of public service, during which they are tested in practical matters as 
well as in the sciences, will the philosophers finally have been turned toward the light of the 
good.227 Only then are they prepared to put that light into the city and its citizens, ruling and 
educating each in turn when not engaging in philosophy (540b). And only then, having ruled and 
thereby improved the city, will they retire to the Isles of the Blessed. 
 Socrates’ governing requirement has raised controversy among Plato’s interpreters. Many 
insist that compelling the philosophers to return to the cave violates the prior notion that justice 
is intrinsically desirable. Bloom, for example, insists that the philosopher’s liberation from the 
cave leads not only to greater happiness, but also to “a great contempt for the cave, its shadows 
and its inhabitants” (1991: 407). Citing Glaucon’s concern for the philosophers’ happiness 
during their turn at ruling, he argues that compelling the philosophers to govern represents 
“injustice in the fullest sense of the word,” that returning to the cave is “contrary to their good” 
insofar as it forces them to violate the principle of specialization that has so far characterized 
Socratic justice. Moreover, mastering the practical arts necessary for complete rulership distracts 
from their most essential training:  
Only [theoretical] knowledge seems to have the character of an end in itself. But the 
philosopher has nothing to do with the city. The practical virtues can only be justified if 
they are understood to be the means to the theoretical virtues…This disproportion 
between the city and philosophy becomes ever more evident during the presentation of 
the philosophic education. Glaucon and Socrates agree that the studies must serve war 
and thought because these are two essential activities of kings who are philosophers. But 
in the course of the discussion the politically relevant content of the studies progressively 
                                                 




decreases, and finally they are forced to abandon the notion that philosophic studies have 
anything to do with action in the city. (1991: 408)  
Bloom draws from this statement the startling, and influential, conclusion that because 
philosophical rule is not only unwise but also undesirable and unjust, the Republic is actually a 
treatise on the impossibility of a perfectly just politics.228 Others have rightly challenged this 
interpretation. Though I am reluctant to retread that well-worn ground here, my own study of 
political judgment and its relationship to philosophy reveals serious flaws Bloom’s argument. 
Exposing those flaws is an important step in defending my claim that Plato is actually more 
attuned to the practical dimensions of rulership than is often credited. 
 Bloom assumes that philosophers will become so enamored with contemplating the good 
that they will only return to political life on pain of coercion. Unless Socrates and his 
companions compel (anankastéos) them to return to the cave, the philosophers would gladly 
immerse themselves in divine thoughts, considering themselves already among the Isles of the 
Blessed. In Bloom’s view, compelling the philosophers to take up politics means dragging them 
from paradise and back to a stinking pit of vicious skeptics torn by conflict. From this view it is 
easy to see how naturally the philosophers would come to resent their situation – in Bloom’s 
words a “shotgun wedding” – and the people they must rule over. Some have taken issue with 
the way in which Bloom assumes the philosophers will be compelled to return, insisting that they 
                                                 
228 As he puts it, “This was not just any city, but one constructed to meet all the demands of justice. Its impossibility 
demonstrates the impossibility of the actualization of a just regime and hence moderates the moral indignation a man 
might experience at the sight of less-then-perfect regimes. The extreme spirit of reform or revolution loses its 
ground if its end is questionable. If the infinite longing for justice on earth is merely a dream or a prayer, the 
shedding of blood in its name turns from idealism into criminality” (409). How and why Bloom makes the leap from 
ideal philosophy to bloody revolution is unclear; surely there is still some critical advantage to holding extant 
politics in the light of an ideal, if only to see more clearly how lived political experience falls short. Speaking 
specifically of Glaucon and his presumed ambition to rule, Bloom – like Annas and others – concludes that Socrates 
is advocating a political quietism as the only viable alternative to a life steeped in acts of injustice. I disagree. If it 
can instead be shown that philosophy can make politics virtuous, he can instead be shown to advocate a very 
specific kind of political activity.   
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will be persuaded to rule rather than manhandled into office.229 For the most part, however, this 
debate overlooks a crucial point in Plato’s theory of political rule, namely that gaining 
experience is necessary for the philosophers’ education. Why would a thinker so closely 
associated with a purely cognitive ideal of moral theory insist upon experience as the final stage 
of moral education? 
 By compelling them to enlist in the military as well as to assume political rulership, 
Socrates tests philosophers in a crucible of conflict and contradiction. His philosopher-rulers do 
not merely return to the cave but to the city, and it is here that they prove themselves genuine 
philosophers. Though much interesting debate surrounds the nature of their political leadership, 
we should not overlook their military service. What does military service teach them about 
justice or the good? If Frank (2007: 450) is correct in her estimation of the military training 
surveyed in Books 2-5, we might not think very much of it; for in her view, the means of 
inculcating martial virtues are insufficient and indeed contrary to the aims of philosophy. She 
takes particular issue with Michael Kochin’s (1999) suggestion that exposure to combat 
encourages sociability through “a kind of contest of virtue among its soldiers to provide models 
for its education” (1999: 418). I share those reservations as far as they go, but Kochin’s study 
stops at Book 5, well before the philosopher-rulers and their prescribed military service are 
mentioned. I am also sympathetic to Frank’s general observation that martial training is a poor 
prolegomenon to philosophy, but it is worth noting that Socrates never suggests that it would be. 
                                                 
229 William Greene explains the philosopher’s return as an act of self-denying duty: “The liberated prisoner may, he 
must, descend again, however reluctantly, to the Cave in compassion and self-denial” (1958, 214). He defends Plato 
against charges of totalitarianism by emphasizing the philosophers’ expertise and commitment to “the whole,” while 
minimizing its practical qualities: “the Republic is not a handbook of politics for the totalitarian control of society, 
nor a blueprint for a viable state; it is rather a trumpet call to self-discipline (at best), or (at the worst) to conduct, for 
‘the good of the whole’, guided by men of wisdom with no axe to grind” (ibid.). Cf. Cornford (1945: 65); Grube, 
(1974: 172 fn. 3); Wolin (1960: 51-55).   
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Rather, when he takes up the training of the philosophers he approaches it as fresh ground.230 
The training Socrates recommends to the philosophers is unlike anything that has come before in 
the dialogue, apparently adding weight to Bloom’s charge that philosophers would make for such 
hopeless warriors that any suggestion to the contrary must surely be in jest. 
 We are thus left with two questions. First, what could the philosophers gain by leading 
the military; second, what about their philosophical training equips them for such service? 
Approaching these questions requires us to recall how Plato’s characters describe warfare to this 
point in the text, as well as to pay special attention to its evaluative function within the 
philosophers’ training regimen. Polemarchus introduces war as the most urgent venue for justice 
(332e), only to have Socrates complicate the craft of warfare as one that could both aid or 
undermine an army (334a).231 Warfare reappears when Socrates introduces the luxurious city. 
The wealthy city will have to defend itself against the pleonectic envy of neighboring polities 
(373e). Indeed, warfare is so important for the city’s welfare that discussion of cobblers, farmers, 
and the rest of the city’s denizens falls away so that Socrates and Glaucon can turn their full 
attention toward it.232 Warrior-guardians are physically fit and courageous (375a), spirited but 
moderate (375b), and sensitive to the differences between friends and enemies (375c). They are 
honest and abstemious (382a), self-sufficient and thoroughly unerotic (387e, 388e, 390c, 402a). 
                                                 
230 This observation lends weight to Frank’s challenge to the “evolutionary” view of guardian education: the 
philosophers’ education fundamentally departs from that received by their auxiliaries; it does not build upon it. 
 
231 When Polemarchus later agrees to fight as Socrates’ “partner in battle” (336a), he at once gestures toward 
aspirational values like loyalty and camaraderie (philia) while appearing to miss the irony.  
 
232 Though Frank does not mention it, the displacement of all other crafts for the sake of adequately attending to 
warfare lends weight to her instructive analysis.  
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They even shun desert (404d). They are, as Steinberger (1989: 1207) observes, the very 
antitheses of Achilles. They are also the city’s judges.  
The warrior-guardians’ judgeship presents a similar paradox to the one we later encounter 
with the philosopher-rulers. Like their philosophical counterparts, they are reared in isolation 
from the city they protect and cloistered as much as possible from injustice in their youth. Yet 
they must also rule over the city and judge the souls who reside within it.233 Lacking “models 
(paradigmata) in themselves of the evil experiences of the vicious,” Socrates worries that young 
warriors are too easily deceived (euexapátētoi) by the wicked (409a). “Therefore,” he continues, 
“a good judge (agathōn dikastein) must not be a young person but an old one, who has learned 
late in life what wrongdoing (adikīas) is like and who has become aware of it not as something at 
home in his own soul, but as something alien and present in others, someone who, after a long 
time, has recognized that injustice is bad by nature, not from his own experience of it, but 
through knowledge (epistēmē)” (409b). In other words, the warrior-guardians must supplement 
their training with lived experience so that they can accurately judge between good and bad. 
Frank is right to point out that there is nothing philosophical about the clumsy heuristic (i.e., 
familiarity is good; unfamiliarity is bad) that these first guardians rely upon; but we would be 
mistaken to conclude that philosopher-rulers gain nothing from their experience in warfare.  
Like the first guardians, the philosophers must supplement their education with practical 
experience in order to practice judgment well.234 That they gain experience through warfare 
                                                 
233 Glaucon assumes the city will need judges (dikastēs) just as naturally as it would need doctors, suggesting that 
even a well-defended luxurious city is not, like its healthy counterpart, free of injustice (408d). Socrates then equates 
rulership to judging: “As for the judge (dikastēs), he does rule (archē) other souls with his own soul” (409a). 
 
234 Also like their counterparts, the philosophers will “be wary of coming to the craft of judging (dikastikeis)” (410a; 
cf.521b) and must be tested in order verify their excellence (412e; cf. 539e).   
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should not surprise us, as Socrates insists throughout his pedagogical discussion that a guardian 
“must be both a warrior (polemikōs) and a philosopher (philosophōs)” (525b). Indeed it would 
seem striking to the fourth-century Greek way of thinking if a political leader was not also a 
general (strategos).235 Others have overstated the importance of warfare to the training of 
Socrates’ guardians, and Frank is right to complain that there is little in the training of the city’s 
first guardians that would prepare them for political philosophy or independent judgment.236 But 
Frank’s analysis of political judgment in the Republic does not consider warfare in the career of a 
philosopher-ruler, and so does not connect Socrates’ theory of justice to the practice of managing 
conflict.237 Likewise, she does not connect the philosophers’ training in and exposure to conflict 
– in the form of their dialectical training – to the effective, practical management of war. If we 
are right, however, to read the dialogue as a partial reaction to the Peloponnesian War, attending 
to the philosophers’ training in war is as important for understanding the whole of how one 
comes to be a philosopher-ruler as it is to appreciating the Republic’s political salience.  
I contend that the philosopher-rulers must engage in warfare and politics for three 
reasons. First, conflict in war and politics confronts them with opportunities to practice justice by 
way of practical judgment. The synoptic vision acquired from training in dialectic equips them 
not only to cultivate each of the virtues attendant to the tripartite conception of the soul, but also 
                                                 
235 The emergence of the strategos as a model of political leadership in Athens during the late fifth and fourth 
centuries was roughly commensurate with hoplite warfare, a pattern that would seem to confirm Frank’s intuitions 
that Plato is advocating a return to the battlefield traditions abandoned during the Peloponnesian War. See Snodgrass 
(1964: 204).    
 
236 With scant textual evidence and on the basis of an elaborate theory of Plato’s numerology, Leon Craig (1994) 
considers warfare the central element in the philosophers’ training because it is their spiritedness that supplies the 
moral indignation necessary to defend justice. For a thorough critique of Craig and similar views, see Roochnik 
(1997).   
 
237 Frank restricts her survey of the dubious educative benefits of conflict to the description of the auxiliaries’ 
pedagogy. While she offers an instructive critique of the tyrant’s equally poor but comparatively freer approach to 
political judgment, she does not attend to the war-making demands of philosophical rulership.  
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to recognize how best to balance each of these parts within their souls in order to maximize the 
virtue of the whole. Helping an actor to achieve such personal harmony would show the intrinsic 
worth of justice but, as Socrates initially explained to Glaucon in Book 2, would also carry 
instrumental benefits. The same talent for balancing between otherwise disparate demands within 
the soul could be equally applied to the material and political demands of the city. Where there is 
no conflict between these demands, as in Socrates’ healthy “city of swine,” there is no need for 
balance and hence no need for justice. Once their souls have been harmonized, then, the 
philosophers must be compelled to look beyond themselves for further instances of imbalance so 
that they can continue to practice justice by judging how best to reconcile the conflicting 
demands within their city. Because they alone are the only ones able to do so, by dint of their 
synoptic vision (485a-487a, 520b0c), any effort by others to engage in such practice would result 
in a fragile, unjust arrangement vulnerable to stasis.238  
A second reason for compelling philosophers to rule, one more internal to the text, is that 
doing so demonstrates the superiority of Socrates’ theory of justice over the alternatives outlined 
in Book 1, particularly those offered by Polemarchus and Thrasymachus. Recall that Socrates 
dismissed those theories because they could not be shown to render the kinds of decisions that 
maximized the happiness of an entire, complex political body. By withholding justice from 
perceived enemies in war, Polemarchus threatened not only to exacerbate conflict, but also to 
harm those true friends he would presumably like to help. Likewise, Thrasymachus’ theory of 
justice as a virtue that benefitted one part of the city by exploiting the rest could not provide an 
account of genuine happiness. The philosophers’ rationally moderate justice, by contrast, 
                                                 
238 This is perhaps the most commonly cited reason for compelling the philosophers to rule, well supported as it is 
by the text. See, e.g., Steinberger (1993: 104-5); Woodruff (2005). 
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privileges the welfare of the whole over any particular part. With his demand that they 
demonstrate their excellence (arête) in all spheres of life and in the face of all tests, Socrates 
suggests that happiness consistent with justice is more durable, and therefore more choiceworthy, 
than Thrasymachus’ tyrannical alternative. Moreover, by showing how radically dependent the 
philosopher-in-training remains upon the city as he or she cultivates that happiness, Socrates 
returns political rulership to a deeply social activity.  
Finally, by emphasizing the philosophers’ superior performance in war, Socrates extends 
the possibility of applying ethical theory to practical judgments about the conduct of war.239 As I 
argue in Chapter 1, the Athenians were all too prepared to eschew justice as a principal 
consideration during their engagements throughout the Peloponnesian War. There, I argue that 
Thucydides’ Brasidas demonstrates superior practical judgment by attempting to weigh a theory 
of justice – one not unlike that advanced by Polemarchus – against the empirical demands 
generated by conflict. Imperfect in execution as well as in analysis, Brasidas’ considerations for 
justice provided a normative end toward which he could focus his actions. How might Brasidas 
have benefited further from training in philosophy? Socrates gestures toward an answer by 
thrusting philosophy into the fray, rather than by marshalling it to advocate quiescent passivity. 
His philosophers are thus not merely steadfast, but active.   
3.3 Platonic Political Judgment 
 Unlike their counterparts in the Theaetetus, the philosophers of the Republic directly 
participate in politics. They are well equipped to do so. Their dialectical training inculcates 
several qualities Plato found lacking in extant Athenian political life, the most important of 
which is a just disposition. The “synoptic vision” acquired through dialectics enables 
                                                 
239 Though Frank never fully develops this point, I take it as implicit throughout.  
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philosophers to countenance the welfare of the whole rather than privileging any single part. By 
privileging communal over partisan welfare, they are better able to inoculate the polis against the 
spasmodic violence of stasis. Importantly, however, they do not do so at the expense of 
discord.240 As a method of grappling with and reconciling opposing views, dialectics instead 
acclimates philosophers to conflict (hence the potential danger in pursuing their study). Further 
experiences in warfare and governance – both of which are venues of pronounced conflict – 
impart the attention to practical matters necessary for grounding them in the world. In short, the 
philosopher-ruler model demonstrates how, at least theoretically, philosophy and politics 
mutually support one another.  
   The previous section defended a more practical view of the philosopher-rulership model 
than many conventional interpretations of the dialogue permit. By showing how philosophy and 
politics are mutually supportive endeavors, my goal was not to suggest that ethical politics 
requires literal adoption of the philosophical rulership as precisely envisioned for Socrates’ 
kallipolis. Pace John Wallach, I instead suggested that the model of ethical governance 
developed in books 5 and 6 serves both to theorize the intrinsic and instrumental value of justice 
(dikaiosyne) as well as to offer a standard against which extant fourth century regimes could be 
assessed. As Wallach puts it, “One could not analyze the ethics of justice without making 
judgments about the collective exercise of power. One could not judge the conduct of power 
without determining the meaning of justice” (2000: 229). Even if, like Aristotle, we accepted 
Socrates’ proposal as an ideal, we would still find ourselves hard-pressed to enact it. No 
guardians of the kind he describes exist, nor could they without the social conditioning he 
details. Moreover, if we maintain our normative commitments to democratic principles, it 
                                                 
240 Cf. Wallach (2000: 254). 
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remains unclear how studying the kallipolis could help us improve upon collective governance. 
Its elitist paternalism cuts against the very principles of equality that underwrite the entire 
democratic enterprise. If a just regime is one that is overseen by a vanguard of specialists who 
craft legislation without regard for popular input, relying instead upon their knowledge of 
unchanging forms, democracies would appear to stand beyond hope of reform. We are again 
faced with a choice between Popper’s view of Plato the tyrant and Bloom’s vision of Socrates’ 
political quietism. 
 I resist that dichotomy. Like Wallach, I interpret the Republic not as an indictment of 
democracy per se, but rather of fourth century Greek politics. While democratic legitimacy came 
to rest on epistemological claims about the collective wisdom of the dēmos, its origins lay in 
class warfare between the impoverished many and the wealthy few.241 As Aristotle observes in 
the Athenian Politeia, the steady expansion of Athenian influence and democracy were products 
of the dēmos – first under the leadership Solon, who freed the Thetes and hektemoroi from debts 
and granted them positions in the assembly and lawcourts; later of demagogues who variously 
deceived and manipulated the majority – wresting control of the city away from the aristocracy, 
often violently.242 Echoing Thucydides, he laments the deterioration of democratic leadership 
after Pericles, describing the diminished stock of potential leaders as “men who chose to talk the 
biggest and pander the most to the tastes of the majority, with their eyes fixed only on the 
                                                 
241 For Ober (2008), Athenian commercial and military success grew from institutional measures ensuring the 
protection of private property and individual rights as well as from the city’s ability to effectively organize otherwise 
disparate expertise scattered among the citizenry. This instrumental defense of democracy pays less attention to its 
normative qualities. On class tensions and the rise of Athenian democracy, see De Ste. Croix (1981: ch. 3); Ober 
(1989: ch. 5).   
 
242 On the condition of class conflict against which the Solonian reforms were established, see Athenian Politeia 5.1-
2. On the extension of political membership to the Thetes, see 7.5. On the Cleisthenic expansion of the Assembly’s 
control over policymaking, see 21-22. For a summary of the pattern between conflict and reform, see 41.  
 248 
 
interests of the moment” (28.12). With few wise men able to consistently council it, the 
amorphous assembly adopted erratic and often contradictory policies.243 Though marked by 
periods of relative prosperity and stability, the democracy in Syracuse suffered its own 
vacillations between popular rule and tyranny. Diodorus of Sicily reports one such episode in 
which a civil war erupted between followers of a “rash fellow” named Tyndarides and the rest of 
the assembly. “And since this sort of thing kept happening time and again,” he writes, “and there 
were men whose hearts were set on tyranny, the people were led to imitate the Athenians and to 
establish a law very similar to the one they had passed on ostracism” (11.86). They quickly 
abandoned the ostracism measure, however, because too many of the “best citizens” were exiled, 
leaving only the “basest” to foment factional strife (11.87). Lest we think these troubles of 
democracy alone, we should recall Thucydides’ mention of Spartan claims to legitimacy that 
were continually contested by the enslaved helot population. In each case, a pattern of rule by 
force of arms emerges against which Plato’s philosopher-ruler model stands in rational counter-
point. Wallach puts this point nicely: “Relative to what preceded it, Plato’s Republic was unique 
in the way it theorized justice, by dynamically linking logos and ergon and providing both an 
ethical critique of political power and a political conception of ethics.”         
 In Wallach’s view, the Platonic politikē technē rationalizes government by applying the 
practice of philosophical dialectic to political deliberation. Socrates intends his logos of justice to 
serve as an ethical model upon which conflict can be addressed, though never entirely 
                                                 
243 Contra Thucydides, Rhodes speculates that the policy mélange adopted by the assembly was more a product of 
its fluctuating composition rather than its fickleness: “The assembly was perfectly capable of taking one decision at 
one meeting, and then at its next meeting (or even at the same meeting) taking another decision which would 
hamper the carrying-out of the first – not because the mob was fickle…but simply because different proposals 
attracted the support of different collections of men within an unregulated body of voters” (2004: 208).  
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eliminated.244 I am sympathetic to much of this argument, particularly as it relates to the “failure 
of twentieth-century liberal political theory” to “deal with political conflict and tensions” (2001: 
409). Certainly, insofar as the political craft describes an “exercise of power in a collective,” the 
inclusion of philosophy – with its emphasis on humility, reflection, and rational order – provides 
an antidote to the spasmodic violence so pervasive in extant Greek politics, without displacing 
the discord of democratic politics altogether (2001: 221).245 But by restricting the exercise of 
justice to leadership, and by further dividing the polis into “active” and “passive” parts with 
philosopher-rulers occupying the former and the dēmos to the latter (260), Wallach neglects to 
fully extend justice into democratic politics. Where he does, he seeks to cultivate a Platonic 
political disposition among citizens in order to “enlighten” their souls by equalizing educational 
opportunities and exposing students to conflicting ethical arguments.246 These are laudable, if 
admittedly vague, goals intended to enliven public debate and encourage critical reflection 
                                                 
244 That the appetitive part of the soul – the source of pleonexia and injustice – is husbanded by logos in the final 
description of the tripartite model reinforces my own argument that Socrates is not addressing injustice by merely 
eradicating desire but is instead tamed through reasonable discipline (589a-b).  
  
245 I am less sanguine than Wallach on Plato’s continued reliance on the craft analogy in the Republic. Like Irwin 
(1979) and Reeve (2006), I read Book 1 as a refutation of the analogy. Wallach thinks that dialectic, unlike rhetoric, 
necessarily promotes a virtuous mode of political practice that is less susceptible to dualistic perversion: “Such an 
art ultimately aims at the good because of the links between Plato’s views about knowledge, nature, and the ethics of 
states and souls and his theory of justice” (272). Taking the aim of dialectics to be the production of laws, and 
insisting that dialectics are necessarily virtuous, Wallach appears to conflate production (poiēsis) and action (praxis) 
in much the way Aristotle attributes to Socrates. Aristotle distinguishes a product from the action that produced it, 
arguing that a product belongs to a craft (technē) and not an action (praxis), which belongs to a state (hexis) (NE 
1140a2-4, 12-15). While one can act from a virtuous state, a product is not properly judged with respect to the 
motivations that animated the craftsman – hence Aristotle’s rejection of the virtue-craft analogy. As Irwin notes, 
Socrates and Aristotle might be working from different definitions of a craft, but if they are then we are not given 
sufficient explication from Plato (70). Regardless, Wallach does not address that important criticism. While the rest 
of the philosopher’s training instills a just disposition (hexis), we cannot attribute that virtuous disposition to 
dialectics alone, nor can we attribute the passing of just legislation to dialectics alone. As Socrates describes it, the 
philosopher-rulers will pass just legislation because they are already just, but not simply because they practice 
dialectics.     
 
246 Wallach (2001: 429-30). 
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among the citizenry. I understand Plato to gesture toward something more concrete in his 
account of democratic judgment. 
 Athenian democracy rested on formal equality and freedom. Nearly every citizen, 
regardless of competence, could expect his lot to be drawn for a position in the magistracy, as 
well as to be judged by his peers – who were themselves chosen by lot – upon completion of his 
term.247 Offices allocated by lot ranged widely between maintaining oversight of public contracts 
(poletae) and debts to the upkeep of horses, prisons, roads, ships, and corn supplies. Leaving so 
much of the polis’ maintenance to chance – indeed, deliberately rejecting the privilege of 
expertise in such matters – might seem to have exposed Athens to potentially wild variation in 
the quality of state services; yet this pattern also underscores the importance of those matters 
over which the city wanted greater control. All officers connected with military service were 
elected by popular vote in the assembly, as were the Archons, whose candidacy received close 
scrutiny (probouleuma) in the Council of Five-Hundred and in the lawcourts – the members of 
which were also chosen by lot –before they could be voted upon (Ath. Pol. 43.2-3, 44.4, 55). 
Unlike direct policy votes in the assembly, which were frequently attacked as products of bribery 
or manipulation, there are few records of electioneering, leading some to suggest that elections 
were of lesser political importance to fourth century Greeks than to their Roman 
contemporaries.248 It is more likely the case that military matters were of graver existential 
consequence to the city and more urgently demanded specialized skills.249  
                                                 
247 Hansen (1991); Saxonhouse (2006: 24). 
 
248 Taylor (2007: 330). 
 
249 The only formal civil education afforded new citizens focused on military drills, and failing to demonstrate the 
necessary martial skills appears to be the only criterion, apart from age, upon which one could be disqualified from 
suffrage (At. Pol. 42.5).  
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Though Athenian democracy may not have been as direct as previous generations of 
historians thought, the regime nevertheless relied upon the average citizen’s native talents much 
more than many neighboring poleis – let alone contemporary constitutional democracies – for 
conducting civil affairs.250 Much like contemporary democracies, however, the average citizen’s 
exercise of political, as opposed to administrative, power amounted to the casting of votes. By 
403 much of the legislative process was passed from the ecclesia to the nomothetai, which 
debated and crafted legislation that was then submitted to the ecclesia for an up or down vote.251 
Moreover, despite norms of equal and frank speech (isēgoria, parrhēsia), few Athenians directly 
addressed the assembly or lawcourt if they could avoid doing so.252 This is not to suggest that 
Athenian democratic procedures were simply cover for a crypto-oligarchy, but it is to suggest 
that the means by which most citizens exercised political power was through collective 
judgments regarding options set before them.253 Contemporary concerns regarding the rationality 
of voting notwithstanding, casting a ballot was a revolutionary act in fourth century Greece.254 
                                                 
250 Schwartzberg (2004: 311). 
 
251 This procedural innovation was motivated by dissatisfaction with volatility stemming from popular decrees 
(psephismata) previously rendered by the ecclesia, but proposed by powerful politicians, with the force of laws 
(nomoi). Decrees were so frequently made and countermanded in the fifth century that the restored democracy 
sought to insulate the lawmaking process. After the reforms, the ecclesia would vote on whether or not the proposed 
legislation was satisfactory, but would not itself author any laws. See Demosthenes (1935: 20.91, 24.20-3); Harrison 
(1955: 33); MacDowell (1975). The assembly also relied upon the Council of Five-Hundred for an agenda of the 
policies upon which it would vote en masse during meetings. 
 
252 Parrhēsia, unlike isēgoria, might more accurately be translated as “frank speech,” implying an importantly 
critical connotation of addressing someone in power. Even more than isēgoria, parrhēsia captured the principles of 
freedom and equality underpinning democratic legitimacy. See Monoson (2000: 52-3); Foucault (2001: 19); 
Saxonhouse (2006: 94-96); Markovits (2008: 66). As Raaflaub puts it, parrhēsia “describes the chief characteristic 
of the fully entitled citizen; free speech is almost synonymous with citizenship. To be deprived of this right makes 
the citizen slavelike…Only democracy, which guarantees this right in political life, can help the freeman achieve 
full self-realization” (2004: 223).  
 
253 See Ober (1993). 
 
254 On the rationality of voting, see Downs (1957); Hardin (1982); Blais and Young (1999); Ashworth and Bueno de 
Mesquita (2014). Cf. Salkever (1980). 
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Suffrage empowered citizens by recognizing the legitimacy and importance of each person’s 
judgment about the welfare of the community.  
When citizens vote they formalize their political judgments in a way that connects their 
considered views (logoi) about the welfare of a community with the exercise (erga) of political 
power. Though Plato does not directly comment upon voting in the Republic, Socrates and his 
interlocutors do examine judgment in the terms I have just described. Toward the conclusion of 
the dialogue, with the main argument complete, Glaucon and Socrates return to the problem of 
poetry and imitation. They describe three levels of crafts. First, the god, who has knowledge of 
the forms, is the “real maker” of concepts that emerge in nature; second, the craftsman, who has 
right understanding of these concepts, manifests them in tangible world; third, the painter, 
imitates the craftsman, reproduces depictions of tangibles.255 Socrates then maps this tripartite 
division of crafts onto the use of products themselves. “For each thing,” he says, “there are these 
three crafts, one that uses it (krēsomēne), one that makes it (poiēsuson), and one that imitates it 
(mīmesomēne)” (601d). The excellence (arēte) of each craft lies, of course, in its use. Socrates 
therefore privileges the user’s experience with a product as a higher order of knowledge about 
how closely it accords with excellence: 
It’s wholly necessary, therefore, that a user of each thing has most experience of it and 
that he tell a maker which of his products performs well or badly in actual use. A flute-
player, for example, tells a flute-maker about the flutes that respond well in actual 
playing and prescribes what kind of flutes he is to make, while the maker follows his 
instructions…Therefore, a maker – through associating with and having to listen to the 
one who knows – has right opinion about whether something he makes is fine or bad, but 
the one who knows is the user. (601e-602a) 
                                                 
255 Poetry and painting, thrice removed from knowledge of the forms, could make things “appear, but…couldn’t 
make the things themselves as they truly are” (596e). No one, Glaucon agrees, would describe an imitative poet as a 
true maker of beds or houses. Likewise, Socrates replies, should we reject the poets’ professed understanding of 
justice and government, for their leader Homer was no general or statesman (600a).            
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In this largely neglected passage, Socrates arrives at the startling conclusions that while artisans 
may possess theoretical insights into the function and design of their crafts, judgments about 
their quality are made through experience. Once again, theory and practice are brought to bear in 
the service of knowledge. In contrast, the imitator is not only ignorant of crafts but also distorts 
the means by which those who are neither producers nor users of crafts might regard them 
(602c).256 
 Though ostensibly a critique of imitative arts alone, Socrates’ observations about the 
method of judging crafts carry political implications as well. Insofar as rulership is a craft 
capable of both social benefit and corruption, we can consider law its products. In all polities, 
regardless of regime type, the users of laws (i.e. citizens) are better positioned to judge their 
quality than the authors themselves. Thrasymachus failed to recognize this in his earlier 
exchange with Socrates. Were he able to defend the view that laws ought to benefit their authors 
alone, he may have been able to secure the complementary position that rulers are best 
positioned to judge their quality inasmuch as they alone have knowledge of their interests. By 
conceding that crafts are performed for the benefit of others, however, he would also have to 
grant that laws are judged and, in consultation with rulers, improved by citizens.  
  Unlike Thrasymachus’ tyranny or Socrates kallipolis, democracies position all citizens as 
both the authors and users of laws. As such, Socrates’ reflections on the qualifications for 
effective judgment are especially important democratic rule. No other regime was more 
accountable to public judgments than democracy and no other system of government took more 
seriously the legitimacy of those judgments. However, as the depiction of the democratic 
                                                 
256 Socrates targets Homer in this passage but the accusation of deliberate distraction and mystification seems better 
suited to sophists. 
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constitution in Book 8 warns, there is also no other regime more vulnerable to stasis. An 
agglomeration of every type of constitution and personality, the democratic regime maximizes 
individual freedom as “the finest thing it has” (557b-e, 562c). But its citizens selfishly guard 
their freedom, praising only those leaders who assuage it through praise while castigating those 
who would criticize or guide its desires: 
A teacher in such a community is afraid of his students and flatters them, while the 
students despise their teachers or tutors. And, in general, the young imitate their elders 
and compete with them in word and deed, while the old stoop to the level of the young 
and are full of lay and pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of appearing disagreeable 
and authoritarian. (563a) 
The consequence of privileging absolute freedom, even from self-imposed order, is chaos. As 
Thucydides made equally clear in his description of Athenian behavior during the Peloponnesian 
War, democrats eschew the standards of judgment that make possible a reasonable distinction 
between good and bad policy. So pathologically divided, their pursuit of freedom renders leaves 
them vulnerable to tyranny. 
 The foregoing account of justice aims to reconcile democracy’s desire for freedom with 
the need for order. By positing a model of justice that identifies individual happiness with 
communal welfare, Socrates gestures toward a standard of political judgment that can 
accommodate individual difference within a framework of collective prosperity. It would be too 
much to suggest that average citizens engage in the practice of dialectics Plato set out for the 
kallipolis, and further still to suggest that citizens could only vote appropriately by comparing 
extant political life to the form of the good. They can, however, reflect upon the principles of 
justice when casting their votes.  
Recalling Socrates’ claim in the Apology that the excellence (arēte) of a judge lies in 
distinguishing between justice and injustice, we can now realize the practical benefits of political 
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philosophizing. Socrates did not define justice in his defense speech. Perhaps he took it for 
granted that most jurors could give an account of justice, though our study of Book 1 makes that 
doubtful. The Republic does supply such an account, however, in the model of philosophical-
rulership. Like their theoretical counterparts in the kallipolis, democratic rulers (i.e. citizens) can 
rely upon a combination of philosophical reflection and lived experience when making 
judgments about the welfare of their entire community. As crafters of law, they must 
demonstrate right opinion about how to promote the good of the polis; as users of law, they must 
have standards against which to assess their performance as craftsmen. Plato guides that effort by 
turning the dēmos away from questions about material benefit and toward questions about virtue.        
3.4 Conclusion 
The Republic closes with a caveat about inexperienced decision-making. In his version of 
the Myth of Er, Socrates explains that each soul can choose among a variety of possible lives 
which they will pursue in the temporal plane. Sometimes funny, other times pitiful, the decisions 
each soul makes should tell an onlooker quite a lot about its character. The soul of Ajax, we are 
told, chooses the life of a lion, avoiding another human life “because he remembered the 
judgment about the armor” (620a).257 Agamemnon selects the life of an eagle because his 
“sufferings also had made him hate the human race” (620b). Finally, the soul of Odysseus 
chooses the quiet life of a private individual after finding it neglected by the others (620c). Such 
were the contented lives favored by the great figures of tragedy. By contrast, a soul who was 
fresh from heaven and “participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy” opts for the 
apparently dazzling life of a great tyrant: “In his folly and greed he chose it without adequate 
                                                 
257 The great Homeric figure, Ajax went mad after the armor of the fallen Achilles was given to Odysseus rather 
than to himself. After slaughtering a herd of sheep, thinking they were the Greek leaders who betrayed him, Ajax 
committed suicide in shame.     
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examination and didn’t notice that, among other evils, he was fated to eat his own children as a 
part of it” (619c). The difference between this unhappy soul and those who chose better, Socrates 
explains, was largely a product of the latter having been trained in suffering. Recalling the 
miseries of apparently good but ultimately disastrous decisions, their suffering had made them 
more cautious and their judgments more deliberate.   
Concluding a work that devotes so much energy to defending the intrinsic and 
instrumental value of abstract philosophical reasoning with a nod to tragic experience may seem 
strange. Indeed, were we to hold the view that Plato exclusively concentrates on the hyper-
rationalism of which he has been accused, we might find it starkly out of place. However, if I am 
right to argue that political wisdom demands ethical reflection as well as practical experience, his 
depiction of Odysseus begins to make more sense. Were habituation to justice sufficient for the 
pursuit of the good, the new souls from heaven would have no problem choosing happy lives for 
themselves. We instead find that experience, particularly with a tragedy such as that seen in the 
Peloponnesian War, is not only a necessary prolegomenon to philosophy but is, further, a vital 
reminder of the necessity for reflection. By combining ethical reflection with political experience 
in his model of the ideal statesman, Plato gestures toward a paradigm of good judgment. We will 
see his student Aristotle elaborate upon that model in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE WISDOM OF A CERTAIN MULTITUDE 
The preceding chapters highlight practical judgment as a central theme of ancient Greek 
political thought. Though I am not the first to notice its importance, the critical literature 
surrounding Thucydides and Plato tends to feature political judgment less prominently than I 
have treated it here. No such recovery efforts are necessary for Aristotle. If anything, 
contemporary theorists pass too quickly over Thucydides and Plato in their rush to Aristotle as 
“the preeminent ancient theorist of practical judgment.”1 Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom 
(phronēsis) remains especially influential among democratic theorists who locate within it a 
variety of insights into the practice of political decision-making and the tensions that animate it.2 
Unlike Thucydides, who appears to neglect ethical dimensions of political judgment, or Plato, 
whose “hyper-rational” idealism eschews politics for words, Aristotle strikes many as a practical 
thinker whose political science aims toward virtue while remaining sensitive to the vicissitudes 
of political life. Aristotle is a theorist of the possible, not of the ideal. I have tried to show that 
dominant characterizations of Aristotle’s predecessors are largely unfair: Thucydides is more 
concerned with ethics than is commonly recognized and Plato is more attentive to practical 
politics, even in his kallipolis, than we might initially realize. While Aristotle is not uniquely 
concerned with political ethics or practice, then, he is more sympathetic to the prospects of wise 
democratic political judgment than any other thinker I have studied in this dissertation. I turn to 
                                                 
1Thiele (2006: 19).  
2 See, e.g., Arendt (1998 [1953]); MacIntyre (2007 [1981]); Beiner (1983); Sullivan (1986); Barber (1988); Salkever 
(1977, 1990, 1991); Yack (1993); Bickford (1996, 2011); Frank (2005); Garsten (2006, 2013); Galston (2014). Cf. 
Steinberger (1993).  
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his work for insights into how democracies can practice wise judgment by cultivating and 
embracing, rather than by limiting, popular participation.               
Though I have argued that democrats can look to Thucydides and Plato for models of 
wise judgment, those models are, admittedly, not obviously democratic. Indeed, Thucydides and 
Plato were both roundly critical of Athenian democracy and developed their works largely in 
opposition to the politics of their day.3 They sometimes looked to Sparta’s conservative ethos for 
their examples of healthy politics but rarely to the Athenians’ unadulterated democracy. 
Likewise, the politeia Aristotle describes in the Politics, with its mixed constitution and warrior 
class of citizens, is more like the Spartan constitution than any other regime known to him. Apart 
from their liberal attitudes toward women – a point Thucydides ignored and Plato found 
appealing – Aristotle holds the Spartans in fairly high regard. Yet Aristotle also takes democracy 
seriously as a tolerable, albeit deviant, regime option and offers a more theoretically nuanced 
analysis of popular rule than any we find in his predecessors. More importantly, his prescriptive 
advice for maintaining democratic government, particularly against the tyrannical impulses and 
demagogic manipulation to which he thought it vulnerable, entails expanding and cultivating 
citizenship rather than delegating all political decisions to leaders like Pericles or submitting to 
the radical re-education demanded of Plato’s philosopher-kings. In short, part of Aristotle’s 
political genius lies in his recognition that promoting good character qualities and refining proper 
habits of mind could improve democratic government in the real world.  
Aristotle examines political practice through an account of practical wisdom that is both 
illuminating and puzzling. Readers looking for a clear and simple definition of the virtue might 
                                                 
3 See Ober (1998: 3-10). 
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sympathize with Joseph Dunne when he complains that Aristotle never fully develops one.4 But 
the philosopher’s lack of precision is not a fault of carelessness so much as a limitation of a 
subject that does not admit of precise description. Though I will focus on the treatment of 
phronēsis provided in Nicomachean Ethics VI, it is important to note that Aristotle develops 
other important points about practical judgment throughout his corpus. Doing so encourages his 
audience to see how discrete and apparently disparate subjects are united as practical sciences. 
Taken together, phronēsis emerges as a manifold virtue of thought that also draws upon the kind 
of practical experience, praiseworthy character, and even-keeled emotional temperament we 
expect to find in generally wise people. It is supremely “architectonic” in the sense that it focuses 
the insights of theoretical, practical, and productive sciences on the subject of human happiness 
(NE 1143b21, Rhet. 1366b20-23, Pol. 1282b15-16).5 Finally, like the other examples of practical 
judgment I have examined in this dissertation, phronēsis takes place in the space between the 
universal and the particular, thereby connecting philosophical reflection with political practice.  
Phronēsis provides an especially important thematic connection among the Nicomachean 
Ethics and the Politics, Aristotle’s two major works of practical science.6 Aristotle taught these 
works together as a series of lectures in how to pursue the human good, yet contemporary 
theorists often neglect this connection by treating each text in isolation.7 For example, Jeremy 
                                                 
4 Dunne (1993: 245). Also see Allan (1952: 182-183); Steinberger (1993: 149). 
 
5 References to the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from the Irwin (1999) translation unless otherwise noted. Those 
from the Politics are from Reeve (1998), references to the Metaphysics are from Ross (1984), to the Rhetoric from 
Roberts (1984), and to the Constitution of Athens from Kenyon (1984) unless otherwise noted.  
 
6 The Nicomachean Ethics is a more prescriptive study in individual eudaimonia while the Politics is a 
comparatively empirical work of regime analysis and communal happiness. Irwin (1988: 352-3) helpfully observes 
that Aristotle does not exclude consideration of political life from the Ethics; both texts are concerned with political 
science and the complete human good.  
 
7 On the value of studying the texts together for insights into Aristotle’s dialectical method and its application to 
moral and political thought, see Irwin (1988: 347, 352-354). On the connection between the works as part of a 
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Waldron’s influential investigation of the “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude” (DWM) in 
the Politics, while attentive to some connections in the Nicomachean Ethics, neglects Aristotle’s 
discussion of phronēsis in Book VI.8 Likewise, theorists such as Ronald Beiner and Benjamin 
Barber, who model democratic discourse on the deliberative rationality examined in the Politics, 
often downplay factors like class and upbringing in the Nicomachean Ethics that may limit how 
many people Aristotle thought likely to exercise practical judgment in an inclusive polity.9 Their 
neglect of the Nicomachean Ethics has lead Richard Ruderman to charge Beiner, Barber and 
other so-called “revivalists” with threatening to “undermine political science” by divorcing 
judgment from philosophy.10 According to Ruderman, Aristotle espouses a more rarified vision 
of political judgment than these theorists realize, according to which pre-political philosophical 
                                                 
broader curriculum, see Salkever (2007: 196). Also see Tessitore (1996), Smith (2000); cf. Lord (1981). Though 
Lord disagrees with Tessitore and Smith’s insistence on the esoteric quality of Aristotle’s rhetoric in these works, he 
accepts the widely shared belief that Aristotle’s audience was primarily comprised of men interested more in 
political ambition than philosophical virtue. Gerald Mara (1987) examines the problem of treating each work in 
isolation, focusing especially on discrepancies between the ideal human life devoted to philosophical contemplation 
in Nicomachean Ethics (see, esp. 1177a17-27) with the practically wise man’s commitment to social life in the 
Politics (see, esp. 1324a23-33). Mara argues that Aristotle and Plato are in closer agreement on the role of 
philosophy in public life than many realize, inasmuch as both use the philosophical life as a standard against which 
to judge the quality of political life. Stephen Salkever (1977: 407) further suggests that political scientists attend to 
the Aristotelian notion that practical philosophy aspires to change the world rather than to merely understand it. Like 
Aristotle, Salkever also cautions theorists against assuming that practical problems can be resolved through purely 
theoretical means: “Such recognition…places in appropriate perspective an activity which has no foreseeable end.” 
Indeed, he advocates a reading of both texts together as a means of framing the endoxa of the Politics within the 
metaphysical and psychological themes of the Ethics. See Salkever (2007).      
 
8 See Waldron (1995). The DWM is also variously called the “summation argument” or the “accumulation 
argument.” Waldron is not, of course, blind to connections between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. His 
argument draws instructively on Aristotle’s discussion of distributive justice in NE V. Yet given his thesis – i.e. the 
many are better judges of factual and moral questions than the few because their collective judgments, experiences, 
and skill sets encourage deeper reflection – one might expect an extended treatment of NE VI as well.  
9 See Beiner (1983); Barber (1988). Cf. Galston (2014: 16-17). 
 
10 Ruderman’s (1997) critique of contemporary interpretations of Aristotelian political judgment paints thinkers as 
diverse as Stephen Salkever, Sheldon Wolin (1960), William Sullivan (1986), and Alasdair MacIntyre (2007 [1981]) 
with the same brush. Tabachnick (2004) similarly criticizes Gadamer (1975, 1989) and Lyotard (1984) for failing to 
recognize phronēsis as a specialized form of rational deliberation that is not amenable to democratic discourse.   
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principles of virtue not only orient political deliberation but also assess its final outcome.11 
Contra the dominant revivalist interpretation, Ruderman regards any effort to popularize 
Aristotle through appeal to the DWM as sheer anachronism.    
 Ruderman’s critique, if accurate, poses a serious challenge to those who find a 
democratic potential in Aristotelian thought. If only students of the Lyceum are capable of 
phronetic judgment, it does not appear as amenable to popular deliberation as many have 
suggested it could be.12 Though Ruderman’s critique enlivens this debate, I think he 
misinterprets philosophy’s relationship to judgment in at least two ways. First, he equates 
philosophy to theoretical wisdom (theoria), noting that a theoretical conception of “what is best” 
affords those with practical wisdom “critical distance on popular but misguided views.”13 Yet 
Aristotle does not call for any such theoretical wisdom in the passage cited (Pol. 1289a11-12).14 
Indeed, as I explain later, it would be strange for him to do so given his distinction between 
theoretical and practical sciences. Thales and Anaxagoras are wise, he says, but not prudent (NE 
1141b5). Ruderman’s argument that “some transcultural element of theoria will be essential to 
the wise exercise of political judgment” is more appropriate to traditional interpretations of Plato 
                                                 
11 Ruderman (1997: 419); Also see Newell (1991: 192). Ruderman cites Politics 1277a14-6 and 1277b25-6 as 
evidence that Aristotle dissuades most people from cultivating practical judgment.  
  
12 See Pangle (2013: 4).  
 
13 Ruderman (1997: 411). Also see Mara (1989: 393). Cf. Reeve (1992: 82). 
  
14 The passage Ruderman cites instead expands on Aristotle’s comparative approach to regime selection. The 
common misconception to which Aristotle refers here is not the “rigid moralism of the community or regime” 
Ruderman describes but rather the error that all oligarchic and democratic regimes are essentially the same: “It is 
often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. But this is a mistake; and in order to 
avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many 
ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, and which 
are suited to different constitutions” (Pol. 1289a8-12, my emphasis). In short, the lesson we should take from a 




than to Aristotle.15 Second, Ruderman undervalues the importance of popular belief (endoxa) to 
Aristotle’s philosophical method. Aristotle takes seriously the possibility that popular views, 
principally derived from experience, likely contain some element of truth about virtue (NE 
1145b1, Rhet. 1355a14-18).16 We thus find in his work examples of how groups can exercise 
sound political judgment (politikē) even when individual members lack a full share of phronēsis. 
By focusing on the account of individual phronēsis provided in the Nicomachean Ethics to the 
exclusion of hypotheses about popular rule in the Politics, Ruderman ironically repeats the 
interpretive problem he criticizes in others.  
 Though I disagree with Ruderman’s critique, his motivating concern remains worth 
consideration. Many of the contemporary theorists he criticizes have been drawn to Aristotle’s 
model of practical judgment because it empowers the rule of the many (plēthos) as opposed to 
that of the elite (aristos mēn oligos) (Pol. 1281a39-1281b8). Josiah Ober, for instance, draws on 
Aristotle’s “potluck analogy” in Politics III as an epistemic justification for democratic decision-
making.17 “Political decision-making, for Aristotle, was,” he explains, “an epistemic endeavor in 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 See Ross (1995 [1923]: 197-198); Reeve (2012: 158-159). Nussbaum (1986: 246) captures the importance of 
popular belief (endoxa) to Aristotle’s method by way of an analysis of phainomena: “The phainomena present us 
with a confused array, often with direct contradiction. They reflect our disagreements and ambivalences. The first 
step must, therefore, be to bring conflicting opinions to the surface and set them out clearly, marshalling the 
considerations for and against each side, showing clearly how the adoption of a certain position on one issue would 
affect our positions on others.” Nussbaum’s description of Aristotle’s philosophical method is at once Socratic – 
insofar as we premise truth-claims on the basis of non-contradiction – and democratic – insofar as Aristotle believes, 
perhaps more than Socrates, that popular opinions may bear some kernel of truth about virtue. She also connects the 
process to an important point about judgment: “Often our idea of the competent judge is more broadly shared among 
us, and less subject to disagreement, than is our view of the subject matter concerning which this judge is to render a 
verdict. In ethics, for example, we agree more readily about the characteristics of intellect, temper, imagination, and 
experience that a competent judge must have than we do about the particular practical judgment that we expect him 
or her to make” (248). Cf. Reeve (2012: 159). 
 
17 See Ober (2013: 111-112). James Wilson (2011: 263-266) similarly reads the potluck analogy as a commentary 
on political judgment, according to which the multitude judge better than the excellent individual, in part, because 
they are better equipped to listen to multiple sides of a policy argument. Cf. Lindsey (1992).   
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that it was meant to discover the best answers to questions of appropriately-shared concern.”18 
Jill Frank likewise observes that inviting multiple perspectives on a political problem promotes 
individual humility while encouraging greater recognition of the particularities that comprise the 
whole.19 As she puts it, “phronetic judgment is, in the first instance, not a gift of rulers but a 
virtue of the practitioners of fair exchange, citizens and noncitizens alike.”20 These 
interpretations gesture toward a puzzling tension in Aristotle’s work. Though he describes 
phronēsis as a virtue unique to rulership in the Politics, he also suggests, along with Plato 
(Republic 601d-602b), that the users of the laws – that is, the citizens – are best positioned to 
judge them. Thinkers like Ober and Frank follow Waldron in claiming that the many are better 
judges than the excellent few because their diversity of experiences, talents and perspectives lend 
their judgment a measure of epistemic superiority.21 Put simply, a large and diverse assembly has 
a deeper reservoir of potential talent and expertise than a smaller committee of excellent men, 
thus improving its chances of making better political decisions.  
 While I agree that the “potluck” analogy implies a role for popular political judgment in 
Aristotle’s political thought, I depart slightly from the dominant understanding of the mechanism 
at work. Whereas most interpreters think that the judgment of “the many” improves with its 
diversity of experience and expertise, I submit that its superiority comes as well from its 
collective moral intuitions. Condorcet’s jury theorem notwithstanding, Aristotle found good 
                                                 
18 Ober (2013: 105). 
 
19 Frank (2005: 92-94). 
 
20 Frank (2005: 98). 
 
21 See Waldron (1995: 564). 
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reason to suspect the wisdom of popular decisions.22 He was not sanguine on the prospects that a 
more inclusively democratic Athens would make wiser decisions than one directed by the 
Areopagus Council; yet he was not entirely pessimistic either. Under certain circumstances with 
the right combination of laws, institutional arrangements, and civic education, he thought 
popular government was feasible and choiceworthy. But he was also attentive to the many 
challenges that popular politics must confront.  
More than the dubious wisdom of assigning political office by lot, or the even more 
radical practice of paying citizens for jury service, Aristotle was deeply troubled by the problem 
of demagoguery.23 Demagogues threatened to “pervert the judge” by unjustly playing upon 
emotions – e.g., stoking anger, feeding envy, manipulating pity – that warped otherwise straight 
measures of judgment (Rhet. 1354a23-25). Ober succinctly summarizes the problem: “The orator 
                                                 
22 Condorcet’s jury theorem imagines members of a group who share preferences and are faced with a decision 
between two proposals, one of which is “correct” and the other “incorrect.” As membership in the decision-making 
group grows, the probability that the group will make the “correct” decision improves even though individual 
members – each of whom begins with a better than even chance of making the correct decision – do not improve 
their individual decision-making ability – that is, their individual odds of picking the right answer do not improve 
over their initial probability. The upshot is that aggregated choices tend toward the right answers, provided the pool 
of decision-makers is sufficiently large. The Aristotelian roots of Condorcet’s theorem have been widely 
acknowledged (e.g., Estlund, Waldron, Grofman and Feld 1989; Congleton 2007). The theorem has drawn special 
attention from formal theorists interested in group rationality (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1992; Surowiecki 2004). 
Philosophers have looked to it for a model of democratic legitimacy. Epistemic democrats like Estlund (1990, 1998; 
cf. 2008), for instance, insist that that democracy is normatively preferable because, as the theorem suggests, larger 
groups are more likely to make decisions that reflect true beliefs about policies that will improve collective welfare 
than are small committees. Urbinati (2010) rejects these efforts as symptomatic of fundamentally unpolitical 
aspirations within democratic theory; by assuming that all voters share the same preferences, proponents of 
Condorcet-style decision-making procedures remove the discordant deliberative qualities that constitute politics. Cf. 
Ladha (1992), who attempts to show that the theorem’s formal results hold for large groups even when diverse 
preferences are (formally) introduced. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) challenge Estlund’s assumption that citizens 
vote according to sincere beliefs. While their thesis – i.e., individuals do not vote sincerely because doing so cannot 
satisfy the conditions of a Nash equilibrium – is not persuasively reasoned, it does raise the point that some citizens 
vote strategically, thereby challenging the epistemic democrats’ faith in collective choices reflecting genuine 
preferences. List and Goodin (2001) defend the jury theorem on epistemic grounds, showing that it can 
accommodate a plurality of choices. Yet even here, they do not take up the difficult political question of what 
constitutes a “correct” choice. 
     
23 Melissa Lane (2012: 181) notes, along with Ober (1989: 106), that while demagogue is more used as a descriptive 
term than a normative epithet, Aristotle does begin to adopt Plato’s practice of employing it in a more pejorative 
sense in the Politics.  
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who could deceive the people into voting wrongly was a manifest danger to all other citizens.”24 
The Constitution of Athens is less a story of “the many” prying political control from the elite, 
and more a tale of popular opportunists exploiting their influence to consolidate institutions that 
favored them.25 Aristotle recognized “the many” as the source of the demagogue’s power. 
Inculcated with the right habits and exposed to the right way of reasoning, the same group could 
also limit that power. As Susan Bickford puts it, “Unless they are glaucoma-ridden, phronēsis-
wise, the many can share in the exercise of reason with the phronimos as they actively judge his 
character and arguments.”26 I extend Bickford’s argument by positing that Aristotle understood 
the cultivation of popular judgment as a uniquely democratic means of limiting the influence of 
demagoguery. Epistemic benefits aside, popular political judgment about character and 
arguments could serve as a bulwark against demagogic cunning.              
I argue that Aristotle’s model of practical judgment serves as an antidote to the poisonous 
rhetoric of Athenian demagoguery. Understanding that model and its application to popular rule 
is therefore essential for appreciating the democratic sympathies in his work. Aristotelian 
phronēsis is amenable to popular government in part because it eschews the rule-based 
systematization of later thinkers like Kant in favor of more general and open-ended 
considerations of communal welfare. Reason and virtue of character guide his person of practical 
wisdom, the phronimos, but they do not foreclose upon deliberation about what constitutes the 
good and how to achieve it.27 Exercising wise judgment instead demands critical and continuous 
                                                 
24 Ober (1989: 169). M.I. Finley (1962: 4) puts it similarly well with respect Athens: “After the death of Pericles 
Athens fell into the hands of demagogues and was ruined.” 
25 See Chapter 1, fn. 21. 
 
26 Bickford (1996: 419). 
 
27 Deliberating about what constitutes the end and how it is best achieved is not the same as deliberating about the 
end itself. Aristotle takes it for granted that happiness (eudaimonia) is the ultimate end toward which all humans 
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reflection upon happiness (eudaimonia) as the end to which all human action is directed. I 
highlight the phronimos model here as a standard by which citizens can assess the qualities of 
popular leadership.  
This chapter begins with a brief survey of Aristotle’s attitudes toward democracy in the 
Politics and Constitution of Athens. While the Politics contains Aristotle’s theoretical 
understanding of democratic politics, the Constitution of Athens gives insights into how actual 
democratic politics developed in its most visibly Greek form. I emphasize Aristotle’s attention to 
demagoguery as a uniquely democratic threat to political judgment in this section. I then turn to 
the model of phronēsis in the Nicomachean Ethics in order to highlight both its deliberative 
potential and difficult acquisition. The final section returns to the “potluck” analogy in Politics 
III. Here, I review the DWM and show that Aristotle did not favor popular political judgment 
primarily for epistemic benefits, but rather as a gesture of faith in popular virtue as a democratic 
counterweight to the potentially destructive advice of demagoguery.   
4.1 Democracy and the Demagogic Challenge 
 Aristotle pursues two goals in the Politics, both of which are connected to the broader 
project set forth in the Nicomachean Ethics. The first goal is empirical: Aristotle wants to study 
man, a political animal (politikon zōion), in his natural habitat in order to get a clearer view of 
human flourishing and “complete the philosophy of human affairs, as far as we are able” (NE 
                                                 
direct their lives. As he says in the Nicomachean Ethics: “Deliberation concerns what is usually [one way rather than 
another], where the outcome is unclear and the right way to act is undefined. And we enlist partners in deliberation 
on large issue when we distrust our ability to discern [the right answer]. We deliberate not about ends, but about 
what promotes ends. A doctor, for instance, does not deliberate about whether he will cure, or an orator about 
whether he will persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce good order, or any other [expert] about the 
end [that his science aims at]. Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it” 
(1112b9-16). Insofar as eudaimonia is the end of political life, no one rationally deliberates from a position that the 
community ought to implode. Yet eudaimonia is a contested concept that is, within Aristotle’s framework, open to 
deliberation. See Bickford (1996: 29).  
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1181b14-15). His second goal is normative: studying various constitutions will allow us to judge 
them as better or worse depending on how well they promote eudaimonia, and will help us 
identify “which political community is best of all for people who are able to live as ideally as 
possible” (Pol. 1260b27-28). The Nicomachean Ethics concludes with an outline for this project: 
First, then, let us try to review any sound remarks our predecessors have made on 
particular topics. Then let us study the collected political systems, to see from them what 
sorts of things preserve and destroy cities, and political systems of different types; and 
what causes some cities to conduct politics well, and some badly. For when we have 
studied these questions, we will perhaps grasp better what sort of political system is best; 
how each political system should be organized so as to be best; and what habits and laws 
it should follow. (1181b16-24) 
  
As Terrence Irwin observes, Book II of the Politics takes up the first task in this outline by 
examining Plato’s Republic and Laws; Books IV-VI correspond to the second sentence by 
offering an empirical description of various regimes and “practical hints of the sort that might be 
expected from a technician and consultant.”28 Books I and III study the nature of the state, while 
Books VII and VIII develop Aristotle’s ideal state. The Nicomachean Ethics concludes by 
encouraging students to “discuss this, then, starting from the beginning” (1181b24), indicating 
once again the thematic connection between the two works. In short, the Politics is an extension 
of the Nicomachean Ethics.  
The Politics pursues its goals through a comparative methodological approach to regime 
analysis. Aristotle divides constitutions according to a number of empirical criteria – i.e. the size 
of the governing class, the arrangement of institutions, the end (telos) toward which all political 
action is aimed, etc. – as well along normative lines: constitutions that look to the common good 
“turn out…to be correct,” while those that pursue class interests at the expense of the common 
good are deviations (parekbaseis) (Pol. 1279a17-21). Kingship, aristocracy, and the mixed 
                                                 
28 Irwin (1988: 354). 
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regime (politeia) are all similar just insofar as they aim at collective welfare; tyranny, oligarchy, 
and democracy are all deviant just insofar as they maximize the ruling element’s happiness 
without regard for the entire community. Though Aristotle elsewhere shares the Athenian view 
that it is proper for free people to govern themselves, there is nothing normatively laudatory 
about inclusive government itself. Adding selfish or unreflective artisans to otherwise aristocratic 
citizenship roles, for instance, would make the constitution more inclusive but not necessarily 
better – and most likely, quite worse (Pol. 1278a5-12). Good laws are what matter, and Aristotle 
thinks that good laws come from good people.29 Good laws also have a hand in making the 
citizens who observe them good, thus setting a virtuous cycle into motion (NE 1180a1-15).   
Writing legislation is one of the main applications of phronēsis to communal life that 
Aristotle describes in the Politics. As I explain in the next section, Aristotle describes political 
wisdom (politikē) as a subspecies of phronēsis writ large. In order to write laws well, Aristotle 
counsels the would-be politikos to consider which laws are best and which are appropriate for 
each constitution (Pol. 1289a11-13). People are suited to different constitutions on the basis of 
how their society produces rulers and multitudes, and political leaders should remain sensitive to 
this. Kingships are appropriate where societies “naturally [produce] a family that is superior in 
the virtue appropriate to political leadership,” whereas aristocracies are preferable where the 
society produces a multitude (plēthos) capable of being ruled by “people who are qualified to 
lead by their possession of the virtue required for the rule of a statesman” (Pol. 1288a5-13).30 
Aristotle’s mixed-regime, the politeia is only appropriate “when there naturally arises in it a 
                                                 
29 See Cherry (2009: 1410). 
 
30 I elaborate on virtue and leadership in §2. Here, it is important to note that leadership qualification is determined 
by virtue writ large rather than on the basis of property ownership or native intelligence. While such qualifications 
might be necessary, they are not sufficient for the virtue specific to rulership. 
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warrior multitude (plēthos polemikon) capable of ruling and being ruled, under a law which 
distributes offices to the rich on the basis of merit” (Pol. 1288a13-14, also see 1279a38-
1279b3).31 If a mixed regime is superior to a kingship or aristocracy, it is so not because the 
mixed regime is more inclusive per se, but because it fosters virtue among a greater share of the 
population and, in doing so, cultivates the kinds of citizens who are able to rule and be ruled in 
turn.32 Likewise, as P.A. Vander Waerdt observes, Aristotle accepts that an excellent kingship 
might be preferred where such a regime affords more people the leisure time to practice 
philosophy.33  
In order to legislate, the would-be politikos must possess two kinds of wisdom. He must 
first familiarize himself with the variety of known constitutions and be able to identify the 
qualities that make them better or worse given certain assumptions about the people who 
subscribe to them (Pol. 1288b27-29, Rhet. 1360a18-30).34 He must extend that study to a global 
                                                 
31 The “warrior multitude” demonstrates a capacity to lead and be led by right reason. As Wilson (2011: 270) rightly 
observes, however, Aristotle criticizes the Spartan regime for mistaking warrior virtues – a necessary part of civic 
virtue in the mixed regime – with the whole of virtue, as doing so motivates an imperial mindset that is at once 
easily manipulated and difficult to satisfy in peacetime (see esp. Pol. 1279a14-17, 1279b2-4). See Salkever (1990: 
198-199).  
 
32 The process by which one acquires civic virtue is more experiential than cognitive. Would-be rulers learn to rule 
“by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander, or to be a 
general by serving under a general, or under a major or a company commander to learn to occupy the office. Hence 
this too is rightly said, that one cannot rule well without having been ruled” (Pol. 1277b8-13). Aristotle’s martial 
tone when describing political rulership is telling.  
   
33 Vander Waerdt (1985: 252-3) insists that this is only problematic in the case of the best regime, where ostracizing 
excellent individuals violates justice. In most cases, as Kraut (2002: 462) notes, Aristotle “thinks that a city that 
eliminates elites entirely is far superior to one that merely restricts their power by balancing it against the power of 
the people.” 
 
34 The Lyceum’s 158 or so copies of extant Greek constitutions was evidence of how seriously Aristotle took this 
advice. Apart from the Athenian Constitution, the remaining constitutions survive only as fragments that mainly 
record heroic myths associated with the polities they study. Contemporary theorists like Yack (1993: 281-282) have 
assumed that Aristotle could consult these constitutions when writing the Politics. David Toye (1999) challenges 
even that assumption, arguing that the Athenian Constitution was atypically attentive to institutional arrangements 
and empirical evidence of historical development. This is difficult to prove with the surviving fragments. Ober 
(1998: 291) summarizes the view of most historians: “Whether or not the 158 constitutional histories collected by 
students at the Lyceum were available at the time of the writing of the Politics, it is certainly a fair guess that its 
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understanding of his own constitution in order to know how his particular law will contribute to 
its end (telos) (Pol. 1289a20-25).35 Additionally, as noted above, the politikos must acquire 
particular understanding of the people for whom he writes the law, including their history, the 
particular things they desire or wish to avoid, and the best ways to encourage or discourage 
behaviors that do not align with the constitution’s aims.36 In order to bring global and particular 
wisdom to bear on political life, the politikos must combine general ethical insights with his 
experience in actual political life.           
Of the constitutions the politikos will examine, democracies are uniquely concerned with 
freedom. Aristotle divides freedom into two components. “One component of freedom,” he says, 
“is ruling and being ruled in turn. For democratic justice is based on numerical equality, not on 
merit” (Pol. 1317b1-2).37 The poor have more authority than the rich in democratic regimes 
simply because the poor are more numerous than the wealthy. Another component of freedom is 
living as one likes, and from this desire “arises the demand not to be ruled by anyone, or failing 
that, to rule and be ruled in turn” (Pol. 1317b14-15). According to Aristotle, “the many” in a 
democracy do not aspire to living well so much as to living without rules. Likewise, most people 
do not participate in political rule in order to live well, but rather as a grudging concession to 
necessity. This view comports with Aristotle’s account of the way most people define 
                                                 
author knew more about comparative Greek political history than any other member of Athens’ critical community.” 
For further speculation on the authorship of the Athenian Constitution itself, see Rhodes (1981).  
 
35Aristotle distinguishes constitutions – which are general – from laws – which are particular – by describing a 
constitution as the “organization of offices in city-states, the way they are distributed, what element is in authority in 
the constitution, and what the end is of each of the communities” (Pol. 1289a14-17). Laws, by contrast, are written 
with particular behaviors in mind (Pol. 1269a9-11).  
 
36 Ober (1991) notes that class differences would have been especially important for such training.  
 
37 Democracies tend to maximize the number of citizens. No matter the regime type, Aristotle says that the citizen 
“is defined by nothing else so much as by his participation in judgment and office” (Pol. 1275a22). As Reeve notes 
in his translation, the “numerical equality” Aristotle refers to involves equal participation in office – that is, ruling 
and being ruled in turn (Pol. 1261a30-1261b6) – and not on equal property ownership.  
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eudaimonia at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. The vulgar multitude, he says, equate 
happiness with pleasure and so pursue lives of gratification that he considers “completely 
slavish” and most appropriate for cows (NE 1095b16-17). Only men of action are attracted to 
politics, for only they equate eudaimonia with honor (NE 1095b22). By describing the 
paradigmatic case of democracy as one favored by those least fit to rule and be ruled in turn, 
Aristotle appears to hold a dim view of Athenian politics.  
In Politics IV, Aristotle shows how democracy’s two goals – maximizing freedom and 
promoting egalitarian self-rule – are mutually reinforcing. They give shape to the features that all 
democracies share: 
[1] Having all choose officials from all. [2] Having all rule each and each in turn rule all. 
[3] Having all offices, or all that do not require experience or skill, filled by lot. [4] 
Having no property assessment for office, or one as low as possible. [5] Having no office, 
or few besides military ones, held twice or more than a few times by the same person. [6] 
Having all offices or as many as possible be short-term. [7] Having all, or bodies selected 
from all, decide all cases, or most of them, and the ones that are most important and 
involve the most authority, such as those having to do with the inspection of officials, the 
constitution, or private contracts. [8] Having the assembly have authority over everything 
or over all the important things, but having no office with authority over anything or over 
as little as possible…[9] Having pay provided, preferably for everyone, for the assembly, 
courts, and public offices, or failing that, for service in the offices, courts, council, and 
assemblies that are in authority, or for those offices that require their holders to share a 
mess…[10] Furthermore, it is democratic to have no office be permanent; and if such an 
office happens to survive an ancient change, to strip it of its power, at least, and have it 
filled by lot rather than by election. (Pol. 1317b18-1318a2) 
These institutional arrangements maximize freedom in two ways. First, by opening offices to as 
many citizens as possible and compensating them for their service, democracies ensure that all 
citizens have an opportunity to share in power and exercise practical judgment. The assembly’s 
supreme authority over “over everything or over all the important things” enhances this measure 
by ensuring that no single office wields a disproportionate amount of control over the entire city. 
Second, by limiting terms of office, the democratic constitutions presumably restrict the amount 
of power any single individual can formally hold over the city. This feature of democracy is 
 278 
 
especially important for understanding Aristotle’s thoughts on the potential for popular political 
judgment. In the moderate democracies that he prefers, where some offices are reserved for those 
with a necessary degree of relevant experience, citizens elect their leaders from among their own 
ranks, implying that they must also have some idea of what good leadership looks like.   
When Aristotle speaks of democracy in the Nicomachean Ethics (1160b18-21), he 
describes it as a corrupted version of the true constitution (politeia), a distinction that awards it 
the dubious honor of “least vicious” among the deviant constitutions. Indeed, the sharpest 
distinction between democracy and politeia is not that the latter restricts the political role of the 
many (plēthos) more than the former, but rather that Aristotle assumes that the many in a 
democracy will favor policies that promote their class interests over the good of the entire city, 
while those of the more moderate middle-class politeia will aim toward a common good.38 
Democracies become more extreme as class interests exert a stronger influence over the laws of 
the city.39 The first democracy “is said to be most of all based on equality,” for the laws of such a 
city say “that there is equality when the poor enjoy no more superiority than the rich and neither 
is in authority but the two are similar” (Pol. 1291b30-33).40 Other kinds of democracy require 
low property qualifications for political participation (Pol. 1291b38-41), restrict the franchise to 
“uncontested citizens” (Pol. 1291b42; 1292b35-36, 1275b22-26), or, like Athens after 
                                                 
38 On Aristotle’s political understanding of class conflict and institutional measures taken to avoid class-based 
faction, see Ste. Croix (1981: 69-80); Yack (1993: 215-238). 
 
39 For an elaboration of this point and critique of Aristotle’s views on Athens as an example of the most extreme 
form of democracy, see Lintott (1992).  
 
40 By describing this definition of democracy as the “first,” Aristotle does not mean to imply that it is best. The truly 
first or best democracy is the “farming kind” where “the multitude live by cultivating the land and herding flocks” 
(1318b8-15). Here, the multitude is kept busy with the necessary tasks of life and has less time for political 
participation – a point Aristotle finds attractive because it demands that more people hold office for shorter periods 
(1308a18-20) – but also lacks the desire to take others’ property. “Indeed,” he continues, “they find working more 
pleasant than engaging in politics and holding office, where no great profit is to be had from office, since the many 
seek money more than honor” (1318b14-16).  
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Cleisthenes, allow anyone to participate in politics by dint of conventional citizenship (Pol. 
1292a1-2; 1275b34-1276a6).41 Though each of these cases differ in their extension of the 
franchise, they each promote freedom through absolute equality between citizens. Furthermore, 
like all regime types, each form of democracy owes its stability to how well the law (nomos) 
articulates a common end (telos) that citizens with diverse social and economic interests can aim 
toward. Because the rule of law is only weakly felt in “extreme democracies,” these constitutions 
are most susceptible to manipulation and lawlessness. As I explain below, tyrants and 
demagogues expand their power by exacerbating class conflicts and garnering support among the 
poor through the unjust redistribution of wealth. When these practices erode the rule of law to 
the point that the city is riven with class conflict and stasis, Aristotle is reluctant to call them 
cities at all.42  
The rule of law protects cities against popular tyranny and demagoguery. Demagogues do 
not emerge in democracies with strong institutional norms that support the rule of law; they only 
preside where the laws are weak and authority is determined by popularity (Pol. 1292a9-10, 
1308a22-23).43 Aristotle therefore considers democracies that surrender the rule of law to the 
decrees (psēphismata) of popular leaders (dēmagōgoi) sharply deviant, likening them to perverse 
                                                 
41 In the final case, the rule of law is most weakly felt, leading Aristotle to question whether it can rightly be called a 
constitution at all (Pol. 1292a32; compare with the description of tyranny at 1289b1). Barry Strauss (1991) argues 
that Aristotle exaggerates and sometime inaccurately describes Athenian democracy in ways that suggest it was 
more extreme than it actually was. Aristotle distinguishes between people who derive their citizenship from birth 
and those who owe their citizenship to changes in convention, as after a revolution. These are a difficult category 
because there is a chance that that we might confuse those who are “rightly citizens” (e.g. those who have lived in 
the polity under a former regime but were denied citizenship according to more restrictive laws) with those who are 
“false” (e.g. the man foreigners and alien slaves Cleisthenes enrolled as citizens after the expulsion of the tyrants in 
the sixth century). See Simpson (1998: 307).  
 
42 See Kraut (2002: 253, 370-375).  
 
43 As Simpson (1998: 307-309) observes, demagogues are always present within democracies, but are only able to 
rise when (1) there is confusion as to whether the law or the multitude is in charge and (2) they are able to displace 
the city’s “best men.”  
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monarchies, “one person composed of many, since the many are in authority not as individuals, 
but all together,” that aspire to free themselves from lawful control (Pol. 1292a10-17). Such 
collective monarchy distorts democratic principles of equality in the name of freedom: 
A people of this kind, since it is a monarchy, seeks to exercise monarchic rule through 
not being ruled by the law, and becomes a master. The result is that flatterers are held in 
esteem, and that a democracy of this kind is the analog of tyranny among the monarchies. 
That is also why their characters are the same: both act like masters (despotica) toward 
the better people (beltionōn); the decrees of the one are like the edicts of the other; a 
popular leader is either the same as a flatterer (kolax) or analogous. Each of these has 
special power in his own sphere, flatterers with tyrants, popular leaders (dēmagōgoi) with 
a people of this kind. They are responsible for decrees being in authority rather than laws 
because they bring everything before the people. This results in their becoming powerful 
because the people have authority over everything, and popular leaders have it over the 
people’s opinion, since the multitude are persuaded by them. Besides, those who make 
accusations against officials say that the people should decide them. The suggestion is 
gladly accepted, with the result that all offices are destroyed. (Pol. 1292a17-29)  
 
This description bears a striking similarity to the portrait of the potentially wise multitude in 
Book III, who come together “just like a single human being, with many feet, hands, and senses” 
(Pol. 1281b5-6).44 The descriptions are telling because Aristotle, unlike Plato, recognizes that 
cities are generally home to multitudinous families, clans, occupations, and classes that share 
basic beliefs about eudaimonia while maintaining discrete conceptions of their particular 
happiness (Pol. 1290b36-1291a11, 1291b5-15).45 By uniting these varied and discordant groups 
into a single, univocal body, demagogues create a kind of partisan unity that strips them of 
something essential to their constitution. Such a people are at once empowered and powerless: 
empowered in the sense that their collective will overwhelms the force of law that would 
constrain them (hence maximizing collective freedom); powerless in the sense that each is 
enthralled to the very collective will of which they are a part (thereby diminishing individual 
                                                 
44 I attend to the interpretive challenges of this characterization in §3. 
 




freedom). The demagogic potential is clear: it is easier to persuade a single person than it is to 
persuade many, especially when the many hold different views; far easier to persuade the many 
when they think and behave as one. Seen from this vantage point, too much unity, especially of 
the factional sort, can harm a polity. As I argue below, this insight is vital for appreciating two 
further points in Aristotle’s political thought, namely, that people should seek unity toward the 
right ends for the right reasons and, second, that conflictual deliberation can improve civic 
health.   
 Demagogues threaten democracies by encouraging factions to undermine established 
laws, and this likewise hinders the citizenry’s capacity for sound judgment. If citizens are 
supposed to make political judgments by looking to how their constitution frames the telos their 
community should strive toward, then replacing the constitution with disjointed and potentially 
conflicting decrees frustrates that process. General judgments that ought to concern the common 
good come to resemble the particular decisions that jurors make in the lawcourts, and this 
method of decision-making is, as Aristotle notes in the Rhetoric, inappropriate for political 
deliberation in the assembly (Rhet. 1354b12-16). In the Politics, Aristotle especially warns 
democracies against the “wanton behavior of popular leaders” (1304b21) who exacerbate class 
conflict either by unjustly persecuting the wealthy or by egging on the multitude against the elite. 
Indeed, demagoguery is usually the cause of negative constitutional change within democracies: 
For popular leaders sometimes treat the notables unjustly in order to curry favor with the 
people and force them to combine, by redistributing their properties or the income by 
means of public services (leitourgia); and sometimes they bring slanderous accusations 
against the rich so as to be in a position to confiscate their property. (1305a3-5)  
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Aristotle suggests a number of institutional mechanisms that might prevent demagoguery, 
including changes to the ways that public men are elected.46 In general, however, it is incumbent 
upon the people themselves to remain wary demagogic speech and to resist the seduction of 
factional rhetoric. In short, the city’s safety hinges on a populace with the critical capacities 
needed to distinguish between good and bad speech.     
Athens herself provides a case study in how demagoguery works to alter democratic 
constitutions. Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens traces Athenian history from the city’s roots as 
an exploitative oligarchy to a democracy assigning important offices by lot. In Chapter 1, I noted 
that Pericles was largely responsible for these popular changes during his tenure (Ath. Con. §27). 
Yet in Aristotle’s estimation, Pericles governed well while in office, and while his efforts made 
the democracy more extreme, they did not fundamentally alter the city’s constitution. Rather, 
Aristotle seems more concerned with figures like Pisistratus, an “extreme democrat” who came 
to political power during a period in which the city was divided between three competing parties 
of elites.47 In a political stunt to turn the city against his rivals, Pisistratus “wounded himself, and 
by representing that his injuries had been inflicted on him by his political rivals, he persuaded the 
people…to grant him a bodyguard” (§14). Shortly thereafter, he deployed his bodyguard of “club 
bearers” in an assault on the Acropolis and briefly took power. He was deposed, but was 
recruited by his former rival Megacles to return to the city eleven years later “by a very primitive 
and simple-minded device”: 
[Megacles] first spread abroad a rumor that Athena was bringing back Pisistratus, and 
then, having found a woman of great stature and beauty, named Phyë…he dressed her in 
                                                 
46 Lane (2012: 191) notes, however, that oligarchies are also susceptible to demagoguery, suggesting that the 
problem is not rooted in democratic institutions alone.  
 
47 The party of the Shore was led by Megacles and “considered to aim at a moderate form of government;” the party 
of the Plain, led by Lycurgus, was more inclined toward oligarchy; and Pisistratus’ party of the Highlands favored a 
more extreme version of democracy (Ath. Con. §13).   
 283 
 
a garb resembling that of the goddess and brought her into the city with Pisistratus. The 
latter drove in on a chariot with the woman beside him, and the inhabitants of the city, 
struck with awe, received him with adoration. (§14) 
Aristotle praises Pisistratus for his mild tyranny, saying that he was “accustomed to observe the 
laws, without giving himself any exceptional privileges” (§16).48 Yet he set a dangerous 
precedent for future would-be leaders who found themselves at odds with their fellow elites. 
Cleisthenes, “being beaten in the political clubs, called in the people by offering the franchise to 
the masses” (§20), only to find himself ousted when his opponent Cleomenes returned to Attica 
and expelled seven hundred families and nearly dissolved the Council. When Cleonmenes fell 
out of popularity, Cleisthenes returned and, “now that he was the popular leader,” (§21) passed 
sweeping and disruptive changes to the constitution. This pattern repeats itself through the fifth 
and fourth centuries until Aristotle arrives at the extreme democracy of his present day. 
 These episodes capture two themes that are central to Aristotle’s understanding of 
Athenian democracy and the prospects for democratic political judgment. As noted earlier, 
Aristotle is sensitive to how socio-economic divisions can, without wise laws and robust 
institutions to moderate them, factionalize a democracy. The Athenian Constitution narrates that 
process, locating the source of institutional change in the waning fortunes of self-interested elites 
vying for popular approval. To the extent that Athens became an ancient welfare state of sorts, 
we see that her citizens owed their improved financial standing more to factional nobles offering 
them access and bribes than to thoughtful deliberation about how the city ought to share 
leadership and divide her wealth. By encouraging citizens to accept this rent-seeking behavior as 
a norm of political life, the democracy’s public men turned the people’s judgment away from 
considering the collective welfare and toward their own interests. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, 
                                                 
48 Note that tyranos is used neutrally here.  
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these norms inculcated citizens with hedonic rather than virtuous conceptions of choiceworthy 
aims. Moreover, Aristotle’s political history of Athens deflates the soaring Periclean vision of a 
people who naturally practice wise decision-making. Even when they supported leaders like 
moderate leaders who practiced personal restraint while in power, Aristotle suggests that the 
Athenians did so for the wrong reasons. As we shall see in the next section, Aristotle’s notion of 
phronēsis holds citizens to a higher standard: they must not only make the right decisions, but do 
so in the right way and for the right reasons. Believing that a leader should exercise power 
because a tall woman has blessed him or because he will pay jurors for their civic service hardly 
rises to that standard. 
As we have already seen in Thucydides and Plato, the pleasure-seeking and freedom-
loving multitude are vulnerable to what Aristotle describes as a kind of absolute tyranny. Unlike 
lawful monarchs, who rule over willing subjects, absolute monarchies behave as tyrants when 
they rule “in an unaccountable fashion over people who are similar to him or better than him, 
with an eye to his own benefit, not that of the ruled” (Pol. 1295a20-22). In other words, tyrants 
become absolute when they are free from concerns for their subjects as well as from the norms of 
legitimacy that lawful regimes observe. It is the multitude’s shared love of freedom, more than 
its varying intelligence, which makes it prone to tyranny when it comes together as a decision-
making body. This argument resonates with Plato’s critique of democracy in the Republic, which 
depicts the democratic man as a pleasure-seeking dilatant who vacillates between hedonic excess 
and abstention, sometimes going in for physical training and sometimes resigning himself to 
idleness, but never reaching an Aristotelian mean of virtue (561c-e, see also NE 1107a1-4). Not 
for nothing does Plato locate the origin of tyranny in democracy (562a). Though Aristotle 
associates democracy more closely and directly with the ideal mixed regime, we find that the 
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democrat’s love of freedom from law renders him uniquely susceptible to demagogic tyranny. 
Proponents of a more inclusive practice of phronetic judgment must therefore show how a 
freedom loving people can acquire the habits and virtues necessary to meet Aristotle’s standard. 
Doing so first requires us to more clearly understand phronēsis.        
4.2 Practical Wisdom in Nicomachean Ethics VI 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics begins and concludes by defining the aim and scope of 
political science (politikē). Political communities foster a wide array of crafts and sciences, each 
of which aim at particular ends (teloi): medicine aims at health, boatbuilding aims at boats, 
generalship aims at victory, and so forth (NE 1094a8-9). Aristotle classifies crafts and sciences 
according to their subjects of study with some naturally subordinate to others. In warfare, for 
instance, bridle-making is subordinate to horsemanship, while cavalry-oriented horsemanship is 
subordinate to generalship. A natural hierarchy thus emerges among sciences and crafts, in 
which the aims of specialized sciences contribute to the aims of sciences with more general and 
choiceworthy ends (1094a14-16). Subordinate sciences derive their social value from the 
contributions they make to higher, more general ends. Bridle-making and horsemanship are not 
themselves virtuous skills, but they become virtuous by dint of their roles in winning victory. 
Military victory is a likewise dubious goal unless it contributes to the city’s overall welfare. In 
other words, specialized crafts and practical sciences derive their normative value from the 
contributions they make to the general ends of others. Aristotle describes politikē as the “highest 
ruling science” (architectonikōn) because it is responsible for orienting the community’s various 
endeavors toward the all-inclusive end of general flourishing (eudaimonia) (1094a27).49 In order 
                                                 
49 Political science is also eminently prescriptive, legislating “what must be done and what avoided” for the city’s 
sake (1094b6-8). Salkever (1981) draws on this point when he contrasts contemporary empirical social sciences with 
Aristotle’s conception of the field. His argument rests largely on the argument that Aristotelian social science 
engages practitioners in the kinds of value judgments that comprise political life in ways that empiricism does not. 
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to legislate, “to make the citizens good and law-abiding,” the true statesman (politikos) must first 
become a good person himself (1102a8-10). Hence the aim of the Nicomachean Ethics is to 
teach would-be politicians how they might become good.      
Aristotle dedicates Book VI to a study of practical judgment and the puzzles it generates. 
Aristotle observes that human action is motivated by decision (proairesis), which is best 
understood as a “deliberative desire” that we can justify through sound reasoning. He explains 
this more clearly in Book III, 
What we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, we deliberate about and 
[consequently] desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an 
action that is up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of 
deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with our wish. (1113a10-14) 
Phronēsis is a practical science concerned with action. If action is motivated by desire, and 
desire is only correct when it is deliberative, then we need to know more about how we ought to 
deliberate if we are to develop our phronetic judgment. Before examining phronēsis as such, 
however, Aristotle first compares practical sciences and those that are theoretical or productive.  
Theoretical sciences are concerned with subjects whose first principles are fixed by 
nature. Because the first principles of theoretical sciences like mathematics “do not admit of 
being otherwise” (1139a7) we can understood subjects like geometry with a higher degree of 
precision than subjects in the practical sciences, whose first principles change through human 
action or luck (1094b15-17). The different subjects also lend themselves to different methods of 
inquiry: theoretical study involves deductive reasoning or demonstration; practical thinking, 
                                                 
Unlike contemporary political science, Aristotelian political science recommends a method of political judgment 




again, entails deliberation (1140b31).50 Contra Ruderman, we should not, therefore, expect the 
method of political science to yield results that are as precise as those we should expect from 
theoretical sciences (1094b24-30, Met. 995a14-17).51  
Practical wisdom and technē are more closely related because both bodies of knowledge 
are concerned with things that can be otherwise through human influence (1140a1).52 Building a 
house, for instance, engages reason just as the science of carpentry studies “how something that 
admits of being and not being comes to be” (1140a12). They differ, however, inasmuch as 
production (poiēsis) and action (praxis) are different activities. In Dunne’s words, “Techne 
provides the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert in one of the specialized crafts, a person 
who understands the principles (logoi, aitiai) underlying the production of an object or state of 
affairs…Phronesis, on the other hand, characterizes a person who knows how to live well.”53 
Unlike the expert carpenter or shipwright, the phronimos is a generalist concerned with living 
                                                 
50 Theoretical knowledge is typically more difficult because its first principles are “furthest from the senses” (Met. 
982a25) but is also closer to true knowledge because the first principles of the eternal things it studies must also be 
“always most true” (Met. 993a27-30). Theoretical knowledge is also more exact because it has fewer first principles. 
 
51 Garsten (2006) locates a democratic value of Aristotelian political judgment in the limited theoretical aims of 
practical wisdom. Unlike Kant, Aristotle did not think that generalized rules could guide ethical decision-making 
and thus made no effort to articulate such rules. By emphasizing practical judgment as a central practice of 
citizenship, Aristotle “found a way to recognize the importance of sensitivity, nuance, and insight – aspects of moral 
life that rule-based systems of ethics tend to ignore” (115). Citizen judgment is, as he puts it, “defined largely by its 
lawlessness.” The potential for lawlessness raises questions about how citizens can distinguish between better and 
worse arguments as they form their policy decisions and muddies the connection between practical science and 
ethics. While individual ethics might survive without rules, we might expect collective decisions to “stand on firmer 
and more definite grounds,” especially given the problem of sophistic manipulation Aristotle highlights in his 
History of the Athenian Constitution (116). 
 
52 See Reeve (2013: 6). As Martha Nussbaum (1986: 290-291) notes, the connection between the unscientific quality 
of practical deliberation and the distinctly anthropocentric conception of eudaimonia he explores throughout are 
deeply entwined: “the reason why good deliberation is not scientific is that this is not the way this model good judge 
goes about deliberating; and the reason why this judge is normative for correct choices is that his procedures and 
methods, rather than those of a more ‘scientific’ judge, appear the most adequate to the subject matter.”    
 
53 Dunne (1993: 244). 
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well in general. As Aristotle explains in Book II, products and actions are also judged 
differently: 
What is true of crafts is not true of virtues. For the products of a craft determine by their 
own qualities whether they have been produced well; and so it suffices that they have the 
right qualities when they have been produced. But for actions in accord with the virtues 
to be done temperately or justly it does not suffice that they themselves have the right 
qualities. Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he 
must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and 
decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and 
unchanging state. (1105a26-35) 
We might judge a boat in terms of how it fares on rough water, the amount of cargo it can safely 
haul, the speed with which it sails, or even on the beauty of its paint; but no one judges a boat’s 
quality by looking to the character of its builder. Actions are different. When we award soldiers 
with medals for demonstrating courage or praise wealthy donors for funding education, we care 
about the agent’s motives and means. The soldier who stays at his post because he fell asleep 
during an invasion is not braver than the ones who fled; the donor who pledges large sums of 
money that she stole is not more generous than the miser. Character matters for practical 
judgment in ways it does not for productive and theoretical inquiry.54 
Having disentangled practical wisdom from theoretical and productive sciences, Aristotle 
concludes that phronēsis is a rational capacity necessary for promoting eudaimonia. As he puts 
it, practical wisdom “is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about 
things that are good or bad for a human being” (1140b5-9). Politikē emerges as a subspecies of 
phronēsis concerned with actions that affect entire communities, which is then subdivided into 
two further parts: 
                                                 
54 Indeed, Aristotle argues that certain qualities of character derive their virtuous status from their relation to 
practical wisdom. Temperance (sōphrosunē) is a virtue “because we think that it preserves prudence (sōzousan tēn 
phronēsin)” (1140b12) by preventing pain and pleasure from clouding judgments about choiceworthy ends and 
action.  Likewise, phronēsis helps us develop virtuous character traits by helping us to understand why virtues are 
choiceworthy. See also NE 1104b5-20, 1140b25-28. 
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Politics and practical wisdom are the same state (hexis) but their being (einai) is not the 
same. Of the practical wisdom concerned with the city, the architectonic part is 
legislative science (nomothetikē), while the part concerned with particulars has the name 
common to both – ‘politics.’ This part is practical and deliberative, since a decree is 
doable in action, as the last thing. That is why only these people are said to take part in 
politics, since it is only they who do things in just the way handicraftsmen do. (1141b24-
30) 
This is passage is challenging because it seems to suggest that political science and practical 
wisdom are at once unified and discrete. We can explain the distinction between them by looking 
more carefully at their ends. In Reeve’s words, “They are the same state because the abilities, 
skills, and virtues an individual needs to promote his own eudaimonia reliably are the same as 
those that a good ruler of a polis needs.”55 Nevertheless, phronēsis and politikē differ in their 
ends. “Phronēsis is most of all phronēsis when it is concerned with the individual’s own good; 
politics is more concerned with acquiring and preserving eudaimonia for ‘a people and a 
polis’.”56 Marguerite Deslauriers further suggests that they are unified through the virtues more 
generally described as “an underlying disposition in the first case to see what is true, and in the 
second case to want what is good.”57 Understood this way, we see that phronēsis and politikē 
emerge when right decisions are made for reasons that we can reasonably take to be virtuous. 
The passages’ further bifurcation of politikē into a legislative part (nomothetikē) and a 
deliberative part (politikē) also highlights the distinction between making laws and judging 
particular cases. As Kevin Cherry observes, few people are likely to have the “amount or breadth 
of experience and reflection” necessary to acquire politikē in the broad sense, “let alone that 
phronēsis necessary for lawgiving.”58 If a broader multitude is capable of acquiring the traits of 
                                                 
55 Reeve (1992: 76). See Pol. 1277a25-30.  
 
56 Ibid. See NE 1094b7-11. 
 
57 Deslauriers (2002: 120). 
 
58 Cherry (2009: 1410). Also see Lindsay (1991: 505-506).  
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phronēsis, then, it is more likely that they will possess the kind of practical wisdom necessary for 
judging particular matters like specific decrees or the quality of particular candidates. While this 
may seem restrictive, I argue that it is more inclusive – and, indeed optimistic – than the 
depiction of democratic judgment we found in Thucydides or Plato. For here, Aristotle is 
acknowledging that the citizens of a “certain kind of multitude” need not become a community 
of Solons and Pericleses in order practice judgment. Rather, they merely need the wherewithal to 
tell the Solons apart from the Cleons.      
Because political science is concerned with general human happiness within a 
community, political practitioners should train themselves as generalists rather than specialists. 
As Aristotle puts it, “Each person judges rightly what he knows, and is a good judge about that; 
hence the good judge in a given area is the person educated in that area, and the unqualifiedly 
good judge is the person educated in every area” (1095a1-2).We saw in the previous section that 
the politikos should study a variety of constitutions – especially with regard to the principles they 
aim toward – as well as the particular people for whom he legislates. Aristotle’s account of the 
phronimos further underscores the importance of cultivating a desire for “fine and just things,” 
first through habituation (1095b5-10) and later through the development of deliberative desires. 
Taken together, Aristotle’s ideal statesman bears striking similarities to a less godlike version of 
the philosopher-statesman outlined in Plato’s Republic. Like my interpretation of the 
philosopher-statesmen, phronemoi require life experience in order to make sound political 
judgments. “This is why a youth is not a suitable student of political science,” Aristotle says, “for 
he lacks experience of the actions in life, which are the subject and premises of our arguments” 
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(1095a2-4).59 They also learn to reason well. Aristotle cautions that practical wisdom is difficult 
because it is deliberative and deliberation is prone to error “about either the universal or the 
particular” (1142a21). His statesmen do not benefit from access to Plato’s forms, making 
Aristotelian political judgment a decidedly deliberative exercise.60    
 Many proponents of a more democratic Aristotelian political philosophy note the close 
association between phronetic judgment and deliberation. In Book III, Aristotle posits that 
deliberation concerns actions that are both possible and for the sake of other things (1112b31-
1113a1), yet this does not tell us how we might deliberate well. Book VI supplements Book III 
by suggesting that good deliberation “is correctness that accords with what is beneficial, about 
the right thing, in the right way, and at the right time” (1142b26-30). This “correctness” is partly 
supplied through his use of the practical syllogism, according to which a conclusion is correct if 
(1) the major and minor premises are true and (2) the conclusion validly follows them.61 If I want 
to eat a healthy lunch, for example, and I know that (1) light meats are healthy and (2) chicken is 
a light meat, then (3) I ought to eat chicken for lunch when I am hungry. Aristotle notes that 
experience can improve this reasoning by acquainting us with information about particulars: 
[Practical wisdom] must also acquire knowledge of particulars, since it is concerned with 
action and action is about particulars. That is why in other areas also some people who 
lack knowledge but have experience are better in action than others who have knowledge. 
For someone who knows that light meats are digestible and [hence] healthy, but not 
which sorts of meats are light, will not produce health; the one who knows that bird 
meats are light and healthy will be better at producing health. (NE 1141b15-25)62 
                                                 
59 By “youth” (néos), Aristotle does not necessarily mean “young in years” so much as “immature.” (1095a6-8). As 
Irwin (1999: 354) observes, Aristotle likely means anyone under the age of eighteen who has not yet taken their 
ephebic oath and is not, therefore, properly a citizen of the city, though this is unclear.   
 
60 See Bickford (1996: 30). 
 
61 See Miller (1984); Reeve (2013: 130-132). Cf. Hardie (1968: 230, 240-243).  
 
62 This is why the young and immature can be clever, but not practically wise (NE 1095a5-11). 
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This procedure seems to accord with what Aristotle refers to as a “certain sort of correctness in 
deliberation” (orthos…euboulia) (NE 1142b16). Though no amount of familiarity with 
particulars will definitively prove the major premise (i.e. light meats are healthy) this method of 
reasoning nevertheless provides a more rational prescription for action than guesswork, intuition, 
or unfounded belief. Character virtues can also improve deliberation by activating our practical 
intuitions.63 Aristotle notes that, in addition to stumbling upon the right action through false 
inference (NE 1142b24), a base person “will use rational calculation to reach what he proposes to 
see, and so will have deliberated correctly [if that is all it takes], but will have got himself a great 
evil” (NE 1142b19-20). For example, if my goal is to get drunk, I can correctly reason that (1) 
alcohol will make me drunk and (2) red wine is alcoholic, so (3) I ought to drink the wine. 
Because drunkenness satisfies a base pleasure, however, Aristotle would be loath to describe my 
drinking as a phronetic action.64 Again, insofar as character virtues shape our desires and our 
desires inform our goals, good deliberation must accord with the ends that people of good 
character would rationally desire. 
 Aristotle’s distinction between good and bad deliberation becomes clearer when he turns 
to the problem of cleverness (deinon). He prefaces his remarks on cleverness by affirming the 
link between virtue and correct decision-making, saying that a decision’s nobility or baseness is 
a function of the end toward which it aims (1144a8, 20-25). He then clarifies the role of 
cleverness with respect to judgment and deliberation: 
There is a capacity, called cleverness (deinotēta), which is such as to be able to do the 
actions that tend to promote whatever goal is assumed and to attain them. If, then, the 
goal is fine (skopos ē kalos), cleverness is praiseworthy, and if the goal is base, 
                                                 
63 See Schollmeier (1989). 
 
64 Rather, I would have become incontinent (NE 1147a30-1147b1).  
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cleverness is unscrupulousness. That is why both prudent and unscrupulous people are 
called clever.  
Prudence is not cleverness, though it requires this capacity. Prudence, this eye of the soul, 
requires virtue in order to reach its fully developed state, as we have said and as is clear. 
For inferences about actions have a principle, ‘Since the end and the best good is this sort 
of thing’ […] And this [best good] is apparent only to the good person; for vice perverts 
us and produces false views about the principles of actions. Evidently, then, we cannot be 
prudent without being good. (NE 1144a25-1144b1) 
Cleverness is a necessary but insufficient feature of phronēsis. Quickly perceiving a problem and 
correctly formulating a solution is virtuous, provided the end one aims toward is consistent with 
eudaimonia. Aristotle strips deinon of its unsettling connotations – terror, awfulness, 
wonderment, uncanniness – to render a more value-neutral account of cleverness amenable to 
noble strategic decision-making.65 Phronēsis harnesses cleverness, using it to ascertain the best 
means toward a noble end. That end, the major premise of the practical syllogism, is not chosen 
by cleverness, however, but by virtue. As I have argued, other virtues of character combine with 
long-sighted virtues of thought to shape that choice of ends. If stripped of its moderating virtues 
– temperance, justice, etc. – unbridled cleverness may still stumble upon the right goal; yet 
nothing internal to the agent ensures this and truly terrifying consequences may result if a clever 
agent aims at the wrong target. Though not necessarily evil, the clever person is not necessarily 
good, either. As Gadamer puts it, the deinos is “capable of anything.”66 “It is more than 
accidental,” he continues, “that such a person is given a name that also means ‘terrible.’ Nothing 
is so terrible, so uncanny, so appalling, as the exercise of brilliant talents for evil.”67    
*** 
                                                 
65 Compare Sophocles’ anthrōpon deinōteron with Plato’s Protagoras who refers to deinon as skillfulness and 
quick-wittedness (Protagoras 338e, 339a) only to have Socrates reassert its negative connotations (341a-b). 
 





 Reading the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics together further clarifies the differences 
between a genuine politikos and his demagogic counterpart that might assist citizens in 
distinguish between them. In simplest terms, the politikos possesses capacities for phronēsis that 
elude the demagogue. Politikē not only requires an accurate and rational conception of 
communal eudaimonia, but a further degree of intimate familiarity with the particular people 
who live under the laws he writes. He must possess the rational faculties to deliberate well 
among other leaders while demonstrating sufficient foresight to legislate about an uncertain 
future. Aristotle’s offers few examples of people with politikē, and when he does, they are 
typically men like Solon. It is not speaking too poorly of democracies, then, to suggest that 
multitudes of people will not fully share equal capacities of this sort. Happily, they (we) do not 
need to. As I shall explain further in the next section, Aristotle’s “certain multitude,” the kind 
capable of phronetic judgment, can make wise decisions about particulars without full possession 
of politikē. Though dependent upon politikoi to write laws that inculcate them with the proper 
habits, desires, and regard for eudaimonia, the average person in a well ordered polity can, at a 
minimum, distinguish between candidates for public office who will likely benefit their city and 
those who may harm the whole to benefit the part. 
4.3 The Wisdom of a Certain Multitude 
 In Book III, chapter 10 of the Politics, Aristotle takes up the question of who should 
govern a polity. Authority must go to the “either the multitude (plēthos), or the rich, or the decent 
people, or the one who is best of all, or a tyrant” (1281a12), yet all involve difficulties. If the 
majority seize power only to unjustly divide the wealth of the few, then surely that must not be 
right. The same logic applies to the tyrannical and the wealthy, who may abuse the majority in 
the same way. If the decent people rule to the exclusion of everyone else, then they will deny 
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most people the honor of holding office. Again, this logic applies to aristocracies, which will 
only exacerbate the problem by excluding even more people from their share of honor. Even 
those who insist that law (nomos) should have authority rather than people are mistaken. What 
difference does it make, Aristotle asks, if law has authority when it, too, can be oligarchic or 
democratic? Chapters 12 and 13 examine the difficulties of distributing offices among the well-
born, the wealthy, and the free, all of which turn on competing conceptions of justice. Chapter 
11, in a passage made famous by Waldron, turns first to examine the claim that the multitude has 
to legitimate authority. 
 As noted above, Waldron and others argue that Aristotle’s account of the multitude in 
Chapter 11 offers a compelling case for popular phronēsis. Before examining that claim, it is 
worth quoting the relevant passage in full: 
But the view that the multitude rather than the few best people should be in authority 
would seem to be held, and while it involves a problem, it perhaps also involves some 
truth. For the many (to plēthos), who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless 
can, when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not individually 
but collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at 
one person’s expense. For being many, each of them can have some part of virtue (aretē) 
and practical wisdom (phronēsis), and when they come together, the multitude is just like 
a single human being, with many feet, hands, and senses, and so too for their character 
traits (ta ēthē) and wisdom (dianoia). That is why the many are better judges of works of 
music and of the poets. For one of them judges one part, another another, and all of them 
the whole thing.  
The basic hypothesis set forth in this passage is that, while each individual is not as competent a 
judge as the single good man, collective bodies of individuals who unite in collective 
deliberation render better judgments than the good man can on his own. Waldron examines two 
formulations of the DWM that follow from this hypothesis. DWM1 elevates popular decision-
making over kingship, proposing that that people “acting as a body are capable of making better 
decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight, than any individual member of 
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the body, however excellent, is capable of making on his own.”68 DWM2 is a stronger claim that 
privileges the multitude not only over kingship but also over aristocracy: “In considering the 
rival claims of democratic and aristocratic regimes, the appropriate comparison is not between 
the people as a whole and individual aristocrats, but between the people acting as a body, on one 
hand, and an aristocratic subset of them, also acting as a body, on the other hand.” 69 In other 
words, the stronger version of the claim privileges the entire populace working together over any 
subset of those same individuals. Here, Waldron is not claiming that the people are better judges 
than experts, but is rather reminding us that the experts are part of the people. This is the 
formulation that Ober appears to have in mind when he claims that the multitude make better 
political judgments than the expert few. 
 Appealing though it is, there are reasons to be skeptical of Waldron’s reading of this 
passage. The claim that the multitude are epistemically superior to the expert few – i.e. those 
with politikē – appears especially shaky when extended to Aristotle’s understanding of 
democracy. Waldron takes care to note that the DWM only holds for populations that are not 
morally debased or prone to the kind of venal factionalism that marks extreme democracy.70 Yet 
as we saw in Chapter 1, even moderate democracies like Periclean Athens made poor decisions 
about foreign policy matters. Waldron’s example of the Sicilian Expedition, intended as evidence 
of the majority’s ability to notice particular facets of complicated policies that might escape 
experts, does not help his argument: 
The assembly is debating whether to mount an expedition to Sicily: one citizen may be 
familiar with the Sicilian coastline; another with the military capacities of the Sicilians; a 
third with the cost and difficulty of naval expeditions; a fourth with the bitterness of 
                                                 
68 Waldron (1995: 564). 
 
69 Ibid, emphasis in original. 
 
70 Waldron (1995: 565-6). Also see Lintott (1992), Ober (1989: 163-165), Bickford (1996: 33).  
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military failure; a fifth with the dangers to a democratic state of successful military 
conquest; and so on. Between them, pooling their knowledge, they can hope to gain the 
widest possible acquaintance with the pros and cons.71 
This is an attractive portrait of democratic deliberation, yet it could not be further from the actual 
debate Thucydides reported.72 There, the people’s judgment was blinded by their almost erotic 
attachment to the voyage and the pleonectic desires its proponents promised to would fulfill. 
Moreover, as Daniella Cammack has shown in her thoughtful analysis of Waldron’s argument, 
the kinds of decisions Aristotle thought appropriate for collective judgment – particulars like 
elections, audits, and court cases – were not deliberative affairs of the kind imagined in this 
example. In each of these cases, decisions were made “simply by voting, without prior 
discussion.”73 Cammack similarly deflates Waldron’s reading of the “potluck analogy,” noting 
that Aristotle is principally concerned not with the variety of dishes on offer but rather with the 
expense: “the contrast he draws is with a meal ‘from a single purse’ (ek mias dapanēs), not one 
cooked ‘by a single chef.’”74 In her view, Waldron’s focus on the epistemic value of popular 
participation is not only inconsistent with Aristotle’s political thought but also with Greek 
political culture more broadly. Kevin Cherry agrees, arguing that Waldron is inattentive to what 
he takes to be a martial quality in the “certain kind of multitude” Aristotle thinks appropriate for 
the model of depicted in Politics III.75 Like Cammack, he posits that Aristotle intends to alert us 
                                                 
71 Waldron (1995: 567, 571). 
 
72 It should also be remembered that the Sicilian debate occurred during a more tumultuous period in Athenian 
democratic life. 
 
73 Cammack (2013:181), emphasis in original. 
 
74 Cammack (2013: 179). She also points out that the Greek diet was, in any case, limited to “bread, olive oil, garlic, 
figs, and wild greens, with a little cheese, meat, or fish.” It is hard to imagine that a “potluck” would yield an 
especially impressive diversity of dishes from that menu.  
 
75 Cherry (2015). Unlike Cammack, who maintains that Aristotle reserves a measure of phronēsis for members of 
the multitude, Cherry insists that the martial culture of Aristotle’s deliberative multitude cultivates the related 
quality of sunesis.   
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more the qualities of character a virtuous multitude would possess rather than to any distinctive 
epistemic features.  
Though I depart from Waldron’s account of the mechanism at play, I share his view that 
Aristotle was amenable to active and popular political judgment. I have suggested in earlier 
chapters that democrats can look to the models of good judgment described by Thucydides and 
Plato for insights into how they might think differently about decision-making. If we assume, 
like Cammack, that actual citizens rarely engaged in deliberation, then much of that argument is 
rendered moot. Yet if we are to consider Aristotle’s contribution to that broader conversation, we 
should try to get on firmer textual ground rather than speculate about whether or not citizens 
actively deliberated in the assembly. (After all, deliberation can take place outside of formal 
spaces and, in any case, Aristotle suggests that a certain measure of deliberation can occur within 
an individual themselves.) Given the demanding nature of politikē and Aristotle’s reservations 
about democracy discussed in the previous sections, I am sympathetic to Cammack and Cherry’s 
argument that Aristotle is more interested in cultivating certain virtuous qualities of character 
than phronēsis among the many. Nevertheless, I find that they are too dismissive of the broader 
ways in which citizens combine their ethical intuitions with their rational faculties when they 
engage in apparently limited practices of political judgment. These qualities emerge most clearly 
in the people’s selection and assessment of legislators.  
   One casualty of the focus on deliberation within the multitude is the dynamic between 
candidates for office and the voters who select them. Beyond legislation, Aristotle restricts most 
political judgments to particulars – i.e. court cases, official elections and audits, etc. – about 
which the law is not sufficiently detailed to decide (Pol. 1281b25-34, 1282a23-41; Rhet. 
1354b12-16). Though such subjects may appear more pedestrian than philosophical – Aristotle 
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describes these tasks as the “minimum power necessary” (1274a15) –  they are phronetic in the 
sense that they require citizens to differentiate between better and worse advisors according to 
the goals and principles of justice encoded in their constitution. More than other forms of 
government, democracies depend on citizens to select their magistrates from a broad and varied 
field of people with different talents and qualities. As Aristotle’s account of democratic politics 
makes clear, the private ambitions of public men pose the greatest threat to civil order, for it is 
they who are positioned to exploit social and economic tensions for their own gain. In order to 
avoid faction, a people need some manner of distinguishing between prudent advisors and 
demagogues.   
I have already noted several ways in which demagogues differ from politikoi. Whereas 
demagogues pander to a subset of residents, politikoi remain sensitive to the needs and 
dispositions of their entire communities. Possessed of phronēsis, genuine politikoi are also more 
desirous of genuinely eudemonic ends, and their deliberations aim toward a general good rather 
than to the good of a single part within the city. Yet effective demagogues are not stupid; the 
clever speaker might reason just as well as his phronetic counterpart, and has strategic reasons 
for understanding his audience as well. In order to tell them apart, Aristotle encourages us to 
consider extra-rational qualities like reputation and character. As he notes in the Rhetoric, a 
speaker’s character has a material impact on his ability to legislate and persuade: 
Particularly in deliberative oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator’s 
influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to 
entertain the right feelings towards his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves 
should be in just the right frame of mind. (1377b25-30) 
Contra Plato, Aristotle raises the status of rhetoric to a practice which, though not on a level with 
politikē, is consistent with ethics (1355b8-11). He not only finds it likely that the average citizen 
has a “natural instinct” for the distinction between truth and falsehood (1354b15-16, also see 
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1354a27-31) but further argues that citizens are well positioned to judge those who would be 
their leaders. “A man’s neighbors,” he says, “are better judges than people at a distance; his 
associates and fellow-countrymen better than strangers; he contemporaries better than posterity; 
sensible persons better than foolish ones; a large number of people better than a small number” 
(1371a8-13). Proximity and experience are important for grasping particulars, and Aristotle here 
again indicates that such familiarity enhances judgment. The final clause also gestures toward 
Waldron’s argument that a more inclusive polity will make better decisions than one that is more 
restrictive.   
 Though he acknowledges the potential objections to inviting the multitude to elect and 
inspect legislators, Aristotle thinks there are two good reasons for doing so, both of which aim to 
ameliorate the factional conditions that can lead to demagoguery and lawlessness. First, he 
observes that “a state in which a large number of people are excluded from office and are poor 
must of necessity be full of enemies” (Pol. 1281b28-30). By following Solon’s practice of 
including these marginalized groups deliberation and judgment, legislators secure them an active 
role in the polity while preventing them from holding office alone. In this way, they share in the 
practice of politics enough to feel included but are not positioned to make more complicated 
decisions like whether or not to sail on Sicily.76 A second reason for including the people in the 
practice of judgment, already noted above, is that the users of the laws may be specially 
positioned to judge them according to criteria that elude the lawmakers. Here, Aristotle draws on 
a craft analogy that resonates with the handicraft-quality of nomothetikē:  
For example, the maker of a house is not the only one who has some knowledge about it; 
the one who uses it is an even better judge (and the one who uses is the household 
                                                 
76 Even this might be risky, as it seems inappropriate to assign the task of assessing experts to non-experts, an 
observation that recalls Plato’s Theaetetus. 
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manager). A captain, too, judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and a guest, rather than 
the cook, a feast. (Pol. 1282a20-23) 
This is a decidedly more empowering justification for including the many in the judgment of 
officials. For by describing the many as the users of law in this way, Aristotle draws but inverts a 
parallel with the users and producers of flutes in Politics III, Chapter 5. There, in an explanation 
of the architectonic qualities of phronēsis, he described the ruled as the producers of flutes and 
the rulers as the flute players who assess their quality (1277b28-29).  
Taken together, these measures aim to include the majority in political life enough to 
maintain broad consent to the city’s laws but not so much that they transform themselves into a 
factional mob seeking absolute tyranny. By turning the majority’s faculty for judgment toward a 
more general account of the good, Aristotle seeks to increase their share in phronēsis and the 
moderate, noble qualities of character it entails. This is still not the “potluck” of epistemic 
perspectives that Waldron describes, as it restricts the scope and range of most people’s 
judgment to the assessment, rather than production, of legislation. But it is also more 
participatory than Cammack’s critique of the feast analogy implies. One reason for attending a 
potluck is, after all, the enjoyment and sense of belonging that come from contributing to a group 
enterprise. Most importantly, it represents an institutional means by which democracies can 
insulate themselves from their greatest threat, namely, demagogic rhetoric. The demagogue is 
persuasive, in part, because marginalized masses want a share in the governance they feel they 
are entitled to. Aristotle forecloses on that potential by providing a means by which dispossessed 






 My earlier chapters interpreted Thucydides and Plato as sympathetic critics of 
democracy. Both thinkers were concerned with the effects of demagogic or manipulative rhetoric 
on political judgment, yet both distributed blame for bad decisions primarily to the Athenians 
themselves. Cleon and Protagoras harmed the city, but only as much as she allowed them to. 
Accordingly, Thucydides and Plato were interested in ways of improving the people’s political 
judgment. Aristotle is likewise concerned that democratic majorities are, in some cases, too eager 
to accept corrupt reasoning as a basis for decisions about public policy. Yet he is also prepared to 
hold speakers accountable for the bad consequences that follow from their advice. “Rhetoric is 
useful,” he says, “because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to 
prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the 
defect must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly” (Rhet. 
1354b22-24). In one way this is refreshing, as it acknowledges a power disparity between 
speaker and listener that was particularly problematic in a city as addicted to speech as was 
fourth century Athens. In another it is humbling, as it recognizes that the people can only be 
reformed so much by thinker who do not know them. Better to focus on bringing up good leaders 
who emulate Solon more than Cleon in the hopes that they will write good laws for the people 
they know better than Plato could. 
 Yet Aristotle does suggest ways in which democratic institutions can preserve themselves 
and foster better political judgment. Read together, his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics develop 
a nuanced and multi-layered account of decision-making. In its fullest sense, politikē captures 
both the productive and deliberative aspects of lawmaking and assessing. This is a rare quality of 
mind requiring studious attention to particular aspects of a people, their desires, and their 
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problems, as well as a grasp of eudaimonia and the best means of pursuing it. Politikē is but part 
of phronēsis, a broader quality of mind and character shared by many in part but by few in full. 
By developing this gradient of judgment and finding a place for each type within an inclusive 
regime, Aristotle suggests that institutional arrangements can mitigate the worst effects of 
factional speech while preserving the diversity and multiplicity that attend actual political life. In 
this regard, he is unique among the figures discussed in this dissertation. 
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 The three models of better judgment presented in this dissertation – Thucydides’ 
Brasidas, Plato’s philosopher-statesman, and Aristotle’s phronimos – each reflect characteristics 
of their creators. Though Brasidas was a historical figure, Thucydides undoubtedly took liberties 
with his characterization of the Spartan that emphasize his commitments to conventional virtues 
like moderation and justice. Despite his strategic and diplomatic innovations, Brasidas retains 
conservative qualities that are consistent with Thucydides’ polis-centric values. Compared with 
Thucydides’ Brasidas, Plato’s philosopher-statesman is a revolutionary ideal. Replacing 
Brasidas’ conventional conception of justice with an alternative theory of justice as psychic 
harmony predicated on his or her knowledge of the good, Plato’s philosophers set a nearly 
impossible standard of political leadership. Yet by emphasizing the practical and experiential 
aspects of their training as rulers, I have tried to resist their frequent depiction as “hyper-rational” 
and godlike. Finally, Aristotle’s phronimos appears to strike a mean between the Thucydidean 
and Platonic models of judgment. For Aristotle, phronetic judgment is guided by and toward 
virtue but remains aware of practical constraints on action. Like Brasidas, he is a rare figure in 
political life, but he does walk among us; like Plato’s philosophers, he is also able to step outside 
of convention to think critically about virtue.  
 None of these models of judgment is perfect. Brasidas’ allegiance to the truth is 
sometimes dubious and his diplomatic victories vanish soon after his own death. Though largely 
bloodless during his own life, many cities were sacked and people killed because of his Thracian 
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campaign. Likewise, while Socrates insists that his model of the philosopher-rulers is practical, 
his critics are not wrong to point out the remoteness of that possibility. As already noted, even 
Aristotle’s phronimos is a rare political figure. Surely, few in Aristotle’s own day could claim 
Solonian or Periclean status. Acknowledging all of this, I have argued throughout this 
dissertation that, like the kallipolis, these models of judgment do not need to be entirely feasible 
to teach us valuable lessons about decision-making. Rather than ranking these figures and 
arguing in favor of one over the others, then, I highlight the features they share.  
Each of these models privileges virtue, especially justice, as a feature of good judgment. 
While divided by different conceptions of virtue, each found value in framing particular 
decisions within broader ethical contexts that they could reasonably expect others to understand. 
As I observed in the introduction, good judgment does not mean shackling oneself to ethical 
commitments –wise judgment sometimes bends the rules – but it does benefit from aiming 
toward just goals. These models also acknowledge the uncertainty surrounding judgment. We 
rely on judgment when information is scarce or unreliable, when outcomes are not known, and 
when right answers are not obvious. Again, ethical reflection can assist decision-making in the 
face of uncertainty by clarifying the goals one ought to aim for. Finally, each of these models 
depicts judgment as an essentially social and political practice. This is important because it 
clarifies the difference between judgment and prediction. Even a very talented game theorist 
relies on her judgment when, looking down different decision trees, she selects one path among 
many. For the figures studied here, such judgments are normatively better when they take other 
people’s interests into consideration.  
By reading Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle together, I hope to have shown how these 
very different thinkers arrived at broadly similar outlines of good judgment. One reason for their 
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common conclusion is that all three identified similar problems with Athenian decision-making. 
Indeed, all were sensitive to the irony that the Athenians, a people who prided themselves on 
their excellent judgment, were among the worst decision-makers in Greece. I have tried to stress 
throughout this dissertation that their problem with Athens had less to do with her democratic 
constitution and more to do with the goals the city set for herself. In short, these thinkers do not 
necessarily suggest that the solution to poor democratic judgment is to make it less democratic. 
Rather, I have argued that their solution was closer to a suggestion that political decision-makers 
cultivate their capacities for ethical reflection and critical thinking. Importantly, all three thinkers 
suggest that one can improve one’s judgment by practicing judgment.  
*** 
 Though she won the popular vote, Hillary Clinton fell short in her bid for the White 
House. As her supporters have tried to understand how an experienced and qualified, albeit 
disliked, candidate for the presidency lost to a political newcomer whom few consider moral and 
many consider dangerous, we might forgive them for questioning the quality of American 
democratic judgment. Looking abroad to other established democracies, the British decision to 
leave the European Union last summer and the swelling popularity of the National Front in 
France might add to these anxieties. Indeed, one large-scale study finds that fewer than 30 
percent of those who were born after 1980 consider it essential to live in a democracy, while 24 
percent consider democracy a bad way to govern. 1 
One lesson from Thucydides’ History and Plato’s Socratic dialogues is that moments of 
crisis can also provoke overdue reflection. How we decide between competing claims about the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Foa and Mounk (2016). 
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good reveals something of our character, our priorities, and our goals. As Socrates suggests in 
Plato’s Euthyphro, the way we define justice and the good can at once deepen social belonging 
among those who agree and harden differences with those who do not. One potential limitation 
of looking to the Greeks for insights into this process is that the average polis was both smaller 
and more homogeneous than contemporary nation-states. Where class conflict was unlikely, 
fellow citizens could assume a greater deal of background agreement about how virtues were 
defined and pursued than contemporary liberal democrats can. This problem revives questions of 
how we judge the judgment of others.  
I have argued that Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle challenged Athenian judgment on the 
basis that it was both ethically impoverished and politically wrongheaded. I have also suggested 
that their works could serve as a means of articulating those challenges with the aim of 
improving Athenian judgment. They were not especially successful. Yet as I noted at the 
beginning of this dissertation, judging is an unavoidable activity; we cannot avoid it by asking 
others to do so in our place. By encouraging citizens to reflect on the foundations upon which 
their judgments stand, the thinkers I have considered here provide an enduring service to 
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